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General introduction 
 
In 1890, Mary Elisabeth Lease pronounced the following words during a political speech for the Farmer’s 
Alliance in Kansas: 
“Wall Street owns the country. It is no longer a government of the people, by the people, and for the 
people, but a government of Wall Street, by Wall Street, and for Wall Street. The great common people of 
this country are slaves, and monopoly is the master”1 
In July 24th 2017, while this thesis was being written, Senator Elisabeth Warren pronounced the following 
words during the presentation of the Democrat’s new economic agenda document entitled “A Better Deal: 
Cracking Down on Corporate Monopolies”: 
"Americans know this economy is rigged, rigged in favor of billionaires and giant corporations and 
rigged against everyone else. It's not hard to see how this happened. In industry after industry, a handful 
of corporations have seized power in this country" (CNBC, 2017) 
The two speeches are separated by more than a century, yet the resemblances are striking. They both 
represent a reaction to a feeling that was common in turn-of-the-century America and is reemerging 
today: competition is dying as firms’ market power becomes larger by the day. 
Far from being a politically driven machination, the idea that market power is killing competition in the 
United States has been worrying academics, the Federal government and the general public. A few days 
before these lines were written, the popular American satire news show Last Week Tonight with John 
Oliver was devoted to corporate consolidation and the dwindling of competition. The same concern had 
reached the Federal government before it found a voice in mass media. In 2016, the Council of Economic 
Advisers (CEA) wrote in a document entitled “Benefits of competition and indicators of market power” 
that “recent indicators suggest that many industries may be becoming more concentrated, that new firm 
entry is declining, and that some firms are generating returns that are greatly in excess of historical 
standards” (CEA, 2016, p. 14). Academics are also worrying about this phenomenon. In words of the 
‘Nobel Prize’ awarded economist Joseph Stiglitz (2012, p. 44), “some of the most important innovations 
in business in the last three decades have centered not on making the economy more efficient but on how 
better to ensure monopoly power”. 
                                                          
1 Quoted in Zinn (2006, p. 288) 
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There is a sense of déjà-vu in the American society regarding the link between market power and 
competition. As former antitrust official at the Justice Department Allen Grunes put it, “we’re back to a 
little bit of the new Gilded Age”2. According to this view, the United States has experienced a phase of 
monopolization until the 1940s, when severe antitrust enforcement set a hiatus that would have ended by 
the mid-1970s. For the past four decades, just like by the end of the XIXth century, market power would 
have increased to a level that hindered competition. This thesis will be devoted to discussing this assertion 
and its theoretical implications for competition theory by focusing on two recent competitive dynamics: 
competition between and within global value chains and competition between firms of the emergent 
platform capitalism such as Uber and Airbnb that we will define as ‘trust-based algorithmic coordination 
platforms’. 
The research question at the core of this thesis emanates from the confrontation of stylized facts regarding 
the link between competition, market power and firms’ performances. We will present them in the 
following lines before formulating in detail the research question that is at the core of this thesis. 
 
Market power rose in the United States since the 1980s: higher and more unequally 
distributed profits 
 
A recent strand of literature has been showing signs of increasing market power in the United States. In a 
recent article, De Loecker and Eeckhout (2017) used 1950-2014 balance sheet data of American publicly 
traded firms to show how their markups over marginal costs rose from 18% in 1980 to 67% in 2014, as 
shown in Figure 1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
2 Quoted by Dayen (2015). 
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Figure 1: The Evolution of Average Markups (1960 - 2014). Average Markup is weighted by marketshare of 
sales in the sample 
 
Source: De Loecker and Eeckhout (2017, p.9) 
Using an alternative measure of markup, the BLS markup (the inverse of the labor share), Nekarda and 
Ramey (2013) also find a historical rise starting in the 1980s and accelerating in the 2000s. Eggertsonn, 
Robbins and Wold (2018), in turn, estimate mark-ups as the inverse of the share of production not 
accounted for by pure profits. They find an overall increase of a similar magnitude as Nekarda and 
Ramey’s (from 1.1 in 1970 to around 1.2 in 2015) but different dynamics: a steady increase instead of an 
acceleration in the 2000s3. If we measure the share of profits in total value added by corporate business, 
the same historical swing in firms’ profitability can be identified, although it would have started in the 
1990s, as the data from the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis (2017) shows. Duménil and Lévy’s (2011) 
measurement of the long-term evolution of the profit rate in the United States (net domestic product 
minus labor compensation over fixed capital net of depreciation) also shows a recovery since the 1980s, 
although less pronounced. Finally, using corporate post-tax profits as a share of GDP or return on capital 
as indicators of market power, we can also observe a historical rise starting in the 1990s, as shown by the 
Economist in its article entitled “Too much of a good thing” (The Economist, 2016). 
 
We can see that, regardless of the measurement chosen, the literature shows a historical recovery of 
profitability in the American economy since the 1980s/1990s, which indicates an overall larger market 
                                                          
3 It is worth mentioning that the authors calculate four different versions of the mark-up series, “each under different 
assumptions about the risk premium and the relative price of capital; these series all show a similar trend” 
(Eggertsonn, Robbins and Wold, 2018, p. 26) 
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power. Perhaps more interestingly, as the above-mentioned article from The Economist also shows, not 
only has profitability raised in the last decades, but the distribution of profits has been increasingly 
concentrating among fewer firms.  
In this vein, De Loecker and Eeckhout (2017) also show that, since the 1980s, there has been an 
increasingly uneven distribution of mark-ups that can be explained to a great extent by abnormal growths 
in the mark-ups of 10% of the firms. Once again, using alternative indicators of profitability, the results 
remain very similar. Analyzing the evolution of U.S. publicly-traded nonfinancial firms’ return on 
invested capital, Furman and Orszag (2015) also find a large gap of profitability in favor of the 90th 
percentile of firms starting in the mid-1980s and widening in the 2000s, as shown in Figure 2. 
Figure 2: Return on invested capital excluding goodwill, U.S. publicly traded nonfinancial firms
 
Source: Furman and Orszag (2015, p. 10) 
 
… in a context of strong global price competition 
 
Conventionally, competition theory would argue that a long-term increase in market power should be 
followed by increases in prices, which would explain the sharp in profitability since the 1980s/1990s in 
favor of a few firms we have exposed above. The standard definition of market power is precisely “the 
ability of a firm (or group of firms) to raise and maintain price above the level that would prevail under 
competition” (OECD, 1993, p.57). 
Nevertheless, prices have remained stable since the 1980s, and have even shown a slight negative 
tendency after the 2008 crisis, as shown in Figure 3. 
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Figure 3: Evolution of the U.S. consumer price index (CPI), seasonally adjusted, 1979 to 2016 
 
 
Source: own elaboration based on data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics 
 
In this vein, using data of publicly available market shares and price indices for the 1972-2012 period, 
Ganapati (2017) finds that, although American industries have grown more concentrated notably through 
the growth of the very largest firms, the effect on prices has been negligible in the case of manufacturing 
industries (where output did not decrease) and inexistent in the case of non-manufacturing industries, 
where output has even increased. The decreasing tendency of prices has been attributed to “a combination 
of weaker unions, intense global competition, and occasional tightening by the Federal Reserve” 
(Guttmann, 2016). Regarding competition, we have to stress that exposure to international competition 
has never been stronger in history, as the evolution of the historical trend of trade openness in the 
international economy and the United States indicate (cf. Figure 4). 
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Figure 4: Trade as percentage of GDP in the world and the United States (1870-2015) 
 
Source: own elaboration based on Klasing and Milionis (2014), Penn World Tables4 and World Bank 
 
Since the 1980s, the world has witnessed the integration of trade and the disintegration of production 
(Feenstra, 1998). Technical progresses made possible the spreading of modular production to many 
industries. At the same time, international trade was liberalized and technological progress reduced 
communication and transportation costs. This allowed for a new international division of labor in which, 
following a modular form of production, firms spread around the globe started exporting inputs to 
subcontracting firms located in other countries and re-importing final products, forming what the 
literature latter labelled as “global value chains” or (internationally-dispersed) “network-firms”. In this 
context, price competition increased to historical levels and became global, and the United States have not 
been spared. It has become a commonplace among economists and researchers in management to speak of 
intensified global competition since the 1990s as a result of trade liberalization and the spread of global 
value chains across the globe (Gereffi, 2014). 
 
                                                          
4 Available at http://cid.econ.ucdavis.edu/pwt.html 
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The competition/market power blind spot in competition theory 
 
In an article entitled “Bring Back Antitrust”, Dayen (2015) put in blunt words the trigger of this 
investigation: “So if monopolists are jacking up prices, why does this not show up in a higher consumer 
price index?”. On the one hand, there are undeniable signs of a rise of market power in the American 
economy since the 1980s/1990s. On the other hand, and largely as a result of profound transformations in 
technology, trade and the organization of production at the world scale, price competition has never been 
more international and fiercer. Contrary to what competition theories would argue, prices have not risen 
as a result of increasing and sustained market power. 
There is therefore a blind spot in competition theory regarding the current link between competition and 
market power. How can it be possible that overall profitability and profit rate differentials among firms 
have been increasing for decades, yet prices remain constant and price competition global and strong?  
Are we witnessing another historical phase of “oscillations in the balance of the monopoly-competition 
dialectic” (Christophers, 2016, p. 75) in which, once again, market power is strong, or rather a historical 
context of exceptionally competitive global markets? Are these two states of affairs incompatible, as the 
traditional opposition of the concepts of competition and market power would suggest? Can we say along 
with Marx (2008, p. 165) that “monopoly produces competition, competition produces monopoly. The 
monopolists are made by competition, the competitors become monopolists”, meaning that one will 
always eventually eliminate or overshadow the other? In other words: can competition and market power 
coexist? In this thesis we will argue that they can.  
Explaining how new competitive dynamics characterized by a synergic relation between competition and 
market power emerged as a historical process and how they can be theoretically apprehended through the 
lenses of competition theory is the main objective of this thesis. In order to do so, we will focus on two 
recent profound changes that have introduced new competitive dynamics: the rise of global value chains 
since the 1990s and the emergence of platform capitalism in the 2000s.  
 
Theoretical approach and methodological choices 
 
The main objective of our thesis, as well as our own understanding of Economics, imposes at least two 
wide theoretical choices. The first one refers to adopting a theoretical framework in which ‘history 
matters’ and institutional transformations can be traced back to understand the evolution of the link 
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between competition and market throughout history. Indeed, it is our belief that no light can be shed on 
the competition/market power blind spot without investigating the historical formation and particularities 
of the new forms of competition we are witnessing. The second one refers to the theory of the firm on 
which any competition theory relies. 
Regarding the central role of institutions and history in our understanding of the transformation of the link 
between competition and market power, we will adopt the Regulation Theory’s theoretical framework. 
Regulation Theory was born in France in the 1970s as an attempt to understand how capitalist 
accumulation regimes can vary over time and space in their logics of functioning, including their specific 
conditions of crisis. This diversity is rooted in the multiplicity of institutional forms that compose a 
specific accumulation regime. Institutional forms are the result of the institutionalization of the existing 
conflicts between actors in the economy and regulate its functioning. “Forms of competition” defined as 
“the relations between groups of fractioned accumulation centers whose decisions are a priori 
independent from each other are organized” (Boyer, 2004, p. 39) constitutes one the five elementary 
institutional forms identified in Regulation Theory5: 
Although the form of competition, as defined above, covers many types of relationships between firms 
and their outcomes, the research done so far within Regulation Theory has been insufficient and, in many 
cases, exclusively focused on pricing mechanisms (Brenner & Glick, 1991). It has been even defined by 
Boyer, one of the fathers of Regulation Theory, as “the process of price setting that corresponds to a 
standard configuration of the relations between the participants of the market” (Boyer, 2004, p. 19)6. For 
this reason, some authors, including scholars that proclaim themselves as adherents to Regulation Theory, 
have criticized the simplicity with which the form of competition has been treated in respect to the other 
four basic institutional forms (Christophers, 2016; Hollard, 2002; Peck & Tickell, 1992). 
Conscious of the limitation of the concept of form of competition in its current state, and equally aware of 
the importance of institutions and history to understand the evolution of the link between market power 
                                                          
5 The four other ones being :  
The wage-labor nexus: it refers to relations between capital and labor in terms of the organization of labor and the 
modalities of remuneration of capital and labor; 
International relations: it refers to the relations between the nation-state and the rest of the world; 
Money: as the general equivalent and the link between private decentralized producers, money constitutes a basic 
institution without which capitalistic accumulation regimes could not exist; 
The form of the State: it refers broadly to how the state intervenes in the economy (e.g. as a producer or a 
technocratic regulator) (Boyer, 2004, p. 39). Translation is ours. 
6 The translation is ours. 
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and competition, we will adopt a larger Regulationist framework in our historical understanding of this 
evolution. This will imply widening the spectrum of issues and relations examined beyond pricing. In 
Chapter I we will study how the ever-changing interplay between certain institutions, technology and the 
transformation of the firm has affected rivalrous relations between firms, resulting in stable forms of 
competition over time. In particular, we will pay attention to antitrust enforcement and jurisprudence, the 
organization of research and development (R&D) and the intellectual property regime, the role of the 
financial sector, the impact of technology and the organizational aspects of the firm. For each form of 
competition analyzed, our focus will be the link between competition and market power, which will 
inevitably highlight some aspects of competitive relations between firms and downplay others. 
The second theoretical framework on which the thesis will be developed is the evolutionary theory of the 
firm. Because competition theory describes the laws of interaction between rival firms, it necessarily 
refers to an underlying theory of the firm. Evolutionary theory has a resource-based approach of the firm 
(Coriat & Weinstein, 2010). It conceives the firm as a unique repertoire of routines (Nelson & Winter, 
2004), the latter being problem-solving devices (Coriat & Dosi, 2009) the firm possess and allows it to 
coordinate and treat knowledge. Routines can evolve, but they do it following path dependency: “a firm’s 
previous investments and its repertoire of routines (its ‘history’) constrains its future behavior” (Teece, 
Rumelt, Dosi, & Winter, 1994, p. 17). In Part II we will develop our own contribution to competition 
theory in the contexts of global value chains and trust-based algorithmic coordination (TBAC) firms. In 
both cases, we will consider firms’ behavior as strategic choices based on their respective repertoire of 
routines in the context of historically institutionalized relations that affect them. In that sense, both the 
Regulationist and the Evolutionary approaches will blend in to set the theoretical basis of our 
investigation. 
In addition to the choice of a theoretical framework on which to develop our investigation, we have made 
some methodological choices that shaped it and are worth mentioning. Firstly, this thesis is mainly a 
theoretical contribution. This does not imply that empirical elements are excluded, as this introduction has 
already shown. Nevertheless, no original empirical contribution is offered besides some stylized facts. We 
will mainly recur to different sorts of stylized facts or econometrical work done by colleagues to describe 
the phenomena our theoretical contributions will try to account for. Fortunately, in the process of our 
investigation, we have found most of the necessary empirical work to be available, which allowed us to 
focus on our theoretical developments aimed at making sense of these empirical results. Moreover, 
mathematical modelling was not required. Although the theoretical contribution presented in Chapter III 
can be modeled (and, as the reader will see, builds on basic mathematical concepts from network theory), 
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we did not consider that doing so would make our contribution any clearer or would provide new relevant 
results. 
Secondly, our investigation does not focus on any particular industry but has rather the intention of 
maintaining a level of generality that allows it to be used to analyze different industries. This creates of 
course obstacles and presents some advantages. On the one hand, it implies a level of abstraction that 
obliges us to ignore some industry-specific competitive dynamics. On the other hand, it allows us to see 
through industry specificities to find common patterns of competitive relations and market-power-
exertion mechanisms. Moreover, the two objects chosen to focus on, global value chains and TBAC firms 
(the latter usually referred to as ‘sharing economy’ or ‘platform-firms’), have been studied in the literature 
as such (including in respect to competitive relations) although they are not industry-defined. In sum, it 
can be said that this thesis studies cross-industry organizational objects and their relations. 
Finally, although the analyses of recent forms of competition on which our competition-theory-related 
contributions will be based are not country-specific but organizational-object-specific (global value 
chains and TBAC firms), our long-term of analysis of the transformation of the link between competition 
and market power is necessarily centered on a country. The above-quoted institutions that will be 
examined to understand successive historical configurations of forms of competition present country 
specificities that become more accentuated as we go back in time. Therefore, when studying the evolution 
of forms of competition in Chapter I, we had to make a choice regarding the country of analysis. As the 
first lines of this introduction hinted, the country chosen is the United States. This responds to two 
criteria. First, it is the country in which more forms of competition can be traced back. As we will show 
along Chapter I, this is due to a great extent to its early antitrust law and the different ways in which it has 
been applied over time according to evolving jurisprudences, the latter being possible because of the 
common law tradition of the country. Second, this long and winding antitrust history has resulted in the 
“constitution of a reservoir of experiences which have been a source of inspiration for the Community and 
later on for the European Union” (Encaoua & Guesnerie, 2006, p. 19)7. But the influence of the historical 
experience of the United States in terms of forms of competition does not stop at antitrust. As it will be 
seen by the end Chapter I, the United States has been one of the major engines of the institution of the 
current hegemonic form of competition, which has taken a global scale. Antitrust legislation is just one 
piece of it. Then, in order to understand the current hegemonic form of competition, studying the history 
of the United States’ forms of competition becomes crucial. 
                                                          
7 The translation is ours. 
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Structure of the thesis 
 
The thesis is structured in two parts, each consisting of two chapters. The two-part structure follows from 
the way in which each chapter approaches the common thread of this thesis: the link between competition 
and market power. While Part I examines it by looking into the past (American economic history) and the 
concepts that have been produced to account for it (competition theories), Part II focuses on how this link 
operates in two archetypical organizational objects of contemporary capitalism: global value chains and 
digital platforms. 
The first part, entitled “Competition and market power: lessons from theories and history” is 
devoted to investigating the link between competition and market power in American economic history 
and in the existing competition theories. The goal of the first part is to understand the different ways in 
which competition and market power can interact and, in that manner, to find elements that can help us 
explaining how market-power-driven long-run profit rate differentials can coexist with strong price 
competition today. In order to do so, we examine, in the first place, the rich American economic history 
and identify a variety of relations between competition and market power throughout history. In the 
second place, we review the different competition theories that, very much inspired by American 
economic history, have produced concepts to explain these relations.  
Chapter I investigates the evolution of capitalistic forms of competition in the United States from the 
1840s to today with a focus on the link between competition and market power. By analyzing how the 
interactions between certain institutions (antitrust enforcement and jurisprudence, the organization of 
Research & Development, the intellectual property regime and the role of the financial sector), the impact 
of technology and the organizational aspects of the firm have forged successive forms of competition, we 
identify different relations between competition and market power over time. We show that while in some 
cases competition has effectively meant the lack of market power or, inversely, market power took over 
competition, in others it has served to (imperfectly) regulate it, while in the current dominant form of 
competition (‘Finance-led’, circa 1980s to today) market power articulates competition, establishing so a 
symbiotic relation with it. 
Chapter II reviews all the existing competition theories with a focus on how they conceptualize the link 
between competition and market power, examining the mechanisms through which they back or reject the 
proposition according to which competition eventually leads to market power creation and exertion (the 
“market power paradox”). We find that, regardless of their stands on this proposition, they all consider 
competition and market power as two opposed concepts that exclude each other. We show that, because 
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of that reason, none of them can account for the coexistence of two major stylized facts proper to the 
current hegemonic form of competition mentioned in Chapter I and in this introduction: long-term profit 
rate differentials between firms and strong price competition. 
Part I shows that competition and market power have established symbiotic relations in the past but that, 
nevertheless, competition theories have failed to account for this symbiosis, and therefore to produce 
concepts that can contribute to explaining the coexistence between the two above-mentioned stylized 
facts. In order to offer contributions to such an explanation, we proceed with the second part of the 
thesis, entitled “Competition and market power in contemporary capitalism: an analysis of two 
archetypical situations”. Part II is dedicated to exploring and analyzing the relation between competition 
and market power in two organizational objects, each of them corresponding to novel and important 
evolutions of contemporary capitalism: global value chains and for-profit digital platforms. The fact that 
the two are proper to contemporary capitalism and, more precisely, to the current Finance-led form of 
competition identified in Chapter I, makes them ideal research objects to account for the coexistence of 
the two above-mentioned stylized facts. In this vein, we show that despite the evident differences between 
global value chains and for-profit digital platforms, they both share organizational logics and apply 
similar mechanisms through which, in contemporary capitalism, competition can be articulated by market 
power, resulting in strong price competition and long-run profit rate differentials coexisting across 
industries.  
Chapter III develops a contribution to the theory of competition between and within global value chains 
(internationally dispersed network-firms) that can coherently account for the two above-mentioned 
stylized facts. The theory parts from a context of vertical disintegration in which firms are forced to form 
network-firms to be able to gather the collective competences required to produce a final product and 
compete with other network-firms. This creates uneven interdependence between them, since some 
possess competences that are more crucial to survive network-firm vs network-firm competition. We 
show that uneven interdependence is the source of within-network-firm market power, which can explain 
long-term profit rate differentials between firms of the same network-firm. Then we show how these 
profit rate differentials can be compatible with strong competition on prices between network-firms.  
Chapter IV studies competition and market power dynamics in platform capitalism by focusing on ‘trust-
based algorithmic coordination’ (TBAC) firms. After explaining the emergence of the platform economy 
in the 2000s, we build on the evolutionary theory of the firm to characterize an emerging type of firm 
within the platform economy, the ‘trust-based algorithmic coordination’ firm. Based on our findings on 
the relevance of algorithmic coordination in this type of firm, and taking into account some properties of 
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multisided markets in play, we claim that there is a winner-takes-all competitive dynamic in TBAC firms. 
Using the case of the ride-hailing company Uber to illustrate, we show that, just as in the network-firm, 
the TBAC firm conjugates vertical market power (TBAC firms being able to obtain increasingly higher 
shares of the value created with other members of the network, e.g. drivers) with strong price competition 
(e.g. Uber constantly cutting prices to leave its competitors out of the market) in a competitive dynamic in 
which there is a tendency towards monopolization. 
To close our investigation, a conclusion presenting our main findings as well as some of the limitations of 
our work and future lines of research is presented.    
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Part I - Competition and market power: lessons from 
theories and history 
Introduction 
 
In Part I we will take a first step towards the comprehension of how can long-run profit rate differentials 
between firms, a sign of prolonged market power, can be compatible with strong price competition. The 
coexistence of these two stylized facts suggests a relation between competition and market power 
different from the traditional antithetical one according to which the presence of the latter hinders the 
former. Consequently, we will examine the link between market power and competition in American 
history (Chapter I) and in competition theories (Chapter II) in search for elements that will allow us to 
conceptualize a different relation between these two concepts. 
Taking a Regulationist approach, Chapter I will identify a series of forms of competition in the United 
States from the 1840s to today. For each form of competition, we will focus on the link between market 
power and competition throughout time, as the evolving hierarchical combinations between technology, 
organizational aspects of the firm and some major institutions (antitrust, research and development, the 
intellectual property regime and the financial sector) have shaped the way in which competition and 
market power function. In this sense, Chapter I represents a critical historical review that will offer some 
insights to understand the current puzzling link between competition and market power. 
Chapter II will review the existing competition theories with a focus on the link between competition 
and market power. We will show, for each of them, how they conceive the competitive process and 
market power mechanisms and, consequently, under which conditions and in what range(s) of the 
industrial organization landscape (horizontally, fully vertically and semi-vertically) they can account for 
long-run profit rate differentials between firms as a result of the competitive process.  
The two chapters constitute a unity in that they represent a repertoire of elements that will help us 
understanding the seemingly inconsistent coexistence of the two above-mentioned stylized facts. While in 
Chapter I we build a series of ideal types of forms of competition that try to capture heterogeneous and 
evolving relations between competition and market power, Chapter II is a critical repertoire of the way in 
which the existing competition theories have conceived that link in the past by observing economic 
history, and especially the rich American one.  
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Chapter I: A short history of capitalistic forms of competition in the 
United States 
 
Introduction 
 
The goal of this chapter is to analyze the evolution of capitalistic forms of competition in the United 
States. In doing so, we hope to contribute to the development of Regulation School’s concept of form of 
competition. 
The chapter will be centered on the United States, although the international dimension will not be 
ignored. This choice responds to two criteria: practicability and theoretical relevance. Forms of 
competition are not homogeneous across borders or over time, as the cross-reading of country-studies of 
forms of competition as different as France’s (Bénassy, Boyer, & Gelpi, 1979) and the United States’ 
(Aglietta, 1997) show. A history of capitalistic forms of competition is necessarily a series of histories, 
which would be an immeasurable objective for the scope of this thesis. A circumscription to a country is 
therefore needed. In that vein, the United States appear to us as the most theoretically relevant choice for 
two reasons. First, it is the country for which more forms of competition can be traced back. This is due to 
a great extent to its early antitrust law and the different ways in which it has been applied over time 
according to evolving jurisprudences, the latter being partly a consequence of the common law tradition 
of the country. Second, this long and winding antitrust history has resulted in the “constitution of a 
reservoir of experiences which have been a source of inspiration for the Community and later on for the 
European Union” (Encaoua & Guesnerie, 2006, p. 19)8. However, the influence of the historical 
experience of the United States in terms of forms of competition does not stop at antitrust. As this chapter 
will show, the United States has been one of the major engines of the institution of the current hegemonic 
form of competition, which has taken a global scale. Antitrust legislation is just one piece of it. Then, in 
order to understand the current hegemonic form of competition, studying the history of the United States’ 
forms of competition becomes a necessity. 
Our reading will consist of analyzing, for each period, how, in certain historical and technological 
contexts, the transformation of the firm and some key institutions create institutional complementarities 
that shape a form of competition. In Boyer’s words, we can define institutional complementarity as “a 
configuration in which the viability of an institutional form is strongly or entirely conditioned by the 
                                                          
8 The translation is ours. 
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existence of several other institutional forms, such as their conjunction offers greater resilience and better 
performance compared with alternative configurations” (Boyer, 2005). Amable and Petit (1999) identify 
three ways in which institutions can create complementarity: 
1. Institutions that have a common activity 
2. Institutions that have a joint effect on something 
3. Institutions that share the same “rules syntax” 
The first way refers to institutions that collaborate in a process (for example, a research lab and 
pharmaceutical firms that develop a molecule together) as well as to an institution that regulates another. 
The second way of institutional complementarity refers to situations in which the simultaneous presence 
of two or more institutions has a joint effect on something else without a necessary direct interaction 
between the institutions. For example, the coexistence of a market-led financial system and a flexible 
labor market can have the joint effect of enhancing innovation in dynamic high-tech sectors that require 
short-term investments. The third way of institutional complementarity refers to institutions that share the 
same structure of “rules syntax” (Amable & Petit, 1999). This implies that agents from those institutions 
can understand them more easily, which has a positive effect on the outcomes that depend on those 
agents.  
Moreover, the dynamics and coherence of institutional architectures rely on a hierarchy of institutions. 
The notion of hierarchy of institutions can be interpreted in both static and dynamic terms. In static terms, 
it refers to the fact that “the inner design of one institution takes into account the constraints and 
incentives associated to another one” (Amable, 2000). In other words, the dominant institution(s) 
impose(s) the conditions that complementary institutions will complement within the boundaries of the 
institutional architecture. In dynamic terms, institutional hierarchy means that “the transformation of one 
institution affects the evolution of another one” (Amable, 2000).  
Along this chapter we will identifies a series of forms of competition that should be read as a series of 
institutional architectures. We will show the institutional complementarities and hierarchies that 
characterize each them. Regarding the institutions that will be analyzed, we will pay attention to antitrust 
enforcement and jurisprudence, the organization of research and development (R&D) and the intellectual 
property regime, the role of the financial sector, the impact of technology and the organizational aspects 
of the firm. As the concept of institutional hierarchy indicates, depending on the period under analysis, 
some might be more relevant than others. Each section of the chapter will develop on a form of 
competition and provide at the end a diagram that signals which institution is dominant and identify the 
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institutional complementarities that are built around it to constitute the form of competition under 
analysis. 
We will follow a chronological order in which each section of the chapter will be devoted to a certain 
time period for which we identify a particular form of competition. This, besides the evident clarity it 
brings in respect to a non-chronological analysis, has the advantage of showing the historical rationale of 
the evolution of forms of competition. In other words, we will try to show how the problems caused by 
each form of competition opened possibilities for the birth of a new one that would try to solve them and, 
in doing so, redefine them. Far from being a historical analysis, this chapter is to be understood as an 
attempt to identify throughout the capitalistic economic history of the United States certain issues related 
to the tensions and complementarities between market power and competition to which the next chapters 
will be devoted. 
The periodization that we will develop in this chapter is not to be interpreted as a univocal way of 
understanding forms of competition. Instead, the forms of competition we will propose are to be read as a 
series of ideal types that can be identified in certain periods of American economic history. Depending on 
the scope of the concept of form of competition employed, as well as the special interest given to some 
aspects, several ideal types are possible. Our focus lies in the historically determined link between 
competition and market power, and our periodization is necessarily influenced by this approach. 
Moreover, different forms of competition can coexist; the ideal type we will present for each period is 
therefore not present across all industries and is certainly not the only one acting in the period in question. 
Moreover, period cuts can never express a perfectly synchronized evolution of all the institutions and the 
firm that result in a new form of competition. Therefore, our historical characterization can surely be 
discussed. Our purpose is merely to be able to offer a stylized variety of historical forms of competition in 
that brings out the ever-changing relations between market power and competition and the concrete forms 
they take. 
In that vein, we will show along this chapter that, once the emergence of a national capitalistic market 
dissolved local monopolies around the 1840s, the competitive landscape that resulted was unregulated in 
the broadest sense of the term, and firms had little market power, which led them to a ruinous dynamic 
during what we have labeled the ‘predatory competition’ phase (1840s to 1860s). Between the 1870s and 
the 1910s, an era we have termed ‘collusive competition’, competing firms colluded to coordinate 
competition, not to annul it. However, in face of the weak enforceability of pools, the emergent federal 
antitrust attack on trusts, and the lack of barriers to entry, firms failed in using horizontal market power to 
coordinate competition. As a result, a profitability crisis opened the way to the ‘constricted competition’ 
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era (1920s to 1945). During that period, firms accumulated market power through vertical integration and 
the anti-competitive use of intellectual property. This new form of market power, which benefited now 
from barriers to entry, allowed them to restore profitability by constricting competition. The profound 
step-up of antitrust that took place since the 1940s put an end to that regime and paved the way for the 
‘Fordist competition’ era (1945 to 1970s), in which market power was rigorously limited by antitrust 
authorities. Consequently, competition (this time regulated by the state) flourished again. Given that this 
form of competition depended on continuous productivity increases that at some point could not be met in 
face of increasing foreign competition and salary hikes, a new profitability crisis took place in the late 
1970s. Again, a new form of competition would emerge from it, the ‘Finance-led’ one (1980s to present). 
In this form of competition, the liberalization of finance allowed shareholders to demand high returns on 
investment, a demand that has been met in part by restructuring the balance between competition and 
market power. The firm disintegrated vertically and the landscape of industrial organization turned into 
one dominated by international competing networks of firms (global value chains), each coordinated by 
some lead firms possessing key competences which are protected by a strengthened and internationally 
harmonious intellectual property regime. In this new form of competition, fierce international competition 
between global value chains coexists with vertical market power within each value chain, the latter 
playing the role of coordinating the production and competitive processes.  
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1 Predatory competition (circa 1840s to 1860s) 
 
“Easy and tolerant competition is the antithesis of monopoly; the cut-throat process is the father of it” 
       
             John B. Clark (1887), The Limits of Competition 
 
During the second half of the XIXth century, the United States underwent a radical transformation of its 
economic system that, although multifaceted, can be read through the lenses of one major revolution: the 
consolidation of the corporation as the organization carrying on the production and the delivery of goods 
and services and, later on, innovation. As we will show along this section, the growth of the corporation, 
in harmony with other institutional and technological transformations, gave birth to the first capitalistic 
form of competition the country has experienced: predatory competition. In this section, we will describe 
these transformations in order to show how the institutional complementarities they present forged a 
particular form of competition in the mid-nineteenth-century. The latter was characterized by an unstable 
competitive process in which evenly matched firms engaged in cutthroat price competition and predatory 
competitive practices that led to recurrent profitability and overproduction crises. 
Before the 1840s the legal entity used by most firms was the partnership, which “remained the most 
common and dominant form of capitalist organization down to the nineteenth century” (Banaji, 2007). 
Partnerships consisted of two or three associates that were usually relatives and based their accounting 
systems in double-entry bookkeeping (Chandler, 2002). Given the vastness of the American territory and 
the lack of reliable transportation and communication networks, merchants created merchant networks 
that, by linking together partnerships, assured the flow of goods up to local markets. Partners and itinerant 
peddlers would purchase goods from some parts of the country and sell them in other ones, assuring in 
that manner the market the coordination process of delivering goods across the country and earning 
markups over the purchase price. Merchants and local firms benefited from a geographical monopoly 
(Fligstein, 1993). Manufacturing, in turn, was mostly handcrafted and mass production was rare. 
Individual producers made independent decisions on price, production levels, and quality (Fligstein, 
1993). Until the aftermath of the Civil War in 1865, slavery was the dominant social form of organization 
of mass production in the farming sector. There were not production markets in the sense of a “self-
reproducing social structure among specific cliques of firms and other actors who evolve roles from 
observations of each other’s behavior” (White, 1981, p. 581). Because production did not rest on free 
labor and producers and sellers were not linked to each other by interdependences based on 
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economic rivalry beyond the scope of very limited local markets, we cannot speak of capitalistic 
competition in the United States before the 1840s. 
Around the 1840s, two sets of innovations, one organizational and the other one technological, disrupted 
the American economy and paved the way for the configuration of its first capitalistic mode of 
competition. On the technological side, the apparition and the expansion of the railway and the telegraph 
are certainly the most relevant ones. Although the steamboat had already triggered a revolution in 
transportation by allowing fast transportation of large amounts of goods in the late XVIIIth century, the 
railroad amplified it in intensity and scope and brought about a significant qualitative transformation that 
would have profound economic effects and transform competition. The railroad reduced dramatically 
transportation costs and allowed to transport large amounts of goods over long distances faster and with 
fewer costs than the steamboat (Lamoreaux, Raff, & Temin, 2002). Moreover, just as the steamboat, 
which had cut dependency over wind to transport merchandises through rivers, the steam locomotive 
made all-weather transportation possible. On the qualitative side, the railroad allowed something that the 
steamboat did not: (almost) total independence from geography. Railroads could be deployed practically 
anywhere to link regions of the country without having to follow the natural course of rivers. This, 
coupled with the replacement of traditional sources of energy (men, animals and wind power) by fossil 
fuels that the availability of coal at industrial levels had allowed for by the mid-1830s (Chandler, 2002), 
rendered capital independent of geography both in terms of energy sources and transportation 
possibilities. As a consequence, industries counting on coal-fueled machinery could locate next to the 
cities that concentrated the labor force instead of locating next to rivers that were far from highly-
populated cities (Malm, 2016), which allowed for the consolidation of a labor market and gave a push to 
industrial manufacturing. Finally, the telegraph, which by the 1840s had been considerably deployed in 
the most relevant parts of the country (Lubrano, 2013), made it possible for words to travel faster than 
goods and, therefore, for the coordination of transportation and production across long distances to take 
place at a rhythm compatible with that of the flow of goods. The technological pre-condition for a 
national market were met. This transformed competition profoundly because the deployment of these 
technologies “eroded geographical monopolies to create a single national market” (Kunzlik, 2003). In 
other words, small-scale geographical monopolies were substituted by nationwide competition. This 
process was accelerated at the pace of the expansion of railways, which peaked at the end of the XIXth 
century. While in 1870 there were 50.000 miles of railways in the United States, by 1900 this number was 
quadrupled to 200.000 miles (Kunzlik, 2003).   
The identity of competitors changed dramatically as well. To explain this transformation we need to take 
into account how the above-described technological transformation interacted with the other major 
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(organizational) innovation that took place in the 1840s: the growth of the corporation. Although the 
United States had inherited the legal figure of the corporation from English jurisprudence in the XVIIIth 
century, corporations were heavily regulated. Of all regulations, the most significant ones were related to 
the rigidness of the granting of corporate entity that states (and not the Federal government – we will 
come back to this point later-) controlled. Corporate entity implies being able to maintain business in the 
name of the company independently of the individuals that compose it, which in turn implies limited 
liability. The company, and not its stockholders, is responsible for debts. Stockholders are only 
responsible for the capital they brought to the company. This, coupled with the fact that corporate status 
allowed dispersed ownership in the form of stocks (which fosters larger agglomerations of capital for 
business purposes) represents a clear advantage of the corporation status over other legal entities designed 
to do business. Nevertheless, the corporation being an exceptional legal entity at the time, it was not until 
the 1840s that the corporation status would start its path towards being rife. Until that time, corporate 
entity was exceptionally used to motivate high-risk investments or the development of projects that 
required large amounts of capital and slow returns such as public utilities. The corporation entity was 
mainly granted to enterprises in the interest of the states. The most common sectors in which firms 
obtained the corporation status were banking, insurance and transportation. Manufacturing was rarely 
undertaken by corporations (Fligstein, 1993).  
In 1837 incorporations stopped being subject to state legislatures’ approvals and the corporation entity 
started being granted under simple declaration. That year marked the beginning of the ascent of the 
corporation. During the same period, a series of other transformations in law eased the rigid control over 
management’s leeway within the corporation. For example, before the 1840s every fundamental change 
carried on within a corporation had to be unanimous among its shareholders (Roy, 1999). By the 1840s, 
corporations started being allowed to hold property outside of the state in which they had been chartered, 
limited liability was instituted, corporations were allowed to sue or be sued in other states and contracts 
passed across state lines became legal (Dodd, 1955). This progressive legal easing of the corporation 
status not only fostered its adoption in industries that had not been benefiting from it, but also encouraged 
its use in businesses that implied interstate trade, which contributed significantly to the creation of a 
national market. By 1860, the corporate charter had been transformed from a privilege granted to 
enterprises serving the interest of the state to a general incorporation legal procedure available to almost 
all kinds of firms (Hurst, 2004).  
With the dissemination of the corporation came the consequential separation of ownership and control. 
While partners were both owners of the capital of the partnership as well as managers of the everyday 
activities it implied, corporations were increasingly dissociating these two functions. Therefore, the 
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dissemination of the corporation unlocked the possibility of creating large organizational structures 
in charge of managing the production and distribution of goods. The railroad, the availability of 
coal at industrial levels and the telegraph gave corporations the technological means to do so across 
large distances with large groups of people disseminated in a single national market in which firms 
would compete.  
In the United States, a young and vast country governed by a multiplicity of federated states, the 
corporation proved to be an efficient organization in developing transportation and communication9. This 
contrasts with other countries such as France, where a centralized federal state, which counted with 
efficient organizations such as the Army and the state bureaucracy that took over that task. It was 
precisely because the corporation proved to be efficient in developing these infrastructures with the 
support of the states that the latter leaned on the former to connect the country. In doing so, the 
corporation created a national market and, therefore, the conditions for a form of competition to emerge in 
the first place. Its efficiency, which would become its first competitive weapon, lied in administrative 
coordination. 
As Alfred Chandler has shown in his seminal The Visible Hand, the separation of ownership and control 
gave rise to administrative coordination, a source of efficiency that would quickly explain the 
replacement of small-scale partnerships by corporations with “a large number of full-time managers to 
coordinate, control, and evaluate the activities of widely scattered operating units” (Chandler, 2002, p.79). 
The possibility of decoupling management from control gave room to a series of organizational 
innovations in the management of corporations that offered those who adopted them a competitive 
advantage. Among these innovations born in the 1850s and 1860s we can highlight the organization of the 
firm in divisions each in charge of a different type of operation (marketing, production, accounting, etc.), 
new accounting practices besides double entry bookkeeping (namely financial, capital and cost 
accounting) and the elaboration of internal statistics and periodical reports to implement management 
control. The efficient internalization of tasks that were previously carried on by separate firms 
coordinated by market mechanisms responds to several factors. Administered coordination implies the 
routinization of tasks, which, by setting repetitive standard procedures, creates automatic responses to 
situations instead of deliberation or contracts, which entail heavier coordination (Coriat & Weinstein, 
2010) and informational costs (Chandler, 2002). Moreover, routines allow for the development of 
collective skills and learning (Weinstein, 2010). In the particular context of the mid-nineteenth-century 
United States, routines-intensive corporations were the perfect organizational match needed to exploit 
                                                          
9 Mainly the telegraph, as the other national communication network, the postal service, had been being managed by 
the federal and local states since the creation of the United States Post Office Department in 1792. 
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transportation networks and large-scale production in the most efficient way because they permitted 
economies of speed. In Chandler’s words, at that time “slow speed of movement remained the most 
powerful constraint on the growth of business enterprise and on the coming of institutional change in 
commerce” (Chandler, 2002, p.49). Railroads and coal offered the technological possibility to increase 
the speed of transactions, while corporations and their administrative coordination made it possible to 
internalize “a high volume of market transactions within a single large modern enterprise”. This “reduced 
unit costs of distributing goods by making it possible for a single set of workers using a single set of 
facilities to handle a much greater number of transactions within a specific period than the same number 
of workers could if they had been scattered in many separate facilities”. In addition, “high-volume stock-
turn assured a steady cash flow that permitted the enterprises to purchase larger quantities in cash and so 
greatly reduce the cost of credit needs and finance distribution of goods” (Chandler, 2002, p.232). As the 
case of the management of railroads exemplifies, “technology made possible fast, all-weather 
transportation; but safe, regular, reliable movements of goods and passengers, as well as the continuing 
maintenance and repair of locomotives, rolling stock, and track, roadbed, stations, roundhouses, and other 
equipment, required the creation of a sizable administrative organization” (Chandler, 2002,).  
As a consequence of this “managerial revolution”, the competitive landscaped was profoundly 
transformed. In retail, the myriad of small geographically defined monopolies held by merchants 
connected through merchant networks and coordinated by market mechanisms was replaced by a 
unified national market in which large-scale wholesalers and retailers coordinated by the visible 
hand of management competed on price by lowering costs through the efficiency gains that 
administrative coordination and its consequent speed economies allowed for. In Berle and Means’ 
words, “the nature of capital has changed. To an increasing extent it is composed not of tangible goods, 
but of organizations built in the past and available to function in the future. Even the value of tangible 
goods tends to become increasingly dependent upon their organized relationship to other tangible goods 
composing the property of one of these great units” (Berle & Means, 1991, p.45) .  
At the production level, transformations carried on by the corporation equivalent to that of the managerial 
revolution would have to wait a few more decades to take place through the organizational innovation that 
Taylorism represented, as we will explain in the next section. It is important to point out that, if slow 
speed of movement was according to Chandler the largest obstacle to the growth of business enterprise, 
economies of speed based on high stock-turn require mass production. The main obstacle to mass 
production, professions (i.e. the fact that workers could control the pace of production through their 
monopoly of the knowledge of the production process) had only been partially bypassed with the putting-
out system, a system in which workers are in charge of recruiting other workers and of organizing and 
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surveilling the labor process (Coriat, 1979). After the Civil War (the first truly industrial war of the 
country), small merchant production that relied on the putting-out system was replaced by industrial 
production organized by corporations (Aglietta, 1976) that, not having still carried on a major 
productivity-enhancing organizational innovation equivalent to that of the management revolution, relied 
on increasing amounts of labor power that the first immigration wave (1815-1865) provided (Coriat, 
1979), as well as on the increasing availability of land and resources that the expansion to the west of the 
country allowed for. 
Another of the major transformations surrounding the ascent of the corporation that shaped the 
competitive landscape of the second half of the XVIIIth century in the United States. was the development 
of a patents market. In 1836 the Patent Act was passed. This law created the Patent Office and stipulated 
the principle of public disclosure of patented inventions. One of the most salient features of the patent 
regime of the period is that only individuals could hold patents. Firms had no automatic rights over the 
patents their employees registered, even if the invention had been developed inside the firm “in the 
absence of express agreement” (Coriat & Weinstein, 2011). If an employee allowed the employer to use 
his/her patent, he/she was implicitly granting the employer a license. This legislation led to a development 
of a technology market in which lawyers and patent agents played the role of intermediaries in arm’s-
length transactions between individual inventors and corporations hungry to acquire any technology that 
could boost their productivity and help them conquer the expanding markets sooner than other competing 
corporations. As a result, the number of patents granted per capita exploded between the 1850s and the 
1880s, as Figure 5 shows. 
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Figure 5: Patents granted by the U.S. Patent Office per Million Residents of the United States 
 
   Source: Lamoreaux (2010) 
 
Along with the above-mentioned transformations, the complementary development of a financial sector 
that facilitated the rise of the corporation took place. The vulgarization of limited liability with which 
corporate entity came along opened the door to the growth of investment markets, and the high fixed costs 
that most of the industries that were booming during the second half of the XIXth century in the United 
States (railways, mining, etc.) required large amounts of funds. The latter were provided by investment 
banks such as Morgan or Rothschild, which “acted as brokers when facilitating trade in existing issues 
and as dealers when underwriting new issues” (Festré & Nasica, 2009). Securities markets, a financial 
instrument that was only possible to a large scale once corporations were put at the center of production 
and exchange, was the mean through which investment banks financed the expansion of corporations that 
needed capital mainly to purchase factories and equipment (Schumpeter, 1939). It is for this reason that 
Minsky (1990, 1992) labels the 1813-1890 period as “industrial capitalism”. The financial sector provided 
the capital needed for these new large-scale corporations to expand their production capacity through the 
vast American territory of which railroad companies are an exemplary illustration. Indeed, they were “the 
leading pre-war form of big business, railroads occupied center stage in the transformation of the 
American economy.  Investments  in  the  railway  industry  were  huge:  they  surpassed  aggregate  
investment  in manufacturing  for  every  decade  between  1850  and  1890,  while  the  book  value  of  
railroad  capital  exceeded aggregate capital  for  the  entire  industrial sector until  the  early  20th 
century” (Giocoli, 2015, p. 12). 
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Having briefly presented some of the main transformations of the American economy between the 1840s 
and the 1870s, we can now start to paint a picture of the features of the form of competition that 
characterized that period. The main agents of competition were corporations, which were divided between 
industrial corporations and wholesalers; both of them were large scaled and coordinated internally by the 
visible hand of management. These firms were financed by investment banks that bought equity from 
capital-intensive industrial corporations to finance the acquisition of factories and equipment required to 
expand geographically and provided commercial credit for retailers and wholesalers. The centers of profit 
creation and appropriation were the corporations themselves, which were mostly restricted to an industry. 
Competition took place also at the industry level between these corporations, and the main mechanisms 
that firms used to outcompete their rivals were organizational innovations in the management of 
corporations that allowed for stronger economies of speed in a context of increasingly mass production 
(and, therefore, to reduce costs) and the purchase of technology from individuals in the technology 
markets in the form of patents. The deploying of these competitive weapons resulted in price cuts that 
would increase their market shares. Pricing was therefore ex-post, since firms regularly adjusted prices 
based on competitors’ prices and fluctuations in demand and made efforts to improve their productivity in 
order to cut costs and survive price competition. Given that “the state and federal governments were 
mainly reactive and did little to stabilize competitive relations” firms resorted to competitive practices 
that were predatory beyond the intensity of the price warfare they practiced: they “undertook to deny 
direct access to raw materials, essential technologies, and customers; secretly purchased their 
competitors’ stock; and, in the extreme, engaged in illegal disruption of production and sales” (Fligstein, 
1993). 
This form of competition in a nascent corporate environment characterized by capital-intensive industries 
with high fixed costs (Lamoreaux, 1988) resulted in a corporate landscape pullulated by “many mass-
production industries in which no firm managed to outdo its competitors- industries that were populated 
by relatively small numbers of evenly matched firms, each of which could affect the pricing and 
production decisions of its rivals” (Lamoreaux, 1988, p. 16). This predatory competition dynamic led to a 
deflationary spiral that jeopardized the stability of firms. As Figure 6 shows, between 1865 (the year after 
the end of the Civil War) and 1897, the general price level experienced a sharp decrease (-51%).  
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Figure 6:  Index of general the general price level for the United States (January 1860 to November 1939) – 
1913=100 
 
 
Source: own elaboration based on National Bureau of Economic Research, Index of the General Price Level for 
United States10 
NB: Shaded years correspond to the Civil War and the First World War; values correspond to those of January for 
each year. 
 
Although this deflationary process corresponds in part to a rebound in prices that followed the inflation of 
the Civil War, it is important to bear in mind that prices declined to a pre-war level (Warren, Pearson, & 
Stoker, 1932), as Figure 7 illustrates.  
Figure 7: Wholesale prices in the United States for 140 years (1793 to 1932) 
 
                                                          
10 Retrieved from FRED, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis 
https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/M04051USM324NNBR, May 14, 2017 
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Source: (Warren, Pearson, & Stoker, 1932) 
The 32 years long deflationary process was the consequence of a combination of severe price competition 
and increasing efficiency (Fligstein, 1993) that resulted from the mechanics of the form of competition we 
have described in this section. In the absence of barriers to entry, and given the high fixed costs that 
characterized the industries that led the way during the second half of the XIXth century in the 
United States, unregulated cutthroat price competition resulted in a deflationary process that was 
unsustainable for firms. The constant overexpansion and price cuts this form of competition caused 
three economic downturns (1873 to 1877; 1885 to 1887 and 1893 to 1897), the last one being the most 
severe (Hoffmann, 1956). Price cuts were too pronounced to counter the cost of expansion and 
productivity increases were not enough to counter the downward effect this had on profits. Moreover, 
“contrary to what classical economists maintained, capital in those industries was hardly fluid: as a matter 
of fact, it was very difficult to withdraw or redirect it. Hence, overproduction was a semi-permanent 
phenomenon in many heavily-capitalized sectors of the economy” (Giocoli, 2014). Therefore, the last two 
economic downturns would result in a strong and long decline in the profit rate of the private sector, 
which was cut by more than 3 in less than 10 years during the 1880s (cf. Figure 8), causing what Duménil 
and Lévy (2001) consider to be one of the three structural crises of capitalism.  
 
Figure 8: The private nonresidential US economy: The profit rate (regular line) and its trend (dotted line) – (1869-1997) 
 
 
Source: Duménil & Lévy (2001) 
In a nutshell, the predatory form of competition that developed in the United States between the 1840s 
and the 1860s was characterized by strong and unregulated (in the broadest sense of the term, as we will 
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develop in the next section) rivalry between firms that competed horizontally and required large amounts 
of capital investment to expand and survive. In the absence of effective state regulation or market power, 
competition led to a profound profitability crisis. The predatory form of competition offered a valuable 
lesson to the nascent corporation: the sustainability of capitalist competition required more than intrafirm 
coordination. If competition was to survive, market power would be necessary. 
 
Diagram 1: The predatory form of competition (circa 1840s to 1860s) 
 
NB: The dominant institution of the form of competition is shaded. Arrows from other institutions indicate the key 
direct and indirect institutional complementarities with the dominant institution. 
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2 Collusive competition (circa 1870s to 1910s) 
 
 
"I like a little competition, but I like combination better . . . Without control you cannot do a thing." 
 
 J.P. Morgan 
 
The period between the 1870s and the 1920s can be analyzed as a coming of age of the American 
corporation in two interconnected senses: regarding its internal structure and in terms of its relation with 
its competitive environment. Internally, the corporation continued its organizational innovation path 
towards controlling production and distribution and incorporated the control of innovation. Regarding its 
environment, the corporation understood that predatory competition was a form of competition too 
unstable for it to grow and prosper and, for the first time, it tried to control its competitive environment 
through explicit coordination with competitors, inaugurating so a novel form of form of competition that 
we have labeled ‘collusive competition’. Additionally, the period represents a coming of age also in terms 
of scale. “Between 1869 and 1889 the average American factory doubled in size, capital invested per  
manufacturing worker almost trebled and total factory productivity grew at an exponential rate” (Giocoli, 
2015). Let us start with the competitive environment. 
As we have described in the previous section, predatory practices and price wars pushed firms out of the 
market once the expansionist phases were over. The Panic of 1873 functioned as a warning sign for firms 
about the need to make changes in the way competition was being handled. The first solution that was 
attempted was setting up horizontal coordination between competitors in order to stabilize prices and 
production and, in that manner, aborting future overproduction crises. The mechanisms deployed by firms 
to do so were pools and trusts, the former being predominant in the 1870s and the 1880s while the latter 
were mainly used during the 1880s (Blicksilver, 1955), although pools had been in use to a lesser extent 
before the Civil War. 
It is important to point out that pools were not legally jeopardized at the moment. In Roy’s (1999, p. 186) 
words, “the fact that the pool would overtly form itself as a company and go to court to enforce the 
contract indicates that it had a reasonable expectation that the contract would be upheld. Moreover, the 
court drew the distinction between partial and general restraint of trade. Only the latter was considered 
illegal. But the distinction between partial and general restraint was vague. (…) The state was in the 
process of specifying the rights, entitlements, and responsibilities it would enforce”. The two key 
economic concepts on which the lawfulness of combinations depended at the time (which were drawn 
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from Classical competition theory, which we will analyze it in depth in the next chapter), were contractual 
liberty and freedom from coercion. Market structure was not taken into account. Then, arrangements such 
as price-fixing were perfectly legal, since it was considered that competitors’ freedom to act was not 
being artificially restrained (Giocoli, 2015). Therefore, although minor legal challenges existed, firms did 
not refrain from recurring to pools for cartelization purposes because, at the time, those forms of 
coordination were far from being unambiguously considered illegal. A stunning (in the eyes of a 
contemporary reader) proof of this is that “trade journals, ordinary newspapers, association minutes, and 
other public activities openly and unabashedly discussed price setting” (Roy, 1999, p. 189). 
Pools were used to coordinate prices and production quotas and to allocate geographical markets. In some 
cases, patent pools were used as a mechanism to enforce the agreed-upon prices and quotas11. Typically, a 
company pooling a bundle of patents needed to produce a single good would be created and members of 
the pool would pay royalties for its use, the right of being able to remain a licensee depending on the 
compliance of prices, quotas or geographical allocations of markets set by the pool12. This was the case 
of, for example, the Great Sewing Machine Combination, founded in 1856, the first national pool and the 
first patent pool in the history of the United States (Hounshell, 1985). Pools appeared mainly in industries 
with high levels of capital investment, low growth, low profits (the latter two characteristics signaling 
economic difficulties induced by predatory competition) and few firms (which simplified the coordination 
process) (Fligstein, 1993). In other words, the profile of the industries that have recurred significantly 
to coordinating competition through pools is the same as that of the industries that suffered the 
most from the predatory form of competition, which indicates that the collusive form of 
competition that emerged in the 1870s was an answer (one among other possible ones) that firms 
brought forth in order to move forward from the ruinous predatory competition they were stuck in. 
It is important to highlight that, in the business and legal environment of the end of the last quarter 
of the XIXth century of the United States, the main goal of these coordination practices, which seem 
today as the antonym of competition, was not to curtail or to annul it, but rather to coordinate it 
and to avoid in that manner the death sentence that unregulated competition had put on itself. “In 
almost every case, actors in the firms [participating in a cartel or a pool] were not trying to collect 
                                                          
11 There are conflicting views in the literature regarding the role that patent pools have played as market power 
mechanisms in the business history of the United States. We share Mangolte’s (2012) nuanced view according to 
which there have been three different types of patent pools in terms of their goals: those aiming at controlling 
markets and industrial activities, those seeking rent extraction and those created to allow free access to techniques 
and to unlock the development of a nascent industry. We will see along this chapter how these types of pools have 
predominated in different forms of competition.  
 
12 Until 1909 patent pools were automatically approved (Christophers, 2016). 
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monopoly rents, but instead were trying to guarantee themselves an adequate profit and continued 
existence” (Fligstein, 1993).  
Nevertheless, these agreements did not work. From an aggregated perspective, as Figures 6  and 7 
illustrate, the fact that prices did not start recovering until the mid-1890s (when, as we will explain in the 
following lines, consolidation strategies took over coordination strategies) and that profits continued to 
decline until around 1890 (cf. Figure 8), shows that coordination strategies were unsuccessful. Moreover, 
many industry studies, empirical investigations and case studies (Chandler, 2002; Fligstein, 1993; 
Lamoreaux, 1988, 2010; Roy, 1999) have offered solid evidence supporting this claim. The reason of this 
failure is also consensual in the literature: pools were unstable because they were difficult to enforce; 
firms would regularly deviate from the agreements to outcompete their rivals. Further on, the birth of 
federal antitrust would precipitate the switch from pools and trusts to consolidation strategies. 
As the inherent instability of pools became apparent to firms, they started to use trusts, which provided a 
more binding horizontal coordination mechanism. The first and one of the most famous trusts in the 
history of the United States was set up by Standard Oil. This legal innovation, which consisted in bringing 
together the stocks of disparate firms under a single management (the trustee), was in fact conceived by 
S.C.T. Dodd, the legal counsel for Standard Oil (Fligstein, 1993). But trusts were short lived. While pools 
did not face legal challenges but failed in assuring horizontal coordination that would put a stop to 
predatory competition because of their weak enforceability, trusts presented the opposite features: 
enforceability was manageable, but the courts quickly put a stop to them. In the late 1880s, a series 
of cases in different states ruled that trusts agreements restrained trade and, hence, violated corporate 
charters. Therefore, “firms that remained in trusts would lose their charters and forfeit the right to do 
businesses” (Fligstein, 1993). This series of cases fostered the animosity towards large firms and their 
practices seeking to restrain trade, which translated in a push for a federal antimonopoly act. As a result, 
by 1890 twelve states had passed legislation against trusts and other restraints of trade. By 1900, this 
number rose by 15 (Fligstein, 1993). This process would reach its tipping point with the passing of the 
Sherman Act, which in 1890 became the first federal antitrust law of the United States and the second one 
of the world after Canada’s, which had been passed the previous year. 
The Sherman Act represented a profound shift in the competitive environment because it gave the federal 
government (and not just state governments) the power to regulate restraints of interstate and international 
trade. This meant that firms could no longer use their national scale to bypass restrictions imposed by 
states that tried to control what they considered to constitute restraints of trade. The act specified that 
“every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or 
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commerce is illegal” and that “every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize or combine 
or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the 
several states or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor”. The phrasing of the 
Sherman Act is of paramount relevance to understand the transformations that the collusive form 
of competition underwent for two reasons. First, it gave the federal government a scale equivalent 
to that of corporations in terms of antitrust enforcement, something that was lacking and had been 
limiting states’ capacity to regulate competition. Second, it explicitly blocked the way to the most 
enforceable legal strategy of horizontal coordination existing (trusts) and created legal grounds to 
block any kind of arrangement between legally independent firms intending to restrain trade or to 
monopolize.  
Given the common law tradition of the United States’ legal system, the effect of the Sherman Act would 
depend on courts’ interpretations of the meaning of “restraint of trade” and “monopolize”. The 
jurisprudence on how to interpret these terms that was developed during the “formative era of American 
antitrust” (1890-1914, i.e. between the Sherman Act and the Clayton Act) (Giocoli, 2015) would shape 
firms’ behaviors by defining which behaviors were tolerated by the law and which ones were not. Three 
phases (each of them defined by landmark cases and a handful of minor cases in line with them) can be 
distinguished during the formative era: the common law phase, the literalist phase and the rule of reason 
phase (Giocoli, 2015).  
The common law phase was the first interpretation the courts made of the Sherman Act and its landmark 
case was a decision by Ohio Circuit judge and future Supreme Court Justice Howell Jackson on a whisky 
trust. During this phase, it was considered that liberty of contract, unless restrained by trusts’ unlawful 
practices, would be enough to protect competition through free entry and rivalry to obtain customers. The 
key point of this doctrine is that it considered that freedom of contract implied the freedom to enter a 
combination in order to preserve “fair and healthy” competition in phase of the possibility of ruinous 
price wars. Indeed, “starting from the 1870s destructive competition began to appear regularly as a 
courtroom defense raised by firms accused of having formed unlawful cartels or combinations” (Giocoli, 
2015). 
Nevertheless, this interpretation of the Sherman Act did not last long. In 1897, a tight 5-to-4 vote of the 
Supreme Court in the United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Association case set the beginning of the 
literalist phase of the formative era of American antitrust. This ruling considered that all price-fixing 
agreements violated the Sherman Act regardless of the reasonableness of the prices they set. While in 
previous rulings reasonableness of prices (understood as prices that would not be so low as to lead to 
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bankruptcy) was an argument employed to validate combinations, this ruling considered that only 
competitive prices were reasonable.  
The literalist interpretation of the Sherman Act left firms seeking to regulate horizontal 
competition with little options other than consolidation (Chandler, 2002; Fligstein, 1993; Freyer, 
1995; Lamoreaux, 2010). Twenty-four years after the Sherman Act, the 1914 Clayton Act reinforced this 
pattern by specifying a list of forbidden practices such as tied sales or price discrimination. Paradoxically, 
it also offered the first legal tool to control horizontal mergers through stock acquisition (Encaoua & 
Guesnerie, 2006) although, as we will explain further on, this clause was generally bypassed or not 
enforced. 
Indeed, although the Sherman Act gave governments a strong power to regulate restraints of international 
and interstate trade and restrictive practices, it did not apply to consolidation strategies. While it was 
almost straightforward that trusts and pools were designed to restrain trade, it was difficult to prove in 
court that a consolidation had the same purpose. The common law of contracts in restraint of trade on 
which the Sherman Act was based was “quite tolerant of business divisions within a single firm, or a 
firm’s decision about how to grow larger (…) Clearly, the union of two or more persons into a 
corporation legal under state law was not automatically an unlawful combination or conspiracy in 
restraint of trade” (Hovenkamp, 1990). In other words, the Sherman Act had no doctrinal power to stop 
mergers and, by not allowing firms to control output and prices through agreements of any sorts, fostered 
mergers (Freyer, 1992). Moreover, states did not stop corporations from selling out to out-of-state interest 
or, inversely, did not prevent out-of-state corporations from buying local corporations for three reasons. 
First, states did not want to drive business activity away, so they chose not to fight the holding company 
(McCurdy, 1979). Second, had states tried to do so, corporations would have sued them alleging that they 
were preventing firms from disposing of their property as they saw fit (Fligstein, 1993). Thirdly, “that the 
power to charter corporations gave states full regulatory authority to proceed against mergers was 
acknowledged by the federal courts. But this power was not very useful when multi-plant giants could 
respond to state regulation by securing a charter from a friendlier jurisdiction or even by closing down 
their enterprises in the state”. As a result, “after a brief flurry of antitrust activity in the 1880s and the 
early 1890s, the states largely gave up. If there was going to be an antitrust initiative, it would have to 
come from the federal government” (Lamoreaux, 2010).  
The lack of enforceability of pools, a series of economic downturns and the serious legal obstacles faced 
by trusts when the literalist interpretation of the Sherman Act of anticompetitive practices between legally 
independent firms pushed the firms that had been (unsuccessfully) recurring to cartelization strategies to 
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the first merger wave of American history, which took place between 1895 and 1905. This interpretation 
of the first merger wave’s origins resting on the fact that it was the only way out allowed by law available 
to firms suffering from predatory competition and trying to coordinate horizontal competition is 
supported by two empirical facts. First, as Fligstein (1993) has empirically showed using Nelson’s  (1959) 
original data, this merger wave was in a stunning 78% horizontal. Second, both Fligstein (1993) and 
Lamoreaux (1988) have provided econometric evidence showing that the firms that participated of the 
first merger wave were mainly located in industries that were “capital-intensive, mass production 
industries in which firms were closely matched and in which expansion had been rapid on the eve of the 
Panic of 1893” (Lamoreaux, 1988). In Fligstein’s words, “the strongest predictor of whether or not an 
industry participated in the merger movement was whether or not its member firms participated in cartels. 
Second, the central factors in the formation of cartels had been high levels of capital investment and low 
levels of profit. These conditions characterized the high-investment production markets where the 
competition was heaviest” (Fligstein, 1993). This characterization matches that of the firms that had 
suffered the most the effects of the predatory competition mode and had formed pools to counter those 
effects in the 1870s and 1880s.  
The finance sector also played an important role in this merger wave, although the underlying causes are 
those we have just presented. Financing through a market of securities was a necessary but not sufficient 
condition for the merger wave to happen. Investment banks that held securities of corporations that had 
been failing in regulating competition through pools and trusts surely fostered and financed mergers in 
order to reverse the downward tendency of profits of those corporations. Moreover, the 1893-1897 
financial panic also worked as a catalyzer of the merger wave in the sense that the financial institutions 
holding stocks in American corporations tried to protect themselves by financing lucrative merger deals 
that, in the anticipation of an increase of profits, would raise the price of the stocks of the consolidated 
companies. In this climate of financial euphoria, it is likely that many firms that would not have merged 
ended up doing it pushed by imitative behavior (Fligstein, 1993) and investment banks’ interest in getting 
merger fees (Christophers, 2016). Therefore, financial institutions, which owned considerable stocks in 
the main American corporations at the end of the XIXth century (Minsky, 1990), passed from a role of 
financing machines and factories to a role of financing trusts and mergers. This shift in the role of 
finance, which Minsky considered to define a period stretching from 1890 to 1933 he labelled 
“banker capitalism” (Minsky, 1990, 1992), is testimonial of the institutional complementarities 
between antitrust law, finance and firms’ strategies that have shaped the collusive form of 
competition at the end of the XIXth century.  
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The merger wave had a considerable magnitude both in terms of the number of firms that engaged in it 
and the market shares obtained after the mergers. In his seminal The First Merger Wave, Nelson (1959) 
estimated the number of net firms disappearances over the 1895-1904 period at 3,012, out of which 2,493 
correspond to consolidations. Lamoreaux (2010), in turn, found the number of consolidations during that 
period to be over 1,800 for manufacturing firms. In terms of market shares, it is remarkable that “of the 
ninety-three consolidations whose market share it is possible to estimate, seventy-two [i.e. 77%] 
controlled at least 40 percent of their industries and forty-two [i.e. 45%] at least 70 percent” (Lamoreaux, 
2010). However, despite its success in terms of the resulting market shares of consolidated firms, the first 
merger wave was unsuccessful in restoring profitability. An in-depth empirical study by Livermore 
(1935) has shown that only 44% of the mergers of the first merger wave succeeded in at least matching 
the average profit rate of the manufacturing sector. Consolidated firms were in most cases unable to 
maintain their market dominance in the long-run. Lamoreaux (1988) explains that this was due to the fact 
that consolidation costs were high because firms purchased overpriced and old depreciated plants; at the 
same time, the rise of prices that consolidations allowed for attracted new competitors, which undermined 
the consolidated firm’s dominant position. A cross-look at Figures 7 and 8 confirms this interpretation. 
While the beginning of the merger wave (around 1895) coincides with a pronounced upward shift in the 
long-run dynamics of prices, profits started growing again approximately from 1890 to 1905, that is to 
say, during the merger wave itself. But after the merger wave was over and firms had to start 
overinvesting again to fight new entrants, profits initiated a downward tendency that in one decade took 
them back to pre-merger-wave levels.  In other words, in the absence of barriers to entry, horizontal 
market power, even after having evolved in terms of mechanisms from collusion to horizontal 
consolidation, was proved to be unstable and ineffective in securing high profits. 
Turning now to the internal aspects of the corporation during this ‘coming of age’ period, we can 
understand better how the (unsuccessful) quest for horizontal market power was not incompatible with a 
continuous push for efficiency gains and competitive tactics. When the period that we have labeled 
‘collusive competition’ started, some key managerial practices that had been developed in the 1850s and 
the 1860s (internal statistics, periodical reports, alternative accounting practices to double-entry 
bookkeeping) had become standard practices. By World War I, the corporation had become the 
hegemonic business institution in the United States (Chandler, 2002).  In other words, the practices that 
had first defined administrative coordination during its development along the predatory competition 
phase consolidated during the collusive competition period. But organizational innovation did not stop 
there. The collusive competition period was also a period that nested a major revolution in management: 
Taylorism.  
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During the 1880s and the 1890s, Taylorism began developing and by the 1910s it had a peak of influence 
(Woodham, 1997). The relevance of this innovation in light of our analysis of the evolution of forms 
of competition lies in that scientific management implied a qualitative leap in the corporation’s 
road to compete on the basis of its capacity to control in the most efficient possible way the entire 
production and distribution process. While the corporation had developed administrative 
coordination practices to control efficiently everyday managerial coordination tasks, it was not until 
the development of scientific management that it was able to fully control the production process 
inside the factory. It did so in two ways. On the one hand, the techniques detailed in Taylor’s seminal 
scientific management paper of 1895 (extreme specialization, routines, time and cost analyses, the 
creation of a planning department, etc.) were effective in rationalizing the production process in order to 
modify it so it would serve the economies of speed on which competitive advantages relied. On the other 
hand, and perhaps most importantly, Taylorism took the control of the production process away from 
workers. This happened in two ways. On the one hand, practices oriented towards the management of 
workers such as the payment of salaries on the basis of the number of pieces produced succeeded in 
taking away from workers the control of the production process by breaking-up workers’ solidarity inside 
the plant. The salary by pieces scheme, for example, was successful in offering a guarantee to workers 
that would drive them away from loitering and resistance practices fostered by unions and would 
substitute worker’s economic solidarity mechanisms such as the union’s fare or the union-run mutual 
funds (Coriat, 1979). On the other hand, “with the Time and Motion Study, Taylorism acted as a gigantic 
process of expropriation of trade workers’ skills, which were then parcelled out and redistributed to 
unskilled workers. Indeed, until the arrival of Taylor, production skills were first and foremost the 
property and ‘monopoly’ of skilled workers. This knowledge, mainly uncoded, was transmitted from one 
generation of workers to the next through the system of apprenticeship. Taylor’s scientific management 
brought this situation to an end, by imposing modes of work division and organisation that were now 
decided by the management. The organisation of work was then claimed by employers’ organisations as a 
‘management right’, in the face of long-running protestations from skilled workers, - and their unions - 
claiming the right to choose what they deemed to be the most efficient operating modes” (Coriat & 
Weinstein, 2011).  This submission of labor to capital’s needs in the production process benefited from 
special historical momentums. Between 1880 and 1915, there was a second immigration wave in the 
United States that came mostly from Southern and Eastern Europe. These workers, contrary to the ones 
that had arrived to the country during the previous immigration wave (1815-1860), had no industrial 
experience or technical knowledge, which impeded them from controlling the production process through 
their possession of tacit knowledge on production. In addition, self-sufficiency through agriculture was 
not an option anymore to these newcomers because the Western frontier of the country was already 
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owned by land and iron speculators and railroads had modified the natural and social landscape of the 
West. Therefore, this ‘ready-made’ male working force (on which capitalists did not need to invest in 
educating or in feeding its families) had no option but to find employment in industrial corporations under 
the rule of scientific management (Coriat, 1979). 
Then, while competition pressured the infant corporation to develop organizational and technical 
innovations that would revolutionize capitalism, horizontal market power was the strategy that it 
employed to try to cast away the self-destroying effects of unreined competition. Even after the 
development of antitrust and successive economic downturns left firms that were trying to flee from 
the ruinous effects of competition with no other option but to build horizontal market power (this 
time emanating from concentration, not from collusion), market power was still playing the role of 
coordinating competition, not eliminating it. As a result, firms were not adopting a rent-seeking 
strategy but, on the contrary, were constantly innovating in order to outcompete their rivals in the 
(now consolidation-supported) collusive competition regime. 
Administrative coordination and management techniques were not the only competitive weapons firms 
developed during the collusive competition era. Intellectual property was also employed. One of the 
turning points in the history of American intellectual property, the shop right doctrine, took place during 
this period. Since the 1850s, firms were able (later on they would obtain the right to) acquire an exclusive 
license over their employees’ inventions. The underlying logic was that when an employee lets its 
employing firm to use his/her invention he/she is implicitly consenting to grant it a license. At the end of 
the XIXth century, the logic shifted to the ‘shop right doctrine’, which stated that if an employee produces 
an invention while working for his/her employer (who, in turn, bears the costs of the invention in terms of 
wages and facilities), the employer had a right to use the invention without paying the employee, who 
nonetheless remained the owner of the intellectual property (Fisk, 1998). The shop-right doctrine 
represented an additional step towards an intellectual property regime centered on the firm instead of the 
individual.  
The shop-right doctrine has to be understood as another mean by which the firm, just as it was 
doing with Taylorism regarding uncodified knowledge, was capturing codified knowledge from 
workers (Coriat & Weinstein, 2011) in order to master it as a competitive weapon. Not 
coincidentally, the collusive competition period (1870s-1910s) matches the second technological 
revolution (1875-1908) that characterized the main firms of the American economy (Perez, 2010). 
This technological revolution, centered on heavy engineering (electrical, chemical, civil, naval) and 
steel (industries with the high fixed-costs that we have identified as a driver of necessity of 
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coordination to escape predatory competition), was marked by one of the more pronounced surges 
in patenting in American history (cf. Figure 5). Firms understood that they had to control the 
codified knowledge on which this technological revolution (and, by extension, their competitive 
position) depended.  
On the same line, in 1905 Congress passed for the first time a law that protected trademarks in domestic 
commerce. “As Mira Wilkins has argued, the timing of the legislation reflected the new efforts of large 
firms competing in oligopolistic markets to use product differentiation to preserve and expand their 
market shares” (Lamoreaux, 2010). 
 
We can conclude this section by highlighting that the collusive form of competition was the first response 
of corporations to the creation of a national market (which was itself partially the result of the deployment 
of the railway and the telegraph by corporations) that had thrown them into an unregulated competition 
environment in which they had to face each other as rivals. Coordinating the competitive process in order 
to avoid the ruinous effects of predatory competition through market-power-creating horizontal 
coordination, be it in the form of collusion or in the form of horizontal consolidation, was the most 
apparent solution. But in the absence of barriers to entry, not even consolidation could fulfill the promise 
of eradicating the evils of predatory competition.  If profitability was to be restored, market power would 
have to play a different role than coordinating competition. It would have to constrict it. 
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Diagram 2: The collusive form of competition (circa 1870s to 1910s) 
 
NB: The dominant institution of the form of competition is shaded. Arrows from other institutions indicate the key 
direct and indirect institutional complementarities with the dominant institution. 
3 Constricted competition (circa 1920s to 1945) 
 
By the 1920s, the major American corporations had understood that horizontal coordination of 
competition through collusion or consolidation were not enough to stabilize prices and to restore 
profitability: without barriers to entry horizontal market power was of little use. The strategy that 
powerful corporations succeeded in deploying and translating into a form of competition consisted in 
dominating markets through efficient mass production while shielding themselves from competition 
through the combined use of three different barriers to entry: intellectual property (through the means of 
patent cartels and trademarks used to restrain trade), vertical integration and collusion. As we will show 
along this section, this course of action responded to the previous experience of firms during the collusive 
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form of competition as well as to a particular transitional historical period regarding technology, antitrust 
enforcement and international political and economic history in general. As we will show, World War I 
and the Great Recession played an important role in creating a political environment in which this market-
power-based form of competition could be tolerated and even nurtured by the federal state until the mid-
1930s. After that period, a general awareness about the necessity of more competition would revive, but it 
would take a decade for institutions (notably the intellectual property regime and antitrust) to 
accommodate and for mass consumption to establish itself so that a new form of competition, Fordist 
Competition (1945-1970s), could take over. In that sense, the Constricted Competition era is to be 
understood as a transitional period. 
During the 1920s, the Taylorist management revolution was boosted by the spread of the semi-automatic 
production chain. The introduction of this technology changed radically firms’ capabilities for various 
reasons and, in doing so, influenced the way in which they competed with each other. From a technical 
point of view, the semi-automatic production chain lowered transportation and manipulation costs of 
mainly heavy objects inside the factory, multiplying in that manner production capacities and increasing 
productivity. This technological advance, in turn, was possible because of the ongoing energetic 
revolution of petrol-based energy, which allowed for the use of electricity and high capacity engines 
inside the factory (Aglietta, 1997). Moreover, the semi-automatic production chain requires less workers 
for maintenance and allows machines to specialize in operations (Coriat, 1979). From the point of view of 
management, the semi-automatic production chain reinforces the Taylorist logic: the chain (and not the 
workers) controls the pace of production, the labor process is broken-up into specialized execution tasks 
that require little training and the spatial distribution around the chain allows for a panoptic mode of 
surveillance. Conception tasks, on the other hand, are the sole responsibility of managers and engineers. 
Therefore, with the introduction of the semi-production chain the firm could increase speed (and hence 
productivity) both by technologically accelerating the production process and by diminishing dead times 
through a higher control of the labor process by management (Coriat, 1979).  
Therefore, mass production of standardized products became a reality in the 1920s American economy 
with the production chain. This radical innovation, along with the energetic revolution that made it 
possible, inaugurates an era that Carlota Perez (2009) considers to span from 1908 (year of the 
introduction of the first Ford-T model) and 1971 and to be technologically characterized by oil, the 
automobile and mass production.  
But in order to succeed in this mass production landscape, firms needed to create sufficient demand 
and/or charge enough to make the most of the economies of speed the semi-automatic production chain 
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allowed for. In order to create demand, firms relied on heavy advertising. Although manufacturers and 
retailers had used advertising before, the 1920s represent a watershed in terms of advertising expenditure. 
During this decade there was a proliferation of national brands. Stimulated by advertising, product style 
started to change rapidly to enhance consumer demand. The rise in advertising expenditure of the decade 
was allocated mainly to maintaining the reputation of tradenames and trademarks and, in doing so, 
building consumer loyalty (Fisher, 1999; Fligstein, 1993).  
Pricing changed accordingly. While in the past pricing had been ex-post (i.e. firms would constantly 
adjust their prices in reaction to demand and competitors’ prices), in the 1920s firms started using ex-ante 
pricing. Prices were maintained regardless of the fluctuations in demand and competitors’ prices; they 
were calculated based on normal costs (i.e. costs of production at a use of capacity judged to be normal) 
and a desired level of profit. This implied that prices were no longer the adjustment variable that resulted 
from competition in the market, but an administratively defined variable consistent with a profitability 
strategy. Consequently, economic gains stopped being measured by mark-ups. Instead, the return on 
investment indicator, which had been introduced in 1917, started to be used.  This switch in the way 
pricing, profitability and long-term decisions were planned within the firm (the fact that managers started 
to take care of strategic decisions instead of day-to-day decisions) translates a tipping point in the 
maturity of the corporation, in which administrative coordination passes from the mere “monitoring of 
current production and distribution of goods” to the “allocation of resources for future production and 
distribution” (Chandler, 2002). 
This new competitive approach centered on dominating markets through mass production and in which 
prices were high enough to restore profitability and stable enough to remain ex-ante required some 
conditions to succeed. On the one hand, a lead firm should be able to establish ex-ante a price that 
competing firms would not want to or could not beat, either because of the lead firm’s superior efficiency 
to hold a price war (contrary to the small number of evenly matched firms characteristic of the predatory 
form of competition) and/or because of the lead firm’s market power. Otherwise, ruinous price wars such 
as the ones that had characterized the predatory form of competition would be triggered and ex-ante 
pricing would be impossible. Moreover, weak competition was a requisite for firms to be profitable 
because the institutional changes required to develop mass consumption that would come after World 
War II (WWII) with Fordism did not exist yet. Therefore, mass consumption of cheap products was not 
an option to obtain profits on small margins over large quantities. Prices needed to remain sufficiently 
high and quality and advertisement were not enough to fulfill that mission; some sheltering from 
competition was needed as well. The collusive form of competition that had spanned from the 1870s to 
the 1910s had been unsuccessful in creating barriers to entry and therefore in restoring profitability. Firms 
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had learned that lesson and, given the possibility of exploiting a nascent competitive strategy that required 
barriers to entry more than ever, they started building them. In other words, market power had to be 
reshaped to forge a new successful form of competition. 
Barriers to entry took many forms during the 1920-1945 period. One of them was vertical integration. As 
we have shown in the previous section, antitrust enforcement had left firms with little option but to 
consolidate in order to exert horizontal market power and avoid price wars. But this horizontal market 
power lacked barriers to entry, which explains why they were unsuccessful in restoring profitability 
during the collusive competition period (1870s-1910s). Following the same logic of consolidation as an 
antitrust-immune strategy of control, firms started to integrate vertically. The strategy consisted in relying 
on “size, integration, and relative effectiveness of the large firms as a potential threat to competitors” 
(Fligstein, 1993). Competitions was discouraged in that manner because large integrated firms could 
control access to raw materials and distribution channels and produce at a lower cost by better 
administratively controlling the flow of goods along the supply chain (Chandler, 2002). This allowed 
them to acquire large market shares and act as price leaders by setting relatively high prices without 
having to fear a price war by non-vertically integrated competitors with higher costs, less resources and 
less control of the supply chain. 
The empirical evidence available confirms that vertical integration was a major part of the strategy 
employed by firms that defined the constricted form of competition. Using four different sources of data 
about the 100 largest American firms, Fligstein (1993) finds that the percentage of firms with some 
amount of vertical integration (measured roughly as “whether or not a firm controlled some aspect of raw 
material production”13) increases between 1919 and 1959. For the 1919-1929 period, the number is at 
51% and it keeps growing until the 1948-1959 period, where it attains 82% before starting to decline. In 
another empirical study on vertical integration, Livesay and Porter (1969) find that “in the period 1899-
1948 there was a general trend toward greater vertical integration in American manufacturing”. 
Therefore, the industrial organization landscape that characterized the constricted form of 
competition was that of vertically integrated oligopolies. This vertical integration movement took 
place mainly through mergers in what is known as the second merger wave of the United States, which 
took place during the 1920s and was characterized by vertical mergers (Eis, 1969; Stigler, 1950) or 
horizontal mergers in markets that were already vertically integrated (Fligstein, 1993). As with the 
                                                          
13 Although Fligstein does not point it out, it is important to highlight that this is a measurement of backward 
integration. 
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previous merger wave, investment banks assured the necessary financing through the purchase of 
securities. 
As important as vertical integration has been for price leaders to cast out competition by discouraging 
competitors to trigger price wars, other strategies that built barriers to entry were deployed. Maintaining 
high prices while keeping competitors out of beating them would require more than a threat of launching 
a price war they could not win: barriers to entry were needed. One of them was intellectual property. The 
two main forms this strategy took were the use of trademarks for anti-competitive purposes and patent 
cartels14.  
As we mentioned above, the constricted competition period was inaugurated by a surge in advertising 
expenditure during the 1920s that aimed at developing customer loyalty attached to trademarks and 
tradenames. Consequently, protection of these intellectual property assets was needed to prevent 
competitors from free-riding on advertisement investment (Fisher, 1999), and the 1905 law protecting 
trademarks in domestic commerce filled that gap (Lamoreaux, 2010). Nevertheless, trademarks were also 
used to restrain trade because before the 1940s intellectual property, just as consolidation, was largely 
immune to antitrust.  Antitrust, which, as we saw above, had become federal and started to be enforced 
more seriously with the 1890 Sherman Act, did not take action against trademarks or copyright until the 
postwar era (Christophers, 2016). Taking advantage of that loophole, before World War II, and especially 
after the 1920s boom in advertising and the front role of trademarks it led to, firms used trademarks to 
practice “illegal division of fields, illegal division of markets and invalid discriminatory price-fixing, pre-
emption of markets and uniform price-fixing, quantity control, and, in general, the support of domestic 
monopoly” (Timberg, 1949). A landmark example of this is American Tobacco, which was founded 
during the first merger wave and by 1907 controlled between 80% and 90% of cigarette trade. It was 
investigated by the Department of Justice (DOJ) and broken-up in five firms in 1911. But through 
trademarking and “a major intensification of advertising and promotion” (Brandt, 2009), each of the new 
companies focused on a single brand, Lucky Strike, which served as a mean to coordinate prices. As a 
consequence, prices did not go down after the break-up (Christophers, 2016).  
The other intellectual property barrier to entry employed by firms to keep competitors away during the 
constricted form of competition was patent pools. As we have mentioned above, following Mangolte’s 
(2014) study of patent pools in the history of the United States, we cannot say that all patent pools were 
used to exclude competitors as ‘patent cartels’. In some cases, patent pools were used to untangle 
                                                          
14 Another ‘hybrid’ intellectual-property-related strategy used besides the two we have just mentioned was merging 
to constitute an intellectual property portfolio robust enough to dominate a market. This strategy was antitrust-
immune at the time. 
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conflicts regarding complementary techniques owned by different firms that were hindering the 
development of industries. Nevertheless, patent pools were also used for cartelization purposes. Between 
the 1920s and the 1940s, this use of patent pools became more and more relevant because of the particular 
stage of the long-term transformation of the American intellectual property regime the country was going 
through after the 1920s. As we have shown in the previous section, with the development of the shop-
right doctrine at the end of the XIXth century, the firm gained increasing power over the use of its 
employees’ patents. At the same time, certain court rulings affirmed the employer’s right to the ownership 
(and not simply the use) of an invention from the moment that the employee had been recruited and paid 
to invent. But it was essentially after 1920 that a doctrine founding the ownership of inventions on the 
employment contract was established. “In 1933, a Supreme Court ruling presented it as an obvious 
principle that ‘the respective rights and obligations of employer and employee, touching an invention 
conceived by the latter, spring from the contract of employment 15’” (Coriat & Weinstein, 2011). In 
parallel, while “relatively few large companies invested in full blown R&D laboratories before the 1920s” 
(Lamoreaux, 2010), after that period in-house research began to be increasingly common in large 
corporations. The market of patents issued to independent inventors was dying during the constricted 
competition period; firms were increasing their control over the production of knowledge. The beginning 
of the constricted competition era was also that of the end of the 1870-1920 era of “independent 
inventors” (Hughes, 2004). This means that, from the 1920s on, firms started increasingly owning patents, 
not just using them. The numbers confirm this long-term pattern. As Merges showed, “in 1885, only 12 
percent of patents were issued to corporations. Slightly more than one hundred years later, the proportions 
had completely reversed:  by 1998, only 12.5 percent of patents were issued to independent inventors” 
(Merges, 2000). The introduction of firms’ ownership over their employees’ inventions in the labor 
contract and the development of in-house R&D by firms, two phenomena that started developing in the 
1920s, are certainly the kickoff of this dramatic transformation in the ownership of patents over the 1885-
1998 period. Since firms were increasingly owning patents, they had increasing opportunities of 
constituting patent pools. And because patent law was older16 than antitrust law and untouched by it (as 
we will see in the next section, it was not until 1942 that patents could no longer be used to cartelize), 
firms took the opportunity of using their enlarging patent portfolios to constitute patent pools for 
collusion purposes and, in doing so, excluding competitors and keeping prices high (Perelman, 2003). An 
                                                          
15 United States vs. Dubilier Condenser Corp, 289 US 178, 187 (1933). Quoted by Fisk (1998). 
 
16 The origins of patent law in the United States go back to the early colonial period, when individuals who invented 
new products could ask for colonial governments to grant them exclusive commercial rights to them. At the end of 
the XVIIIth century, sates started to pass general patent laws. By 1790, the country had a federal Patent Act, while 
the 1787 constitution had given Congress the power to grant patents and copyright protection. 
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example of this is Standard Oil, which after having been forced to break-up in four firms in 1911 for 
having violated the Sherman Act, re-entered the top 30 Dow Jones index in 1924 through Standard Oil 
California and Standard Oil of New Jersey using a price-fixing patent pool made of patents over cracking 
methods of which these two firms participated (Kemnitzer, 1938). This use of patent pools was consistent 
with the competitive strategy that structured the constricted form of competition.  Moreover, firms also 
used their increasingly in-house patents to shield themselves from competition without recurring to patent 
pools. For example, “American Telephone and Telegraph, General Electric, Westinghouse, and numerous 
other firms used their laboratories to develop patents as a strategy of keeping substitute goods from being 
developed by their competitors and as a mean of enhancing and maintaining market share with similar 
strategies (Passer, 1953; Noble, 1977; Reich, 1977, 1980)” (Campbell, Hollingsworth, & Lindberg, 1991, 
pp. 43–44).  
While between the 1920s and the 1940s firms were designing strategies to shield themselves from 
competition by bypassing antitrust legislation, the evolution of antitrust doctrine rendered antitrust 
enforcement loose during much of the period under analysis (roughly between 1915 and 1936 according 
to Kovacic and Shapiro’s (2000) analysis), which also contributed to shape the constricted form of 
competition.  As we will show in the following lines, the evolution of antitrust doctrine, in turn, cannot be 
understood outside of the particular transitional historical context of the Constricted Competition era, a 
period during which the war efforts for World War I and the catastrophic economic consequences of the 
Great Depression favored an associationist view of the economy in which strong competition was 
perceived as a threat. 
As we have mentioned above, the literalist jurisprudence in antitrust was in vogue since the 1897 United 
States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Association case. According to this view, all price-fixing agreements 
were considered to violate the Sherman Act regardless of the reasonability of the prices, a concept that 
had been used in courts to soften the enforcement of the Sherman Act during the previous common law 
phase. Nevertheless, the literalist jurisprudence was a weak equilibrium, as the 5-to-4 vote on the above 
mentioned case indicates (Giocoli, 2015). In 1911, two landmark decisions we have quoted above, 
Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United States and United States v. American Tobacco Company, which 
rulings came with a few days delay, reverted this trend in jurisprudence and initiated what would be 
known as the rule of reason doctrine. In the Standard Oil case, the company was accused of several 
violations of the Sherman Act including threats to suppliers and distributors who did business with 
competitors, taking preferential rebates from shippers, the use of commercial spies or cutthroat pricing. 
Two matters that would set influential jurisprudence were at stake in this case. The first one was if 
whether, as the literalist interpretation would go, the fact that Standard Oil was a trust was in itself a 
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violation of the Sherman Act. The second one was if these practices, which Standard Oil did not deny, 
were illegal. The ruling effectively distinguished these two matters. Regarding the first one, it was 
decided that neither trusts nor monopolies were illegal per se, but only in cases where they would result in 
“restriction upon individual freedom of contract and their injury to the public”17. In other words, the 
literalist approach was not valid: the legality of combinations should be judged on a case-by-case basis 
using a rule of reason. The key factor was whether the freedom of contract of a combination was in 
violation of the freedom of contract of competitors by restricting their possibility to compete, not if the 
prices resulting from the combination were reasonable in the sense of high enough to avoid ruinous 
competition. Standard Oil was found to be guilty of violations of the Sherman Act for that latter reason, 
and so was American Tobacco for the same motive a few days later in a similar case. Although these two 
landmark cases signified a blow taken by two of the major industrial behemoths of the early XXth century 
(a blow they would recover from by using intellectual property to conspire, as we have mentioned above), 
it also turned the rule of reason into the cornerstone of antitrust enforcement for a little more than two 
decades. Under the rule of reason, “freedom of contract and the protection of property rights became the 
Supreme Court’s guiding light for antitrust enforcement until the New Deal” (Giocoli, 2015).  
Ironically, the rule of reason, born from the victory of antitrust over two notorious giant corporations, 
opened the door to loose antitrust enforcement. The rule of reason established a difference between tight 
combinations (those that involved only one corporation, which were increasingly common after 1895) and 
loose combinations (those that involved more than one firm). While the latter continued to be illegal per 
se, the former could only be considered illegal if it could be proven that its “evident purpose” was to 
restrain trade. In order to do so, it was required “to marshal abundant testimony from competitors that the 
consolidation had engaged in unfair, restrictive, or discriminatory acts that were meant to abridge the 
freedom of others to go about their business in the normal manner or engage in the trade of their 
choosing” (Lamoreaux, 1988, pp. 191–192). As a result of this doctrine, tight combinations retained some 
options such as controlling a resource through vertical integration. More importantly, because 
competitors’ testimony were crucial to prove the “evident purpose” of a restraint of trade in a tight 
combination case, most of the times competitors did not have incentives to provide such a testimony. 
Because, as we have shown, the form of competition of the period was characterized by vertically 
integrated lead firms setting relatively high prices, non-lead firms profited from the high prices lead firms 
could set by recurring, among other things, to tight combinations. Therefore, non-lead firms had no 
incentives to testify against lead-firms (Lamoreaux, 1988). Consequently, “Supreme Court decisions in 
this era affecting collusion and cooperation between firms reflected tolerant treatment”; the era also 
                                                          
17 Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United States, 221 US 1 (1911) p. 54 
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“marks the longest lapse for the enforcement of antitrust controls on dominant firm behavior” (Giocoli, 
2015).  
The soft enforcement of antitrust during this period was certainly made possible by the switch from the 
literalist jurisprudence to the rule of reason jurisprudence, but the active factors that explain the loosening 
of antitrust enforcement are to be found in the historical context of the country at the time. Under other 
historical circumstances, the rule of reason could have been as well used as a weapon to practice a harsher 
yet more sophisticated antitrust. Two major historical events have to be recalled to understand the way in 
which the rule of reason was applied until the mid-1930s: World War I and the Great Depression. In 
1917, the Federal Government set in place the War Industries Board (WIB), an agency in charge of 
purchasing war supplies in preparation for United States’ involvement in World War I. This agency 
encouraged mass production, set production quotas and allocated raw materials. The WIB was a success: 
between 1917 and 1919 (last year of its existence), industrial production rose by 20 percent. This 
experience legitimized an ‘associationalist’ vision of business-government relations (Giocoli, 2015) and 
improved public (and judges’) opinion of large corporations and trusts, which, by recurring to 
collaboration practices considerably distant from what a strict antitrust approach would have prescribed, 
had been the industrial engine of war. A decade later, “to many observers the 1929 crash repudiated the 
competitive model of economic organization and verified the associationalist preference that the 
government take stronger steps to orchestrate commerce” (Kovacic & Shapiro, 2000, pp. 46–47). 
Following this spirit, in 1933 the federal government passed the National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA) 
in order to spur recovery and fight deflation (cf. Figures 6 and 7) in the midst of what had been the worst 
economic crisis of the history of the country. Among other measures, the NIRA legalized cartels and 
other forms of price-fixing and cooperation between competitors (Eisner, 2000). In Fligstein words, “the 
NIRA was the embodiment of the cartelized approach. The firms in each industry organized with the 
blessing of the NRA” (Fligstein, 1993, p. 122). 
By the mid-1930s, the NIRA experiment was unanimously considered a failure and in 1935 the Supreme 
Court judged that it was unconstitutional and put an end to it. Moreover, the luster of the associationist 
view had faded after the growth in size and market power of major corporations had not proven to be a 
cure to the recession. This led to a change of mentality from the federal government, the public opinion 
and the judges that had to decide on antitrust cases. President Franklin Roosevelt started to turn to 
advisors defending the idea that competition was the only way to economic recovery (Leuchtenburg, 
1963). From 1936 to 1940, he appointed several officials to the Justice Department that “mounted 
ambitious attacks on horizontal collusion and single-firm dominance” (Kovacic & Shapiro, 2000). At the 
same time, the 1936 Robinson-Patman Act was passed. This act, which prohibited for the first time price 
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discrimination, was designed to protect small stores from chain stores that would buy cheaper than them. 
This act was another signal of the renewed anti-large corporations and pro-antitrust spirit that started to 
spread in the mid-1930s. On the courts’ side, the same spirit led to a shift towards a considerably more 
rigid application of the rule of reason. Through several cases, enforcement against price-fixing and market 
allocation cartels as well as condemnations of dominant firms’ behaviors increased (Kovacic & Shapiro, 
2000). Nevertheless, it would take a few more years for antitrust to attack what had been the major market 
power devices of the constricted competition era: intellectual property rights and vertical and horizontal 
integration. 
Another important consequence of the impact the Great Depression had on the forging of the Fordist form 
of competition (1945-1970s) that started in during the constricted form competition period was the 
separation between commercial and investment banking. In 1932, the Senate led the Pecora Investigation 
to investigate the causes of the 1929 stock market crash. The investigation pointed out several abusive 
practices of the financial sector, which led to the passing of the Banking Act a year later, also known as 
the Glass-Steagall Act. This act forbad investment banks and securities firms from taking deposits. 
Symmetrically, it prevented commercial Federal Reserve banks from: 
 dealing in non-governmental securities for customers 
 investing in non-investment grade securities for themselves 
 underwriting or distributing non-governmental securities 
 affiliating (or sharing employees) with companies involved in such activities 
This separation between commercial and investment activities in the financial industry would assure that 
the financial sector would mainly play the role of financing the expansion and consolidation of non-
financial firms until the beginning of the Fordist form of competition (1945-1970s). 
To conclude, the constricted form of competition implied a redefinition of the purpose of and the 
forms taken by market power. During the collusive competition phase, market power had been 
primarily used to coordinate competition and avoid predatory pricing through collusion and, later on, 
horizontal mergers. During the constricted competition era market power started to be used not to 
coordinate but to constrict competition. The collusive competition strategy had failed because, given the 
industrial organization and legal landscape of the time, without barriers to entry ruinous competition was 
inevitable. During the constricted competition era, firms were successful in remedying that mistake by 
raising barriers to entry through the use of intellectual property and vertical integration. But not only did 
the forms taken by market power during that era changed; so did the role it played regarding competition. 
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Instead of using market power to coordinate competition, firms started to use it to shelter themselves from 
competition following a strategy based on dominant vertically integrated firms using low-cost mass 
production techniques and setting high prices that were sustainable because their market power sheltered 
them from new entrants and discouraged defiance by incumbent competitors. Unlike its predecessor, this 
form of competition was successful in resisting deflation18 and restoring profitability. The period 
spanning from 1920 to 1950 represents an upward shift in the long-term trend of the rate of profit in the 
United States (cf. Figure 8). Victim of its success, this form of competition would generate the seeds of its 
destruction. The animosity against large corporations and monopolization that started to revive in the 
mid-1930s would lead to a radical transformation in antitrust legislation and enforcement that, together 
with other crucial evolutions of the organizational structure of the firm and, more broadly, of the 
American regulatory regime, would configure a new form of competition: the Fordist form of 
competition. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
18 Although the period in question presents a downward tendency in prices (cf. Figure 6), one has to bear in mind 
that it starts after the strong inflation of the World War I period, during which prices rose by 88% in 6 years. A 
rebound deflation was therefore inevitable. Moreover, the constricted competition period has also been shaken by 
the Great Depression and its subsequent profound deflation. Nonetheless (and this show to which extent market 
power was playing a countervailing role in prices dynamics during a severely deflationary period), between 1920 
(the peak of the World War I inflation period) and 1939 prices were in average 59% higher than before their pre-
World-War-I inflation level, which in turn had been the highest in 41 years (!). 
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Diagram 3: The constricted form of competition (circa 1920s to 1945) 
 
NB: The dominant institution of the form of competition is shaded. Arrows from other institutions indicate the key 
direct and indirect institutional complementarities with the dominant institution. 
 
4 Fordist Competition (circa 1945 to 1970s) 
 
The origins of the Fordist form of competition are to be found in the Great Depression. It was after this 
event that two major transformations that would redefine the functioning of competition and the nature of 
its link to market power took place: the birth of the diversified M firm and a profound strengthening of 
antitrust enforcement and legislation. Together, and complemented with the institutional designs of the 
intellectual property regime and the financial sector in a technological context favorable to mass 
production, they would shape a new form of competition. In this new form of competition market power 
would be severely curtailed by antitrust and firms would be therefore exposed to strong competition in 
mass consumption markets. In order to compete, they would have to constantly innovate to raise 
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productivity and introduce new products. But only after WWII would those changes have matured and the 
broader regulation mode known as Fordism would have been deployed for this new form of competition 
to be able to unfold. 
During the 1920s, pioneer firms started to develop a new competitive strategy that, unlike the dominant 
one at the time, was not based on controlling the prices of a market through efficient production and 
barriers to entry arising from vertical integration and intellectual property assets. In the midst of the 
marketing revolution that had multiplied advertisement expenditure in the 1920s, these firms started 
implementing a business strategy in which “the emphasis was on producing brand loyalty, expanding 
market share, and finding new markets for existing and new products, rather than on direct price 
competition (…) Firms no longer produced a narrow line of products, but began to produce full lines that 
spanned entire industries. Organizational fields were no longer systems of power oriented toward 
controlling price and production levels. Instead, they were places to observe what competitors were doing 
in order to avoid direct competition and find new opportunities to increase sales” (Fligstein, 1993, p. 
123).  
The diversification and product differentiation strategy proper to this competitive strategy required a 
complementary organizational innovation that came along at the same time: the M firm. By the 1920s, the 
unitary and functional forms of organization of the corporation were hegemonic in the United States: 
“modern business enterprise had reached its maturity” (Chandler, 2002). This form, perfected by General 
Electric and Du Pont before World War I, had been used “primarily by companies producing a single line 
of goods for one major product or regional market” (Chandler, 2002), as it had been widely the case 
before the 1920s. At this period, General Motors and Du Pont pioneered in developing a new way of 
organizing the firm into a multidivisional, decentralized structure in which every division was in charge 
of a market and top managers were exclusively taking care of strategic decisions instead of day-to-day 
business, which was one of the weaknesses of the previous structures. Functional departments (e.g. sales, 
production) were not monolithic anymore but spread around divisions that formed a largely autonomous 
organization within the organization and centered on a product line or a regional market. This new form 
of organization is the one that best fit firms “manufacturing several lines for a number of product and 
regional markets” (Chandler, 2002). Indeed, it gives the firm a larger strategic flexibility that allows an 
easier penetration of new markets or the diversification into new types of products, while it favors the 
coordination of different stages of production and the integration between production and sales within 
each division, as well as the exploitation of economies of scale and variety (Weinstein, 2010). As 
Fligstein (1993, p. 159) sums it up, “in order to coordinate the production of multiple products, the 
multidivisional form was invented”. Although diversification, and the subsequent adoption of the M firm 
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organizational model, started in the 1920s, it multiplied after the Great Depression. Using data from firms 
with more than $5,000 of production, Fligstein shows that among firms that were producing different 
product lines, the percentage producing related products (e.g. an instruments companies that produces 
guitars and pianos) passed from 25.3% in 1919 to 42.3% in 1937 (Fligstein, 1993). In another study that 
compares firms’ membership in the 100 largest firm category and their strategy in terms of product line 
diversification (Fligstein, 1991) he finds that during the 1920s the firms that entered the top 100 did so by 
using a product-related diversification strategy and, during the 1930s, this strategy made them grow. The 
final shift occurred in the 1940s, when many of the firms that remained in the top 100 started to adopt the 
product-related diversification strategy of the newcomers.   
Moreover, the World War II context contributed to catalyze the spread of this second “managerial 
revolution” to many sectors of the economy for two reasons (Chandler, 2002). First, the war required the 
production of new technologically complex products, a task that was better coordinated through a 
divisional form of organization of the firm and required accelerating the ongoing transformation of the 
role of management from mere “monitoring of current production and distribution of goods” to the 
“allocation of resources for future production and distribution” (Chandler, 2002). Second, the 
requirements of mobilizing the economy to prepare for war led to the pooling and expansion of the 
managerial procedures and controls that were until then confined to large firms. By the end of World War 
II, the diversified firm was the dominant model among the largest American firms. Using three different 
long-run datasets on products mix of the 100 largest firms, Fligstein concludes that “the 100 largest firms 
at the end of the [1950s] decade were either becoming diversified or already diversified. This is evidence 
that in order to remain in the population of the largest firms, one needed to be diversified” (Fligstein, 
1993, p. 263). This tendency accelerated in the 1950s. Analyzing the 200 largest firms, Gort (1962) finds 
that the rate of introduction of new products jumps from 39.5% in the 1939-1950 period to 86.5% in the 
1950-1954 period. Moreover, he finds a continuous decline in the percentage of those new products that 
are introduced in the main industry19 of the firm between 1929-1939 and 1950-1954. 
In brief, the diversification strategy started in the 1920s with some pioneer firms, spread after the Great 
Depression during the 1930s and at the end of the 1950s it had become the hegemonic strategy of the 
leading firms of the American economy. This strategy spread during the Great Depression because it 
offered firms the possibility to cover from risk in a very uncertain context by spreading it across different 
product lines and it gave them the possibility of raising the utilization of the plant capacity, two reasons 
quoted by the executives of 26 of the 50 largest firms interviewed in 1937 by Thorp and Crowder in their 
                                                          
19 The main industry refers to two-digit SIC scores. 
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research on diversification (Thorp & Crowder, 1941). In Fligstein (1993) words, “the environmental 
shock that pushed diversification from a tactic employed by a small number of firms to the central tactic 
used by almost all of the largest firms was the Depression”. Nonetheless, in order to understand why this 
strategy that suited well times of economic crises spread during the next decades until it became 
dominant, other factors need to be taken into account. From a long-term term perspective, the expansion 
of in-house R&D, which had become usual among the largest firms since the 1920s, offers a part of the 
explanation. In-house research labs were now providing firms with increasing product innovations, which 
opened up opportunities to diversify. This is another of the reasons for adopting diversification strategies 
pointed out by executives in Thorp and Crowder’s study. 
But the fundamental reasons of the endurance of the Great-Depression-suited diversified M firm 
during the “golden age of capitalism” are to be found in the collapse of the pillars of the constricted 
form of competition. As shown in the previous section, the latter was based on vertically integrated 
unitary firms that dominated non-mass-consumption markets and could set high prices because of 
the barriers to entry that their market power (which came from their size, vertical integration, 
their use of intellectual property as barriers to entry and their horizontal and vertical anti-
competitive practices) allowed them to create and maintain. Beginning around World War II, the 
expansion and deepening of antitrust legislation and enforcement, as well as the setup of a new 
regulation mode based on salaried workers and mass consumption, dismantled the old form of 
competition and left fertile soil for a new one in which the diversified M firm would reign. Once the 
possibility of exerting market power disappeared, the only way left for firms to survive competition 
was to raise productivity and to introduce new products. What had been the survival strategy of a 
few pioneer firms during the Great Depression had become a standard competitive practice in the 
Fordist form of competition. 
As explained in the previous section, the mid-1930s were a turning point in terms of antitrust. The 
Roosevelt administration, not without the support of the general public, decided to go after the large 
firms, which were perceived as having accumulated too much market power without that resulting in 
economic recovery. But it was not until the late 1940s that significant changes in antitrust legislation and 
enforcement started to take place. Figures 9 and 10 offer a good picture of the shift in antitrust 
enforcement. 
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Figure 9: Total antitrust cases (left axis) and percentage of Antitrust Division cases won (right axis) in the 
proceUnited States (1920-1952) 
 
Source: own elaboration based on Fligstein’s (1993) data. 
 
Figure 10: Expenditure on antitrust enforcement in the United States (1920-1952) 
 
Source: own elaboration based on Fligstein’s (1993) data. 
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As Figure 9 shows, 1939 was the turning point in terms of antitrust enforcement measured in number of 
cases issued. After that year, the activity of the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice and the 
Federal Trade Commission (FTC) increased significantly: while the average number of antitrust cases 
issued per year in the 1920-1930 decades was 13.3, during the 1940-1950s decades this number rose to 
31.3. As soon as 1948, half of the 100 largest American firms had been sued by the Antitrust Division 
(Christophers, 2016). Moreover, while activity picked up, the effectivity in terms of percentage of cases 
won by the Antitrust Division also increased: it went from an average of 66% during the 1920-1930 
period to 71% during the 1940-1950s decades. The rise in antitrust enforcement is consistent with the 
increase in the expenditure dedicated to it. As seen in Figure 10, the rate of growth of antitrust 
expenditures shifted upwards drastically in 1946 for the Antitrust Division and in 1947 for the FTC. 
Indeed, in the seven years after the end of World War II, total antitrust expenditure more than doubled, 
passing from 3.5 million in 1945 to 7.6 million in 1952.  
The shift in antitrust was not only in terms of enforcement. Antitrust jurisprudence started to evolve to 
become more and more stringent and to continuously erode firms’ possibility of exerting market power. 
Regarding vertical market power exerted through contractual means, as Hovenkamp (2014) explains, 
“beginning with former Assistant Attorney General Thurman Arnold in the late 1930s, U.S. antitrust 
policy dramatically shifted from tolerance to a drastic attack on both ownership vertical control via the 
law of monopolization and mergers, and contractual vertical control via tying, exclusive dealing, and 
resale price maintenance. By the late 1930s and 1940s, vertical integration was widely perceived as 
almost inherently monopolistic”.  
Some landmark cases set precedent to forbid practices that had been common during the constricted form 
of competition. For example, the 1947 International Salt Co. v. United States case is one of the landmark 
cases in terms of horizontal restraints jurisprudence. The defendant had patented machines that facilitated 
salt processing, mixing and injection and required those who used the machines to also buy the salt 
processed with the machines. The ruling was against the defendant on the basis that tied sales were a per 
se violation of the Sherman Act. This ruling set a precedent and removed tied selling from firms’ market-
power-building strategies menu. Another example, this time regarding vertical restraints, is the 1967 
United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co. in which the Supreme Court judged that territorial restrictions on 
resale imposed by a manufacturer to a distributor are per se violations of the Sherman Act (Hartley, 
1999). The common pattern in the evolution of antirust jurisprudence on restraints of trade is the 
subsequent fading off of the rule of reason in favor of stricter per se rules. This rendered antitrust 
stricter because, by setting precedents against defendants based on per se rules, antitrust started to 
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forbid practices regardless of the circumstances, the possible positive effects in terms of efficiency 
(Encaoua & Guesnerie, 2006) and the interpretations made by the judges, who otherwise might 
have used the rule of reason to lighten antitrust enforcement, as we have seen it had been the case 
in the past.  
Another major evolution of antitrust jurisprudence that contributed significantly to curtail firms’ capacity 
of exerting both horizontal and vertical market power was the consistent hostility towards intellectual 
property from antitrust that started in the 1940s (Christophers, 2016; Fisher, 1999; Sell, 2004, Waller & 
Byrne, 1993).  
A landmark case regarding antitrust and patents is the 1948 United States v. Line Material Co. This case 
has to be read in light of the ruling of the 1926 United States v. General Electric Co. case. General 
Electric held three patents needed to produce electric lights with tungsten filaments as well as a market 
share of 69% on lightbulbs. It decided to grant a license to its competitor Westinghouse (which held a 
16% market share) on the condition that the latter would sell the lightbulbs at a price fixed by General 
Electric, which could change at discretion. This practice was suspected of constituting a price-fixing 
agreement masked in intellectual property licensing, but the Supreme Court judged it lawful. Consistent 
with the features of the constricted form of competition described in the previous section, the decision 
reflected the antitrust immunity intellectual property benefited from at the time. The ruling of the case 
states that the patentee has the right to impose any conditions (including price) when licensing to a 
manufacturer that “are normally and reasonably adapted to secure pecuniary reward for the patentee’s 
monopoly”20. In Line Material, several manufacturers of electrical devices formed a patent pool to obtain 
licenses over two patents from the firms Lemmon and Shultz, which ‘blocked’ each other but, combined, 
resulted in a superior device. The licensing agreements contained price-fixing clauses, which is why the 
Supreme Court considered it a violation of the Sherman Act. This case represented a watershed in 
antitrust jurisprudence regarding patent pools and other uses of patent licenses that might restrain trade, 
ending so with the doctrine set in General Electric. From Line Material on, antitrust would be hard on 
any use of patent licensing that might restrain trade in any way. This policy crystallized in the list of 
licensing practices considered to represent restraints of trade that the Antitrust Division issued in 1975, 
but that had been already announced in 1970 by Bruce B. Wilson, Deputy Assistant Attorney General 
before the Fourth New England Antitrust Conference. The list, which came to be known as the ‘Nine No-
Nos’, included the following practices (Lim, 2013): 
                                                          
20 United States v. Line Material Co., 333 U.S. 287 (1948) Available at: 
https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/333/287/case.html 
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(1) Tying the purchase of unpatented materials as a condition of the license 
(2) Requiring the licensee to assign back subsequent patents 
(3) Restricting the right of the purchaser of the product in the resale of the product 
(4) Restricting the licensee's ability to deal in products outside the scope of the patent 
(5) A licensor's agreement not to grant further licenses 
(6) Mandatory package licenses 
(7) Royalty provisions not reasonably related to the licensee's sales 
(8) Restrictions on a licensee's use of a product made by a patented process 
(9) Minimum resale price provisions for the licensed products 
Moreover, besides the strong limits set to intellectual property through antitrust, it was common that the 
state would impose compulsory licensing to companies (Fisher, 1999), although many times compulsory 
licensing was the result of an antitrust-related court ruling. 
Patents were not the only intellectual property assets which use started to be curtailed by antitrust. Before 
1949 there had not been a single antitrust case involving trademarks. At the beginning of that year, the 
Antitrust Division launched a series of cases in which the use of trademark was considered to be “a 
primary and direct source of antitrust violation” (Timberg, 1949), setting jurisprudence that would impose 
severe antitrust restrictions to the use of trademark as tools to restrain trade in the same way that was 
happening with patents. 
Another main feature of the harshening of antitrust, and perhaps the most influential one, was the tight 
merger control that began in 1950 with the Celler-Kefauver Act. Its origins go back to the mid-1930s, 
when, as we have shown above, antitrust started to regain power. During that period, economists started 
to take a lead role in antitrust, a discipline that until then had been solely exerted by jurists. By the 1950s-
1960s economic-model-based antitrust had become the norm (Carstensen, 1988). The importance of the 
role economists started to play to understand the Fordist form of competition lies in the fact that it was a 
particular economic school, the Structuralist School, which came to dominate antitrust thinking between 
1936 and 1972 (Kovacic & Shapiro, 2000). This school of thought considered firms’ behaviors to depend 
on the industry’s structure, and mainly on its concentration level. The Structuralist School had a strong 
influence on jurisprudence first and antitrust legislation afterwards. In US v. Alcoa (1945) and US v. 
American Tobacco (1946), two cases that made it to the Supreme Court, the government’s cases were for 
the first time not based on alleged conspiracies, but on concentration and size within the industry. For the 
first time the Court started accepting statistical arguments on concentration and size as evidence in 
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antitrust cases (Fligstein, 1993). This reasoning would become increasingly frequent and would 
materialize soon in the 1950 Celler-Kefauver Act. 
In the late 1940s, two issues that worried the general public were mobilized by the FTC, the Congress and 
the Department of Justice in their campaign against big companies: inflation and the fear of communism. 
Inflation, they claimed, was the consequence of the economy being dominated by a few large 
corporations with market power that were avoiding competitive pricing.  The size of the few companies 
dominating the economy, in turn, was seen as a prelude to collectivism (Fligstein, 1993). In both 
arguments was implicit the Structuralist idea according to which size equals power. These arguments 
added to the increasing animosity against large companies that had started in the mid-1930s and 
contributed to pass in 1950 the Celler-Kefauver Act, which set strong legal barriers to horizontal and 
vertical mergers. This act declared illegal any merger or joint venture (be it horizontal or vertical) that 
would lessen competition or create a monopoly (Fligstein, 1993). Moreover, it closed the legal loophole 
of the Clayton Act. The latter forbad companies to buy their competitors’ securities, but not their assets. 
With the Celler-Kefauver Act, the buying of competitors’ assets started to be controlled as well. 
Additionally, the act clarified that the Clayton Act applied not only to horizontal mergers but also to 
vertical mergers (Christophers, 2016). Armed with the Celler-Kefauver Act, and supported by the 
Structuralist economic theory, the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice and the FTC imposed a 
severe control of both horizontal and vertical mergers during the 1940s, 1950s, and 1960s (Christophers, 
2016; Encaoua & Guesnerie, 2006; Fligstein, 1991; Kovacic & Shapiro, 2000), probably the most severe 
it has ever existed. As Fox and Pitofsky (1997) put it, “in the 1960s the United States had by far the most 
stringent antitrust merger policy in the world, striking down mergers among small firms in 
unconcentrated markets. It was not unusual for the government to challenge successfully mergers among 
direct competitors holding no more than 5 or 6 percent of the market”. The stringent Structuralist 
approach to Antitrust regarding mergers crystallized in the influential Department of Justice’s merger 
guidelines of 1968, in which it was made clear that concentration was the measure of market power and 
that the former would almost univocally lead to the obtaining and exertion of the latter (Christophers, 
2016). Efficiency gains were considered to be minor positive effects in comparison to the harmfulness of 
increases in market power generated by concentration. An illustration of the spirit of merger policy during 
the Fordist competition era is the merger guideline’s view on vertical integration: “integration 
accomplished by a large vertical merger will usually raise entry barriers or disadvantage competitors to an 
extent not accounted for by, and wholly disproportionate to, such economies as may result from the 
merger”21. 
                                                          
21 Quoted by Hovenkampf (2014). 
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The strictness of the merger policy of the period under analysis is one of the factors that have contributed 
to the third merger wave of the United States, which took place during the 1960s22 and was characterized 
by being majorly driven by conglomerate mergers (Fligstein, 1993; Weinstein, 2010). As a result of this 
trend, by 1980 the median large American corporation operated in three different industries (Davis, 
Diekmann, & Tinsley, 1994). Faced to the fact that antitrust was very strict on firms that would become 
too big in their industries and it was blocking both horizontal and vertical mergers, the only option for 
growth left to firms was the conglomerate. This, in turn, was in line with the trend towards diversification 
of the firm that, as we have seen above, started in the 1920s and matured during the Fordist competition 
era. Finally, the good economic environment and the low interest rates were other factors contributing to 
the conglomerate merger wave of the 1960s. The merger wave started with small firms that were under 
the radar of the FTC and the Department of Justice, but once the conglomerate strategy for growth they 
were carrying on became apparent, large firms started to implement it as well (Fligstein, 1993). And 
because conglomerates group by definition firms in different industries, the Structuralist approach to 
market power based on concentration in a same relevant market or on the leverage that vertical integration 
offers did not apply. Hence, antitrust authorities could not oppose these mergers. The result of this 
process was the definition of an industrial organization landscape that characterized the Fordist 
form of competition: conglomerates of vertically integrated firms. 
 
Therefore, during the Fordist competition era, vertically integrated firms grouped in conglomerates were 
competing under strict supervision of antitrust authorities, which blocked any abuse of market power 
related to size, vertical integration or intellectual property. During the constricted competition era, 
market power had given firms the possibility to set high prices that (more than) compensated the 
lack of mass markets needed to absorb their mass production. During the Fordist competition era, 
the harshness of antitrust and the development of mass markets altered competitive dynamics: lead 
firms no longer used market power to become price-setters; firms started competing on price and 
through the introduction of new products in mass markets because they could not exert market 
power and mass markets allowed them to make profits over large quantities of standardized 
products instead of on large margins. 
 
Let us point out that although firms competed on price this does not mean that prices constantly fluctuated 
as a result of price wars, as it was the case notably during the Predatory Competition era (1840s-1860s). 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
 
22 Fligstein (1993) considers a wider range of years for the third merger wave (1954-1969). 
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On the contrary, firms set prices according to an ex-ante cost-plus logic23. To set a price, they would add a 
mark-up over costs that would remain steady in spite of short-term fluctuations in demand or costs (Boyer 
& Mistral, 1983). This short-term-steady level of mark-up depended on competition and wages. Price 
competition took place in the long-run through price cuts, as productivity increases translated in lower 
normal costs and antitrust authorities made sure prices were not abusive. 
 
The development of mass markets was therefore a social process that created institutional 
complementarities that co-built the Fordist competition regime. Two major channels of creation of mass 
markets can be identified. First, the broadest change of the regulation mode after World War II (the war 
effort itself being a government stimulus that resulted in full employment at the beginning of the period, 
as Chandler (2002) recalls) that has been studied in depth by the Regulation School. After 1945, the state 
started, on the one hand, to develop social welfare, which allowed individuals to have minimum living 
standard conditions guaranteed by the state and, so, to use their salary to foster demand in mass markets, 
or even to consume when they were not wage earners (Coriat, 1979). On the other hand, the State would 
guarantee full employment through Keynesian economic policy and through a set of regulations that 
would result in setting the employment relationship as a universal status that would provide high salaries 
(for example, by fixing minimal wages) (Lipietz, 1983). Moreover, the regulation of the wage-labor 
nexus, which became hierarchical over the other institutional forms during the period, gave workers a 
strong bargaining position, which allowed them to negotiate high salaries that would increase with 
productivity, enabling so the emergence of mass markets (Aglietta, 1997; Boyer & Saillard, 1995).  
 
Another important transformation that came from the firm and allowed for the creation of mass markets 
was the policy of setting high salaries subject to productivity and working process conditions. Ford’s 
famous ‘five dollars a day’ policy is the emblem of this logic that would become popular during the 
Fordist form of competition. One of the outcomes of this policy was that it allowed for the 
commoditization of workers’ consumption: with high salaries, workers stopped recurring to domestic 
agriculture in parallel of their jobs. But although this was a major outcome of the “five dollars a day” 
policy, its application followed the logic of the transformation of the firm towards a greater control over 
the working process that we have been tracing. Indeed, this salary was subject to respecting some 
existence conditions (hygiene, moral, alcohol and tobacco consumption, etc.). This had an effect of 
breaking worker’s rebelliousness and high turnover, which was due to the unhygienic and violent working 
conditions that prevailed at the time. Finally, the ‘five dollars a day’ salary was also subject to respecting 
                                                          
23 This pricing mechanism will be thoroughly explained in Chapter 2. 
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the pace of the assembly line, which had taken workers’ control over the speed of the production process 
(Coriat, 1979). 
 
In addition to the existence of a mass market, strong long-run price competition between vertically 
integrated diversified firms grouped in conglomerates was possible because of the particular 
configurations of the financial sector and the intellectual property regime that prevailed during the Fordist 
competition era. Regarding the financial sector, the Fordist competition regime corresponds to the 
financial regime that Minsky (1990, 1992) has defined as “managerial capitalism” (1933-1982). During 
this era, the financial sector was dominated by investment banks dedicated to financing the growth and 
stability of corporations through long-term lines of credit. Internal financing by the corporation was also 
common during this period. Although the financial sector also financed the third merger wave, it is 
important to point out the qualitative difference that bears with the role it had played in financing mergers 
in the past. The first merger wave was a rationalization merger wave. Banks were financing it in the hope 
that consolidation would allow firms to raise prices and stop ruinous competition. During the second 
merger wave, banks were also financing mostly vertical mergers in order to consolidate a market-power-
building strategy that would allow firms to raise prices and increase earnings for banks that owned their 
stocks. But during the third merger wave, banks financed conglomerate mergers in order to expand the 
growth of the corporation once antitrust blocked any other form of expansion, not to obtain market power 
and increase profits by exerting it.  
 
We want to stress the complementarity of the role of finance and the form of competition during 
Fordism: in a scenario of strong competition on prices and limited possibilities of market power 
exertion, banks played the role of financing the long-term investments needed to improve 
productivity, fund the development of research and development leading to the introduction of new 
products and expand diagonally through conglomerates. Productivity gains and introducing new 
products were the only way for firms to increase profits in domestic markets dominated by strong 
long-run price competition between vertically integrated firms deprived of market power that 
earned money on quantities and not on mark-up. ‘Collecting’ performing firms in those industries 
through conglomerate acquisitions, in turn, was the best way for financial institutions to build a 
healthy financial portfolio in what was a highly regulated financial market. Indeed, the Glass-
Steagall Act forced commercial banks to center their activity on making loans. Short-run financial 
profits were not an option for them and, therefore, firms could count on commercial banks to 
finance long-term investment in R&D and expansion. 
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The institutional complementarities of the Fordist form of competition also extend to the intellectual 
property regime. During this period, the regulation of intellectual property was configured around the 
“open science regime”, which relied on two basic pillars (Coriat & Weinstein, 2011; Orsi & Coriat, 
2006). The first one is the clear distinction between inventions and discoveries, the latter being the only 
valid subjects of patenting. Inventions correspond to basic science, while discoveries refer to industrial 
applications24 of intellectual findings. The counterpart of the temporary monopoly the patent represents is 
the divulgation of the discovery. Discoveries were therefore confined to technology. The second pillar is 
the clear and consequent division between the agents in charge of each type of intellectual creation. 
Scientific research (i.e. research aimed at producing basic science) took place mainly in public nonprofit 
organizations whose objective was the production of freely-circulating knowledge such as universities, 
publicly-funded research labs or government agencies. Technological research, in turn, took place within 
the corporation. As we have seen above, in-house research started spreading in the 1920s. By World War 
II it had become the norm in large American firms. The production of technological knowledge was 
therefore part of firms’ routines. The underlying basic knowledge was open and firms used it to build 
technological applications over it and obtain patents.  
We want to stress this time the complementarities of the open science regime and the competitive 
dynamics proper to Fordism. On the one hand, the patent system, which implies a temporary 
monopoly over a technology, gave firms incentives to invest in technologies that would raise their 
productivity and help them creating or conquering new markets by introducing new products. 
These were the only possible competitive strategies to increase profits in a form of competition 
dominated by strong price competition and curbed market power. Moreover, antitrust authorities 
made sure that the legal monopolies granted by patents would not result in market power exertion, 
as the frequency of compulsory licensing and the harshness of the DOJ and the FTC on intellectual-
property-related cases during the period reflects. On the other hand, the strict distinction between 
patentable discoveries and non-patentable inventions assured that no firm could obtain market 
power by blocking other firms’ discoveries through the holding of a patent over an invention on 
which they would rely. Inventions were preserved by the intellectual property regime as “common 
knowledge bases” (Arrow, 1962) that would give firms the opportunity to compete through 
technological discoveries. 
                                                          
24 In the United States (as in Anglo-Saxon law in general) this distinction took the form of the “utility” doctrine: a 
discovery could only be patented if the “practical or commercial utility” of the invention was proven, which 
excluded by definition scientific inventions (Eisenberg, 1987; Orsi & Coriat, 2006). 
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In conclusion, the Fordist form of competition was a regime in which market power was caged by 
antitrust authorities and the open science regime. This, coupled with the evolution of the firm towards a 
Fordist mass production model managed through a divisional organizational structure, resulted in a form 
of competition characterized by strong price competition in which vertically integrated firms competed 
over conquering mass consumption markets through the introduction of new products and productivity 
increases. These were financed by internal means and through investment banks’ long-term lines of 
credit.  
Given the strict watch over market power exertion that reigned at the time, as well as the strong 
competition that existed largely as a result25, productivity increases would translate into price cuts. 
Moreover, because of the hierarchical role played by the wage-labor nexus, they would also translate into 
wage increases. This, added to the intensified foreign competition that developed during Fordism as other 
countries caught-up in terms of productivity and international trade liberalized and expanded (cf. Figure 
4), set the bar high for productivity increases to translate into increasing (or at least stable) profits, and 
eventually starting driving the latter down in the 1960s, when productivity increases could not keep up 
anymore (Christophers, 2016; Glyn et al., 1988; Jilberto, Lipietz, Ominami, & Amin, 1987). As Figure 8 
shows, the 1950-1980 period corresponds to a long-term declining phase of the profit rate in the United 
States.  
As we will see in the next section, this profitability crisis would be solved (again) through a complete 
reconfiguration of the hegemonic form of competition in which market power would once again take the 
center stage. Nevertheless, this would not imply a return to the constricted form of competition. On the 
contrary, in the finance-led form of competition that came to replace the Fordist one, market power would 
take a new form and purpose that would redefine the way it relates to competition. Like during the 
collusive form of competition, and unlike during the constricted form of competition, in the finance-led 
form of competition market power would play the role of coordinating competition. Nevertheless, unlike 
the collusive form of competition, coordination would be vertical and would penetrate the production 
process. Moreover, like in the constricted form of competition, market power would serve as a mean to 
extract profits in detriment of other firms, although it would not imply the annulling of competition but, 
quite the contrary, its enhancement. We shall expose the transformations that crafted this historically 
unique relation between competition and market power in the next section.  
                                                          
25 In an empirical study that uses both structural variables (market shares, concentration ratios, presence of barriers 
to entry, etc.) and behavioral variables (capacity to set prices or make profits, speed of innovation in the industry, 
etc.) to measure the degree of competition in the United States, Shepherd (1982) finds that during the 1939-1980 
period antitrust policies “emerge as the strongest single cause of rising competition”. 
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Diagram 4: The Fordist form of competition 
 
NB: The dominant institution of the form of competition is shaded. Arrows from other institutions indicate the key 
direct and indirect institutional complementarities with the dominant institution. 
5 Finance-led competition (circa 1980s to present) 
 
By the late 1970s, the profit rate in the United States had reached its lowest level since the beginning of 
World War II (cf. Figure 8). The country was losing markets to Western Europe and Japan, which were 
becoming increasingly competitive (Kovacic & Shapiro, 2000). International trade was hitting historically 
high levels (cf. Figure 4) as trade had been undergoing a process of liberalization since 1945. While in 
1947 trade tariffs were in average almost as high as 40%, in 1980 they were around 10% (Durand, 
Copinschi, Martin, & Placidi, 2012). Competition was more globalized than it had ever been, and the 
country needed to change its strategy to stay on foot in face of increasing competition both for foreign 
markets and inside its domestic market. In order to solve this economic conundrum, a complete 
reconfiguration of the regulation regime took place, and with it a new form of competition emerged. 
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This reconfiguration gave birth to a radical departure from the Fordist form of competition and replaced it 
by a new one (the finance-led form) that would occupy a major role in what the Regulation Schoool has 
labeled the financialized/“assetisized”26 (Aglietta, 2005; Boyer, 1998; Lordon, 2013) growth regime. The 
finance-led form of competition was the result major transformations in antitrust enforcement and 
law, the intellectual property regime, financial regulation and the industrial organization landscape 
in the context of a technological revolution driven by radical innovations in the field of information 
and communications technologies (ICT). These transformations created institutional 
complementarities that shaped a new form of competition in which fierce competition between 
international networks of vertically disintegrated firms (“global value chains”) is conjugated with 
strong vertical market power, resulting in a polarization of profit rate levels between firms. The 
obtainment of high profit rates by some firms within global value chains is, in turn, necessary to 
satisfy the financial sector’s draconian demands of return on investment the liberalization of 
finance that started in the 1980s gives it the power to require in an era in which shareholders have 
taken over the governance of the firm. 
By the mid-1970s, the Chicago School started to gain influence in antitrust thinking in the United States. 
This school of thought, of which Richard Posner and Robert Bork are the best representatives, stands for 
loose antitrust enforcement. While antitrust during the Fordist competition era was dominated by the 
Structuralist school and its heavy attack on market power detention and exertion, the Chicago School, 
which came to dominate antitrust enforcement during the finance-led form of competition era, set 
efficiency gains and the expectable consumer welfare resulting from it as the main goal of antitrust. As 
Bork puts it in his influential The Antitrust Paradox, “the only legitimate goal of American antitrust law 
is the maximization of consumer welfare” (Bork, 1993). According to this school, high levels of 
concentration are not a problem as long as they translate into efficiency gains, which in turn are expected 
to reflect in an increase in consumer welfare. Chicago School’s benchmark of competition is not 
concentration ratios but potential competition: a firm might have a large market share, but as long as 
barriers to entry are not high, the threat of potential competitors would force it to behave competitively 
and translate the efficiency gains that come from size into lower prices and/or higher quality of the 
products sold27. Consequently, the Chicago School considers per se rules to be useful in very limited 
cases such as cartelization. The rule of reason is privileged because it allows assessing in each case 
                                                          
26 The original French term is “patrimonial”. 
 
27 We will expose in more detail Chicago School’s competition theory in Chapter II. The current description is 
simply meant to facilitate the understanding of the rationale of antitrust during the finance-led competition era. 
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whether efficiency gains can justify a merger or avoiding condemning a practice that the Structuralist 
School would have most of the times considered anti-competitive per se. 
The Chicago School gained much influence in the 1970s and came to replace the Structuralist School as 
the mainstream thinking in antitrust by the 1980s. In 1981 Bork and Posner were nominated to the Courts 
of Appeals, and new heads of the FTC (James Miller) and the Department of Justice’s antitrust division 
(William Baxter), also belonging to the Chicago School, were designated (Christophers, 2016). 
Economists and legal scholars keen to the Chicago School started to get more reception and their thinking 
permeated the courts, the DOJ Antitrust Division and the FTC. In Adams and Brock’s (1989, p. 223) 
words, “the apostles of the Chicago School (…) “captured control of the antitrust agencies during the 
Reagan administration”. The penetration of the Chicago School in these institutions translated into a U-
turn in terms of competition policy. 
Higher concentration ratios than the ones considered to threaten competition during the Fordist era started 
to be used to judge both horizontal and vertical mergers, and efficiency gains and potential competition 
started to became common arguments to approve mergers (Kovacic & Shapiro, 2000). From 1973 on, 
“several influential lower court cases used evidence concerning ease of entry to permit mergers that 
yielded high market shares” (Kovacic & Shapiro, 2000). This jurisprudence crystalized in the 1982 
merger guidelines.  
 
Regarding restraints of trade, the 1977 Continental Television v. GTE Sylvania case can be read as the 
turning point in antitrust enforcement and jurisprudence. GTE-Sylvania tried to reduce the number of 
competing retailers by "limiting the number of franchises granted for any given area [of the country] and 
requiring each franchisee to sell his Sylvania products only from the location or locations at which he was 
franchised"28. When Continental Television was denied such a franchise, it filed a lawsuit alleging a 
violation of the Sherman Act. The above-quoted landmark case United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co 
had set a legal precedent prohibiting per se territorial restrictions on resale, but the ruling of the Supreme 
Court in Continental Television v. GTE Sylvania put an end to it. This ruling considered that "per se rules 
of illegality are appropriate only when they relate to conduct that is manifestly anticompetitive"29, 
inaugurating so a new era of antitrust in which, once again, the rule of reason would be used to open the 
door to many practices that had been considered to constitute restraints of trade in the legal tradition of 
the per se rules in vogue during the Fordist era. After that case “all of these per se rules [regarding 
                                                          
28 Continental Television v. GTE Sylvania 433 U.S., p. 38. 
 
29 Ibid, p. 49-50. 
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vertical price and non-price restrictions on distribution] were overturned [by the Supreme Court] and 
replaced by assessment under the rule of reason”  (Anderson & Huffman, 2017). In addition, and not less 
importantly, this was the first case that made it to the Supreme Court in which it was ruled that antitrust 
cases should be assessed in terms of efficiency. This created a precedent on which to develop 
jurisprudence more tolerant towards what is considered to be a restraint of trade (Fox, 1980). One could 
compare the role efficiency gains started playing in American antitrust cases in the finance-led form of 
competition era to the role the concept of “reasonableness of prices” had played in the collusive 
competition era. 
 
When efficiency gains were not quoted as an argument to relax antitrust enforcement on alleged restraints 
of trade, potential competition and potential scenarios were used instead. For example, regarding 
purchasing or supply patterns, during the 1980s, “often the courts were satisfied with a finding that 
substitute production could appear rather than whether it actually would appear in the market” (Fox, 
1997). In that vein, the influence of the Chicago School also played a major role in shaping competition 
policy. During the 1970s and 1980s, the dominance of game-theoretic methods put forward by those 
schools gave enough flexibility to “generate equilibrium predictions in settings involving a wide range of 
conduct, from R&D decisions to advertising to product positioning, as well as the classic problem of 
oligopolistic pricing” (Kovacic & Shapiro, 2000). This flexibility was often used to avoid condemning 
conducts by alleging potential efficiency outcomes that would result from them, or potential competition 
as a guarantee of them not resulting in market power exertion. 
 
Under the influence of the Chicago School, the balance between intellectual property and antitrust also 
shifted dramatically in favor of the former. Contrary to the Structuralist-School-inspired legal doctrine in 
vogue until the 1970s, the Chicago School considered that seldom does intellectual property constitute 
barriers to entry (Christophers, 2016). Consequently, even when markets are concentrated and intellectual 
property plays a major role, the threat of potential competition exists and mergers or supposedly 
restrictive conducts should not be condemned by antitrust agencies. This school of thought not only 
considers that intellectual property does not generally create barriers to entry; it also justifies the pro-
competitive effects it has. Regarding trademarks, the Chicago School reasoning that the courts have been 
following since the mid-1970s considers them pro-competitive because they lower consumer search costs, 
create quality-control incentives and ease entry into the markets (McClure, 1996). Regarding patents, in 
1988 new guidelines issued by the DOJ rescinded the “Nine No-Nos” embodied in the 1977 guidelines in 
favor of, once again, a treatment of antitrust cases related to alleged patent misuse based on the rule 
reason and not on per se prohibitions. This allowed antitrust authorities and courts to consider that 
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intellectual property owners do not have market power when close substitutes exist for the product or the 
process. Coupled with a broader definition of the relevant market, this approach has resulted in fewer 
condemnations in antitrust cases related to intellectual property licensing (Sell, 2003).  Moreover, on the 
same line and year (1988), Congress passed the Patent Misuse Reform Act, which expanded the 
exemptions to patent misuse (Barr, 2011). Judge Justice Blackmun summarized the new mainstream in 
terms of the balance between intellectual property rights and antitrust when he wrote for a majority in the 
1980 Dawson Chem. Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co case30, that "the policy of free competition runs in our law... 
but the policy of stimulating invention that underlies the entire patent system runs no less deep". 
 
The shift towards soft antitrust enforcement can be understood as the consequence of two historical 
trends (Encaoua & Guesnerie, 2006; Kovacic & Shapiro, 2000).  First, antitrust had been extremely 
severe during the Fordist era. The new approach promoted by the Chicago School was therefore 
well received as a necessary counterbalance to what was perceived as an excess. Second, the strict 
antitrust enforcement of the Foridst period was seen as a factor contributing to the loss of 
American firms’ competitiveness. If they wanted to be able to face their competitors at home and 
abroad, firms would need the degrees of freedom their European and Japanese competitors were 
benefiting from. As the Department of Justice itself put it in 1982, "antitrust laws should not be applied 
in a way that hinders the emphasis on competitiveness”31. 
This same rationale justified the complementary reform of the intellectual property regime that started in 
the United States and expanded to the world during the finance-led form of competition era.  If the United 
States wanted to be able to face foreign competition, they would need more freedom in the use of 
intellectual property. Not only did antitrust become more intellectual-property-friendly since the 
1980s; beginning at the same period, the entire American intellectual property regime was 
profoundly strengthened, extended and then exported to the world. 
During the late 1980s, the 1990s and the 2000s, the American intellectual property regime was extended 
both in terms of what is protectable under intellectual property law, the rights given to the owner of the 
intellectual property asset and the duration of the protection. In 1988, the Sonny Bono Copyright Term 
Extension Act extended the term of all copyrights (existing and future) by twenty years. That same year 
the Trademark Law Revision Act introduced, among other changes, the possibility of filing a trademark 
application before having used the name of the brand. This gave legal grounds for a firm to ‘steal’ a 
                                                          
30 Dawson Chem. Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co., 448 U.S. 176 (1980). 
 
31 Quoted by Hoff (1986). 
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competitor’s goodwill that might have been created through the use of an unprotected brand (McClure, 
1996). It also allowed a firm to register brands with the sole intention of not letting (potential) 
competitors use it to enter the market, even when the firm has no intention of creating a product under the 
protected brand. By legally protecting these practices, the law implied a “significant substantive 
expansion of trademark rights” (McClure, 1996). Seven years later, the Federal Trademark Dilution Act 
(1995) extended “protection from the realms of de jure infringement” (Christophers, 2016) in that it 
lowered the burden of proof of confusion by stipulating that confusion is not necessary for the value of 
the trademark to be diluted. On the patents side, several court rulings made software, databases and living 
entities patentable. The motives behind these extensions of the reach of patentability are in line with those 
of the softening of antitrust. In Coriat and Orsi’s (2006) words, “it is as if, after American industry’s 
extremely pronounced losses of competitiveness in the 1980s, a reaction were organized in the new 
technology fields in order to allow firms to gain privileged access to the basic knowledge provided by the 
American science system through a new IP law”. 
Not only were intellectual property rights expanded during the 1980s, but their enforcement was also 
strengthened. In 1982 the Federal Courts Improvement Act created the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Federal Circuit. This Court was given exclusive jurisdiction over appeals in patent-related cases. The 
main goal of this bill was to stop forum shopping by litigants in patent-related cases. But a non-negligible 
hidden agenda of this bill consisted in strengthening patent law enforcement (Christophers, 2016). The 
first decisions of the court “quickly touched on all important areas of patent law, from novelty to 
infringement, from non-obviousness to remedies. And over time, it has proven to be a more patent-
friendly court than its scattered regional predecessors” (Merges, 2000). As a consequence of the creation 
of the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, there was “a significant increase in the 
economic power of patents” ( Sell, 2003, p. 67).  
Another major reform of the intellectual property regime was the 1980 Bay-Dole Act. This law opened 
two possibilities. First, it allowed universities and research labs to file patents. Second, it allowed them to 
transfer “these patents to private firms in the form of exclusive licenses or creating joint ventures with 
such firms in order to take advantage of the knowledge thus transferred. This created the opportunity for 
such joint ventures firms either to trade on it or to make use of it to arrive at marketable products. A 
massive increase in the number of patents registered by university labs followed (Jaffe, 2000)” (Orsi & 
Coriat, 2006). By allowing private firms to own the results of publicly funded research, this reform 
destroyed the incentive to innovate through public grants that had characterized of the open science 
regime (Orsi & Coriat, 2006). As a result of all the reforms of the American intellectual property regime, 
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there was an acceleration of patenting in the 1980s and especially the mid-1990s in that country (cf. 
Figure 5).  
By the mid-1990s intellectual property had been strengthened and extended in many ways in the United 
States. But it was not until the 1994 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
(TRIPS) that this new intellectual property regime became the new international standard. The TRIPS 
agreement represents a milestone in the history of intellectual property because it created the first truly 
harmonized32 international intellectual property regime, and it did so in the image of the United States’. 
Although two international treaties on intellectual property had been in place for more than a century (the 
1883 Paris Convention, covering industrial property in the widest sense of the term and the 1886 Berne 
Convention, which referred only to copyright), “the internationally recognized rules were both few and 
lax. Signatory countries enjoyed great latitude to define their own national IPR [intellectual property 
regime] codes. The result was a wide heterogeneity of situations” (Orsi & Coriat, 2006). Moreover, 
before the TRIPS agreement “there was precious little institutionalized political-economic recourse if 
equal protections were not in fact afforded” (Christophers, 2016). As a result of the signature of the 
TRIPS agreement, patent rights were extended to “virtually all subject matter except plants and animals 
other than micro-organisms, including pharmaceutical products, chemicals, and pesticides” (Sell, 2004) 
across virtually every country in the world (162 countries, i.e. all the World Trade Organization 
members). It also interesting to point out that the TRIPS agreement not only exported the extensiveness 
and the strong enforceability of the United States’ new intellectual property regime to the world, but that 
it also disseminated the American recently increased antitrust immunity of intellectual property rights to 
other countries. One of the three guiding principles of the agreement was “a requirement of consistency 
between national IPR-related competition policy and the TRIPS Agreement’s principles of IP protection”, 
which “must be read as a caveat against an excessive exercise of competition policy, which the TRIPS 
Agreement, by its purpose and express wording, otherwise leaves Members free to define. It means that 
they may not use antitrust regulation as a pretext to undermine the protection of IPRs as guaranteed by the 
TRIPS Agreement” (Ullrich, 2004). 
Although the TRIPS agreement can be considered an export of the new American intellectual property 
regime to the world, other major world economic powers such as the United Kingdom and Japan had been 
actively pushing for such an international agreement since the mid-1980s (Christophers, 2016). The 
reason of this concerted move towards a harmonized, strengthened and enlarged intellectual 
property regime in the 1980s is to be found in another important transformation that started in the 
                                                          
32 For example, the TRIPS agreement created a uniform duration of patent protection of twenty years. 
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same decade and has institutional complementarities in the finance-led form of competition: 
vertical disintegration and offshoring.  
Facilitated by a looser and intra-industry-mergers-friendly antitrust regime, there was in the 1980s a wave 
of “‘bust-up’ takeovers, in which undervalued conglomerates were purchased with the intention of being 
split back up into their component parts and either operated as free-standing companies or sold to buyers 
in related industries” (Davis & Cobb, 2010). The empirical research led by Lang and Stulz (1994) 
confirms this. Using data from global companies around the world, they show that by 1989 firms had 
divested 60% of the acquisitions they had made between 1970 and 1982 outside of their core business. 
Moreover, Davis, Diekmann and Tinsley (1994) find that during the 1980s, a third of the Fortune 500 
firms was acquired or merged, resulting in a more core-business-focused corporate sector. 
The withdrawal of the firm to its core competences was not only due to the dissolution of the hegemony 
of the conglomerate. It also manifested in a process of vertical disintegration across industries (Arndt & 
Kierzkowski, 2001; Baudry & Chassagnon, 2012; Chassagnon, 2009; Feenstra & Hanson, 1997; 
Krugman, Cooper, & Srinivasan, 1995; Milberg, 2004), the “major fact since the 1980s in terms of 
production systems and organization” (Weinstein, 2010, p. 10)33.  Vertical disintegration, in turn, took an 
international dimension. Starting in the 1980s, the vertically integrated firm has been replaced by 
networks of more core-competence-focused firms distributed around the globe that came to be known as 
“global value chains”. Different empirical measurements have been offered to account for this 
phenomenon. Feenstra and Hanson (1997) estimated the share of imported inputs in total intermediate 
goods in the United States manufacturing and found that it went from 6.5% in 1972 to 8.5% in 1979 to 
11.6% in 1990. Similarly, Campa and Golberg (1997) measured the share of imported inputs in total 
inputs in the mid-1970s, mid-1980s and mid-1990s for the United States, Canada, Japan and the United 
Kingdom and found a constant increase for all countries across industries. Other measurements using 
global input-output data on domestic value added provided by the OECD’s TIVA database (cf. Figures 11 
and 12) confirm this trend. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
33 The translation is ours. 
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Figure 11: Percentage of intermediary products imports in global imports (1955-2011) 
 
Source: own elaboration based on TIVA database data 
 
Figure 12: Value added coming from another country as percentage of total exports of the main 62 economies 
of the world 
 
Source: own elaboration based on TIVA database data 
The evolution towards an industrial organization landscape characterized by networks of firms more 
centered on their core competences and spread across the globe that started in the 1980s can be explained, 
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in part, by the fast development of ICT that started at the same period. However, ICT should not be 
conceived as the underlying cause of offshoring and vertical disintegration, but rather as an enabling 
factor (Yeung & Coe, 2015). Indeed, ICT have facilitated this process by allowing three things 
(Whittaker, Zhu, Sturgeon, Tsai, & Okita, 2010): 
1) The codification and easy processing of complex information from one state of the production chain 
to the next (Balconi, 2002; Baldwin & Clark, 2000) 
 
2) Flexible, computerized production machinery that allows capital-intensive manufacturing capacity to 
be shared and pooled like labor-intensive manufacturing (Brusoni & Prencipe, 2001; Langlois, 2003) 
 
3) Supply-chain management tools, such as “enterprise resource planning” software and radio-frequency 
identification tags, that are pushing even labor-intensive industries up the technology curve (Abernathy, 
1999) 
The blend of these three items, in combination with improvements in transportation costs34 and a 
continuous process of trade liberalization (Durand et al., 2012), has allowed firms to move from a model 
of vertically integrated domestic production to that of a constellation of more core-business-centered 
firms forming networks of production and distribution of goods and services around the world.   
While many authors have been right in highlighting the importance of the development of ICT to 
account for offshoring and vertical disintegration, little attention has been paid to the link this 
latter process has with the parallel above-described transformation of the international intellectual 
property regime. The vertically integrated firm has split its once in-house production and distribution 
processes across many countries and firms (most of them not under its legal control) looking for cost 
advantages in terms of access to natural resources, infrastructure, access to markets, capacities and labor 
costs (Dunning, 2001), and retaining at the same time the control of the most profitable stages. However, 
this split production process is usually orchestrated by a “lead firm” that guarantees the performance of 
the global value chain. This includes being able to export the key aspects of a production technology it 
generally owns and to retain a considerable slice of the profits produced by the multitude of firms located 
in different countries the global value chain is made of (Baudry & Chassagnon, 2012). In doing so, a 
harmonious, strong, and overreached intellectual property regime has been essential. Firms of the 
developed countries that fostered the TRIPS agreement (mainly the United States, Western Europe 
and Japan) have used its resulting global intellectual property regime to be able to export their 
                                                          
34 The OECD (2007) estimates that sea freight costs have diminished by approximately 60% between 1930 and 
1980. 
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more productive technologies and designs to countries with lower labor costs or other 
country/region-specific advantages without risking the appropriation of the intellectual property 
assets underlying it. Moreover, the circumscription of lead firms to high value added immaterial 
core competences (design, a certain high-tech production process, etc.) on which their dominance of 
global value chains rely was only possible once the protection of immaterial assets was rendered 
strong enough around the globe for firms to be able to be legally ‘cut-off’ around a bundle of 
intellectual property assets on which their roles within the global value chains they participate in is 
based. In that manner, firms that retain the intellectual-property-based competences more relevant 
for the global value chain can disinvest in other processes and offload the costs and the risks 
associated to them to other firms, while retaining higher profits than other firms of the global value 
chain as a result of the key role they play in orchestrating it. In that manner, lead firms coordinate 
the competitive process using their vertical market power within the global value chain35, while non-
lead firms have no option but to submit to lead firms in order to benefit from their intellectual-
property-protected key competences and the productivity level that comes with them, which they 
need to compete at the global scale. The transformations of the intellectual property regime and the 
global vertically disintegrated industrial organizational landscape that started to take shape in the 
1980s must therefore be understood as two sides of the same coin. 
We have seen so far how the evolution of antitrust, the intellectual property regime and the industrial 
organizational landscape since the 1980s present strong institutional complementarities. There is, 
however, a missing piece in the puzzle. In order to be able to portray the post-fordist form of competition 
and the link between competition and market power that characterizes it, we need to examine the 
institutional complementarities these transformations have with the parallel mutation of the financial 
system. 
Much has been written about the transformation of the financial sector since the 1980s, which the 
literature has labelled “financialization”, a term that has taken many different meanings from author to 
author (Van der Zwan, 2014). It is out of the scope of this work to review in detail these transformations. 
Instead, we will pinpoint a series of changes in the financial sector (“financialization” hereafter) that 
constitute to our understanding the major institutional complementarities with the other transformations 
described in this section, and which comprehension will help us characterizing the form of competition 
that replaced the Fordist one.  
                                                          
35 We will develop this in depth in Chapter 3. 
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The financial sector has been profoundly internationalized and liberalized after the Fordist era. The 
beginning of this process can be traced back to 1971, when the end of the Bretton Woods system implied, 
among other things, the end of capital controls. From that day on, it became increasingly easy to trade 
currencies and financial assets at an international scale without many restrictions, which resulted in a 
financial globalization that went hand with hand with the undergoing trade liberalization (cf. Figure 4).  
The dismantling of barriers to capital control unfolded over the decades to come, reaching a tipping point 
in Europe with the 1986 Single European Act, which set 1992 as the deadline to remove all capital 
controls between countries of the European Union. The later expansion of the European Union to the East 
would reinforce this trend in the Old Continent. During the 1990s, capital controls were progressively 
washed out in developing countries under the influence of the International Monetary Fund (Dierckx, 
2011). In parallel, the 1980s were a decade in which sovereign bond markets were created around the 
world, generating new financial investment opportunities. Finally, through a series of deregulations that 
took place during the 1980s and 1990s, the barriers between different financial markets were lifted. This 
meant that it became possible for any financial institution (insurance company, bank, pension fund, etc.) 
to arbitrate with any financial asset (bonds, stocks, derivatives, etc.) in any financial center in the world. 
In respect to its effect on the transformation of the form of competition, we should highlight the 
importance of the dismantling of the Glass-Stegall Act among the numerous financial deregulations of the 
period. Although some legal loopholes had been exploited and some particular interpretations and 
legislative amendments to loosen it had been taking place since the 1960s, it was not until the Gramm-
Leach-Bililey Act (also known as the Financial Services Modernization Act) of 1999 was passed that the 
separation between commercial and investment banking was fully put to an end. As a result of the end of 
end of this separation, other complementary financial deregulations and the concomitant 
development of high-return financial innovations during the 1980s and 1990s (securitization, 
collateralized debt obligations, subprime credit, etc.), the role of the financial sector switched from 
a subordinate one based on financing the expansion and the R&D of firms to a dominant one in 
which firms would adapt their competitive strategies to provide financial institutions a high return 
on investment. 
It is because of these transformations that we can speak of “financialization” (Auvray, Dallery, & Rigot, 
2016). Although, as we have seen along this chapter, the financial sector has played an important 
role in driving the expansion and the consolidation of corporations through history, it was not until 
the end of Fordism that this sector was given so much freedom by historical standards.  The novelty 
of these deregulations lies in the fact that they allowed the financial sector to subjugate the other 
institutional forms to it, including the form of competition. Indeed, this freedom of movement built 
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two institutional complementarities that have shaped the finance-led form of competition: the 
financialization of intellectual property and the financialization of the corporation. 
As we have shown above, the reforms of the intellectual property regime that begun in the 1980s allowed 
corporations to own inventions resulting from basic knowledge. In addition, both inventions and 
discoveries gained an increasingly important role for (lead) firms, which were now restricted to their 
immaterial core competences on which their dominance of global value chains rely. Previously, those 
“common knowledge bases” (Arrow, 1962) were developed and funded by the state following a 
long-run financial logic, and firms could not appropriate it. Once firms started gaining ownership 
over basic knowledge and intellectual property assets became more important than ever for firms 
to survive competition, the financial sector partially took over the state’s role of financing long-
term research and, since its output was put on the market for the first time, it had to price it. The 
financial sector therefore took over roles that had belonged until then to the state using financial 
instruments that were more suited to the new intellectual property regime that those used by traditional 
banks. Regarding financing, financial institutions are more suited than banks to finance intellectual 
property-intensive firms for four reasons (Mouhoud & Plihon, 2009). First, basic research implies a high 
risk and financial instruments allow diluting it across different agents. Second, since intellectual property 
assets are specific investments (and therefore hardly re-sellable), a bank cannot ask for collateral. Third, 
given that immaterial investments have random yields, companies cannot repay loans on a pre-fixed 
regular basis as with traditional credit lines. Finally, banks’ traditional evaluation techniques based on 
balance sheet information such as scoring are not suited to evaluate investment projects based on 
knowledge creation. Then, once the state lost its monopoly as the financer of long-term basic 
knowledge creation, financial instruments such as risk capital filled that gap. Because traditional 
loans were not suited to finance this, financial instruments did it by rendering inherently illiquid 
investments liquid through the stock exchange. Financial regulations were adapted accordingly to meet 
this goal. A regulation known as Alternative 2 allowed loss-making firms with a lot of intellectual 
property assets to be listed in the NASDAQ, and the ‘401k regulation’ allowed pension funds to invest in 
high-risk bonds and assets usually related to loss-making firms with a high stock of intellectual property 
assets (Coriat & Weinstein, 2011). In this new intellectual-property-friendly stock exchange, investors 
can find liquidity in their intellectual-property-related investments by reselling at any time their assets. In 
that manner, the stock exchange plays the role of pricing immaterial assets that used to be outside 
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of the market, although pricing relies heavily on “confidence, fashion and mimetism”36 (Mouhoud & 
Plihon, 2009). 
Just as finance penetrated the firm through intellectual property, it also did so by changing the conception 
of value creation and appropriation and, in that manner, redefined the form of competition. The 
internationalization and liberalization of the financial sector recalled above gave investors the possibility 
to move capital from one firm to the other across countries in little time, a trend that accelerated with the 
evolution of ICTs. This created a “liquidity paradox” for shareholders (Auvray, Dallery & Rigot, 2016). 
Indeed, an active is considered to be liquid if a) it can be easily sold without cost and b) its future value is 
predictable without capital loss risks. The deregulation of finance recalled above and the financialization 
of intellectual property made shareholders’ capital and intellectual property assets (which in many cases 
constitute a large part of firms’ capital) liquid in the sense of a). However, for the same reason, the 
capacity to constantly trade financial assets in the stock exchange made their future value unpredictable. 
The way of breaking the liquidity paradox has consisted in shareholders demanding high dividends  
(Auvray, Dallery & Rigot, 2016). The mechanisms through which shareholders have been implementing 
this strategy within the firm (managers’ bonuses linked to stock prices, shareholders’ foot voting, etc.) 
have been widely described in detail in the literature as a transformation of corporate governance into a 
“shareholder governance” model (Caby & Hirigoyen, 2001). But their capacity of implementing those 
mechanisms relies ultimately on the liberalization and internationalization of finance: if a firm does not 
deliver dividends as high as other firms’ or alternative financial assets, shareholders’ capital can easily fly 
away and make its stock price go down. This, in turn, could not have been possible without the 
liquefaction of firms’ capital that financialization created (Auvray, Dallery & Rigot, 2016). As a result, 
the share of dividend distribution by American nonfinancial corporations over cash flow has been 
increasing since the 1980s and more than doubled over two decades (Crotty, 2005).  
Since the 1980s, the firm is therefore conceived as “a collection of assets earning varying rates of return” 
(Fligstein, 1993, pp. 238–239) that shareholders can pressure to be set at high levels (usually not below 
15%). The question that arises is how, in a context of increased globalized competition, can firms 
deliver such levels of rates of return. A part of the explanation has been widely discussed in the 
literature: the deterioration of the share of labor in value added and the outsourcing of production 
to countries with lower wages (Harrison, 2005)37, which has also significantly contributed to 
                                                          
36 The translation is ours. 
 
37 Freeman (2006) has calculated that the after “the collapse of Soviet communism, China’s movement toward 
market capitalism, and India’s decision to undertake market reforms and enter the global trading system” the size of 
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reducing production costs (Milberg, 2006). Nevertheless, we believe that another part of the 
explanation lies in the reconfigured finance-led form of competition which building blocks we have 
presented along this section. 
In the finance-led form of competition, firms are centered on their core competences and linked to each 
other through global value chains spread around the globe. Competition takes place between global value 
chains at the international level. Within global value chains there is an uneven power relation between 
firms according to which the ones performing the crucial stages of the production and/or distribution 
process can, usually through their ownership of intellectual property assets around which their legal 
frontiers are drawn, act as leaders that coordinate the production process and allocate profits in their favor 
(Baudry & Chassagnon, 2012; Chassagnon, 2009). In an aggregate level, this translates into an increase in 
profit rate differentials during the finance-led competition era, as Figures 2 and 13 show.  
Figure 2: Return on invested capital excluding goodwill, U.S. publicly traded nonfinancial firms
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
the global labor pool went “from approximately 1.46 billion workers to 2.93 billion workers”, which represents a 
duplication of the world’s labor force in low-wage countries that happened “almost all at one in the 1990s”. 
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Figure 133: Return on invested capital including goodwill for U.S. publicly traded nonfinancial firms (in 
percentage) 
 
Source: Furman and Orszag (2015) 
 
The process of uneven allocation of profits is the outcome of the asymmetries of market power between 
the firms that participate in global value chain. The lead firm(s) that control(s) the key aspects of the 
production or the distribution process can use its/their power to pressure down the price it pays to 
subcontractors of its chain, while keeping the final price low to compete with other supply chains, 
minimizing so its size and capital expenditure and offloading risk to other less powerful members of the 
global value chain. In this form of competition, there is a “hybridization of the taylorist and cognitive 
logics” in which “the cognitive division delimitates the competence field of the [lead, we add] firm in 
which the investment will be concentrated following an excellence and long-term logic. Taylorist division 
is used to externalize the generic assets of the firm in cost-minimization logic in a minimum time: it’s the 
‘minimal cost, minimal delay’ logic” (Mouhoud & Plihon, 2009). 
The building block of the finance-led form of competition can now be woven together to understand the 
links between the different institutional complementarities on which it is built. Facing a declining profit 
rate, financialization has been the driving force for American and other major economic powers to restore 
profitability. The ‘liquefaction’ of capital it brought about allowed shareholders to demand high rates of 
return on their stocks. In a context of increasing globalization and a new technological revolution led by 
ICT (Perez, 2010), vertical disintegration and offshoring has constituted the mean through which 
shareholder’s demand of high profits has been met. On the one hand, offshoring has allowed firms to 
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minimize costs, especially labor costs. On the other hand, vertical disintegration has allowed firms to 
minimize their capital expenditure and offload risk to other members of the supply chain. Moreover, lead 
firms possessing key competences can capture a higher rate of the value created within the global value 
chain of which they participate as orchestrators. This capacity to exert market power within the global 
value chain, in turn, has been enabled by the strengthening, the extension and the internationalization of 
the intellectual property regime and a consequent accommodation of antitrust. The latter has 
accommodated not only to avoid hindering the exertion of intellectual property rights, but also to allow 
firms to merge horizontally in order to compete at a world scale while they vertically disintegrate.  
A symbiotic logic between competition and market power proper to the finance-led form of 
competition takes place in this logic. Because competition is strong and global, firms competing in 
rival global value chains need to constantly minimize costs and match competitors’ final prices to 
stay in the market. At the same time, some lead firms have vertical market power within global 
value chains that comes from the key competences (crystalized in their intellectual property assets) 
they bring to the rest of the firms of the global value chain without which the latter could not 
produce at a competitive level. This market power gives lead firms the capacity to coordinate the 
competitive process by controlling the global value chain’s production process (who produces what, 
how and where), as well the capacity to retain a higher share of the value created within the global 
value chain, satisfying in that manner shareholders’ demands of high returns on investment. 
Financialization is therefore the driving force and the structuring rationale of the current form of 
competition in which market power and competition are linked symbiotically. 
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Diagram 5: The finance-led form of competition (circa 1980s to present) 
 
NB: The dominant institution of the form of competition is shaded. Arrows from other institutions indicate the key 
direct and indirect institutional complementarities with the dominant institution. 
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Conclusions 
 
Forms of competition have evolved over time in the United States as a result of complementary 
institutional changes, the evolution of the firm and some major historical events. The dialectic relation 
between competition and market power has been a constant source of tension and change that has been at 
the core of the transformations of forms of competition. 
Around the 1840s, when the country was economically unified under a national market and fully capitalist 
production relations became the standard, competition lacked any kind of regulation, be it by the states or 
through inter-firm coordination. Firms were evenly matched and barriers to entry weak. Therefore, market 
power could not serve as a mean of regulating the anarchic competitive relations between firms that 
recurred to predatory prices to survive in the market. The result of this dynamic was constant instability 
and overproduction crises. The predatory form of competition (1840s to 1860s) was unstable because 
competition took place in an institutional and market power vacuum.  
Once this inherent instability became apparent to firms, they recurred to horizontal market power to 
regulate their competitive relations. Trusts and pools were the first obvious ways to achieve this goal. 
While the former were too weakly enforceable to endure, the development of the latter was stopped by the 
nascent federal antitrust legislation. The Federal state had stepped in to provide the elementary 
coordination necessary to take competition out of its ruinous isolation. However, antitrust was still one 
step behind firms, who realized that horizontal concentration was still a legal option. Nevertheless, in the 
absence of barriers to entry, market power was still not stable, and it could therefore not stabilize 
competition. As a result, the collusive form of competition (1870s to 1910s) was also unstable and profits 
were unable to grow steadily.  
When horizontally-consolidated firms started integrating vertically and using their now relevant enough 
intellectual property assets to create barriers to entry, market power became sufficiently robust to cast 
away ruinous predatory competition. However, at this point a redefinition of the purpose of and the forms 
taken by market power took place. During the constricted form of competition (1920s to 1945), dominant 
firms with large market shares would set high prices and dominate markets with the (successful) intention 
of hindering competition. Market power had not only changed its form from collusion to vertical 
integration and intellectual-property-based barriers to entry; it had also changed its purpose from 
regulating competitive relations between firms to replacing them by market power-enforced decisions 
about the functioning of the market made by dominant firms.  
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This logic would change after WWII, when Fordism, mass consumption and a strict antitrust enforcement 
transformed completely the form of competition into one based on conglomerates of vertically integrated 
firms unable to obtain or exert market power. Strong long-run competition on prices in mass markets left 
firms with no option but to expand diagonally, constantly improve their productivity and introduce new 
products to grow. As productivity increases began not being high enough to absorb increments in salaries 
and to face foreign competition, profitability hit a historical low and the Fordist form of competition 
(1945 to 1970s) came to an end. As during the predatory competition period, market power was absent, 
but this time antitrust and the state in a largest sense regulated competitive relations between firms, while 
during the predatory competition era regulation was missing. However, these regulations were, in the 
long-run, ineffective in avoiding competition’s self-destruction, as they resulted in a historical descent of 
the rate of profit that took it to pre-WWII levels. 
The 1980s represented a breakthrough that set the bases for a new form of competition. Antitrust was 
relaxed, the intellectual property regime extended, strengthened and internationalized and production was 
vertically disintegrated and internationalized. The liberalization of finance towards a regime in which 
financial assets (including firms’ stocks, debts and intellectual property assets) became liquid gave the 
financial sector the capacity to demand high dividends to firms. Competitive dynamics switched to strong 
international competition between global value chains within which vertical market power based on 
intellectual-property-protected key competences gives lead firms the capacity to coordinate the 
production process and to influence profit allocation in their favor. As a result, profitability was restored, 
but its repartition between firms became increasingly heterogeneous. While lead firms can obtain higher 
profits to respond to shareholders’ demands, other firms in the global value chain have to settle for small 
profits, as they are dependent on lead firms to be able to achieve the productivity level necessary to 
participate in global competition against other global value chains. In this dynamic, a symbiotic relation 
between competition and market power takes place: vertical market power is the mean by which 
coordination between the firms in the global value chain takes place in order to face global strong 
horizontal competition between global value chains; in that manner, vertical market power coordinates 
horizontal competition. 
The study of the history of forms of competition in the United States shows that, in the long-run, 
competition cannot exist without market power. A quick reading of this history would suggest that this is 
the case because, as the competition paradox goes, competition leads to market power, which in turn 
annuls competition. However, as we have seen, during the collusive competition era (1870s to 1910s) and 
since the 1980s, market power has also played the role of coordinating competition, not annulling it. 
Moreover, we have seen that the ways in which it has done so, as well as the way in which, during other 
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periods, competition or market power have annulled each other, have taken different forms that can only 
be explained when the institutional environment of competition is studied. While it is true that 
competition eventually leads to market power, history has shown that this does not necessarily 
mean the latter ends up annulling the former when it occurs. 
Having learnt from the study of history, we now have to pursue our investigation by interrogating theory. 
In the next chapter we will review competition theories to analyze how they account for the link between 
competition and market power.  
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Chapter 2: A critical cartography of competition theories 
 
"Competition is by no means only an incentive-mechanism but, first of all, an instrument for the 
deprivation of power (Entmachtungsinstrument)... the most magnificent and most ingenious instrument of 
deprivation of power in history"   
Böhm, Reden und Schriften, p. 22, quoted in Vanberg (2002), p. 59 
 
Introduction 
 
The historically heterogeneous and variant link between competition and market power in 
competition theory  
 
In Chapter I, we saw how, throughout the American economic history, the nature of the relation between 
competition and market power varied. We have identified two types of links between these two forces: 
antithetical and symbiotic. During the Predatory Competition (circa 1840s to 1860s) and the Fordist 
Competition (circa 1945 to 1970s) eras, competition reigned and hindered market power; symmetrically, 
the Constricted Competition era (circa 1920s to 1945) was characterized by the exertion of market power 
mechanisms that set obstacles to competition. In all of these cases, competition and market power have 
been antithetical. During other periods, nonetheless, we identified a symbiotic relation between the two: 
in the Collusive Competition era (circa 1870s to 1910s), market power played the role of regulating 
competition to avoid the ruinous cutthroat price wars characteristic of the Predatory Competition era; in 
the current Finance-led Competition era (1980s to present), we saw that market power plays the role of 
articulating competition. Therefore, market power and competition have established a 
symbiotic relation in these two latter cases.   
 
In terms of the balance between competition and market power, we have identified two major historical 
swings: one that goes from a competitive landscape in the 1840s (Predatory Competition) to a market-
power dominated one that lasted until World War II (the end of the Constricted Competition era). Then 
there has been another swing in favor of competition when the Fordist Competition era started (circa 
1945). Since the 1980s, the Finance-led form of competition poses the puzzling scenario of intensified 
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international competition in which global value chains became central coupled with a considerable 
increase in long-run profit rate differentials between firms, which would indicate an increase in market 
power. 
The goal of this chapter will be to analyze the link between competition and market power in 
competition theory in light of the findings of Chapter I. We will visit the existing competition 
theories, which have been majorly influenced by the American economic history, and analyze to 
what extend are they capable of capturing the different natures and the evolution of the link 
between market power and competition we have observed.  
 
For each theory, we will explore the underlying concepts of competition and market power as well as the 
mechanisms that animate and relate the two. In doing so, we will unveil the nature of market power 
implicit in the market power creation mechanisms we will describe. We will then create a cartography 
that groups competition theories according to this analysis and that will pay special attention to how they 
can or cannot account for the fact that competition leads to market power asymmetries, a process that is 
key to understand the current Finance-led competition landscape in which firms participating of a 
vertically disintegrated mode of (global) production obtain heterogeneous long-run profit rates (Dedrick, 
Kraemer, & Linden, 2010; Pavlínek & Ženka, 2016) in a highly internationally competitive scenario. 
 
A reading grid of the link between competition and market power in competition theory 
Our endeavor of characterizing the link between competition and market power in the different existing 
competition theories implies a choice of focus. Because our goal is to understand how competition 
theories conceptualize this link and, consequently, can or cannot account competition leading to market 
power asymmetries that explain long-run profit rate differentials, we will focus on three main points. 
1) Does competition lead to market power asymmetries that result in long-run profit rate 
differentials between firms? 
For each theory, we will show to what extent and through which mechanisms it can justify or deny the 
assertion according to which competition leads to some firms obtaining and exerting market power, 
resulting in them obtaining higher profit rates in the long-run. We will call this the “market power 
paradox” in reference to the concept of “monopoly paradox” that Foucault coined in his extensive study 
of the ordoliberal economic doctrine. According to this paradox, “monopoly is considered to be a half-
natural half-necessary consequence of competition in a capitalist regime; that is to say that competition 
cannot be let to be developed without seeing appear, at the same time, monopolistic phenomena that have 
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precisely the effect of limiting, ease, ultimately annul competition. It would be therefore part of the 
historical-economic logic of competition to suppress itself (…)” (Foucault, 2004, p. 140, emphasis added) 
2)  Is the concept of competition a static or a dynamic one? 
Studies on competition theories have so far focused on the important although insufficient distinction 
between “dynamic” or “behavioral” (Benzoni, 1991; Cayla, 2014; Guerrero, 1994; McNulty, 1968; 
Metcalfe, 1989; Moudud, 2010; Shaikh, 2008; Tsoulfidis, 2015) and “static” theories. In static theories, 
competition is identified to a market structure understood as a set of conditions (a state of nature) that 
defines if the conditions for a competitive scenario are met or, on the contrary, they are not, which would 
give some firms market power over others. In dynamic competition theories, on the contrary, competition 
is identified to behavior, a process, and not defined by a market structure, but rather by how firms act and 
interact. The consequences of these two opposite views on the nature of the concept of competition are 
major in terms of how each theory may account or not for the market power paradox. In static theories, 
the market structure will heavily influence whether competition or market power prevails relatively 
independently of firms’ behaviors. Consequently, if market power asymmetries that can account for long-
run profit rate differentials between firms exist, static theories would argue that they are mainly the result 
of a certain type of market structure. On the contrary, in dynamic competition theories, if market power 
asymmetries can be developed, they are the result of the behavior of certain firms (for example, choices 
related to innovation) that, relatively independently of the market structure, allows them to obtain higher 
profit rates in the long-run. 
3)  What is the scope of competition? 
We have shown in the previous chapter that the current Finance-led form of competition is characterized, 
among other things, by vertical disintegration and long-run profit rate differentials between firms that 
participate in the same (vertically disintegrated) global value chain. These phenomena are closely related 
to competition, market power and their links. Consequently, we will identify for each theory what the 
scope of competition is by differentiating horizontal competition from vertical competition. 
Horizontal competition refers to competition between two firms of the same industry located in the same 
tier of the supply chain that compete in the same market. Vertical competition, on the contrary, refers to 
competition between firms located in different tiers of the same supply chain. These firms, which can 
belong to different industries, establish a relation of supplier and client. Within the vertical competition 
scope, we will distinguish semi-vertical competition from fully vertical competition. In the former, 
competition takes place between direct supplier and client firms: suppliers compete with their clients 
and/or vice versa. In fully vertical competition the scope of competition is the entire supply chain. As a 
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consequence, not only is there competition between supplying and client firms, but also between all of the 
firms that participate of a supply chain, or even between supply chains understood as a whole. 
Opting for this particular reading grid to group competition theories implies overlooking some of their 
features so we can highlight what interests us. In order to avoid getting lost in the myriad of nuances we 
can find between and within theories, we chose to group theories that share some basic common 
principles we consider to be crucial to the purpose of our cartography. This means that our explanations 
will only focus on some common essential trends each group of authors/schools share and that we will 
overlook aspects of the theories that do not serve directly our purpose. In terms of the resulting grouping, 
this implies that authors belonging to different schools of thought who may even have opposite views 
regarding many central aspects in economics in general or regarding some features of competition theory 
we chose to overlook might be placed in the same or similar positions in our cartography. Symmetrically, 
authors or schools of thought that share a common theoretical background can belong to different groups 
in our cartography if their competition theories differ in the way in which they answer the question we 
will ask them.  
Structure of the chapter 
 
The chapter will be structured as follows. Each section will group different competition theories that, to 
the purpose of our analysis, can be considered to be similar, namely Marxian, Neoclassical, Imperfect 
competition and Monopoly Capital, Transaction Cost Theory and Evolutionary theories. These groupings, 
as we will explain in detail in each subsection, group competition theories that share some basic common 
principles we consider to be crucial for the purposes of our cartography, especially regarding the notion of 
competition and its link to market power, regardless of differences they might have regarding issues such 
as the competitive mechanisms at play. Each subsection, in turn, will be devoted to exposing a particular 
theory, the last subsection of each section being devoted to concluding remarks that will sum-up how 
the theories of the section can be identified in terms of our reading grid.  
Finally, the conclusions will present, in the first place, the cartography derived from the analyses of the 
previous sections (Figure 14) and a summary of all the sufficient and non-sufficient mechanisms 
identified in the different competition theories that explain long-run profit rate differentials (Figure 15). 
Based on the analysis of the cartography and these mechanisms, we will make three major conclusions. 
First, we will show that none of the existing competition theories has a fully vertical scope in the 
sense we have given to that term above. Second, we will show that the dynamic/static distinction, 
although relevant to characterize competition theories, is not sufficient to understand how each of them 
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responds to the market power paradox. Third, we will show that the vast majority of competition 
theories considers market power exclusively as an obstacle to competition and that, even when they 
do not, they are all incapable of conciliating price competition with long-run profit rate 
differentials. We will therefore differentiate market power mechanisms that consider market power to be 
an obstacle to competition (e.g. barriers to entry, rent-earning resources) from what we will call 
“positional market power” mechanisms, which we will define as mechanisms in which market power is 
exerted as a strategic obtainment and usufruct of a particular link with other agents as a result of 
multilateral strategic choices by all of the agents in a competitive context. 
These conclusions will lead us to set the bases of Part II by the end of the chapter. We will argue that, in 
order to be able to simultaneously account for long-run profit rate differentials and strong price 
competition, competition theory needs to take a fully vertical scope and consider a positional market 
power mechanism. Developing theoretical contributions in that direction will be the object of Chapter 
III. 
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1 Competition and the labor value theory: the Marxian tradition 
 
1.1 The central role of competition in the Marxian branch of the classical 
tradition 
 
While Classical theory represents a unified body of literature, there are certainly important differences 
between authors belonging to it that cannot be downplayed. Despite the remarkable contributions of 
authors such as Adam Smith (1976), David Ricardo (1891) or John Stuart Mill (1973) to competition 
theory (McNulty, 1968), we will devote our analysis to the Marxian tradition, which, to our 
understanding, and as we will show along this chapter, is the branch of the Classsical School based on 
labor value theory that has developed the most this topic38. 
Competition plays a central role in the Marxian classical tradition; it is the force that assures that all the 
other laws of the classical representation of the economic processes take place. Its importance comes from 
the fact that it is what assures that the cornerstone of this ramification of the Ricardian version of classical 
theory, the value law, is verified. The presence of competition is therefore, in the Marxian view, a 
condition of possibility for economic science. In John Stuart Mill’s words: 
“So far as rents, profits, wages, prices, are determined by competition, laws may be assigned for them. 
Assume competition to be their exclusive regulator and principles of broad generality and scientific 
precision may be laid down, according to which they will be regulated” (Mill, 1973, p. 306). 
Then, in order to fully understand the Marxian theory of competition, we need to take a step back to the 
cornerstone of this branch of classical theory: the value law. It is not our purpose to discuss the value law 
in classical theory itself, which would exceed the scope of this investigation. This subsection is aimed at 
setting the basic theoretical grounds to understand how the competition mechanisms described in 
the following two subsections are subject to the labor value law that constitutes the backbone of 
Marxian economic theory. Therefore, the way in which Marxian theory will answer the market 
power paradox through its competition theory is subject to making that answer compatible with the 
labor value law. Hence, we will present an extremely succinct and general explanation of this law that 
                                                          
38 Other authors belonging to the Classical Schools such as Say or Bastiat have successors that developed a different 
theory of value based on utility and scarceness. The contributions of these authors to competition theory will be 
examined in other sections of this chapter.  
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focuses exclusively on the mechanisms that make commodities be sold at their values. Since we expect to 
understand the role that competition plays in articulating these mechanisms, our extremely simplified 
explanation of the value law will be sufficient. We will follow Marx’s Capital since we consider this 
book to be the ultimate development of a logic trail of classical authors’ contributions to the branch of the 
classical theory that is based on the labor value law.  
A large part of classical authors built representations of the entire economic system on the same ground 
stone: the value law. This law is a logic consequence of a fundamental question of Political Economy that 
the classics have answered in the same way: what determines the exchange value (i.e. the amount of 
another commodity it can be obtained by selling it in the market) of a commodity? The classics’ answer 
is, in a nutshell, “human labor”. But for this answer to mean something an understanding of the 
implications of what human labor is in a capitalist society is needed (something we will not enter into in 
detail here) and the mechanisms of competition need to be specified for the answer to hold. The latter will 
be the object of this subsection.  
In Capital (2015), Marx offers a very elaborated justification of this answer that we will however 
reproduce here in a succinct way. He begins by pointing out that if two commodities A and B are 
exchanged in the market, they are being socially recognized as equally valuable. If one unit of A is sold 
for one unit of B, this means that there must be something both commodities possess in the same amount 
and makes them equal. One can easily see that use values (the technic characteristics of the commodities 
that give them some use desired by the purchaser –value use-) are not that common “content”39. If a 
pineapple is exchanged for a pen, it is obvious that these two commodities differ in their use values. 
Nevertheless, all the commodities share one characteristic: they are all the result of human labor.  
More precisely, they are the result of human abstract labor. Marx differentiates concrete labor from 
abstract labor. The former refers to the specific activity in which labor is involved, the concrete form that 
labor takes to make a use value (i.e. building a house, sewing, fishing, etc.). On the contrary, abstract 
labor refers to the abstract (i.e. regardless of the task it performs) “expenditure of human labor power”, 
i.e. two different concrete labors. Although the concrete labors employed to produce the pineapple and the 
pens are different, they both have in common being the product of abstract labor. They are both 
“productive expenditure of human brains, nerves, and muscles, and in this sense are human labour” 
(Marx, 2015). Therefore, “the equalization of the most different kinds of labor can be the result only of an 
abstraction from their inequalities, or of reducing them to their common denominator viz. expenditure of 
                                                          
39 The use of the word “content” should not be interpreted as a personal view of value as a content in the discussion 
on the value form. 
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human labour power or human labour in the abstract” (Marx, 2015, p. 87). Or, put differently, “when we 
bring our products into relation with each other as values to the extent that we see these 
articles only as material receptacles of homogenous human labour ...” (Marx, 2015, p. 242). 
The question that follows is how we can measure that abstract labor that two commodities exchanged in 
the market have in common. The first thing to notice here is that value is inherently a social concept. 
Given this, abstract labor can only be conceived in social terms. This has two major implications that 
interest us for our purpose. First, it means that the expenditure of labor power that matters is not the 
individual’s but the social one. In fact, if an individual took 5 hours to make a pen but, in average, the 
society makes it in 2 hours, the amount of abstract labor that will be recognized in the market when the 
pen will be exchanged is not 5 hours but 2 hours. Second, as Adam Smith points out, when calculating the 
value of a commodity, “the different degrees of hardship endured, and of ingenuity exercised, must 
likewise be taken into account. There may be more labour in an hour’s hard work than in two hour’s easy 
business” (Smith, 1976). This leads Marx to specify two things. Regarding the first remark, Marx states 
that the labor that is represented when two commodities are exchanged in the market is not only abstract 
but also a “socially necessary labor time”. This means that the value of a commodity depends on the 
average time society needs to produce it “under the normal conditions of production, and with the average 
degree of skill and intensity prevalent at the time” (Marx, 2015), and not the individual time each 
producer might need to do it.  Regarding the second remark, Marx introduces the concept of simple labor 
as the common unit to which more complex labors can be reduced: 
“It is the expenditure of simple labour power, i.e., of the labour power which, on an average, apart from 
any special development, exists in the organism of every ordinary individual. Simple average labour, it is 
true, varies in character in different countries and at different times, but in a particular society it is given. 
Skilled labour counts only as simple labour intensified, or rather, as multiplied simple labour, a given 
quantity of skilled being considered equal to a greater quantity of simple labour. Experience shows that 
this reduction is constantly being made. A commodity may be the product of the most skilled labour, but 
its value, by equating it to the product of simple unskilled labour, represents a definite quantity of the 
latter labour alone. The different proportions in which different sorts of labour are reduced to unskilled 
labour as their standard, are established by a social process that goes on behind the backs of the 
producers, and, consequently, appear to be fixed by custom” (Marx, 2015). 
Now that the mystery of the labor value has been (extremely roughly) revealed, now that we know what 
makes two commodities being exchanged as equals in the market, another question arises. How does it 
happen? How do people know how much socially necessary labor a certain commodity represents? Smith, 
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on whose and Ricardo’s work Marx builds his theory, was already conscious of the problem this question 
entails. In fact, Smith had already noticed that in capitalism, contrary to what ‘happened’40 in the “early 
and rude state of society”, the division of labor that characterizes capitalist societies has two 
consequences that inhibit the straightforward recognition of the socially necessary labor time represented 
by a commodity. In fact, if every person is dedicated to perform a single or a few tasks while he/she relies 
on others to acquire every commodity that he/she requires to live, how does he/she know how much time 
is socially required to produce the commodities he/she is purchasing? The answer to this problem is given 
by the laws of competition. 
1.2 The mechanisms of competition in Marxian theory41 
 
In order to explain the mechanisms of competition in the Marxian tradition, we must keep in mind that 
one of the premises of capitalist mode of production, which is consistent with Smith’s stress of the 
extension of the division of labor in capitalism, is that “capital exists and can only exist as many capitals, 
and its self-determination therefore appears as their reciprocal interaction with one another” (Marx, 1993, 
p. 414). Regarding the justification of this statement, Weeks tells us that “Marx's analysis has greater 
sophistication because he begins by asking the fundamental question: why is there competition? The 
answer to this question reveals the historically specific character of capitalism. Competition is the 
historically specific result of the loss of the ability of people to produce. This loss results from the 
separation of labor from the means by which work is realized, from their means of production” (Weeks, 
2012). 
Capitalism is therefore only possible if a multiplicity of interacting capitals exist and their interaction is 
nothing more (and nothing less) than competition. In Marx words, “competition is nothing more than the 
way in which the many capitals force the inherent determinants of capital upon one another and upon 
themselves” (Marx, 1993, p. 651). “Conceptually, competition is nothing more than the inner nature of 
capital, its essential character, appearing in and realized as the reciprocal interaction of many capitals 
with one another” (Marx, 1993, p. 414, emphasis in the original). 
                                                          
40 We use quotation marks since we interpret Smith’s rude and primitive society as a figure he employed to stress 
some features of capitalism by opposing these two societies, and not an actual society that has existed.  
 
41 We will base this section on Marx’s own writings as well as on certain interpretations of them and further 
developments of its theory by other authors that we judged pertinent to our investigation. 
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We must therefore understand how the value law operates in a society made of many competing capitals. 
What the classics show is that the value law operates precisely through and thanks to the laws of 
competition. We shall then make these laws explicit. Competition mechanisms in the Marxian tradition 
can be divided in two mechanisms: inter-industry competition and intra-industry competition (Guerrero, 
1994). 
1.2.1 Intra-industry competition 
 
Let us first examine intra-industry competition. In capitalism, firms have to fight each other to survive in 
the market. Each of them looks forward to outpace other firms by conquering the largest possible market 
share, eliminating actual and potential threating firms and valorizing their capitals as much as they can 
(Shaikh, 1982). In order to do so, they need to constantly improve their production techniques in such a 
way that the productivity of labor rises and, therefore, the individual value of the commodity produced is 
lowered. “Price and cost-cutting behavior by all firms” plays a “central role” in the classical tradition 
(Moudud, 2012) and the “key drive to minimize selling prices arises from the potential threat of invasion 
by firms outside an industry, a potential that can become an actual threat if such firms succeed in 
developing new technologies” (Moudud, 2010).  
However, not all firms possess the same capabilities. Some are more productive than others. In each 
industry there is a firm that, typically as a result of its innovation process, can produce at lower costs than 
other competing firms that sell the same commodity and, therefore, has the capacity to set the price of the 
commodity that other firms will have to match in order to avoid losing market shares. This firm is 
referred to as the “regulating capital” (Shaikh, 2008; Tsoulfidis, 2015). If we start our analysis from a 
state in which all the firms have the same rate of profit and sell the same homogeneous commodity42, the 
firm that succeeds in innovating before the others (the “regulating capital”) can profit from its lower costs 
to make an extraordinary profit, even if it sells the commodity at a lower price than its competitors (yet 
not low enough to make the extraordinary profit disappear) in order to conquer a larger market share. This 
forces the less efficient non-innovating/less performant firms to quickly adopt the new technique so they 
will not run out of business. In the meantime, they are forced to sell their commodities to the regulating 
                                                          
42 Not all of the classical analyses assume the homogeneity of commodities in a market. Some authors of the 
classical tradition like Duménil and Lévy have even stated that “monopolistic competition is the right approach to 
classical competition” (Duménil & Lévy, 1993). For the sake of simplicity, we will refer here to the homogeneous 
commodity intra-industry competition mechanism that can be found in the ‘old’ authors belonging to the labor value 
branch of the Classical tradition such as Mill, Smith, Ricardo or Marx. Nonetheless, as we will explain at the end of 
this sub-section, when inter-industry competition is considered, not assuming the homogeneity of commodities 
within an industry does not alter the classical view of competition.  
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capital’s price for their market shares not to evaporate. Therefore, since non-regulating firms possess an 
old and less productive production technique, selling their output to the regulating capital’s value can only 
mean accepting a lower profit rate. This process happens continuously and, while it takes place, some 
firms run out of business while some others grow. At the same time, during this process some firms get 
higher profit rates than others according to the degree to which they have developed their techniques or 
their organizational skills. In Shaikh’s (1982, p. 77) words: 
“In any given industry, different methods of production of various ages coexist, with both differences in 
age method producing variations in annual profit rates. Since old methods are constantly eliminated and 
new ones constantly added, this intra-industrial constellation of profit rates is perpetually recreated by the 
dynamics of accumulation” (…) Even for regulating capitals, specific concrete factors ranging from 
variation in managerial abilities to sheer luck will produce a spectrum of profit rates across the individual 
capitals concerned”. 
 
It is therefore the coexistence of unequally efficient production techniques in a continuous process of 
innovation what creates this constellation of profit rates as a result of the competitive process. Firms are 
considered to be heterogeneous regarding their organizational and technological capabilities and 
adaptation to reach the state of the art technique or to set the new state of the art technique is a constantly 
ongoing process. Therefore, there will always be firms ‘ahead’ in the cost-cutting race, while some will 
be always lagging behind. The length on the adaptation is a consequence of “lock-in” effects. “Large 
fixed capital investments ‘lock in’ a firm’s current technology for some time, during which time its 
market position may be disrupted by other firms. Uncertainty about future sales, the availability of 
industries that would provide crucial inputs into a new technology, and recent losses, are all likely to 
create this ‘lock-in’ effect” (Moudud, 2012, p. 44). 
We can appreciate how “intraindustry competition shows how a common price for homogeneous 
commodities finally prevails on the market, on the basis of decentralized price setting” (Duménil & Lévy, 
1993).  Put in value terms, intra-industry competition is what assures that commodities will tend to 
be sold at their values, the mechanism that enforces the labor value law. In Ricardo’s words, “in 
speaking, then, of commodities, of their exchangeable value, and of the laws which regulate their relative 
prices, we mean always such commodities on the production of which competition operates without 
restraint” (Ricardo, 1913, p. 6). If we consider the evident dynamic character of the intra-industry 
competition process we have just explained, it becomes obvious that it describes the continuous creation 
and operation of forces that take time to fully operate, which leads us to conclude that the value law 
operates as a tendency.  
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1.2.2 Inter-industry competition 
 
We shall now consider the other competition force present in the Marxian theory, inter-industry 
competition. Inter-industry competition is one of the pillars of the Marxian theory because it assures the 
(inter-industry) equalization of the rates of profit. As we will see in the next paragraph, this allows for a 
coherent introduction of the laws of supply and demand within the value-law based classical tradition and 
makes the value law possible. Moreover, as we will show during this chapter, in every competition theory 
the position taken regarding the equalization of profit rates has a major impact on the way in which 
competition is represented.  
Inter-industry competition is an intuitive mechanism. Consider an industry A in which a commodity is 
sold at its “natural” value, meaning the value that corresponds to the socially necessary time to reproduce 
that commodity. Consider also that all the industries of the economy sell commodities at their values and 
have the same “normal” rate of profit.  If, for some reason, demand for industry A’s commodity rises 
(diminishes) the output not having changed, its price should go up (down). In that case, the commodity 
will be sold at more (less) than its value. The same can be said if output is altered to an extent that it 
modifies the exchange value. In a first instance, it seems like the fluctuation of prices caused by 
fluctuations in supply and demand contradicts the value law. But it is not the case, and this is where inter-
industry competition enters. If industry A’s commodity is being sold at a price higher than its natural 
value, industry A will enjoy an extraordinary profit compared to other industries’ profits. This will attract 
investment from capitalists from other industries (or expel investment to other industries in the case in 
which demand had diminished). Firms will enter (leave) industry A and output will increase (decrease). 
The variation of output will make the value of the commodity go down (up) until the extraordinary profit 
disappears or, analogously, until the commodity is sold at its value. In other words, in the Marxian 
tradition, when firms obtain the same normal rate of profit across industries, each industry’s 
commodity is being sold at its value. Therefore, inter-industry competition is, along with intra-firm 
competition, another mechanism that enforces the law of labor value: if a commodity is being sold 
above its value in an industry, inter-industry competition will attract capital to it; this increases supply 
and, through the law of supply and demand, forces producers to lower the value at which they sell the 
commodity until it reaches its “natural” value. 
 
“This restless desire on the part of all the employers of stock to quit a less profitable for a more 
advantageous business has a strong tendency to equalise the rate of profit of all...(Ricardo, 1913, p. 48). 
Or, in Marx’s words, “Capital withdraws from a sphere with a low rate of profit and wends its way to 
others that yield higher profit. This constant migration, the distribution of capital between the different 
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spheres according to where the profit rate is rising and where it is falling, is what produces a relationship 
between supply and demand such that the average profit is the same in the various different spheres... ” 
(Marx, 2015, p. 297). Then, when intra-industry and inter-industry competition are considered together, 
the Marxian tradition concludes that “the dynamics of competition, rather than market imperfections, tend 
to reproduce unequal profit rates within industries and roughly equal profit rates between industries” 
(Moudud, 2010, p. 16). 
 
It is important to clarify that it is not the average rates of profit of industries that equalize, but the rates of 
profit of the regulating capitals of each industry. Indeed, the latter get by definition the highest rate of 
profit within a certain industry. If the regulating capital’s rate of profit happens to be higher in one 
industry, the output in that industry will rise until the price descends up to the point in which the 
regulating capitals’ rates of profit tend to equalize. This happens in two ways:  through an expansion of 
capacity utilization in the first place and through a rise in the productive capacities in the industry in the 
second place (Shaikh, 2008). In the latter case, “new contestants by and large aim at the most up-to-date 
plants or production conditions in the industry and not the outdated or the most efficient ones. The 
outdated production methods, other things equal, possess profitability lower than the average, whereas the 
most profitable methods of production may not be easily duplicated or their reproduction may entail a 
certain degree of risk, thereby discouraging potential new contestants. Hence, during ‘a cycle of fat and 
lean years’ that is, over a long period of time there is tendential equalization of inter-industry profit rates 
for the regulating capitals” (Tsoulfidis, 2015, p. 27). 
We would like to make three important remarks before concluding the exposition of competition 
mechanisms in the Marxian tradition. First, the compliance of the competitive mechanism of 
equalization of rates of profits depends on a key assumption, which is the absence or the fragility of 
barriers to entry in every industry. While some authors like Kurz (2008) speak of absence of barriers to 
entry, the majority of the authors of the Marxian tradition state that barriers to entry do exist but are not 
persistent. The fragility of barriers to entry is explicitly assumed by many authors of the Marxian tradition 
(Duménil & Lévy, 1993) and some of them have also offered theoretical and empirical arguments to 
defend this assumption (Moudud, 2012). We will not enter into the arguments for and against the debate 
on the porosity of barriers to entry in this chapter. For the purpose of the current chapter, we only need to 
point out that in the Marxian tradition inter-industry competition is based on the porosity of barriers to 
entry. 
Second, as with intra-industry competition, inter-industry competition is a dynamic process that takes 
time. Therefore, the equalization of the rate of profit and the value laws are tendencies. The equality of 
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profit rates can only happen in the long-run (Stigler, 1957). Supply and demand make prices oscillate 
around their production prices, the latter being determined by technical conditions. 
Finally, there is an implicit assumption, which is that when industries’ profit rates equalize through the 
entrance of new capitals, the new capitals are capable of producing with a technique as effective as the 
incumbent regulating capital that is getting an extraordinary rate of profit. In effect, if the regulating 
capital innovates and lowers its cost, its rate of profit rises. Then, if capitalists observe this extraordinary 
rate of profit and enter the industry, they must possess an equally efficient technology; otherwise, they 
would not be getting the attractive extraordinary rate of profit of the regulating capital but a lower one. 
The underlying logic is that in every industry (which in Marxian competition theory represents the 
smallest unit of accumulation center and is thought as led by a single firm), there is at least one regulating 
capital that has the technical and managerial skills required to be able to obtain the same rate of profit as 
the other regulating capitals from other industries. 
Then, not only does inter-industry competition also enforce the value law, it makes it compatible 
with the laws of supply and demand as well.  Inter-industry competition is clearly the most 
important of the two competition mechanisms of the Marxian tradition. Even if commodities are 
considered to be differenced among an industry and therefore intra-industry competition becomes 
monopolistic, the presence of inter-industry competition will assure that profit rates equalize through the 
entry/exit of capitals that will increase/decrease the supply, making the price go up/down. Then, as long 
as prices are not perfectly rigid, the degree of competition depends positively on capital mobility (inter-
industry competition).  
1.3 Further developments in Marxian competition theory: the administered 
prices and normal cost pricing theories 
 
We have seen that in intra-industry competition the regulating capital sets the price that other less 
productive firms from the same industry have to adapt to in order to survive. In the “old” authors of the 
labor value branch of the Classical tradition, firms align their prices with the regulating capital’s through 
a series of continuous short-run price adjustments. But, once the dominance of the big vertically 
integrated corporation and its administered pricing practice analyzed in the previous chapter established 
itself during the XXth century (cf. Chapter I), this short-run price adjustment mechanism called for a 
revision. If the Marxian intra-industry competition mechanisms were to hold, further developments 
to show how could prices converge to the regulating capital’s as a result of intra-industry 
competition once administered pricing had become the norm (once prices were being set ahead and 
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became rigid in the short-run independently of the variations of supply and demand) were needed. 
Moreover, for these developments to be compatible with the Marxian tradition, they would need to 
comply with two of its basic theoretical assumptions we have identified in the previous subsections: 
the fact that barriers to entry are temporary and the fact that competitive pressures from both 
inside and outside the industry will tend to make similar products have similar selling prices. As we 
will show along this subsection, the normal cost pricing (also referred to as “full cost pricing”) and the 
administered pricing (also labeled “managed competition” and “target return pricing theory”) theories 
can be considered to be theoretical developments that go in that direction and, therefore, that we 
can class along the labor value branch of Classical economics developed by the Marxian tradition in 
terms of competition theory, as many authors belonging to the Marxian (Moudud, 2012; Shaikh, 2008) 
and administered prices theories (Berle & Means, 1991; Tucker, 1940) acknowledge. Consequently, 
when referring to competition mechanisms proper to the Marxian tradition in the conclusions of 
this chapter, one should bear in mind that the administered pricing and the normal cost pricing 
theories are considered to be part of the Marxian tradition in terms of competition theory. On the 
contrary, mark-up pricing, as we will argue later in this chapter, although very close to the former two 
theories we just mentioned in terms of their description of pricing methods (which is why these three 
theories are referred to as “cost-plus” theories), differs considerably regarding  its underlying competition 
theory. Let us now describe these three theories and highlight the compatibility of the administered 
pricing and the normal cost pricing theories with Marxian competition theory, as summarized in Table 1. 
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Table 2: Major characteristics of the three cost-plus pricing theories 
 
 
CATEGORY 
 
 
CHARACTERISTICS 
      
THEORIES 
 
 
Administered 
pricing 
 
Normal cost 
pricing 
 
Mark-up 
pricing 
 
 
Characteristics 
common to 
the three cost-
plus pricing 
theories 
Prices are managerially 
determined before 
transactions take place 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
Prices are set as a 
margin above a 
standard cost that is 
calculated based on the 
average use of capacity 
over a certain period 
 
 
 
           Yes 
 
            
 
        Yes 
 
 
 
        Yes 
 
Major 
differences 
between the 
three pricing 
mechanisms 
Overhead costs are 
taken into account as 
part of the standard 
costs on which prices 
are set 
 
 
Yes 
 
 
Yes 
 
 
No 
 
Prices include a target 
profit rate 
 
 
Yes 
 
No 
 
No 
 
 
Compatibility 
with Marxian 
competition 
theory 
Barriers to entry are 
temporary and/or 
porous 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
No 
Competition forces 
firms to sell at the 
lowest possible price 
set by the lead firm 
 
 
Yes 
 
 
Yes 
 
 
No 
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In terms of pricing theory, the administered prices, the normal cost and the mark-up pricing 
theories can be considered to be three versions of a single “cost-plus” theory.  In these three cost-plus 
theories, “prices do not coordinate enterprise activities. Prices arise in the course of strategic, cooperative, 
and organized enterprise activities. Resulting prices do not clear markets. Nor does the market control 
itself and participating enterprises” (Jo, 2013, pp. 9–10). Similarly, Lavoie states that “what characterizes 
all these authors is the recognition that prices set by firms in the short run are not market-clearing prices, 
and are not even intended to be so” (Lavoie, 2014).  Instead, cost-plus pricing theories make two basic 
assumptions that characterize them: 
i) Firms set their prices as a margin above a standard cost that is calculated based on the average use of 
capacity over a certain period (Andrews, 1949; Berle & Means, 1991; Hall & Hitch, 1939; Lavoie, 
2014; Lee, 1999). 
ii) “Rather than having the price [of a good] determined in the process of the transaction itself, as it was 
for the atomistic enterprise, management determined its price prior to the transaction itself” (Lee, 1999, 
p. 55). 
Therefore, the two basic assumptions of these three doctrines that Lavoie (2014) identifies follow: 
a) The margin of profit and the price do not vary with reasonable fluctuations in output 
b) Prices will respond to fluctuations in standard or normal costs 
There are two points that allow for the division of cost-plus pricing theory into three theories. First, 
while “mark-up pricing does not take modifications of normal overhead costs into account” (Lavoie, 
2014), normal cost and administered prices theories do. Second, the administered prices doctrine specifies 
that “margins added to standard costs are designed to produce the target profit rate on investment, 
assuming standard volume to be the long-run average rate of plant utilization” (Kaplan, Dirlam, & 
Lanzillotti, 1980, p. 923), while the normal costs doctrine does not include the level of investment 
objective there is behind normal-cost pricing. In that sense, it can be said that administered pricing 
constitutes a specification of normal-cost pricing (Lavoie, 2014).  
Doctrines and even each authors within each doctrine differ in terms of what they consider the firm takes 
into account to set the level of the margin over cost. Many goals and constrains are taken into account by 
the firm, such as inter-temporal growth of the corporation, the degree of market competition and 
competitor’s prices (Berle & Means, 1991), technological innovation (Galbraith, 2015) or the strength of 
barriers to entry (Andrews, 1949). We will not enter into details in this subject. What we intend to show 
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in this subsection is that the pricing procedures described by two of these three cost-plus doctrines 
imply a notion of competition that is fully compatible with the Marxian approach and the 
mechanisms it describes. This compatibility comes from two propositions that both the 
administered prices and the normal cost doctrines (but not the mark-up doctrine) share (Moudud, 
2012): 
1) Barriers to entry are porous and/or not likely to be persistent in the long-run 
 
2) Competition forces firms to sell at the lowest possible price set by the lead firm. 
 
Regarding the first proposition, just as with Marxian theory, we will not develop here the arguments 
provided by the authors to justify it. For the purpose of this chapter, we should simply bear in mind that, 
just as the authors of the Marxian tradition do, authors of the administered prices and the normal cost 
doctrines consider barriers to entry to be temporary (Andrews, 1949; Hall & Hitch, 1939). 
 
Regarding the second proposition, an examination of the two doctrines’ description of pricing 
procedure reveals that, although there is no price competition in the short-run, price competition 
does take place in the long-run precisely because barriers to entry are porous and/or temporary; 
this makes the administered pricing and the normal cost pricing theories compatible with Marxian 
competition theory. The mechanism can be summarized as follows. In the normal cost and the 
administered prices doctrines, competition is considered to be “a series of strategic moves and counter-
moves” (Lee, 1999) in which, because price is set ahead and does not fluctuate in the short-run, in the 
short-run, firms compete for market shares on quantities rather than on price. In fact, as we mentioned 
above, these authors consider that in every market “there are so few independent competitors that each 
has a significant degree of pricing discretion, so that setting prices becomes an active function of business 
administration” (Berle & Means, 1991) that results in a fixed price in the short-run. Therefore, in the short 
run competition focuses on “administered sales campaigns designed to alter customer goodwill, and hence 
market share and growth rate” (Lee, 1999, p. 57). 
Nevertheless, this does not mean that prices can be set at will in a non-competitive way and that they are 
not subject to competition. On the contrary, price competition occurs, only that, unlike what happens in 
the “old” classical authors, it occurs only in the long-run. Potential competition (which, given that barriers 
to entry are temporary, is always a threat), government intervention and continual technical change limit 
the big corporation’s capacity to set a high “uncompetitive” price. “Market prices would not be set where 
the profit margin would be above the conventional profit margin since, in the long period, it would invite 
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entry and thus undermine the prevailing enterprises' existence even though in the short period it would be 
a profitable maneuver” (Lee, 1999). Moreover, the administered prices and the normal cost doctrines 
describe a long-run price competition process that is very similar to the Marxian process. Indeed, constant 
technological progress leads to continuous reductions in the average cost of production, which makes 
prices go down. Firms within an industry are heterogeneous regarding their technological capacities and 
their organizational skills. They all take into account other firms’ prices to choose the price or to adapt to 
the leading firm’s price43 (Berle & Means, 1991; Lee, 1999), so that a single prices prevails (Andrews, 
1949; Hall & Hitch, 1939). “If the prices in the market remain non uniform, pressure will emerge to force 
the prices to converge to the lowest price in the market” (Lee, 1999, p. 107). Therefore, “the essence of 
competition is that each seller is restricted in his pricing by the prices of his competitors” and, so, every 
firm “is controlled in the matter of costs and prices by the irresistible forces of the market” (Tucker, 1940, 
pp. 356–357). As in the Marxian tradition, this necessarily leads to differential rates of profits within an 
industry (Lee, 1999).  
 
1.4 Some concluding comments regarding the Marxian competition theory and 
its further developments 
 
Having presented the nature of competition and its mechanisms in the Marxian competition theory and its 
further developments (administered prices and normal cost pricing theories), we will now address some 
important features of these theories that are of major importance for our cartography.  
A dynamic competition theory inside and outside the firm 
One of the characteristics of the above-mentioned competition theories (but that is also present in other 
competition theories, as we will show further on) that has been stressed in the literature is its dynamic or 
behavioral essence, as opposed to the static vision of competition present in other theories such as 
neoclassical theory. As McNulty explains, this notion of competition was the standard view in the 
classical tradition even before Smith: 
"[Adam Smith] incorporated into the Wealth of Nations a concept of competition already well developed 
in the economic literature of his time. That concept was a behavioral one, the essence of which was the 
                                                          
43 Andrews allows for a third case in which the market price is established by a trade association. In that case, “the 
participating enterprises based the market price on the most efficient enterprise's normal average direct costs and 
then added on an agreed upon gross costing margin” (Lee, 1999, p. 12). 
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effort of the individual seller to under-sell, or the individual buyer to outbid, his rivals in the marketplace, 
and had earlier been employed and developed by a number of writers including Cantillon, Turgot, Hume, 
Steuart, and others, in their various efforts to explain how price was, in a free market, ultimately forced to 
a level which would just cover costs, that is, to the lowest level which would be sustainable over the long-
run” (McNulty, 1968, p. 647). 
McNulty makes evident in this quotation that competition is considered to be a behavioral notion in the 
classical tradition. This means that it can be said that competition is present if firms are acting and 
reacting in order to improve their situation or just survive in the market. This acting and reacting process 
implies rivalry. Competition is a war in which “each individual capital strives to capture the largest 
possible share of the market and supplant its competitors and exclude them from the market” (Marx, 
1991, p. 484).  
Not surprisingly, Marx uses the word “interaction” when characterizing competition. “Conceptually, 
competition is nothing other than the inner nature of capital, its essential character, appearing in and 
realized as the reciprocal interaction of many capitals with one another, the inner tendency as external 
necessity. Capital exists and can only exist as many capitals, and its self-determination therefore appears 
as their reciprocal interaction with one another” (Marx, 1993, emphasis added).  
This vision represents the opposite of the static notion of competition we will address further on in this 
chapter, according to which competition depends on certain characteristics of the market. On the contrary, 
“the Marxist notion of competition defines a process, not a state” (Shaikh, 1982). Competition takes place 
in time, while capitals react to each other by innovating, investing, pricing, advertising, etc.  
This shows that competition acts inside the firm. But competition is also the force that pushes 
commodities’ prices towards their respective production prices and capitals towards the industries with 
above average rates of profit, a force that "assures order and stability in the economic world much as does 
gravitation in the physical world" (McNulty, 1968, p. 643). It is therefore a force that constrains firms’ 
behavior. It acts both inside and outside the firm. 
Competition takes place inside an industry and between industries 
Regarding the fields of competition, it is obvious from the previous subsections that in the Marxian 
tradition competition takes place both inside the industry (intra-industry competition) and between 
industries (inter-industry competition). “All firms, even large-sized ones, are under competitive pressure 
from both within and outside the industry” (Moudud, 2012, p. 44). 
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Competition leads to short-run profit rate differentials within an industry 
We would like to address now the relationship between the competitive process and the existence of 
market power asymmetries in the Marxian tradition.  
In Marxian competition theory, the benchmark and the role of competition is that commodities are 
sold at their values. This, added to an acknowledgement of the dynamic essence of competition, the 
recognition of a differential of capabilities between firms and the assumption of “porous” barriers 
to entry, is what explains that Marxian competition theory allows for short-run profit rate 
differentials between firms of the same industry. Nonetheless, contrary to what happens in most of 
competition theories, these profit rate differentials are not the result of market power asymmetries 
but, on the contrary, of competition acting. 
As we have seen, intra-industry competition describes the mechanisms through which a single (lowest) 
price, the regulating capital’s, prevails in the market. In the classical labor value theory tradition this price 
can be considered to represent the value of the commodity. As Ricardo puts it, “in speaking, then, of 
commodities, of their exchangeable value, and of the laws which regulate their relative prices, we mean 
always such commodities on the production of which competition operates without restraint.” (Ricardo, 
1913, p. 6). But, as we saw, firms are considered to be heterogeneous regarding their technological and 
organizational capacities. There are regulating capitals that set the lowest possible price and less efficient 
capitals that have to adapt to that price even if their costs are higher. Therefore, short-run differentials in 
rates of profit exist within an industry. On the contrary, inter-industry rates of profit tend to converge. 
Barriers to entry are temporary and capital flows from one industry to the other seeking the highest 
possible rate of profit. Excesses and lack of supply tend to equalize rates of profits among industries 
because of inter-industry competition. 
Therefore, the disparity of rates of profit between industries is only temporary (Stigler, 1957). Barriers to 
entry being porous, these rates of profit tend to equalize just as the price of a commodity tends to its value 
over time although it may never reach it (Marx, 2015; Moudud, 2012; Ricardo, 1913). On the contrary, 
short-run profit rate differentials always exist within an industry (Duménil & Lévy, 1996; Moudud, 2012; 
Shaikh, 1982). There is no competitive force that leads to an equalization of rates of profit in this case. 
The nature of dynamic competition in a landscape of heterogeneous firms struggling to cut their costs by 
innovating leads to a continuous process in which the regulating capital manages to lower its cost and its 
selling price and obtains a profit rate above the other firms’. “In all of this there can never be any 
guarantee for any individual capital that it will earn any profit at all, let alone the social average rate of 
profit” (Shaikh, 1982). The distinction between regulating capitals and non-regulating capitals being just 
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a polar case, we can think of various categories of firms according their differentials in technical and 
organizational skills. Then, Marxian competition theory allows for the existence of a “constellation of 
profit rates” (Shaikh, 1982) within an industry not doomed to disappear while it invalidates the existence 
of a long-run profit rate differentials between industries. This constellation of profit rates is the result of 
intra-industry competition acting and not an expression of market power asymmetries. 
2 Neoclassical competition theories 
 
In this section we will analyze what we will hereafter refer to as neoclassical competition theories. This 
umbrella term, which takes many meanings depending on the author, will be used to refer to 
competition theories that hold that, if markets respect certain characteristics (atomicity, ‘free’ 
entrance and exit from the market, free movement of production factors, homogeneousness of goods 
and/or optimal repartition of property rights, as we will show along the section), the rational behavior of 
agents (i.e. the fact that agents use available information in the best possible way to optimize their 
behavior) will result in a competitive state in which no agent will influence prices or quantities in a 
market in its favor in such a way that departs from the social optimum. As we will see, the 
conditions markets have to respect for rational agents to behave in such a manner have evolved, leading to 
different neoclassical theories that share this common trait. Since the appearance of the concept of perfect 
competition, the Chicago School and Modern Property Rights Theory have redefined these conditions. 
Therefore, this section will develop the contributions of each of these theories to the neoclassical concept 
of competition. 
The neoclassical concept of competition can be pictured as the exact opposite of the branch of the 
Classical approach that centered on labor value theory analyzed in the previous section. The first version 
of the neoclassical economics, general equilibrium theory and the perfect competition paradigm, which 
was born with the Marginalist revolution in the XIX century, departed from the above-mentioned branch 
of Classical economics core concepts, developments and research program. They developed a completely 
different economic theory that aims to argue that ‘free’ markets are the most efficient possible way of 
organizing production based on a conceptual framework that confronts this branch of the Classical 
tradition in almost every aspect. In this subsection we will focus on one of its building blocks: 
competition theory. 
As we did with the classical theory, we need to understand the role competition plays in the neoclassical 
theoretical analysis of the economy as a whole in order to fully comprehend it. Therefore, before 
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analyzing the neoclassical concept of competition we need to briefly recall the main aspects of the theory 
of the firm and equilibrium on which its first version, perfect competition, relies. Just as we did with the 
classical theory, we will outline the main points of the neoclassical theory that we will be needed to 
analyze the concept of competition without entering into details, debates or subtleties. Our exposition 
should be considered a sketch that will serve as an input for the ultimate goal of this chapter, which is the 
creation of a critical cartography of competition theories. 
 
2.1 Efficient equilibrium and the firm in general equilibrium theory 
 
General equilibrium theory considers the economy is constituted by independent firms that seek to 
maximize their profits and rely on three factors of production to produce: labor, capital and land. Each of 
these factors has a productivity that is supposed to be marginally decreasing. The firm’s technique refers 
to the way in which it combines in different proportions these factors. All firms are supposed to choose 
the state of the art technique, i.e. the one that allows for the production of a unit of output with the 
smallest possible cost.  
This, in turn, is nothing but the result of two of the key assumptions of neoclassical theory: rationality and 
perfect information. This implies that all firms can freely and immediately access all the relevant 
information (perfect information) and use it the best possible way to optimize their behavior (rationality). 
Therefore, they can choose the technique (combinations of production factors) that, according to the 
current market prices of factors and technology, maximizes their profits. The latter being supposed to be 
equal to merely a combination of factors equally accessible in the market to every firm, it follows that all 
the firms will choose the optimum technique. Then, contrary to what the classical theory assumes, firms 
are homogeneous regarding their capabilities, which is why neoclassical models represent them all as a 
single “representative firm”. The homogeneity of firms follows from the assumption of perfect rationality 
in a “competitive” market environment. Now we need to understand what “competitive” means in 
neoclassical competition theory. 
Factors’ prices are ‘freely’ (we will come back to this later) determined by the factors’ markets and 
cannot be influenced by the firm that acquires them. In every market, including the one in which they sell 
their output, firms are price-takers. The firm’s cost depends therefore on the choice of technique (how 
many of each factor is used to produce a unit of output) and the factors’ prices. All the firms will 
therefore choose the same optimal technique that minimizes the cost of the production of a unit of output 
according to the factors’ prices. 
 124 
As long as the firm’s output price is above its production cost, the firm will choose to use more factors in 
order to produce more and, so, increase its profit. But since productivity is assumed to be marginally 
decreasing, every additional factor will render a profit smaller than the one that had been previously 
added. Therefore, at some point the addition of a unit of a factor will render a marginal revenue smaller 
than its cost. At this point, it would not be convenient to continue expanding production. Then, firms have 
to compare marginal revenues with marginal costs and produce the amount of output for which, under the 
state of the art/cost-minimizing technique all the firms share, the marginal revenue of producing an extra 
unit of output (the output’s price) is equal to its marginal cost, i.e. the cost of the extra factors needed to 
produce an additional unit of output. If we aggregate all the firms in the market, we can obtain a market 
supply curve in which price/marginal cost is positively related to the level of output. 
Symmetrically, consumers experience marginally decreasing utility while consuming a good: each unit 
consumed brings more utility, but the utility added by each unit is smaller than the one added by the 
previous unit consumed. Consumers will be willing to buy an additional unit of the firm’s output as long 
as its price is equal to or smaller than the satisfaction its consumption (which is supposed to be 
measurable in monetary units) brings. Therefore, since their marginal utility decreases with the amount of 
units consumed, consumers face a negative relation between output and the price they are willing to pay. 
This can be represented as the demand curve.  
When supply equals demand, consumers are paying the maximum they are willing to pay for the last unit 
consumed and firms are maximizing their profits. The resulting level of output and price/marginal cost is 
considered to be efficient for both firms and consumers, i.e. for the society as a whole. It is considered to 
be a point of allocative efficiency, i.e. a point in which consumers pay a price that is equal to the marginal 
cost of production of the last unit. It is therefore the minimum possible price they can pay if firms are 
supposed to rationally choose their level of production in order to maximize profit. Then, at this point of 
“allocative efficiency”, consumers’ utility and firms’ profits are maximized. The later can only be 
possible if the good is produced at the lowest average total cost possible.  
This ideal point of social efficiency is nonetheless possible only when “perfect” competition exists. There 
are underlying assumptions that make the mechanisms we have just described possible. We shall then 
explore in the following subs-section the meaning of perfect competition. 
2.2 Perfect competition 
 
As we saw, the general-equilibrium-rooted neoclassical theory argument for the social efficiency of the 
equilibrium between supply and demand relies on some key assumptions: 
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i) Consumers face marginally decreasing utility when consuming a good 
ii) Firms face marginally decreasing or constant productivity (Arrow & Hahn, 1971) 
iii) Firms are price-takers 
The first condition, although it has been discussed in the literature (Kauder, 2015), does not interest us in 
order to comprehend the meaning of perfect competition. The second condition, even if unrealistic and 
criticized in the literature, has a direct effect on the competitive process, but we will refer to it later in this 
section in relation to the third condition. We will focus on the latter, since it is the underlying specific 
assumptions that neoclassical theory gives to it what shapes the concept of perfect competition and 
neoclassical competition theory in general. 
Firms being price-takers means much more than what it seems in perfect competition theory. As McNulty 
shows, it is with neoclassical economics that the idea of competition as a market structure emerges 
(McNulty, 1968). Following McNulty, we can trace the development of this idea of competition to 
Cournot, who wrote that competition “had reached their limit when the output of each firm was 
‘inappreciable’ with respect to total industry output, and could be subtracted from the total output 
"without any appreciable variation resulting in the price of the commodity" (Mill, 1973, p. 306). Later on, 
Jevons and Edgeworth in the late nineteenth century, with the subsequent refinements of J.B. Clark and 
Frank Knight, the marriage between competition and market structure in the way the current concept of 
perfect competition took place. 
The underlying idea of perfect competition is that, for firms to be price-takers, they need to have a 
negligible influence on each other and on the market in which they participate. As Stigler puts it, market 
competition can be defined as “the absence of monopoly power in a market” (Stigler, 1957). This implies 
that "the trader submits to the market prices without deliberately trying to modify them. These prices are 
effectively modified by his supply and demand, but unwillingly. It is what characterizes the state that we 
shall name free competition" (Pareto, 1964, p. 90)44. This is formalized by Marhsall’s introduction of 
Cournot’s horizontal demand curve firms face in the third edition of his Principles (Marshall, 2009). The 
meaning of this curve is the same: individual increases of output have no effect on market price.  
The conditions for this lack of market power are assimilated to a particular market structure in perfect 
competition theory.  In particular, each firm’s output should be negligible compared to the total output 
                                                          
44 The translation is ours. 
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(Marshall, 2009). If we examine the conditions of perfect competition or of equilibrium efficiency that 
refer to competition, we can find the following ones:  
i) Atomicity of the market: there are “indefinitely large numbers of participants on both sides of the 
market” (Stigler, 1957) (Arrow & Hahn, 1971; Edgeworth, 1881). 
ii) Free entrance and exit from the market: there are no costs associated to the entrance/exit to/from the 
market (Arrow & Hahn, 1971; Knight, 2012) 
iii) Free movement of production factors: there are no costs associated to movements or changes, neither 
regarding the acquisition of production factors 
iv) Goods are homogeneous 
These conditions constitute the core of the concept of perfect competition. When they are met, 
competition is perfect in the sense that no firm will have any influence over the market price. This 
(neoclassical) interpretation of the lack of market power is to us what constitutes the core of the 
neoclassical concept of competition. Moreover, the latter is identified with a certain market structure: the 
market has to be made of many equally uninfluential firms that have no power whatsoever over price and 
quantities. This particular market structure, in turn, is nothing but the result of these four conditions being 
met and the previously mentioned assumption of decreasing marginal productivity of factors. Indeed, if 
there is decreasing marginal productivity of factors and conditions ii) iii) and iv) are met, the market will 
be atomistic (condition i) will be met) and firms will be powerless regarding their capacity to influence 
the market price. On the contrary, if marginal productivity increased with output, the firm will find 
optimal to produce all the output demand can absorb, since marginal costs would always be above 
marginal gains. The result would be a monopoly. Therefore, in the perfect competition framework, the 
shape of the technically determined cost function explains the market structure, which in turn explains 
firms’ competitive behaviors. In Coriat’s and Weinstein’s (2015, p. 15) words , “the nature of the 
variables that it [the neoclassical firm] can manipulate (its policies) is determined by the market structure 
that is imposed to it”45. 
Regarding condition iv), if goods are not homogeneous, a firm could have the monopoly of a market 
defined by the good of which it is the only produces. Finally, even in the case of a monopoly, if barriers to 
entry do not exist or are temporary (an access to a particular resource reserved to a particular firm can 
thought of as a barrier to entry), the monopoly could be easily threatened and forced to practice 
“competitive” prices. Therefore, condition ii) is a key assumptions of the perfect competition theory. As 
                                                          
45 The translation is ours. 
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we will show in the following subsection, neoclassical economics had to rethink condition ii) in order to 
make its own benchmark and definition of competition (the impossibility for any firm of setting prices 
above the “competitive” level) compatible with the evident existence of market concentration (violation 
of condition i) ). This is what the authors from the Chicago School did by developing the notion of 
contestable markets, as we shall see in the next subsection. 
2.3 The Chicago School and the notion of contestable markets 
 
Cournot, the father of the neoclassical concept of competition, did not pay much attention to conditions of 
entry in an industry. Therefore, a market with numerous firms with similar market shares in which the 
entry was impossible should be considered to be competitive in Cournot’s terms (Stigler, 1957). In fact, 
perfect competition theory studied intra-industry competition without taking a particular interest in the 
“openness” of a market to potential entrants. This changed when scholars from the Chicago School such 
as Posner, Stigler, Baumol or Panzar, among others, developed the concept of contestable markets. This 
theoretical development refined neoclassical competition theory and became a major theoretical 
background for antitrust policy in the United States during the 1970s and the 1980s (Souty, 1995), as 
evoked in Chapter I. 
The Chicago School arose in the 1970s as a neoclassical alternative to the conclusions of the Harvard or 
Structuralist School. We will address the latter in more detail in the following subsection. For the time 
being, we can say that, in a nutshell, Harvard School’s competition theory is based on the following two 
propositions (Souty, 1995). 
i) Structure Conduct Performance (SCP) paradigm: market structures determine firms’ behaviors. In that 
sense, the more concentrated a market is, the more market power firms will have and exert and, 
therefore, the market will perform worst in terms of efficiency. 
ii) Market power (i.e. the capacity to set prices above the competitive level) is inherently damaging in 
terms of economic efficiency and should therefore be banned per se. 
We can see that while the Harvard School shares the ideas that market structure defines firms’ behavior 
with perfect competition theory, unlike the latter, it considers anti-competitive concentrated market 
structures to be a result of the competitive process. That means that competition eventually leads to its 
self-destruction: concentrated market structures that result in anti-competitive behaviors and, therefore, 
inefficient performances.  
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Harvard School’s competition theory had been the cornerstone of American antitrust during the Fordist 
competition era (circa 1945 to 1970s). Guided by the ideas according to which market structures heavily 
influence firms’ behaviors (SCP paradigm) and competition leads eventually to market power, American 
antitrust and regulators applied many restrictive measures to assure that market structures would not give 
market power to firms (cf. Chapter I). When, during the 1980s, a process of deregulation started to take 
place in the United States (notably in the telecommunications and airline industries), these measures 
started to be relaxed. Through the lenses of the Harvard School, this implied augmenting firms’ market 
power and, therefore, giving them the power to raise prices. In this context, and in order to justify the 
benign competitive outcomes that should arise from deregulation, The Chicago School developed the 
notion of “contestable market”, which would reconcile the overwhelming empirical evidence of the 
dominance of concentrated market structures with the idea that competition in the neoclassical sense of 
the term still prevails, something that the Harvard School thought to be impossible. In order to do so, it 
rejected the SCP paradigm (proposition ii) while keeping the neoclassical competition theory framework, 
especially its conception of competition as a market structure that does not give firms market power, the 
latter being understood as the capacity to raise prices over the competitive level (proposition i). The 
Chicago School defied the SCP paradigm with the notion of “contestable market”, which became its 
definition of a competitive market. Baumol (1986, p. 3) defined the later in the following way: 
“A contestable market is one into which entry is absolutely free, and exit is absolutely costless. We use 
‘freedom of entry’ in Stigler's sense, not to mean that it is costless or easy, but that the entrant suffers no 
disadvantage in terms of production technique or perceived product quality relative to the incumbent, and 
that potential entrants find it appropriate to evaluate the profitability of entry in terms of the incumbent 
firms' pre-entry prices. In short, it is a requirement of contestability that there be no cost discrimination 
against entrants. Absolute freedom of exit, to us, is one way to guarantee freedom of entry. By this we 
mean that any firm can leave without impediment, and in the process of departure can recoup any costs 
incurred in the entry process.” 
The strength of contestable markets as a theoretical tool to refine the neoclassical concept of perfect 
competition is major. As long as a market is contestable, no matter how concentrated it is, it will be 
competitive and, therefore, it will also be efficient if other conditions relative to the characteristics of the 
markets46 are met. The incumbent firm will keep its price at the competitive level (it will not exert its 
market power, although it may have some) to avoid attracting potential entrants. Since it is obvious that 
no entrance and no exit from a market is ever costless, the Chicago School redefined that notion so 
                                                          
46 Namely perfect information and complete divisibility of goods. 
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“costless entry or exit” would mean “relatively costless entry or exit”: firms can face a cost of entry or 
exit, but no firm should face a higher cost than others’.  
The impact of these refinements was of paramount importance for neoclassical competition theory47. The 
neoclassical notion of competition (i.e. a competitive market is a market that possess characteristics 
that guarantees that firms will not set prices above the competitive level) was kept by changing the 
condition of competition. Market concentration (which in turn depends on the technically 
determined cost function, as we mentioned above) is not a source of (un)competitive conditions 
anymore. Equal costs of entry and exit become the only condition of competition. Therefore, the 
concept of contestable markets reconciled concentrated market structures with the neoclassical 
notion of competition and, more importantly, with the prevalence of competition. Even in the 
extreme case of a monopoly, as long as there is a threat of new firms entering the market, competition 
would prevail and prices would be the same as those of perfect competition. We will now take a deeper 
look into the prevalence of competition in neoclassical competition theory and other aspects we wish to 
analyze before concluding this subsection. 
Before closing this subsection, we would like to refer quickly to Chicago School’s position regarding 
(semi)vertical market power. Another of the main differences this school of thought presents in terms of 
competition theory with perfect competition theory is the consideration of vertical relationships between 
firms. The Chicago School has dealt with vertical relationships mainly by treating the issue of vertical 
restraints, i.e. contractual arrangements between producers and retailers such as the imposition of a re-sale 
price, exclusive sales, exclusive territories or tied sales. The position of this school is that “vertical 
restraints do not support the transmission of monopoly power from one level to another” (Dobson & 
Waterson, 1996), as the work of some of the most prominent authors of the Chicago School such as Bork 
(1979; 1966), Telser  (1960) and Posner (1981, 2014) argues. Their position regarding the existence of 
market power in these cases can be considered to be an answer to the Harvard School’s stand, which is 
the opposite. While the Harvard School tends to see in these practices the exertion of market power from 
one firm to its immediate buyer/seller firm, the Chicago School usually sees arrangements that allow for 
the increase of efficiency when externalities are present (Encaoua, 2015). Indeed, the main argument of 
the Chicago School relies on the fact that in vertical relationships goods sold by the upstream and the 
downstream firms are complementary (since both firms need each other to operate) and not substitute asit 
is the case in horizontal competition between firms competing in the same market. Then, contrary to what 
                                                          
47 The impact is not only theoretical. As shown in Chapter I, antitrust policy, especially in the United States, 
underwent a major shift partially as a consequence of the influence of the Chicago School literature on competition 
theory.  
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happens with substitute goods, a price cut by a firm creates incentives for the other downstream firm to 
increase its demand for the good. This is an externality that the price-cutting company will normally not 
take into account. But if vertical agreements exist, firms will internalize this effect and therefore will have 
an incentive to cut prices and not to exert market power on the downstream firm (Verouden, 2008). Then, 
monopoly rents can only exist in horizontal competition.  When it comes to vertical competition between 
upstream and downstream firms, vertical agreements “do not allow for additional monopoly rent to be 
created” (Dobson & Waterson, 1996, p. 1).  
2.4  Modern property rights theory and incomplete contracts 
 
Modern property rights theory (MPRT) can be considered to be a variation of neoclassical theory in terms 
of competition theory in that, just like perfect competition theory and the Chicago School, it argues that, if 
markets respect certain characteristics, rational agents’ interactions in the market will lead to a 
competitive state in which none will set prices and/or quantities in the market in such a way that departs 
from the social optimum.  In order to complete the analysis of neoclassical theories, this section will show 
how the link between competition and market power is addressed by MPRT through the notion of 
incomplete contracts, which redefines the conditions of a competitive state in the sense we just have given 
to the term by introducing the problem of the repartition of property rights. 
We have just seen how, using the notion of contestable markets, the Chicago School redefined the 
benchmark of competition to conclude, along with the perfect competition framework, that, under certain 
conditions that make a market competitive (free entry in the case of contestable markets), market power 
will not emerge. In the same manner, MPRT integrates the problem of the distribution of property rights 
and concludes that a right distribution of property rights is another necessary condition for market power 
not to arise.  
MPRT conceives the problem of incomplete contracts as an ex-post difficulty firms and individuals face 
after having signed a contract for a transaction (Chassagnon, 2009). According to this theory, an 
engagement can only be translated into a contract if it is checkable by a third party (a judge for example). 
However, most of the times it is not the case. Outcomes are not necessarily observable, which makes 
contract incompleteness possible even when information is symmetrical and agents are rational. Then, 
when an agent invests in a specific asset (an asset that has more value in the transaction for which the 
investment was made than if used for other transactions), given the existence of incomplete contracts, the 
hold-up problem appears. 
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In MPRT the firm is conceived as a set of assets subject to the same authority and a unified control (Blair 
& Stout, 1999). Control, in turn, is assimilated to property rights: whoever possesses an asset has residual 
control rights over it, i.e. the right to decide on the use and the exclusion from the use of the asset in the 
terms stipulated by legal rules. Since employees have asset-specific skills (for example, the ability to use 
a particular software), authority from the owners of those assets in the firm can be exerted to coordinate 
labor. Consequently, the firm is nothing but a “nexus of contracts” (Jensen & Meckling, 1976) 
indistinguishable from the market. The boundaries of the firm are ultimately defined by the risk of hold-
up. When a circumstance that is not contemplated in a contract that involves a previous investment on a 
specific asset by agent A occurs, agent B can benefit from the situation. In this case, there is a risk of 
hold-up. Agent B can act opportunistically by threatening not to fulfill the transaction if it is not carried in 
a way that is more beneficial to it since the specificity of agent A’s investment makes agent A dependent 
on B. Intra-firm coordination is the solution to the problem of hold-up. If both agents were part of the 
same firm, none would not gain from being opportunistic or by holding-up the other. Then, when there is 
a high risk of hold-up, market transactions will be replaced by within-the-firm transactions in which de 
jure power (the legal power to decide on the use and the exclusion from a resource) becomes the 
coordination mechanism. Consequently, MPRT concludes that “ownership is a source of power when 
contracts are incomplete” (Hart, 1995, p. 29).  
In respect to competition theory, we can appreciate that one of the major consequences of the analysis 
of incomplete contracts made by MPRT is that there is an optimal distribution of property rights 
that annuls the possibility of hold-up and, therefore, of market power asymmetries between firms. 
In other words, as long as property rights are properly defined (and it is in the interest of rational 
agents that internalize in the firm transactions that require large specific investments), competition 
will not lead to market power. 
2.5 Some concluding comments regarding neoclassical competition theories 
 
We would like to address now some important features of neoclassical competition theory that are of 
major importance for our cartography.  
The first thing we will like to point out is the static conception of competition in neoclassical economics. 
Unlike the classical tradition, neoclassical economics sees competition as a state and not as a process. 
Competition is not behavioral and dynamic but rather a state of affairs. If we consider the perfect 
competition framework, competition is defined as a particular state of market structure that makes firms 
unable to set prices above the competitive level. If we consider the contestable markets framework, 
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competition is defined as a state in which the costs of entry and exit are the same for all the firms, which 
makes the incumbent firms not to wish to set prices above the competitive level. In the case of MPRT, 
competition implies a proper distribution of property rights. In every case competition is not identified, as 
it was the case with the Marxian tradition, with “a series of strategic moves and counter-moves” (Lee, 
1999) between firms reacting one to each other, i.e. a process. On the contrary, competition is in 
neoclassical economics a situation. Since competition is a static and non-behavioral concept in 
neoclassical theory, it only operates in the market but not inside the firm. Competition is reduced to 
certain characteristics of the market on which competitive behavior depends. 
Regarding the field of competition, neoclassical economics is split depending on what version is to be 
considered. The perfect competition framework focuses on intra-industry competition, the existence of 
free entrance and exit being assumed. On the contrary, the contestable markets framework makes of 
relatively costless entrance and exit from the market a condition of competition and therefore one of the 
fields on which it takes place. Moreover, in this framework intra-industry competition can only happen if 
inter-industry competition takes place: the two fields are deeply interconnected. Modern Property Rights 
Theory, in turn, applies its analysis of the hold-up problem both to transactions between two competitors 
in the same market and to firms engaged in a direct supplier/client relations within a supply chain. 
Finally, we would like to address an important feature of neoclassical competition theory that 
distinguishes it from neighboring theories such as the Harvard School’s: the relationship between 
competition and market power asymmetries. In neoclassical competition theory, competition leads to the 
annulment of market power. In the perfect competition framework, competition can never lead to exertion 
(not even to the appearance) of market power by firms that would set prices above the competitive level. 
A market with all the basic competitive features will automatically lead to a situation in which firms will 
not have any market power. This, of course, does not mean that uncompetitive situations cannot take 
place. Agents can collude, the government could set uneven barriers to entry, agents could possess 
imperfect and/or asymmetrical information, etc. What we want to stress is that, in the perfect 
competition framework, competition will not lead to market power asymmetries by itself. The latter 
can only exist if uncompetitive external forces act, but not as a result of competition. That is to say, 
the market power paradox is not verified. If we consider the Chicago School competition theory, the same 
conclusion is to be drawn. Regarding horizontal competition, a contestable market, as long as no external 
uncompetitive forces interfere (a firm wishing to set an uncompetitive barrier to entry to prevent a 
particular firm to enter the market, unequal public regulations on the entry or the exit of the market, etc.), 
will remain competitive and, therefore, will not allow for market power asymmetries. Although in a 
competitive state some firms can possess market power, as long as competition takes place (as long as the 
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market is contestable), they will not use it and no market power asymmetry leading to long-run profit rate 
differentials will exist. The same can be concluded for MPRT: if property rights are properly distributed, 
market power asymmetries cannot arise and, therefore, competition does not lead to long-run profit rate 
differentials between firms. 
Regarding vertical competition, we have seen that for the Chicago School (the perfect competition 
framework does not analyze vertical competition) vertical agreements do not allow for the transmission of 
monopoly rents and, on the contrary, stimulate constant price cuts (they foster competition). In that sense, 
we can say that vertical competition does not lead to market power asymmetries.  
In the perfect competition, the MPRT and the contestable markets frameworks, the social role of 
competition is preserved: competition always leads by itself to the biggest possible efficiency for both 
consumers and producers. This is the conclusion to which all the variants of neoclassical competition 
theory try to arrive. 
3 Imperfect Competition and Monopoly Capital theories 
 
At the beginning of the XXth century, two schools of thought (Monopoly Capital Marxism48 and what we 
will label the “imperfect competition” tradition) departed from what up to the moment had been the 
standard view in their theoretical traditions: the labor value branch of Classical competition theory and 
perfect competition, respectively. In both cases, what spurred their contributions to competition theory 
were the new industrial organization landscape that, as shown in Chapter I, by the turn of the century had 
become dominant in developed economies: the large vertically integrated corporation, administered 
prices, cartels and trusts, among others. In both cases, the new competition landscape seemed to be 
difficult to fit the theoretical frameworks they had in mind. In both cases, then, new competition theories 
emerged as an answer. In this section we will examine the particularities of these theories in the light of 
the reading grid that guides this chapter and we will show how their mutual evolution from Classical 
competition theory and perfect competition theory gave birth to a common understanding of competition 
and its link with market power. Let us start with Monopoly Capital Theory. 
                                                          
48 We include some authors belonging to the dependence theory in Monopoly Capital Theory category. Indeed, a 
branch of dependence theory (Andre Gunder Frank, 1966; Marini, 1977a; Santos, 1970) came from Monopoly 
Capital Theory (Palma, 1987). At some stage of their theoretical constructions, authors belonging to the former 
recurred to (although not exclusively), “parasitism” explanations of dependency of peripheral countries on 
metropolises that, in some cases, referred to Monopoly Capital Theory’s competition mechanisms. 
 134 
3.1 Monopoly Capital competition theory 
 
Monopoly Capital Theory can be thought as Marxism’s theoretical reaction to the overwhelming and 
increasing importance of economic practices that seemed to go against what was usually understood as 
“competitive”. On one side, administered pricing seemed to undermine the major role competition on 
prices (the battleground of intra-industry competition in the classical tradition) plays in Marxist 
competition theory. On the other side, the colossal size of corporations that resulted from historically 
increasing concentration and centralization of capital (in many cases brought about by trusts, cartels and 
other forms of ententes between firms of the same industry) put at risk the assumption of perfect mobility 
of capital between industries, which, as we saw, is the cornerstone of inter-industry competition in the 
classical tradition.  
The first author of the Marxist tradition to notice this was Lafarge, who concluded that the death of 
competition was approaching: 
“ (…) we will see this competition, condition of every production, every trade and all the capitalist moral, 
self-destroy and constitute by its own game capitalist centralization, which results fatally in the 
organization of industry in trusts, which suppress competition in an equally efficient way as corporatist 
organization does” (Lafargue, 1903) 49. 
 
Nevertheless, not all the authors of the Monopoly Capital tradition share the view of competition being 
extinguished. Baran and Sweezy, for example, argue that with monopoly capital, although price 
competition disappears, competition “takes new forms and rages on with ever increasing intensity” (Baran 
& Sweezy, 1968, p. 67). But the debate on the degree of prevalence of competition is not what interests us 
for the purposes of our cartography. We would like to begin by stressing a common agreement within 
Monopoly Capital Theory, which is its argument according to which monopoly capital emerges from 
competition (Hilferding, 1985). In every author belonging to this tradition we find the idea (explicit or 
not) that the competition laws that Marx enounced a century before them were valid during the 
competitive phase of capitalism and that, if developed, they can only (theoretically and historically) 
evolve toward monopoly capital. 
The first author to explain this, and on which all the tradition of monopoly capital stands, was Hilferding 
(1985). Following Marx’s own reasoning when he developed the law of the tendency of the rate of profit 
                                                          
49 The translation is ours. 
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to fall in Capital, Hilferding argued that the very same laws of classical competition that show how firms 
need to constantly improve their technological capabilities to reduce costs and survive the competitive 
struggle “also brings about a change in the component elements of constant capital” (Hilferding, 1985, p. 
183). More precisely, this change requires more constant and fixed capital. This makes industries more 
and more difficult to enter and to exit. It is worth to quote Hilderding’s full and clear account of the latter: 
“This enormous inflation of fixed capital means, however, that once capital has been invested, its transfer 
from one sphere to other becomes increasingly difficult. Circulating capital is reconverted into money at 
the expiration of each turnover period, and can then be invested in any other branch of production; but 
fixed capital is tied up in the production process through a whole series of turnover periods (…) The 
larger the fixed capital, the greater weight in the balance of investments, and the larger its proportion in 
relation to the total capital, the more difficult it becomes to realize the value embodied in it without very 
considerable losses, and to transfer it to a more advantageous sphere. This circumstance modifies the 
competition between capitals for investment outlets emerged which limit the mobility of capital, although 
admittedly they only affect the capital which has already been transformed into means of production, not 
the capital which still awaits investment. A second limitation consists in the fact that technical progress 
expands the scale of production, and that the increasing volume of constant capital, especially fixed 
capital, requires an ever greater absolute sum of capital in order to expand production itself on a 
corresponding scale or to establish new enterprises. The sums which are gradually accumulated from 
surplus value are far from adequate to be transformed into independent capitals. It is conceivable, 
therefore, that the influx of new capital is insufficient or arrives too late” (Hilferding, 1985, p. 186).  
Following the same line of reasoning, Baran and Sweezy add other factors to the difficulty of capital 
mobility. In their view, in the “monopolistic and oligopolistic industry” (i.e. the industries that require 
investments that are so important that only one or a few firms in a market can afford), “the amount of 
capital required for the establishment of a new firm assumes prodigious proportions. Not only are the 
present standards of technology (such as to render the erection of a modern, scientifically adequate plant) 
very expensive, but the initial outlays on advertising, sales-promotion campaigns, and so-forth, that have 
to be met by a new firm call for large amounts of investment. What is more, the largely ephemeral nature 
of the initially acquired ‘asset’ (goodwill, market connections, etc.) greatly increases the riskiness of the 
new product. It becomes thus entirely inaccessible to small businessmen or even group of businessmen 
(corporations) neither themselves endowed with the requisite funds nor able to obtain sufficient support 
from the capital market” (…) “The extraordinary difficulty, if not impossibility, to entry of new firms into 
monopolistic and oligopolistic industries endows the established monopolies and oligopolies with what 
might be called ‘privileged sanctuaries’. The rules of behavior in the relative tranquility and security of 
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these retreats are, however, quite different from those applicable to industries exposed to the sharp winds 
of competition” (Baran & Sweezy, 1968, pp. 196–197). 
The major implications of these new “rules of behavior” are fully assumed by the authors of Monopoly 
Capital Theory. Hilderding (1985, p. 186) points out that “the free movement of capital, however, is a 
necessary condition for the establishment of an equal rate of profit. This equality is violated whenever the 
ebb and flow of capital is impeded in any way”. Then, during the “monopolistic phase of capitalism”, 
contrary to what happens in competitive industries, “in the monopolistic and oligopolistic sphere of the 
economy rates of profit on invested capital are unequal but predominantly high” (Hilferding, 1985, p. 
207). These theoretical developments of the labor value branch of Classical competition theory put the 
finger on its sensitive spots: if free mobility of capital between industries (the mechanism of inter-
industry competition that, we recall, is the central one in this branch of Classical competition theory) is 
swept away, competition as the authors belonging to this tradition understood it is dead, and so the 
equalization of profit rates and the labor value law (Kornblihtt, 2008). Needless to stress the importance 
this conclusion has for the Marxian tradition.  
The resulting mechanisms of competition theory, although rooted in the labor value branch of Classical 
Theory, are quite different the ones we exposed in the previous section. To sum up, concentration and 
centralization, two theoretical and historical necessary outcomes of Marxian competition laws, as well as 
the increasing importance of other variables of competition (goodwill, “technological rents” -Mandel, 
1999, p. 317- ), considerably restricted capital mobility in the age of monopolistic capitalism. As a result, 
price-competition ceased to exist. The latter is a conclusion held by Lafargue, Hilferding, Bujarin, Baran 
and Sweezy (Kornblihtt, 2008). As a result, firms in oligopolistic and monopolistic industries benefit 
from “surplus-profits” (Mandel, 1999, p. 317) that can be achieved “primarily by raising prices once they 
are in a position to eliminate competition” (Hilferding, 1985, p. 227). “Monopoly prices” (Dobb, 1975) 
are then the usual practice and competition, if it can be considered to exist (as we said before, the view on 
this point is not homogeneous among authors) is rather based on fights between oligopolies on market 
shares through advertising and sales effort (Baran & Sweezy, 1968; Hilferding, 1985), i.e. intra-industry 
competition on quantities. Similarly, the authors’ views on technological competition are not consensual. 
While some authors argue that under monopolistic and oligopolistic competition cost-cutting innovations 
are still constantly introduced in order to increase profit rates (Baran & Sweezy, 1968; Mandel, 1999) 
others see monopoly capital as a cause of the stagnation of innovation and capitalism in general 
(Hilferding, 1985). In any case, competitive mechanisms do not rely anymore on placing capital in 
the most profitable industries (until extraordinary profits disappear) and trying to cut costs by 
innovating in order to obtain (temporary) extraordinary profits. In Monopoly Capital competition 
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theory, the increasing needs of fixed capital and the evolution of the technology needed to produce 
at an efficient level lead inevitably to firms holding and exerting market power and obtaining long-
run extraordinary profits. 
3.2 Imperfect competition theories: the Harvard School’s and mark-up pricing 
theories 
 
In the early 1930s, the “imperfect competition” approach started to develop with Chamberlin’s “Theory 
of monopolistic competition” (1948) and Joan Robinson’s (1969) (1969) foundational works. These 
authors identified for the first time “intermediate categories in between purely competitive and 
monopolistic markets” (Galbraith, 1956, p. 60) that seemed to describe in a more realistic way the 
concentrated markets characterized by price-fixing corporations that dominated the economic landscape 
at the beginning of the XXth century. In this subsection, we will outline the main characteristics of this 
approach in order to see how it answers the market power paradox and our reading grid. In this sense, we 
will limit the discussion to the main basic contributions of some of the most relevant authors of this 
tradition.  
The heart of the imperfect competition tradition lies in two points: 
a) The SCP paradigm: “By affecting the character and intensity of competition among firms in the same 
industry, market structure shapes their conduct and performance” (Bain, 1968, p. 27). 
 
b) Competition takes places in markets that are not perfect in the sense that neoclassical theory gave to 
that term (see subsection 2.2), which alters the neoclassical conclusions on pricing and market power, 
among others.  
 
The latter gave name to the industrial organization paradigm that was identified for decades as Harvard 
School’s, and of which Bain became the main contributor, the “Structure conduct performance” (SCP) 
paradigm50. Market structures were classified according to three interrelated characteristics: the degree of 
seller concentration, the extent of product differentiation and the condition of entry to the industry (Bain, 
                                                          
50 Monopolistic competition theory and Harvard School’s imperfect competition theories are in fact very close to 
each other (Cayla, 2001; Samuelson, 1967). In terms of our analysis they can be considered to constitute a single 
competition theory in which monopolistic competition is a particular case of imperfect competition  in the sense that 
monopolistic competition explores the ultimate consequences in terms of competition theory of one of the 
characteristics that make a market imperfect: product differentiation (Cayla, 2001). 
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1968). Although authors belonging to this tradition do not always agree on which of these characteristics 
of market structures is/are the one(s) that defines imperfect competition or even on the distinctions made 
between these three characteristics51, they all agree on the fact that at least one of them differs from its 
neoclassical characterization, which has effects on the way competition takes place and market power is 
created.  
Concentration is conceived as the almost inevitable outcome of the characteristics of markets that will 
shape firms’ behaviors. In particular, Bain (1968) identified the following conditions as necessary for a 
market not to be concentrated, arguing that this outcome is unlikely: 
 Atomistic market 
 Scales economies are “unimportant” 
 Diseconomies of the large-scale firm are “important” 
 Products are homogeneous 
If at least one of these conditions is not met, “firms may grow or combine without loss of efficiency until 
their sizes are large and their number is few. Thereupon, the force of inter-firm competition may be 
restricted to permit periodic elevation of price above minimal average cost” (Bain, 1968, p. 181). 
Concentration can also be the result of the existence of barriers to entry of any of the three types 
identified by Bain: product differentiation (Chamberlin, 1937), absolute cost advantages and economies 
of scale.  Regardless of the origin of concentration, the result will be a positive correlation between 
concentration and extraordinary profits. In Bain’s words (1968, p. 439), “higher seller concentration 
within industries should be associated with substantial excesses of selling price over long-run average 
(and marginal) costs, moderately high or moderate seller concentration with appreciable but lesser 
excesses of price over cost, and lower seller concentration with no excesses at all- all this subject to two 
provisos” : (…) “price-elasticity of demand for industry output should be about the same for industries 
with different degrees of seller concentration (…)” and “barriers to entry to industries should not turn out 
to be lower for highly concentrated than for less concentrated industries”. 
Product differentiation and the presence of barriers to entry, even when they do not create concentration 
in a market, also lead firms to set prices above the competitive level by giving them market power (Bain, 
1968; Labini, 1969; Sraffa, 1926). For example, Chamberlin insists on the inevitable omnipresence of 
                                                          
51 Chamberlin, for instance, insisted on the fact that it is the downward slope of the individual firm demand curve 
(which is possible because of the existence of product differentiation acting as a barrier to entry that allows for a low 
price elasticity of demand) what “marks the contrast between monopolistic and pure competition” (Chamberlin, 
1937). Harrod (1934) shared this view, although his definition of imperfect competition includes free entry. 
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product differentiation to justify market power: “no one else can produce a product identical with it, 
although he may be able to produce other which are fairly good substitutes for it. Under monopolistic 
competition, then, there can be freedom of entry only in the sense of a freedom to produce substitutes; and 
in this sense freedom of entry is universal, since substitutes are entirely a matter of degree” (Chamberlin, 
1951, p. 567). In all cases, the underlying logic is that firms do not have to face as many rivals (or at least 
one challenging rival) as it would take for them not to be able to set uncompetitive prices. This may be 
the case either because their product is somehow ‘unique’ and captures a specific demand, either because 
there are barriers of any kind that limit the entrance of potential competitors or because the firm already 
possesses a certain scale that makes it dominant in the market. The relevance of the concept of 
monopolistic competition should not be underplayed, as it shows that market power can prevail in 
almost any type of industry and firm. Its strength relies on the fact that it shows that, independently of 
the position held in the market by firms and their sizes, they can all obtain and exert market power 
through product differentiation; and they all have incentives to do so: small firms with high production 
costs can avoid being swept out of the market by large firms with lower production costs, while the latter 
can avoid ruinous price wars by recurring to product differentiation. 
Following the same trend, the kaleckian branch of post-Keynesian economics52 used the imperfect 
competition approach to build a correspondent pricing theory, mark-up pricing. This theory argues that 
firms set their prices on a cost-plus basis by adding a mark-up to prime costs (non-overhead costs are not 
included) (Lavoie, 2014; Lee, 1999). The size of the mark-up depends on what Kalecki called the “degree 
of monopoly” of the firm. The latter represents the firm’s market power, which level depends on the 
importance of market imperfections, which includes industrial concentration (Lee, 1999), barriers to entry 
(Hieser, 1953) and product differentiation. Then, mark-up pricing can be considered to be the pricing 
theory that matches the imperfect competition approach in the sense that it considers price level to be a 
result of the market power a firm holds, the latter being determined by a market structure that results from 
‘realistic’ competitive conditions. 
As a consequence of these market imperfections that allow for the setting of uncompetitive prices, profit 
differentials within and between industries appear (Chamberlin, 1937; Labini, 1969). Accordingly, most 
of the empirical contributions of authors from the SCP paradigm tried to explain a branch’s profit rate or 
profit margin using market structure variables, especially concentration and barriers to entry (Encaoua, 
2015). 
                                                          
52 As we showed in subsection 1.3, there are two other post-Keynesian pricing theories (administered prices and 
normal cost pricing) that are more compatible with Marxian competition theory. 
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We would like to mention that these phenomena, contrary to what happens in Monopoly Capital Theory, 
also have a vertical dimension that we will not explore in depth in this chapter. The Harvard School, 
which served as the theoretical support of much of the antitrust legislation in the United States until the 
1960s (Souty, 1995), produced a prolific literature on vertical restraints. The latter can be defined as the 
use of any kind of restraint (vertical integration, refusal to deal, setting high input prices, producing an 
input incompatible with the competitors’, etc.) by an input supplier to obtain market power in the output 
market. This could result in vertical foreclosure (the exclusion of a competitor in the output market by 
using the market power obtained in the input market) or, in the case of vertical integration as a 
downstream and upstream monopolist, double marginalization (the obtaining of a double monopoly 
profit). The Harvard School was in general terms not supportive of vertical restraints, since it believed it 
would most certainly result in the exertion of market power (Encaoua, 2015) and, as a consequence, in an 
unequal distribution of profits between suppliers and buyers. It is important to mention the existence of 
the Harvard School’s literature on vertical restraints and its main conclusion in the context of this chapter 
because it shows that the Harvard School considered competition for a market to take place also through 
the neighboring upstream and downstream markets. Then, we can conclude that the competition 
landscape in the Harvard School is composed of the market on which firms directly compete by selling 
the same or substitute products and the immediate upstream and downstream markets.  
It is important to stress that in Imperfect Competition Theory competition is not annulled. It is not 
“perfect” in the neoclassical sense of the term, but this does not mean it does not exist. Firms do compete, 
but rather on quantities and quality (especially in imperfect markets characterized by high product 
differentiation) than on prices (Steindl, 1952). Moreover, firms’ pricing power is not absolute  (Kalecki, 
1971). It is restricted by the extent of the market imperfections they benefit from, as the expression 
“degree of monopoly” shows. The higher entry barriers are, the higher the “limit price” (the price that 
would render the entrance of a potential competitor profitable) is (Labini, 1969). 
We would like to end this subsection by stressing that the market power paradox holds in the imperfect 
competition approach according to which “competition can be permanent only when it is hampered by 
highly imperfect markets or softened by a spirit of live and let live among the entrepreneurs concerned”  
(Robinson, 1953, p. 592). The imperfect competition approach argues that market power is the 
result of firms competing in a market structure that is far from the neoclassical characterizations of 
perfect competition, since characteristics such as scale economies, different technological 
capabilities between firms, consumers’ psychology, the patent system or the size of the market 
prevail. Consequently, the outcome of competition in market structures with such characteristics 
can only be the exertion of market power that allows firms to set uncompetitive prices. Market 
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power, then, is the outcome of real world “imperfect” competition. Therefore, the Harvard School has 
historically advocated for a harsh competition policy that would intervene on market structures in order to 
contain the exertion of market power, which is considered to be damaging in terms of economic 
efficiency and consumers’ welfare. 
 
3.3 Some concluding comments regarding Monopoly Capital and Imperfect 
Competition theories  
 
Having presented the particularities of Monopoly Capital and Imperfect Competition theories and their 
competition mechanisms, we would like now to classify them by following our reading grid. We will 
show how these two competition theories, in spite of coming from very different schools of thought, share 
some important features that allow us to group them.  
 
A static concept of competition 
The first point we would like to underline is the static character of the concept of competition in these 
theories. In both cases, the key aspect that defines competition is market structure (McNulty, 1967, 1968). 
Competition is generally defined in terms of the characteristics of a market: the size and nature of barriers 
to entry, the level of concentration and product differentiation. Accordingly, these authors oppose the era 
of “imperfect competition” or “monopolistic capital” to a “competitive” historical period that differs in 
terms of market structures. Then, the benchmark of competition is in most cases not competitive activity, 
but a state of the market, a market structure. This, of course, does not mean that competitive activities are 
excluded from these theories. As we mentioned above, the literature that draws from them, especially the 
imperfect competition literature, treats in detail competitive activities, mostly on quantities and quality. 
Moreover, Chamberlin’s concept of monopolistic competition focuses on firms’ activity of differentiating 
products. Nevertheless, in these theories, what shapes (imperfect or monopolistic) competitive activities 
and defines the degree of competition is in most cases a state of the market. Competitive processes are 
downplayed and replaced by competitive states. This is most striking in Monopoly Capital Theory which, 
having evolved from Marx’s version of Classical Theory, argued against the validity of its inter-industry 
and intra-industry competition mechanisms and introduced instead mechanisms that are based purely on 
market structures. Therefore, competition operates exclusively outside of the firm, in the market. 
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Competition being identified with some characteristics of the market, activities such as innovation within 
a firm are not seen as competition operating per se until they contribute to shape the market. 
Competition is intra-industrial... and sometimes semi-vertical  
In both theories, the stress is put on the predominance of high barriers to entry (Imperfect Competition 
Theory) or the difficulty of capital mobility (Monopoly Capital Theory). This, of course, eliminates the 
possibility or the relevance of inter-industry competition as described in Marxian Theory. On the 
contrary, competition happens within an industry by competing on quantities and/or quality. Sale efforts, 
advertising, client’s good will and so forth are the methods employed by firms to compete for a certain 
industry’s market shares. Nevertheless, Imperfect Competition Theory differentiates from Monopoly 
Capital Theory since it includes a “semi-vertical” dimension of competition. Indeed, the literature on 
vertical restraints explores how a firm can use the market power it possesses in its own market in a 
neighbor downstream or upstream market in order to benefit from larger extraordinary profits. This shows 
that competition is not only intra-industrial as in Monopoly Capital Theory. Nevertheless, the vertical 
dimension is limited to the vertically neighboring markets and the latter are only relevant as weapons in 
the competitive struggle in the main market. In Imperfect Competition Theory, the whole value chain that 
links firms vertically is not the competitive landscape of the firm. Therefore, we can say that in Imperfect 
Competition Theory competition is intra-industry and semi-vertical, while it is only intra-industry in 
Monopoly Capital Theory. 
Competition leads to long-run profit rate differentials that result from market power asymmetries 
Monopoly Capital and Imperfect Competition theories necessarily lead to conclude that some firms have 
more market power than others and, therefore, can benefit from a higher rate of profit. In fact, profit rate 
differentials are the manifestation of the power to set uncompetitive prices based on the particularities of 
the structure of the market in which the firm is present. 
In Monopoly Capital Theory, concentration and its consequent erection of barriers to entry enables some 
firms to raise prices and the result is a “strikingly uneven distribution of profits” (Paul, 1957, p. 179) 
between firms. Firms belonging to industries in which entry is difficult because of the large amount of 
fixed capital needed to produce are of course the winners: they are able to set high prices and, as a result, 
in these industries “the rates of profit on invested capital are unequal but predominantly high”, contrary to 
what happens in the “competitive industry of the economy” where “the mechanisms of equalization of the 
rates of profit operates” and, therefore, “the rates of profit are low” (Baran & Sweezy, 1968, p. 207). The 
result is the existence of “a different profit rate for the monopolistic industry and the competitive industry 
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(where this rate will be consequently lower)”53 (Baran & Sweezy, 1968, p. 45). We find the same idea in 
Mandel, who speaks of two average profit rates: one for the monopolistic industry and one for the non-
monopolistic industry (Mandel, 1969). It is important to stress that since labor value theory is a central 
aspect of Monopoly Capital Theory, over-the-average profit rates, or higher average monopolistic profit 
rates, can only be possible if value created in the less profitable firms is transferred to the more profitable 
ones (Baran & Sweezy, 1968; Mandel, 1999). Indeed, the mechanisms that allow for this in profit rate 
differentials are based on the capacity to exclude some firms from competition and set prices above 
production (competitive) prices. Then, following the logic of Classical labor value theory, this can only 
happen if other firms are selling their output at prices above production prices. The over-profit of some 
firms is therefore made possible by capturing some value that, under a competitive regime, should belong 
to other firms.  
Some authors belonging to the Dependency Theory tradition (Andre Gunder Frank, 1966; Marini, 1977; 
Santos, 1970) arrived to the same conclusion drawing from Monopoly Capital Theory. Their goal was to 
show how peripheral countries are dependent upon and subjugated to metropolises. Part of the 
explanations of this dependence was based on the mechanisms we have just described, with a difference 
in the geographical and political scope: monopolistic firms belong to metropolises and competitive firms 
belong to peripheral countries. Value transfer happens in part via international trade, which, according to 
Gunder Frank, is “the main international relation with which capitalist development in its monopolistic 
phase consolidates in detriment of the development of an even deeper underdevelopment in Latin 
America” (André Gunder Frank, Pacios, & Izaguirre, 1970, p. 191)54.  Marini supports this view when he 
claims that mechanisms of value transfer are rooted in productivity differentials and the monopoly of 
production of certain industrial goods from which metropolises benefit (Marini, 1977). Another mean by 
which this value transfer operates is metropolises’ direct ownership of monopolistic capital located in 
peripheral countries, which profit is returned to metropolises by transferring utilities or by the means of 
multinationals’ transfer prices practices (André Gunder Frank et al., 1970; Mandel, 1999). 
Imperfect Competition Theory, as we saw above, also argues that competition leads to market power, 
which in turn makes differentials in profitability between firms possible. The only difference with 
Monopoly Capital Theory lies in the mechanisms each considers. While Monopoly Capital Theory refers 
                                                          
53 The translation is ours. 
 
54 Idem. 
 
 144 
almost exclusively to concentration to justify market power creation55, Imperfect Competition Theory also 
refers to product differentiation (Chamberlin, 1951; Harrod, 1934) and non-concentration-related barriers 
to entry (Labini, 1969; Robinson, 1953). The result is, as in Marxian intra-industry competition, a myriad 
of profit rates. “Some firms in the economic system earn no profits in excess of the minimum counted as 
cost, others earn more than this, and in various degrees” (Chamberlin, 1937, p. 568). 
4 Transaction Cost Theory and the hold-up problem 
 
As we did with other theories, our description of Transaction Cost Theory (TCT) will focus on the 
concept of competition and its relationship to market power following our reading grid. Moreover, we 
will only refer to the aspects that are unique to this theory in terms of competition theory in order to avoid 
recalling common features with other theories (mostly with Modern Property Rights Theory, the Chicago 
School and the Harvard School’s). 
TCT has a theory of the firm based on the ground ideas that Coase (1937) set in his famous article « The 
nature of the firm ». In this article, Coase asks why some activities are carried on within the firm instead 
of outside of it, i.e. through the market. His answer is that in a world where information is imperfect, 
market transactions are not costless (Barzel, 1997). Then, the costlier using the market is, the more likely 
it will be for an activity to be done inside of the firm. Nevertheless, coordination inside of the firm is also 
costly, since it implies some bureaucracy coordination costs, among other kinds of costs. Then, from 
Coase’s perspective, the boundaries of the firm will result from arbitration between the cost of 
coordinating activities through the market and the cost of coordinating activities inside of the firm.  
Later on, Williamson took Coase’s question and answered in a similar but complementary way. He 
started by characterizing economic agents as agents with bounded rationality. Following Herbert (1957), 
he postulates that agents have limited cognitive skills. Contrary to economic agents in standard 
neoclassical theory, they cannot calculate every possible outcome and the consequences of their choices 
(Coriat & Weinstein, 2010). This means that contracts will never be complete in the sense that not every 
circumstance can be conceived and included in the contract. Unexpected events cannot be taken into 
                                                          
55 Yet, some other factors somehow external to the mechanisms of competition are also quoted by authors of the 
Monopoly Capital tradition to account for capital immobility. Some authors quote “technological monopoly” or 
“technological rents” – the latter not being explained by any competition mechanism bur rather assumed as a fact- 
(André Gunder Frank, Pacios, & Izaguirre, 1970; Mandel, 1999; Marini, 1977b) while others find political and 
military sources of monopolies in a world scale (Baran & Sweezy, 1968; Mandel, 1999) . 
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account in contracts. This will create two problems that will shape the boundaries of the firm and on 
which the TCT-specific market power mechanisms rely. First, given that information is not only 
imperfect but also asymmetrical, agents take advantage of contract incompleteness by recurring to 
opportunistic behavior, i.e. manipulation of information. Second, some activities require an agent 
investing in specific assets, assets that can render a higher value if used in a specific transaction (a 
transaction that usually depends on a particular agent) and, in the worst case, render little or no value in 
other transactions. In those cases, the incompleteness of contracts gives birth to the risk of hold-up: when 
a circumstance that is not contemplated in a contract that involves a previous investment on a specific 
asset by agent A occurs, agent B can benefit from the situation. It can threat not to fulfill the transaction if 
it is not carried in a way that is more beneficial to it since the specificity of agent A’s investment makes 
agent A dependent on B. Intra-firm coordination is the solution to the problems of opportunism and hold-
up. Inside of the firm agents would not gain from being opportunistic or by holding-up other agents.  
While Coase and Williamson differ in terms of their explanation of the boundaries of the firm, they both 
share the idea that “authority is the main ontological difference between market and firm” (Chassagnon, 
2009). The firm is conceived as an organizational mechanism in which authority (i.e. the capacity of a 
boss to tell its employees what tasks they should accomplish and in what order) coordinates actions. In 
TCT, this authority derives simply from the nature of labor contracts and has the advantage of avoiding 
renegotiation when unexpected events occur by making discretional decisions (Coriat & Weinstein, 
2010). 
TCT’s further development relied heavily on game theory based modelling (Norman & Chisholm, 2014; 
Shepherd, 1982). The use of this mathematical tool is consistent with two aspects of TCT’s approach to 
competition that are of special interest for our investigation. First, it shows that firms’ strategic behavior 
is at the center of the analysis: firms act taking into account other firm’s reactions to their actions and so 
on. This is at the core of classical subjects in the TCT-inspired industrial organization literature such as 
the credibility of a limit price strategy, competition on prices (Maskin & Tirole, 1988b) or quantities 
(Maskin & Tirole, 1988a) in a repeated infinite game, strategic irreversible investment to prevent 
competition and the possibility of an excess of investment for that reason (Fudenberg & Tirole, 1984). 
Therefore, contrary to what happens in Imperfect Competition Theory, in TCT theory competition 
is conceived as a dynamic behavioral process. Therefore, competition operates within the firm when it 
behaves strategically in order to be able to make a move in the future. It also operates, of course, in the 
market, when the moves take place. 
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Second, the use of game theory shows that, as in the Harvard School and the Chicago School, there are no 
competition mechanisms that hold for every case. Every game is different regarding market structure, 
which in TCT also includes the characteristics of information (its degree of symmetry and its 
completeness), as well as regarding firm’s behavioral functions.  Consequently, the answer to the market 
power paradox, although enriched by the contract-incompleteness-related source of market power, 
remains the same as the imperfect competition theories’: without adequate regulation, market power is 
the outcome of real world ‘imperfect’ competition. 
In our view, TCT’s approach to competition and market power also distinguishes itself from other 
competition theories because of its incomplete contracts theoretical roots. Indeed, TCT acknowledges the 
same market imperfections that Imperfect Competition Theory does: markets are imperfect in terms of 
concentration, product differentiation and conditions of entry. But it adds a different source of market 
imperfections that become visible with the problem of opportunism. In TCT, there is a novel behavioral 
dimension of market power: relationship lock-in. Since markets are ‘imperfect’ in many ways 
(including the distribution of and extension of information), there is interdependence between 
firms. This gives some of them market power that comes from behaving in an opportunistic 
manner. That market power ultimately comes from market imperfections, but it is translated 
differently according to the way in which firms act to use interdependence in their favor. Indeed, 
there are many optimal ways in which agents can rationally act to use interdependence to their 
advantage. In Mueller’s (2012, p. 237) words, “the results of game theory are most often 
indeterminate”56 (Osborne & Rubinstein, 1994) and, therefore, market power and the extent and 
distribution of its correspondent profit rate differentials also depend on the behavior chosen by 
firms, which can differ independently of the situation faced even when perfect rationality is 
assumed. Then, the firm’s choice of actions has an influence on the resulting market power, which 
leads us to consider strategic action as a distinct source of market power in the TCT literature. 
It is important to stress that relationship lock-in is based on mutual interest by two firms. This 
distinguishes it qualitatively as a source of market power from barriers to entry. The latter implies that 
firms are impeded to compete or restrained in their competition. On the contrary, in relationship lock-in 
firms choose as a competitive strategy to relate to each other although this relationship might not be 
optimal for them because it is the best outcome they can get in a certain time frame. Interdependence, 
which is the result of strategic choices in the context of a competitive struggle (and not a constraint 
to competition like barriers to entry), is the core of relationship lock-in. 
                                                          
56 The Folk Theorem is an excellent example of the indetermination of results in game theory. 
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In order to cover the integrity of our reading grid, we would like to point out that the TCT literature has 
held this view on market power and profit rate differentials and used the above-described approach to 
competition to analyze both horizontal and vertical competition. For example, the hold-up problem can be 
used to describe a supplier-buyer relationship between two firms in which one has bargaining power over 
the other. Tirole’s and Rey’s (1986) seminal article on vertical restraints between a manufacturer and a 
retailer is a good example of how TCT can represent vertical market power both in the organizational and 
behavioral perspectives that we have described in the previous paragraph. The article assumes 
information asymmetry between the producer and the distributor and shows that according to what the 
asymmetry of information is about (the demand function or retail cost) –organizational source of market 
power based on information problems and inter-dependence- and to how agents react to risk and the kind 
of vertical restraint chosen (if chosen) –behavioral source of market power based on agents’ strategic 
choices-, the degree of market power will vary. Consequently, the profits in each case will differ. 
Nevertheless, TCT’s stand on the exertion of vertical market power in vertical restraints, contrary to the 
traditional stands of the Chicago School and the Harvard School, is not monolithic. As Tirole (1988, p. 
186) has put it, “theoretically, the only defensible position on vertical restraints seems to be the rule of 
reason. Most vertical restraints can increase or decrease welfare, depending on the environment. Legality 
or illegality per se thus seems unwarranted”. While the quote refers to welfare, the same goes for the 
exertion of vertical market power and its consequent profit rate differentials.  
Finally, we would like to stress that, as with the other competition theories so far described that treat 
market power in its vertical dimension, TCT’s analysis is made at the immediate upstream/downstream 
level. The whole chain of production is never considered to be a single vertical field of competition. 
5 Evolutionary economics competition theories: the Austrian and 
the Neo-Schumpeterian traditions 
 
Evolutionary economics brings together authors with different theoretical backgrounds that share a way 
of conceptualizing economic processes (competition being one of the main ones), although in many cases 
they differ in their understandings of the outcomes of these processes. Broadly speaking, for the purpose 
of this section, we can divide evolutionists into two groups: Austrians (Hayek, Von Mises, Mueller, High, 
Demsetz, Armentano) on one side, and what, following Hanusch and Pyka (2007), we will call the neo-
Schumpeterian school (Dosi, Nelson, Winter, Freeman, Teece). The latter group is usually referred to 
simply as “evolutionist”. Nevertheless, we preserve the term “evolutionist” to refer to the theoretical 
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pillars these two schools share. The convenience of these broad distinctions will be clear in the next 
subsection. 
  
Evolutionary competition theory is built on a theory of the firm that challenges all the basic assumptions 
of Neoclassical Theory and that approaches Classical Theory in many aspects regarding firm theory and 
competition theory.  In terms of our study, it can be thought as a comeback to classical competition theory 
in the sense that it rejects the static view of competition that the Marginalist revolution set in the research 
program of both orthodox schools of thought (Perfect Competition Theory, Contestable Markets Theory) 
and heterodox ones (Monopoly Capital, Marxist theory, Dependence Theory, Mark-up Pricing Theory). 
The first evolutionary reaction to static competition happened at the beginning of the XXth century with 
Schumpeter and the authors of the Austrian School. These authors, although closely related to 
neoclassical theory in many aspects, differ majorly from it regarding competition theory. The second 
evolutionary reaction to static competition came from the neo-Schumpeterian tradition that strongly 
developed in the 1980s after Nelson’s and Winter’s An Evolutionary Theory of Economic Change (2004). 
The latter tradition, although distanced and critical of neoclassical economics in many aspects that go 
beyond competition theory, shares a common competition theory with the Austrian authors and 
Schumpeter.  
 
Although evolutionary economics can be thought as a comeback to the dynamic concept of competition 
of the Marxian tradition, its research programs not being aligned with the compliance of the labor value 
law as this branch of Classical Theory is, we will show that the question of market power asymmetries 
and their effects on long-run profit rate differentials will not be answered in the same way as Marxian 
competition theory and its further developments do. We shall start by describing the main departures from 
neoclassical theory present in evolutionary economics to understand its competition theory.  
5.1 A common ground between Austrians and Neo-Schumpeterians: an 
evolutionary the theory of the firm 
 
The first main departure from neoclassical theory concerns the nature of the firm. Deepening into the 
resource-based approach of the firm (Coriat & Weinstein, 2010), the firm is conceived as an organization 
that, as such, is characterized by its (unique) repertoire of routines (Nelson & Winter, 2004). Routines are 
problem-solving devices (Coriat & Dosi, 2009) the firm possess and allows it to coordinate and treat 
knowledge. Since the firm is made of multiple individuals with different cognitive characteristics, 
routines create the coherence firms need in order to act as a single entity by constraining the individuals’ 
behaviors (Winter, 1988). Routines are what make each firm unique since they are “idiosyncratic, 
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difficult to imitate, often only incrementally changing over time” (Dosi, 2012). They are organizational 
automatized responses to problems of wide-ranged problems on which the firm’s capabilities are built. In 
the words of Nelson and Winter (2004, p. 73), “individual skills are the analogue of organizational 
routines”. Since firms are intrinsically heterogeneous organizations, they carry “different technological, 
organizational and behavioural traits” (Dosi, Gambardella, Grazzi, & Orsenigo, 2007). Indeed, not only 
are firms different in respect to their routines (skills), but also regarding the decision rules (Chiaromonte 
& Dosi, 1993) on which their learning (and, therefore, the evolution of their routines/skills) depends. The 
routines and the organizational or technological knowhow that characterize a firm are largely tacit, which 
makes them difficult to transfer (Coriat & Weinstein, 2015, p. 130). This assures the heterogeneity will 
remain through time. 
 
This leads us to the second ‘crucial departure’ from neoclassical firm theory, which “is to consider that 
the firm has a limited information and a bounded rationality, but is able to learn through time” (Lesourne, 
Orléan, & Walliser, 2006, p. 72). This means that, unlike the neoclassical firm, evolutionist firms “have at 
best imperfect understanding of the environment they live in, and, even more so, of what the future will 
deliver”. As defined in Dosi, Marengo and Fagiolo (2001) this implies limitations in: (i) access to 
information; (ii) memory; (iii) computational abilities; (iv) intrinsically imperfect representations of the 
environment in which firms operate; (v) ubiquitous limitations in the firm’s abilities to master physical 
and “social” technologies (vi) fuzziness, possibly incoherence, and instability in the perception of its own 
preferences (Dosi, 2012). Although “imperfect” (one could question the realism and the theoretical 
relevance of the postulated “perfect” rationality of the neoclassical firm…), the firm learns as a result of 
“experience and experimentation” (Dopfer & Potts, 2014). Routines, usually said to play the role genes 
play in biological evolution57, are different to the latter in one fundamental aspect: they can be 
consciously (yet slowly) modified by the firm as an answer to its interaction with the economic 
environment. In order to do this, firms use their “meta-routines”, which are the routines that deal with the 
modification and adaptation of lower level routines (Nelson & Winter, 2004). Nevertheless, routines 
cannot change in any way and, more importantly, their change depends on the history of the firm. Path 
dependence (the recognition that “history matters”) plays an important role in evolutionary economics. At 
the firm level (and regarding competition theory), path dependence implies that “a firm’s previous 
investments and its repertoire of routines (its ‘history’) constrains its future behavior” (Teece, Rumelt, 
                                                          
57 Many of the most relevant scholars in evolutionary economics treat routines as “quasi-genetic traits of the firm” 
(Cohen et al., 1996; Foss, Heimeriks, Winter, & Zollo, 2012; McKelvey, 1982; Nelson & Winter, 2004). 
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Dosi, & Winter, 1994, p. 17). In particular, “opportunities for successful new developments58 will be 
‘close in’ to previous activities”. This is so because “if too many parameters are changed simultaneously, 
the ability of firms to conduct meaningful natural quasi experiments is attenuated” (Teece et al., 1994, p. 
17). The logic is simple. Firms accumulate specific skills that will be suitable to go in one direction but 
not in another. For example, a firm that accumulates skills regarding how to make micro-processors might 
be able to evolve and learn how to start making smartphones, but will find it difficult to enter the garment 
industry.  
 
We shall now enter the learning process par excellence of the firm: competition. Competition is 
conceived in the evolutionary tradition as a “discovery procedure” (Hayek, 1968). It is a “market process 
of discovery and adjustment” that “works to coordinate anticipated demand with supply in a world of 
imperfect information” or, from the firm’s point of view, “an entrepreneurial process of discovery and 
adjustment under conditions of uncertainty” (Armentano, 1999). Firms are constantly searching for new 
technological and organizational arrangements that will allow them to survive and grow in the market by 
developing “relative advantages” (Nelson & Winter, 2004). This implies, among other things, 
technological innovation, organizational innovation, product differentiation, advertising, partnerships and 
joint ventures, etc. Competition is therefore “a struggle to achieve competitive advantages that derive 
from superior efficiency” (Jacobides, Winter, & Kassberger, 2007, p. 4) in an uncertain environment that 
no firm can perfectly predict or know. Firms react to market responses and try to adapt to them in their 
quest for survival and growth. 
 
While both Austrians and Neo-Schumpeterian agree on this firm-level vision of what constitutes 
competition, they differ in how they conceive the competitive interaction between firms and, in some 
cases, in the outcomes of these interactions in terms of market power and long-run profit rate differentials. 
As we will show in the following pages, Austrian authors consider that, for different reasons, competition 
always leads to the disappearance of market power. In the case of Neo-Schumpeterians, this is not a 
shared vision, as conceptions on how the “selection environment” (a concept proper to this school of 
thought we will develop) works differ. 
 
 
                                                          
58 The term “new developments” should be understood in the broadest possible sense here (a change in routines, 
technological innovation, organizational innovation, etc.). 
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5.2 Competition in the Austrian tradition 
 
The Austrian school, like neoclassical economics, treats the issue of long-run profit rate differentials 
mainly in terms of market power, the latter being understood as a firm’s capacity to control market prices 
or, put in other terms, to set a monopoly price “higher than the potential market price would have been in 
the absence of monopoly” (Von Mises, 2008)59. In Hayek’s words, “competition prevails, that is, if the 
individual producer has to adapt himself to price changes and cannot control them”  (Hayek, 2014, p. 52). 
As the previous quote shows, the Austrian school considers the capacity to control prices (which allows 
for the existence of long-run profit rate differentials) to be something external to competition. Authors 
like Mueller and Reardon (1993) have addressed the issue directly in terms of profit rate differentials. The 
logic remains the same, since the potential above normal rates of profit would come from prices set above 
their competitive levels. In any case, the Austrian school’s answer to the above-formulated question is an 
emphatic “no”: competition does not lead to long-run profit rate differentials. The selection environment 
works. But why? 
The Austrian school conceives the selection environment as we pictured it above. “In the real business 
world, a dominant firm, as distinct from a textbook monopolist, arises and operates under uncertain, 
disequilibrium conditions. The dominant firm gains and holds its market share by engaging successfully 
in a competitive market process of discovery adjustment. And as a consequence of its market-
coordinating skills, the dominant firm tends to grow faster than its rivals (or potential rivals) into a 
position (perhaps temporary) of market dominance” (Armentano, 1989, p. 65). Their particular 
contribution to evolutionary competition theory comes from the arguments they provide to claim that 
competition prevails even in conditions of concentrated market structures. Austrian authors, just as 
neoclassical authors of the perfect competition framework, believe that competition leads to the absence 
of market power (and, hence, market power-based long-run profit rate differentials), but for very different 
reasons. While the perfect competition framework states that, when competition prevails, it will tend to 
reproduce an atomistic market landscape of small firms, Austrian competition theory, similarly to the 
contestable market framework, states that “any market structure is compatible with an efficient market 
process as long as there are no legal barriers to entry” (Armentano, 1989, p. 71, emphasis in the original). 
“We have no theory that allows us to deduce from the observable degree of concentration in a particular 
                                                          
59 It is important to stress that the potential market price in the absence of monopoly is not equal to the perfect 
competition price of the neoclassical school, which existence and theoretical relevance Austrian authors argue 
against, as we will explain later. 
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market whether or not price and output are competitive” (Demsetz, 1968, pp. 59–60, emphasis in the 
original). 
Indeed, in the Austrian tradition, market dominance is nothing but the result of a successful competitive 
performance (Souty, 1995). “Dominant firms have achieved their position of ‘dominance’ in free markets 
by being successful. They have innovated the products and services that consumers prefer relative to 
rivals and potential rivals” (Armentano, 1989, p. 68). Even in the extreme case of monopoly, market 
dominance will not induce the firm to set uncompetitive prices and, so, to obtain high profits (Souty, 
1995). Indeed, if, because of economies of scale, one producer obtains a monopoly, this does not imply 
that it will practice a monopoly price. The smallest price will prevail. “Price will tend toward ‘cost’ 
(everything else equal) and profit incentives will drive cost curves to a minimum level” (Armentano, 
1989, p. 65). Since only equally efficient enough companies are supposed to survive the selection 
environment, this implies that “all individual company profit rates converge to a single, competitive 
level”. (Mueller, 1986, p. 13). “Supranormal profits are the reflection of superior management” (Atkinson 
& Audretsch, 2011, p. 29)  but, like in the labor value branch of Classical Competition Theory, they will 
not persist in the long-run unless the dominant firm can continue to improve its efficiency in every period, 
and they are not the result of the exertion of market power. The argument that supports this claim is 
simple: a dominant firm will be constantly trying to reduce its prices in order to maintain its privileged 
position. Yet, for this argument to be plausible, the firm should know that there is no other way of 
maintaining its privileged position. This is the case in the Austrian tradition for two reasons.  
The first one is an argument shared by the Marxian tradition we referred to previously: barriers to entry 
are temporary. While Austrian authors consider all non-legal barriers to entry as legitimate competitive 
weapons (Souty, 1995), they argue that “after all, free markets are always open to potential rivalry and 
entry, and dominant suppliers can attempt to maintain their market positions only by maintaining an 
overall efficiency advantage over potential users of resources” (Armentano, 1989, p. 71). In terms of the 
rate of profit, this means that “the forces of entry are strongly and rapidly attracted to excess profits” 
(Mueller, 1986, p. 4). Then, like in the classical tradition, extraordinary profits between industries are 
only temporary. In Demsetz words: “Even though the profits that arise from a firm's activities may be 
eroded by competitive imitation, since information is costly to obtain and techniques are difficult to 
duplicate, the firm may enjoy growth and a superior rate of return for some time” (Demsetz, 1973, p. 3, 
emphasis added). As we did with Marxian authors, we will not enter into details regarding the arguments 
supporting the temporariness of barriers to entry, the object of the current chapter being to position 
competition theories in our cartography and to identify the main unresolved problems regarding market 
power in competition theories.  
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The second argument is that even if a monopolist could exclude potential entrants, it will still have to 
compete with other goods producers for consumers’ purchasing power, which will lead the monopolist to 
set the lowest possible price and to try to constantly improve its efficiency. “The shape of the demand 
curve that makes the appearance of monopoly prices possible and directs the monopolists’ conduct is 
determined by the competition of all other commodities competing for the buyers’ dollars. The higher the 
monopolist fixes the price at which he is ready to sell, the more potential buyers turn their dollars toward 
other vendible goods. On the market every commodity competes with all other commodities” (Von 
Mises, 2008, p. 278). 
 
5.3 The concept of selection environment in the Neo-Schumpeterian tradition 
 
 
While the previous paragraph describes the competitive activity, a second and closely related element is 
needed to complete the analysis of competition in the evolutionist tradition: the competitive forces 
referred to as the “selection environment”. As we mentioned, firms respond to the selection environment 
(markets) by adapting their behaviors. But what is exactly a selection environment? How does it work? 
The answer to these two questions, we will see, are of paramount importance and continue to constitute 
the evolutionist research program. 
  
The concept of selection environment is rather opaque (Hodgson, Samuels, & Tool, 1994) and has been 
referred to as a truism (Knudsen, 2002). There are many reasons for this. On the one side, there are many 
definitions that include heterogeneous dimensions on which the selection depends60. On the other side, 
the mechanisms through which selection operates also vary considerably among authors. Despite these 
dissimilarities, the main concept can be summarized as it follows. The selection environment plays the 
role the fitness function plays in biology. In a nutshell, it determinates what firms/strategies “fit” the 
competitive environment and, therefore, what firms will eventually survive the competitive struggle. 
Firms that can easily adapt and find the best-suited technologies and organizational arrangements will be 
“selected”. On the contrary, firms that cannot easily adapt and tried inefficient technologies and 
organizational arrangements will be “punished” by the economic environment with a bad performance 
that will put them one step closer to exiting the market. Selection environments “include many aspects of 
                                                          
60 For a mapping of the different dimensions and theoretical perspective of the organizational fitness on which the 
selection environment relies see (Hodgson, Samuels, & Tool, 1994). 
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markets: public policy impact (especially regulation), frequency of technologic discontinuities, market 
structures, openness of markets (which depends on the nature and the importance of barriers to entry), 
possibility of access to financial resources….” (Coriat & Weinstein, 2015, p. 129)61. Since these aspects 
vary from market to market, it follows that some selection environments are “tighter” than others. 
 
Two movements take place during selection: “at the firm level, selection is accomplished primarily 
through market processes involving entry and exit; growth and decline provide a second mechanism” 
(Teece et al., 1994, p. 22). Indeed, a main sequence can be identified: (1) incumbent and entrant firms try 
different strategies to improve their efficiencies (2) the selection environment “judges” the success of the 
strategy chosen (3) the firm grows if the strategy is successful or loses market share and/or profitability to 
successful firms if the strategy is not successful. (4) Firms learn from the selection environment’s 
response to their initial strategies and adapt the latter to perform better in the future (the “discovery 
procedure”). Eventually, repeatedly unsuccessful firms exit the market.  
 
As we mentioned above, the mechanisms that determine the factors on which entry and exit, on the one 
side, and growth and decline, on the other side, differ between and within authors depending on the model 
employed. Nevertheless, these mechanisms are of little importance in order to explain how a selection 
mechanism (regardless of the concrete form it takes) operates. We will take as an illustration the canonic 
selection mechanism developed by Nelson and Winter in Chapter 12 of An Evolutionary Theory of 
Economic Change (2004). In this model, firms compete by engaging in R&D investment to make 
innovations that can improve their productivities or not. Firms can also choose to imitate another firm’s 
successful innovation. If they choose to innovate, they cannot know in advance which innovation will 
succeed and which will not: “there is no choice that is clearly best ex ante” (Nelson & Winter, 2004). 
Increased productivity allows them to lower prices and to win market shares and therefore to expand. As a 
result, there will be winners and losers. “Some firms track emerging technological opportunities with 
greater success than other firms; the former tend to prosper and grow, the latter to suffer losses and 
decline. Growth confers advantages that make further success more likely, while decline breeds 
technological obsolescence and further decline” (Nelson & Winter, 2004, p. 325). Since, as we explained, 
firms are different in their routines/skills and their learning processes, their responses to market signals 
will differ, and so will their evolutions. “One function of competition, in the structural sense of many 
firms, then would be to make possible that diversity. Another function of competition, in this more active 
sense, is to reward and enhance the choices that prove good in practice and to suppress the bad ones.  
Over the long-run, one hopes, the competitive system would promote firms that choose well on the 
                                                          
61 The translation is ours. 
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average and would eliminate, or force reform upon, firms that consistently make mistakes” (Nelson & 
Winter, 2004, p. 276). 
 
However, Dosi (2012), along with Dosi and Nelson (2010), acknowledges that empirical studies show the 
contrary: “contemporary markets do not appear to be too effective selectors delivering rewards and 
punishments in terms of relative sizes or shares, no matter how measured, according to differential 
efficiencies” and therefore “diverse degrees of efficiencies seem to yield primarily relatively persistent 
profitability differentials” (Dosi & Nelson, 2010, p. 103). This “requires that evolutionary theories re-
think their account of the selection landscapes- that is the space over which competitive interactions are 
represented” (Dosi, 2011). 
 
5.4 The long-run profit rate differentials cleavage in Evolutionary economics 
 
Dosi calls for a revision of evolutionary competition theory because the latter would not fit empirical 
evidence. Nevertheless, not all evolutionary competition theory goes against this empirical evidence. 
There is in fact a cleavage regarding this crucial aspect of competition theory that, to our understanding, 
has been underestimated by most of the evolutionary literature62. One could rephrase the problem as it 
follows: do selection mechanisms assure that only the most (equally?) efficient firms will survive in the 
long-run? If not, why not? This brings us back to the problem of long-run profit rate differentials between 
firms. In other words, we are asking if the selection mechanism (the evolutionist forces of competition) 
will lead per se to long-run profit rate differentials between firms. If so, are the latter caused by market 
power asymmetries?  
 
Two branches can be identified in terms of the evolutionist tradition’s answer to the problem of long-run 
profit rate differentials and the selection environment: the Austrian approach shared by some neo-
Schumpeterians and the “deviant neo-Schumpeterian approach”. We have chosen the term “deviating 
neo-Schumpeterians” to refer to the neo-Schumpeterian authors who do not share the Austrian view 
according to which competition annuls market power and, therefore, does not lead to long-run profit rate 
differentials. Indeed, Dosi (2012) claims in some of his works that the mechanism should work in theory. 
The same claim is supported by Winter, Dosi and Kaniovski (2003, p. 379): 
 
                                                          
62 Dosi’s above-quoted call for a revision of evolutionary competition theory constitutes an exception, of course. 
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“The view of the outcomes of the competition process, in a sense, is a formal vindication of the intuition 
of classical economists that conditions of entry and (heterogeneous) techniques of production determine 
some sort of ‘centers of gravity’ around which actual prices, quantities and profitabilities persistently 
fluctuate”. 
Teece et al (1994), as well as Alchian (1950) also share this view, although Teece et al consider that there 
are often exceptions to the theoretical effectiveness of the selection environment: 
“Selection is the process by which inefficient firms or businesses get weeded out. At the firm level, 
selection is accomplished primarily through market processes involving entry and exit; growth and 
decline provide a second mechanism. Neither mechanism works instantaneously so that firms with 
different capabilities may exist side-by-side attempting to serve the same customer needs. Indeed, 
bankruptcy laws in certain countries may slow selection processes. However, ‘market rationality’ 
eventually prevails, and less competent firms, and less competent firms can be expected to decline and 
exit” (Teece et al., 1994, p. 22). 
As we mentioned, not all neo-Schumpeterian evolutionists share the same view. Dosi and Chiaromonte 
(1993) have developed an evolutionary model in which competition in a selection environment produces 
“persistent asymmetries in efficiency and profitability among firms” attributed to “firm-specific decision 
rules, together with the history of innovation, imitation, and learning by individual agents” as well as to 
“the fact that no agent is capable of correctly computing ex ante equilibria where individual actions are 
reciprocally consistent” (Chiaromonte & Dosi, 1993, p. 52). Yet, although it explains the continuous 
appearance of differences in profitability, it is not clear why the selection environment does not eliminate 
the less profitable firms in the long-run. 
Three arguments have been pointed out by deviating neo-Schumpeterian evolutionists to solve this 
problem. The first one is market concentration, as Jacobides, Winter and Kassberger make explicit by 
stating that “if only one or a few firms are particularly efficient, their increasingly dominant role should 
eventually enable them to affect prices. The hand of selection may create oligopoly or monopoly” 
(Jacobides et al., 2007, p. 7)63. Nevertheless, for this argument to hold, the weakness or inexistence of 
barriers to entry should be admitted. 
The second argument is what Dosi considers to be “the single most important factor in accounting for 
persistently heterogeneous performances”: “equally heterogeneous organizational capabilities –
                                                          
63 Curiously, the passage quoted was not included in the final version of the paper that was published in Strategic 
Management Journal, Vol. 33, Issue 12. 
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idiosyncratic, difficult to imitate, often only incrementally changing over time” (Dosi, 2011, 2012, 
emphasis added). In particular, the argument relies on the existence of four kinds of asymmetries between 
firms (Dosi & Nelson, 2010).  
(i) Differences in the ability to innovate and/or adopt innovation developed elsewhere regarding product 
characteristics and production processes  
(ii) Different production efficiencies  
(iii) Different organizational arrangements  
(iv) Different propensities to invest and grow conditional on the foregoing set of variables 
We could add a fifth source of difficulty to imitate, “ambiguity as to what factors are responsible for 
superior (or inferior) performance” or “uncertain imitability” (Lippman & Rumelt, 1982). This 
uncertainty does not come from bounded rationality but from the inherent ambiguity there is regarding the 
outcomes of market discovery processes such as innovation64. As a result, firms “obtain different ‘quasi-
rent’ or, conversely, losses above/below the notional ‘pure competition’ profit rates” (Dosi & Nelson, 
2010, p. 103). 
The above-quoted paper by Jacobides, Winter and Kassberger develops a model that illustrates this 
argument. In that paper, the authors explore in detail another explanation in an evolutionary framework: 
“profitability that is sustainable in long-run equilibrium, even under competitive conditions may derive 
from the possession of idiosyncratic rent-earning resources” (Jacobides et al., 2007, p. 21, emphasis in the 
original). The authors lean on a resource-based view (RBV) inspired literature on the capacity of 
idiosyncratic resources to render abnormal profits in equilibrium (Barney, 1991; Peteraf & Barney, 2003) 
to develop an evolutionary model of constant disequilibrium that produces the same results. Their 
explanation of how idiosyncratic rent-earning resources can give firms long-run abnormal profits is the 
following. Every firm can invest in customizing resources in order to obtain an idiosyncratic resource 
that, in this particular model, is assimilated to a skilled worker. Since firms differ in their behaviors, not 
all of them will invest in resource customization. Customization is considered to be a once-and-for-all 
investment that, if successful, allows for a greater growth and profit. Therefore, as expected in an 
evolutionary competition theory, there will be winners and losers. The key question is why losers are not 
eliminated by the selection environment. The authors’ answer is that “firms of somewhat inferior skills 
                                                          
64 In the authors’ words, “there is a difference, for example, between being unable to predict the exact size of an 
underground oil deposit, and being unable to work out the optimal drilling policy in the face of uncertainty” 
(Lippman & Rumelt, 1982, p. 421). 
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might well persist, even in long-run equilibrium (as long as they happened to appear early on, made the 
appropriate sunk investments, and were not too inefficient). This provides an evolutionary explanation for 
heterogeneity in capabilities even in long-run ‘selection equilibrium’” (Jacobides et al., 2007, p. 13). 
Moreover, “the extent of dispersion that can be sustained in equilibrium is a function of the extent to 
which it is difficult to convert ‘generic inputs’ into ‘idiosyncratic resources,’ as well as of the interest rate, 
and of the relative role of these ‘idiosyncratic’ resources in total output (Jacobides et al., 2007, p. 13). 
The third deviating neo-Schumpeterian argument is more general than the previous one and 
complementary to the two arguments we have just exposed. The idea is simple: “the selection 
environment works by “selecting not the most fit or profitable or in some way entity, but selecting a range 
of tolerably well fit. Selection as a filtering mechanism favours not the fastest, but the sufficiently fast, 
not the most profitable, but the sufficiently profitable” (Dopfer & Potts, 2014, pp. 95–96). Although this 
seems plausible, the determinants of the extent of the range of the selection and, more fundamentally, the 
reason of the existence of a range of selection should be specified. Regarding the latter, possible 
explanations are “the ‘sunkness’ and indivisibilities of many technological events and investment 
decisions” (Dosi & Nelson, 2010, p. 103). 
 
5.5 Some concluding comments regarding Evolutionary competition theories 
 
We would like to conclude the section on Evolutionary competition theory by examining how it answers 
the questions that constitute this chapter’s reading grid. 
Unquestionably, evolutionary economics conceives competition as a behavioral “active dynamic process” 
(Nelson & Winter, 2004, p. 275). The competition process we described above shows this. Firms compete 
by constantly innovating and adapting to the competitive environment in which they are embedded. 
Routines are modified in a never-stopping process of trying new strategies to survive and to grow in the 
market. As in the classical tradition, the outcome of a multiplicity of firms’ competitive activities is an 
aggregate force that is imposed to every firm in order to survive (McNulty, 1968). Consequently, 
evolutionists see “competition as a dynamic process that select among the effective actions of firms”. The 
“selection process” (Dosi et al., 2007) is in evolutionist literature the force that is imposed to firms as a 
result of decentralized rivalry between them. As a consequence of this, competition takes place both 
inside and outside the firm. At the firm level, competition operates when firms innovate, act and react to 
market signals. “The function of competition is to get -or help to get- the signals and incentives right” 
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(Nelson & Winter, 2004, p. 276), which is precisely the role of the selection environment. Then, 
competition operates also outside of firms by constraining their behaviors, punishing and rewarding, 
selecting them. 
Regarding the field of competition, evolutionary competition theory can be said to focus on intra-industry 
competition. Contrary to its closest neighbor, the labor value branch of Classical competition theory, 
Evolutionary competition theory does not explicitly include competition mechanisms that link different 
industries. Their description of competitive activity either refers to intra-industry competition mechanisms 
where selection environments are industry-specific or uses these very same mechanisms to refer to inter-
industry competition. Regarding this, we share Glick’s and Ochoa’s (1990, p. 25) view according to 
which in this literature “the different roles played by firms and industries in competition” (…) “often 
lacks clarity”65.  
The issue of long-run profit rate differentials has been addressed in the previous subsection. We will 
therefore recall the main findings regarding that topic. Evolutionary competition theory is branched in 
two in respect to the problem of long-run profit rate differentials. On the one side, the Austrian branch 
(which, as we pointed out before, also includes some neo-Schumpeterians) believes selection 
environments tend to weed out inefficient firms and that, in the long-run, only the most efficient ones will 
survive. Therefore, profit rate differentials are only temporal. Market power is not a possible outcome of 
competition; the market power paradox does not hold. In Alchian and Demsetz’s (1972, p. 111) words, 
the firm “has no power of fiat, no authority, no disciplinary action any different in the slightest degree 
from ordinary market contracting between any two people”. On the contrary, another branch, deviating 
neo-Schumpeterian economics, believes that selection environments do create long-run profit rate 
differentials mostly dependent on market power asymmetries. Three mechanisms have been identified in 
the evolutionist literature to account for this:  
 
i) Uncompetitive price setting by firms that benefited from their previous efficiency and grew enough to 
obtain a big share of the market (endogenous concentration) 
ii) Obtaining “quasi-rents” by possessing “idiosyncratic rent-earning resources” (Jacobides et al., 2007) 
that are “difficult to imitate” (Dosi, 2012). 
                                                          
65 In the passage quoted, the authors refer to what they call “the empirical literature” and they quote Demsetz to 
exemplify, so we can without much risk of being mistaken associate this statement to evolutionary literature in 
general. 
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iii) The selection environment selects a wide range of firms of considerable different performance. The 
possible explanation for this found in the literature is “the ‘sunkness’ and indivisibilities of many 
technological events and investment decisions” (Dosi & Nelson, 2010, p. 103). 
Further descriptions of the types of firms that can benefit from these market power asymmetries to obtain 
a higher profit rate in the long-run are scarce in the evolutionist literature. Nevertheless, some allusions to 
the subject can be found in the literature. Two explanations can be offered to account for it. Schumpeter 
offers two typologies of firms that benefit from market power asymmetries. One that corresponds to the 
‘first’ Schumpeter -the one from The Theory of Economic Development (1961)- distinguishes between 
innovating firms, non-innovating firms that do not aim to conquer a large market share, non-innovating 
firms that try to modify their methods and non-innovating monopolies. The second Schumpeter’s 
typology differentiates between big innovating firms and the rest. Pavitt’s taxonomy is another possible 
typology of market power asymmetries in the evolutionist tradition. Although its aim is to “describe and 
explain industrial patterns of technical change” (Pavitt, 1984, p. 1) and that no mentions of the different 
groups being unequally performing is made, the typology contains an interesting element that, if 
developed, could become a typology of market power asymmetries. Pavitt’s typology includes the means 
of appropriation of innovation (non-technical, process secrecy and know how, dynamic learning, patent, 
etc.) as a variable to class industries. It could be thought that if these means of appropriation are unequally 
effective, market power asymmetries would exist between industries, leading to long-run profit rate 
differentials between industries. In that case, there would be four categories of industries in terms of the 
market power asymmetries they would lead to that have already been identified by Pavitt (1984): 
supplier-dominated, scale-intensive, specialized suppliers and science-based.  
Since selection environments are industry-specific, market power asymmetries exist only within an 
industry. Yet, by developing the above-mentioned idea of differentials in the appropriability of 
innovations between industries, it could be argued that profit rate differentials may exist between 
industries. Another argument to support this view would be that some selection environment being 
“tighter” than others, profit rate differentials can also exist between industries, since the distribution of 
market power is not homogeneous across industries. Nevertheless, to our knowledge none of these 
possibilities has been researched by evolutionist authors.  
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Conclusions 
 
In this chapter we have reviewed the exiting competition theories with a focus on how they conceptualize 
the link between competition and market power. In order to do so, we have analyzed competition theories 
according to three criteria: their dynamic/static status, the scopes of competition they take into account 
(horizontal, semi-vertical and vertical) and whether competition leads to market power mechanisms that 
result in long-run profit rate differentials between firms or not (i.e. how they answer the market power 
paradox). The results of this classification are summarized in Figure 14.  
Figure 14: A cartography of competition theories 
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The x-axis refers to the nature of competition (dynamic or static) while the y-axis refers to the dimensions 
of the competition landscape (horizontal, vertical, semi-vertical and fully vertical) taken into account. 
Finally, the shape of the image that represents each theory (a dot, a square or a triangle) indicates how the 
market power paradox is answered. One should bear in mind that there are no exclusively 
vertical/horizontal or exclusively dynamic/static competition theories and, in that manner, Figure 14 
represents a broad typology. 
One of the main conclusions we can draw from this chapter is the lack of a fully vertical 
competition theory. In most competition theories, when inter-industry competition is considered, no 
qualitative difference is made between vertically-related, horizontally-related and diagonally-related 
industries. When some theories conceptualize vertical competition and its specific mechanisms are 
described, only immediately vertically-related firms are considered (i.e. the scope of competition is semi-
vertical). As shown in Figure 14, in no case the vertical dimension of competition is taken into account as 
a single space of competition that relates industries that are not directly linked by market transactions. We 
consider this to be a symptom of a narrow and outdated conception of markets and market structures that 
does not depicts two of the main traits of the current dominant form of competition identified in Chapter 
I: vertical disintegration and modular production. In competition theory, market structures are usually 
analyzed in terms of concentration, product differentiation, barriers to entry and (since the emergence of 
TCT) the distribution of information and property rights with a horizontal and semi-vertical scope. This is 
particularly problematic since, as we have seen in the opening chapter, since the 1980s vertically 
disintegrated production and modular production are the norm (Cattaneo, Gereffi, & Staritz, 2010; 
Chassagnon, 2011; Langlois, 2003; Powell, 2003; Richardson, 1994; Sturgeon, 2002). This should lead 
research on competition theory toward taking into account the shape of production networks from the first 
to the last link of the production chain. Nonetheless, the explanation of vertical market power and vertical 
long-run profit rate differentials remains an open question that is under theorized. 
By analyzing Figure 14, we arrive to the second main conclusion of this chapter: the dynamic/static 
distinction, although valuable, is not sufficient to understand how a competition theory answers the 
market power paradox. The distinction between dynamic and static theories is nowadays a common and 
the sole border drawn by authors interested in a critical analysis of competition theories (Benzoni, 1991; 
Guerrero, 1994; McNulty, 1967; Metcalfe, 1989; Moudud, 2012; Tsoulfidis, 2015). Although we consider 
this distinction to be crucial, it is not sufficient to account for how each theory answers the market power 
paradox. Figure 14 shows that there is no link between the dynamic/static status of competition theories 
and the way in which they answer the market power paradox. We can find on the right side of the graphic 
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dynamic competition theories, all of which answer the paradox in different ways. Austrian, Marxian 
(including its further developments with the administered and normal cost pricing theories),  and Non-
deviant Neo-Schumpeterian theories claim that competition does not lead to market power asymmetries 
and long-run profit rate differentials between firms, while deviating neo-Schumpeterian and Transaction 
Cost theories support the opposite view. Marxian competition theory offers a singular answer: 
competition leads to long-run profit rate differentials, but only between firms belonging to the same 
industry and not through the creation of market power. Contrary to the rest of the theories that support the 
idea that competition leads to long-run profit rate differentials between firms, Marxian competition theory 
argues that they are not based on market power that would have been created in the competitive process, 
but rather the outcome of a competitive process in which market power does not intervene. The left side 
of the graphic, which groups static competition theories, is as heterogeneous as the right side. While 
Perfect Competition, Modern Property Rights and Chicago School theories argue that competition leads 
neither to profit rate differentials between firms nor to market power, Monopoly Capital, Mark-Up 
Pricing and Harvard School theories claim the contrary. Hence, the key to understanding the way in 
which competition theories answer the market power paradox does not lie in the dynamic or static 
status of these theories. We need to go beyond this distinction if we are to understand the existing 
theorization on one of the core issues of any competition theory: the relationship between 
competition, market power and long-run profit rate differentials. 
In order to understand why competition theories that are heterogeneous regarding their dynamic/static 
status and their theoretical background answer in the same way the market power paradox we have to pay 
attention the competitive mechanisms they describe. Figure 16 summarizes the mechanisms found along 
our analysis of the different theories (most of them reappear in many theories) that are put forward in 
order to explain the origin or the non-existence of long-run profit rate differentials between firms. 
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Figure 14: Sources of long-run profit rate differentials in competition theories 
 
 
 
 
Regarding theories that claim that competition does not lead to long-run profit rate differentials, the 
porosity of barriers to entry is what assures that firms will not exert market power (it is the sufficient 
condition in the theories that can make the market power paradox not hold) and therefore no long-run 
profit rate differentials will arise, even when market structures are not ‘perfect’ in terms of concentration 
and product differentiation. This view is held both by static competition theories such as Perfect 
Competition or the Chicago School and dynamic competition theories like Marxian competition theory. 
Indeed, contemporary authors of the Marxian tradition and the Chicago School have shown, as we saw 
earlier, that market structures can be imperfect regarding concentration and product differentiation while 
there can still be a competitive scenario as long as barriers to entry are porous. In that case, even if some 
firms have market power, they cannot exert it. This is therefore an argument reliant on market structures 
that questions the possibility of the exertion of market power. There is empirical evidence to support this 
 165 
claim that shows no correlation between concentration and high profitability at the industry level 
(Sawyer, 1981; Semmler, 1984) or even a negative correlation between concentration and profitability 
differentials between industries (Keil, 2013; Tsaliki & Tsoulfidis, 1998). It is important to stress that 
although the dynamic Austrian, Non-deviating neo-Schumpeterian and Marxian theories claim that 
competition does not lead to long-run profit rate differentials, they support the idea that short-run intra-
industry profit rate differentials exist as a result of the continuousness of the process of innovation and the 
heterogeneity of firms’ capabilities. 
In the case of supporters of the idea that competition leads to the creation of long-run profit rate 
differentials between firms of different industries, the arguments held are slightly more abundant. First we 
have market concentration, which is an argument present in all of these theories, either presented as a 
state of affairs or as the result of competition in the sense that firms need to scale up production to survive 
the competitive struggle and hence markets become concentrated. The presence of barriers to entry is the 
second main argument that all of these theories share. A very similar argument is the holding of rent-
earning resources of any kind (organizational skills, intellectual property assets, privileged access to a 
natural resource, etc.). In many cases, rent-earning resource can be considered to be a barrier to entry, so 
the two categories may overlap, although not necessarily. Fourth, we have the conjugation of incomplete 
contracts (which, in turn, may be the result of bounded rationality –TCT- or the non-observability of 
outcomes – NPRT-) and relationship lock-in (either by concentration or by the complementarity of 
assets). Fifth, there is a TCT-specific market power mechanism: the impact of agent’s strategic behavior 
(their choice of actions) in imperfect markets. These five mechanisms can be applied to explain long-run 
profit rate differentials both within and between industries, including semi-vertical long-run profit rate 
differentials when firms use a neighbor upstream or downstream market to obtain market power in their 
market. In order to fully grasp the qualitative differences between these five sources of market power that 
explain profit rate differentials between firms of different industries, it is of vital importance to remember 
that relationship lock-in is based on mutual interest by two firms. This distinguishes it qualitatively as a 
source of market power from barriers to entry. The latter implies that firms are impeded to compete or 
restrained in their competition. On the contrary, in presence of relationship lock-in, firms choose as a 
competitive strategy to relate to each other although this relationship might not be optimal for them 
because it is the best outcome they can get in a certain time frame. Interdependence, which is the result 
of strategic choices in the context of a competitive struggle (and not a constraint to competition like 
barriers to entry), is the core of relationship lock-in. 
The remaining argument is (not coincidently) shared by two dynamic theories of competition (deviating 
neo-Schumpeterian and Marxian theories) to justify intra-industry long-run profit rate differentials 
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between firms. Firms being heterogeneous in their technological and organizational capabilities, and 
competition being a dynamic and constantly ongoing process, there is always in a given industry a firm 
that lags behind the market leader and, therefore, obtains smaller profits. Although the competitive 
process eventually eliminates underperforming firms, it allows for the coexistence of leader and non-
leader firms. This argument is explicitly developed by the authors belonging to the Marxian tradition and 
less explicitly present in the deviating neo-Schumpeterian theory with the idea of selection being made on 
a range. In both cases it applies to firms competing on the same market and trying to innovate to become 
(or remain) market leaders. It is by nature a dynamic competition argument that applies strictly to intra-
industry short-run profit rate differentials and does not imply the creation of market power in the sense 
given by these theories to the term: the profit rate differential is not obtained by pricing above the 
competitive level but, on the contrary, by innovating and creating a new (lower) competitive price that 
other firms cannot meet.  
As shown in italic in Figure 15, the sufficient arguments to explain profit rate differentials through market 
power mechanisms that would arise from competition (which validates the market power paradox) come 
down to four: the impermeability of barriers to entry, the possession of rent-earning resources, the 
conjugation of incomplete contracts and asset specificity that creates a form of relationship lock-in and 
agent’s strategic behavior coupled with relationship lock-in.  There is a fifth argument to account for 
long-run profit rate differentials that does not involve market power (and hence, cannot be used to 
corroborate the market power paradox) but that it is interesting to consider nevertheless: the heterogeneity 
of the capabilities of firms in a context of continuous dynamic innovation.  
We would like to make two important and overlapping distinctions regarding these arguments. For the 
first distinction we will paraphrase66 Lippman and Rumelt (1982, p. 419) by saying that “a theory 
explaining the dispersion of firm efficiencies” (…) “must address both the origins of interfirm differences 
and the mechanisms that impede their elimination through competition and entry”. The mechanisms that 
impede the elimination of inter-firm dispersion of efficiencies (which translate into long-run profit rate 
differentials) are the ones in bold letters: relationship lock-in, rent-earning resources, impermeable 
barriers to entry and the dynamic and continuous nature of innovation. The other mechanisms on the 
“Yes” side of Figure 15 are the ones that account for the origins of inter-firm dispersion of efficiencies or 
(consequent) profit rate differentials. Rent-earning resources fall into a middle category, since in many 
cases they can be both the origin of inter-firm efficiencies (for example, when a firm possesses a 
performant unique technology) and a mechanism to impede the elimination of this dispersion. This can be 
                                                          
66 The quote refers only to intra-industry dispersion of efficiencies. 
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the case when, for example, a patent on the technology blocks its use by other firm, creating thus a rent 
and, hence, profit rate differentials. 
The second distinction also builds on Lippman and Rumelt’s quote but with a slight (yet important) 
different approach. In terms of the link between market power and competition present in these 
mechanisms (both the ones that explain the origin and the sustainability of inter-firm dispersion of 
efficiencies) we can say that there are two different natures of market power described: market 
power as an obstacle (either created by a firm or present in the market structure) to current or 
potential incumbent rival firms’ competition (rent-earning resources and barriers to entry coupled 
or not with concentration67) and market power as the strategic obtainment and usufruct of a 
particular link with other agents as a result of multilateral strategic choices by all of the agents in a 
competitive context. The latter involves relationship lock-in. We will call it “positional market 
power”. 
This distinction leads to the third main conclusion of the chapter: if market power is conceived as 
an obstacle to competition, long-run profit rate differentials between firms cannot coexist with 
price competition. This shows the limitation of most existing competition theories in accounting for 
the current Finance-led form of competition in which, as we saw in Chapter I, high competitive 
pressure on prices and long-run profit rate differentials between firms of different industries 
coexist. Indeed, when barriers to entry and rent-earning resources are the only and ultimate explanation of 
market power used to explain profit rate differentials between firms of different industries (confirming 
thus the market power paradox), competitive pricing cannot prevail. Symmetrically, if the market power 
paradox is denied by arguing the irrelevance or the permeability of barriers to entry and rent-earning 
resources in order to account for competitive pricing, profit rate differentials between firms of different 
industries cannot exist.  
The straightforward way out of this conundrum would be to offer a dual answer to the market power 
paradox. This consists on arguing that while some firms or industries benefit from impermeable barriers 
to entry (and, therefore, stable less competitive market structures such as oligopolies or monopolies) 
and/or rent-earning resources, some other do not. Therefore, competition prevails in some industries/for 
                                                          
67 If concentration gives a firm bargaining power, the nature of the market power exerted would be related to 
relationship lock-in, but its origin would not, because it is only because barriers to entry are not porous that the 
positional market power that concentration offers can be exerted. This is true also in the particular case where 
concentration acts as a barrier to entry itself. For example, when concentration reflects high fixed costs in a natural 
monopoly. This is the reason why we do not include concentration as a kind of relationship lock-in-related market 
power. 
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some firms (which would explain the evidence on competitive pricing) but is hampered in others (which 
would explain the prevalence of long-run profit rate differentials between firms of different industries). 
This is Milberg’s argument, in which vertical profit rate differentials within global value chains in a 
context of strong price competition are explained by “an asymmetry of market structures through the 
global value chains, with oligopoly, lead firms, at the top, and competitive markets among the lower-tier 
suppliers” (Milberg, 2006, p. 11). It is also the deviating neo-Schumpeterian argument that claims that 
some firms possess rent-earning resources while the general environment remains competitive, which 
implies a (somehow) general competitive price setting system.  
The problem with this argument is that, although it describes correctly some concrete phenomena related 
to competition and market power (the fact that some firms hold rent-earning resources, the existence of 
unequal distribution of barriers to entry across firms and industries and the coexistence of a “general” 
strong price competition environment and profit rate differentials between firms of different industries), it 
does not explain them. The argument remains insufficient if a general theory of competition is intended.  
According to this argument, the market power paradox would hold in some cases and not in others 
without a coherent comprehensive theory of competition and its link to market power existing to account 
for this duality. Competition should prevail where competitive pricing exists, but it should not where 
long-run profit rate differentials between firms of different industries are observed. We would be in a 
“free pass on competition for some firms” framework where the market power paradox would only hold 
in some cases for some firms that can manage to elude the forces of market-power-restraining 
competition. Although it is evident that some firms and industries do enjoy higher barriers to entry than 
others and/or possess rent-earning resources, the logic question that follows is why do some 
firms/industries manage to (constantly in many cases) to acquire and maintain these competition-eluding 
assets and some others do not (Starosta, 2010). Nothing in these two mechanisms can answer that 
question. A common logic that would make cutthroat price competition and profit rate differentials 
between firms of different industries compatible and mutually complementary (and not just co-
existent) is a theoretical necessity for the argument to hold. Postulating or assuming the ability of 
some firms to erect and maintain barriers to entry and/or to obtain rent-earning resources is not a 
sufficient answer to meet this challenge.  
Hence, the way out of this paradox has to lie in positional market power. Nevertheless, the current 
theoretical development of positional market power is far from having found an answer to the market 
paradox and from having met that challenge. In Transaction Cost Theory’s approach to the concept of 
positional market power, the latter is a strategic behavior that takes the shape of opportunistic behaviors 
in markets in which information is not perfect, agents have bounded rationality, assets complementarity is 
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high and contract are incomplete. The reliance on opportunistic behaviors by firms to account for market 
power exertion is problematic. Every market requires a certain amount of trust in order to function (Coriat 
& Weinstein, 2010), especially when long-run supplier relationships are considered. Opportunistic 
behavior cannot be the norm. Moreover, the utilitarian value theory and the transactional conception of 
the firm on which TCT relies (Coriat & Weinstein, 2010) also make inter-industry profit rate differentials 
incompatible with competitive pricing. Indeed, when a firm is opportunistic and holds-up gains that 
should belong to another firm, there is “allocative inefficiency” which, in terms of this school’s approach, 
can only happen when prices are not competitive. Then, the existent competition theories that consider 
positional market power also fail to conjugate long-run profit rate differentials between industries 
with competitive pricing, even when they avoid conceptualizing market power in terms of barriers 
to entry and/or rent-earning resources (market power as an obstacle to competition).  
This contradiction shows the limitations of competition theories’ theorization of barriers to entry and rent-
earning resources, the necessity to reformulate the market power paradox and the need to further 
conceptualize positional market power. The three are of course related. Stated as it is, the market power 
paradox cannot be answered by relying on the role of barriers to entry and without competition theory 
having to deny either the prevalence of competitive pricing or the existence of long-run profit rate 
differentials between industries; or without entering into a dualistic explanation that would admit both 
phenomena by paying the price of reducing theory to a sophisticated description. We believe that further 
work on positional market power is needed in order to find a solution to these difficulties. 
Hence, the market power paradox has to be reformulated. We will argue that the pertinent market 
power paradox of the current dominant form of competition should read as follows: competitive 
behavior results in the obtaining and use of market power by some firms, which renders the 
competitive landscape… competitive. This means that competition theory, in order to be theoretically 
coherent and consistent with empirical observations, needs to reconcile market-power-originated profit 
rate differentials between firms of different industries with competition itself, which of course includes 
(strong) price competition. The theoretical challenge the restated market power paradox faces 
consists in conjugating coherently competition and market power not as two opposed concepts 
where the first would give birth to the second (its self-destruction) but rather as two manifestations 
of a same process.  
This does not mean we think the ‘old’ market power paradox is uninteresting or that it is a false paradox. 
What we want to show is that we need to pose a different market power paradox, a new research question, 
in order to build a coherent and holistic competition theory that can account for today’s characteristic and 
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relevant competitive mechanisms, their links with market power and its implications. The ‘old’ market 
power paradox remains as interesting as before, but it is nonetheless not sufficient anymore to understand 
all the ways in which competition and market power amalgam nowadays.  
We believe that the path to overcoming these three difficulties lies in the concept of positional 
market power.  In the next chapter, we will show that this concept does not rely on the concepts of 
barriers to entry or rent-earning resources (although it is compatible with them) and that it can be 
used to understand how fully vertical global value chains operate. Furthermore, we will argue that 
in doing so, it can account for competition and market power exertion mechanisms (including the 
pricing of inputs) that can explain profit rate differentials between firms of different industries in a 
context of strong price competition. In terms of the cartography drawn in Figure 14, our contribution to 
competition theory will be built in the bottom-right quadrant. 
The next chapter will therefore intend to offer a theory of the most relevant competitive struggle of our 
times: fully vertical competition in a vertically disintegrated mode of production. In doing so, will offer 
an answer to the restated market power paradox. This will imply reconciling competitive pricing with 
market-power-originated profit rate differentials between firms of different industries and, more 
generally, to reconcile competition and (a kind of) market power as two sides of the same coin. This 
particular and extremely relevant type of market power will not be conceived as a denial of competition, 
not as an obstacle to competition or a byproduct of competitive mechanisms, but as an expression of 
competition.  
  
 171 
 
  
 172 
Conclusions of Part I 
 
In Part I we have examined the link between market power in American economic history (Chapter I) and 
in competition theories (Chapter II) in order to find elements to account for the coexistence of the two 
seemingly incompatible stylized facts that triggered this investigation: strong price competition and long-
run profit rate differentials between firms.  
In Chapter I we showed how American economic history provides evidence of a non-antithetical relation 
between competition and market power. By expanding the Regulationist concept of form of competition, 
we identified two forms of competition in the history of the United States in which, contrary to the views 
according to which throughout history “the balance between monopoly and competition oscillates 
erratically back and forth” (Harvey, 2014, p. 134), competition has not always simply led to market power 
or the latter has not always simply taken over the former, as it had been the case during the Predatory 
Competition (circa 1840s to 1860s) and Constricted Competition (circa 1920s to 1945) forms of 
competition respectively. In effect, a symbiotic relation between the two has existed. During what we 
have labelled the ‘Collusive form of competition’ (circa 1870s to 1910s), market power has served to 
(imperfectly) regulate competition, and in the current hegemonic Finance-led form of competition (circa 
1980s to present) market power articulates competition, which results in long-term profit rate differentials 
coexisting with strong price competition. At the end of the chapter, we offered a general account of how 
the coexistence of these two stylized facts can be thought of coherently by paying special attention to the 
role that the current internationally vertically disintegrated landscape of industrial organization plays in 
competitive dynamics, but without entering into the competition theory that would support our claims yet. 
In Chapter II we reviewed the existing competition theories focusing on the link between competition 
and market power they establish. We have seen that, relying on a variety of (anti)competitive mechanisms 
and concepts of competition, competition theories differ in respect to how they stand on the market power 
paradox according to which competition necessarily leads to market power asymmetries that result in 
long-run profit rate differentials between firms. Nevertheless, regardless of theories’ stands on the market 
power paradox, none has proven to be able to avoid conceptualizing competition and market power as 
two antithetical concepts. We have shown that the fact that in most of them market power arises from 
setting obstacles to competition makes it theoretically impossible to conciliate long-run profit rate 
differentials and strong price competition. In some of them, we have identified another type of market 
power mechanism, ‘positional market power’, which is based on the strategic obtainment and usufruct of 
a particular link with other agents as a result of multilateral strategic choices by all of the agents in a 
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competitive context. Although theories relying on positional market power also fail in conciliating the 
above-mentioned stylized facts, we have suggested by then end of the chapter that positional market 
power was the key to do it. Moreover, we have highlighted the narrow vertical scope of most competition 
theories, which do not consider (anti)competitive relations between firms located all along the supply 
chain (“fully vertical competition”), and we suggested that a theory that does so was needed to conciliate 
these stylized facts. 
The results are interesting in that, while we have identified two periods in American economic history in 
which competition and market power have not been antithetical, competition theory, which has been 
strongly influenced by the observation of American economic history, fails to account for them. 
Moreover, they fail to account for the coexistence of strong price competition and long-run profit rate 
differentials and the vertical scope of competition characteristic of the current Finance-led form of 
competition identified in Chapter I. Because most competition theories make the compatibility of 
competition and market power impossible by definition by presenting the latter as mechanisms that set 
obstacles to the former, and because positional market power in its current state cannot account for a 
long-run synergic relations between competition and market power, we can conclude that there is a gap 
between history and theory regarding the relation between these concepts.  
In Part II we will proceed to offering some contributions that aim at narrowing this gap. In doing so, we 
will follow our findings of Chapter II by developing a concept of positional market power that will pay 
special attention to fully vertical market power. 
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Part II - Competition and Market power in contemporary 
capitalism: an analysis of two archetypal situations  
 
 
Introduction  
 
In Part I we have shown that, although there have been extended periods in American history in which 
market power has served to (imperfectly) regulate (the ‘Collusive form of competition’ era, circa 1870s to 
1910s) and articulate (the ‘Finance-led competition’, circa 1980s to today) competition, the existing 
competition theories, built to a large extent on the experience of American economic history, continue to 
present these two concepts as antithetical. As a consequence of this conception of the link between 
competition and market power, the existing competition theories are unable to account for both strong 
price competition and long-run profit rate differentials between firms, two stylized facts that we have 
identified as proper to the current Finance-led form of competition. 
Moreover, two recent major changes that challenge the traditional antithetical link between competition 
and market power have taken place since these theories have been developed: the rise of global value 
chains, on the one side, and what is nowadays more and more defined as "platform capitalism", on the 
other side; two novelties that are far from being unrelated. Let us develop these points. 
Beginning in the 1990s, the liberalization of trade and the advances in ICT made possible “the integration 
of trade and the disintegration of production” (Feenstra, 1998) through internationally-dispersed supply 
chains (global value chains) that have profoundly altered market structures and firms’ strategies. Through 
the rise of global value chains, competition has become global and fiercer but, at the same time, market 
power asymmetries have developed within global value chains. More recently, further developments in 
ICT and the increasing penetration of the internet and smartphones opened the door to an organizational 
revolution: the rise of the platform economy, a term that covers all the organizations in which data-fed 
algorithms (platforms) are at the core of the business model. This revolution has also profoundly altered 
market structures through the disintermediation brought about by platforms in several industries (e.g. 
retail, transportation, and lodging, to name a few) and the competitive strategies of both platforms and 
traditional firms. As in the case of global value chains, the platform economy has intensified competition 
and, at the same time, created new forms of market power. 
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Building on the findings of Part I, Part II will be devoted to offering contributions to make strong price 
competition and long-run profit rate differentials theoretically compatible. In order to do so, each chapter 
will focus on the two above-mentioned organizational objects that, to our understanding, have altered the 
most the link between competition and market power and, therefore, can shed some light on how can 
long-run profit rate differentials and strong price competition be compatible: global value chains and the 
platform economy. Because the latter comprises a series of distinct types of firms, we will narrow our 
object of study to a specific type of platform that has to date altered the most market structures and firms’ 
strategies, ‘trust-based algorithmic coordination firms’ (TBACF), a label we have chosen to describe 
platforms of which Uber and Airbnb are the most well-known examples. 
Chapter III examines the link between competition and market power in global value chains. After doing 
a brief review of the genealogy of the concept and pointing out its limitations, we offer an evolutionary 
theory of the internationally-dispersed network-firm (aka global value chain) in which market power is 
constitutive of the network-firm. This will be the cornerstone to develop at the end of the chapter 
contributions to a competition theory within and between global value chains in which, as shown in 
Chapter I, market power articulates competition in such a manner that strong price competition and long-
run profit rate differentials between firms of different industries are compatible. 
Chapter IV revisits the link between competition and market power in a specific type of platform-firm 
that we will label ‘trust-based algorithmic coordination (TBAC) firm, and of which Uber and Airbnb are 
the most well-known examples. After quickly reviewing the technological and institutional 
transformations that led to the emergence of the platform economy of which TBAC firms are part, we 
characterize them following an evolutionary theory of the firm. This sets the cornerstone of a competition 
theory between TBAC and incumbent non-platform-firms, on the one side, and between TBAC firms, on 
the other side. In both cases, we will show how market power articulates price competition and, in the 
second case, we will offer a case study of the ride-hailing firm Uber in some of the main American 
markets to support one of the main theoretical arguments made in the chapter, namely the existence of 
winner-takes-all dynamics in markets in which TBAC firms participate.  
While the two chapters differ significantly in the organizational objects on which they are centered, they 
form a unity both in methodological and theoretical terms. Methodologically, in both chapters we begin 
by proposing an evolutionary theory of the firm on which the contributions to competition theory that 
follow build. Theoretically, they both offer a competition theory in which market power articulates 
competition and, as a consequence, long-run profit rate differentials are compatible with strong price 
competition. 
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Chapter 3: Contributions for a theory of competition and market 
power within and between global value chains 
 
 
“You know what capital is? You think it’s something you own, don’t you. You think it’s factories and 
machines and buildings and land and things you can sell and stocks and money and banks and 
corporations. (…) But you are mistaken. Capital is controlling things. Controlling things.” 
 
Reverend Bacon, The Bonfire of the Vanities 
 
Introduction 
 
In Chapter I we have seen that vertically-disintegrated production of goods by firms spread around the 
world (a phenomenon that, since the 2000s, came to be known as “global value chains”) has become the 
dominant form of industrial organization from the 1980s on. Moreover, we have seen that the new form 
of competition that emerged with the surge of global value chains is characterized by two salient stylized 
facts: long-run profit rate differentials between firms of different industries and strong competition on 
prices. 
Looking for an explanation of these two stylized facts, in Chapter II we have reviewed the existing 
competition theories and concluded that none could conciliate them. Moreover, noticing that very few 
competition theories take a fully vertical dimension in their scope despite the relevant role played by 
global value chains in the current Finance-led competition form described in Chapter I, we suggested that 
the way to make these two stylized facts compatible in a coherent competition theory would be precisely 
to build a competition theory that has a full vertical scope, which comes down to developing a theory of 
competition within and between (we will show why the ‘between’ is necessary in Section 3) global value 
chains. The goal of this chapter will therefore be to set the basis for a theory of competition and 
market power that, taking global value chains as its objet, can make long-run profit rate 
differentials between firms and strong price competition compatible. 
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Before starting developing in that direction, we should begin by examining a body of literature that has 
taken global value chains as its object of study. Although these literatures are not competition theories per 
se, they address some aspects of interest for our investigation. Therefore, in Section 1 we will study, for 
the different variants of those literatures (namely Commodity Chains, Global Commodity Chains and 
Global Value Chains in its mainstream and ‘market power’ versions), what competitive mechanisms exist 
and how they explain profit rate differentials between tiers of a value chain. 
After showing that, just as it is the case of the competition theories studied in Chapter II, none of these 
literatures can conciliate long-run profit rate differential between firms of different industries (tiers) and 
strong competition on prices, we will proceed to developing our theory of competition within and 
between global value chains. Section 2 will begin by exposing an evolutionist theory of the network-firm, 
a term that applies to both ‘national’ network-firms and ‘international’ network-firms, i.e.  global value 
chains. We will show how de facto power, by assuring the coordination and defining the borders of the 
network-firm, constitutes its backbone. This will be the pillar of our theoretical explanation of long-
run profit rate differentials between firms in the context of global value chains in the following 
section. 
Section 3 will build on the findings on the previous section and introduce the concept of ‘net 
independence’ to account for the source of the de facto power that some lead firms have within global 
value chains. We will begin by explaining how it translates into pricing mechanisms that result in profit 
rate differentials between firms of different industries (tiers). Then, using numerical examples and 
building on some concepts from network theory, we will show how this market power mechanism is 
compatible with the two competitive forces that operate in a global value chain context in the short-run: 
‘traditional’ horizontal price competition and ‘network-firm vs network-firm’ competition. In this way, by 
the end of Section 3 we will have reached the goal of this chapter by having shown that long-run 
profit rate differentials and strong competition on prices are compatible in an industrial 
organization landscape dominated by global value chains. For these reasons, our thesis is to be 
considered not simply a vision of competition within and between global value chains, but rather a 
contribution to a theory of competition and market power within and between global value chains. In this 
sense, the results obtained in Section 3 will provide elements for a competition-theory-grounded 
explanation of the coexistence between competition and market power we have identified in Chapter I 
when analyzing the current Finance-led form of competition. Then, by developing a contribution to a 
theory of competition and market power, this chapter will reinforce the main conclusion we have reached 
in Chapter I when we analyzed the history of capitalistic forms of competition in the United States: 
competition and market power are not necessarily incompatible; just like during the collusive competition 
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era (1870s to 1910s), although in a different manner, in the current Finance-led form of competition 
(1980s to present) in which global value chains predominate, market power can coordinate competition. 
Finally, Section 4 will take the implications of our findings of the previous sections a step further by 
introducing an additional competition force that plays in the long-run in a global value chains context: 
competition for fully vertical market power. We will first show how make-or-buy and innovation 
decisions can be understood as long-run strategic choices by firms trying to occupy or create the role that 
gives them more fully vertical market power within the global value chain. We will finally point out how 
institutional change can also be interpreted in the same way. 
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1 Global value chains: genealogy of an eclectic concept 
 
Since the 1980s, the dominant form of production and international trade started to change towards what 
Feenstra (1998) has cleverly summarized as “the integration of trade and the disintegration of 
production”. As we have seen in Chapter I, around those years a series of technical progresses made 
possible the spreading of modular production to many industries. At the same time, international trade 
was liberalized and technological progress reduced communication and transportation costs. This allowed 
for a new international division of labor in which, following a modular form of production, firms spread 
around the globe started exporting inputs to subcontracting firms located in other countries and re-
importing final products. The novelty of the phenomenon did not rely in modular production alone 
but rather on its international dimension. 
Many scholars identified this novelty and started to build new theoretical frameworks to understand it. 
One of the earliest has been the New International Division of Labor (NIDL, or ‘DIPP’ in its French 
version, which brought about many contributions to the field) that started to develop in the 1980s 
(Fontagné, 1989; Lassudrie-Duchene, 1982; Mouhoud, 1993). The goal of this body of literature was to 
understand why this new international division of labor was taking place and what criteria were these new 
networks of firms following to choose what stage of production they would locate in which country. Two 
conflicting explanations were put forward to account for the latter: a Neo-Ricardian one based on the 
comparative advantages certain countries or regions offer for certain stages of production (low wages, an 
advantageous geographical position, infrastructures, market potential, etc.) and a cognitive one, in which 
short-run cost minimization is not the goal of locating a stage of production in a particular country, but 
rather the mastering of a specific productive knowledge and the ambition to remain at the technological 
edge (Moati & Mouhoud, 2005). Nevertheless, the NIDL approach did not focus on competitive 
mechanisms or the unequal distribution of profits within the nascent international network-firms, two 
topics central to our investigation to which the different versions of the Global Value Chains literature 
devoted itself. 
As the NIDL approach was being developed, another body of literature looking at the same object but 
with different questions arose, the Commodity Chains approach. This concept was born within the World-
Systems Theory, a macro-scale multidisciplinary framework influenced by Dependency Theory that 
privileges the world as a system as its unit of analysis of long-run social change rather than nation states. 
In this vein, during the 1980s the term ‘commodity chains’ was coined to designate “a network of labour 
and production processes whose end result is a finished commodity” (Hopkins & Wallerstein, 1986, p. 
159). It is important to point out that this definition of a commodity chain, while vague, includes 
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explicitly labor as one of its components. Consequently, and given the Marxist roots of this approach, the 
analysis of commodity chains includes the modes control and reproduction of labor that are found in a 
node or ‘box’ in the original terminology (Bair, 2009). The commodity chains approach sees the latter not 
as a novelty of the last quarter of the XXth century but as a phase of longue durée cycles. In Wallerstein’s 
words, “transstate, geographically extensive commodity chains are not a recent phenomenon, dating from 
say the 1970s or even 1945, … they have been an integral part of … the functioning of the capitalist 
world-economy since it came into existence in the long sixteenth century” (Wallerstein, 2000, p. 2). 
Hopkins and Wallerstein (1994) see that some tiers of the commodity chain benefit from market power 
because of the more technologically advanced processes they involve and the barriers to entry that have to 
be overcome to enter them. Similarly, Gereffi and Korzeniewicz (1994, p. 2) wrote that “within a 
commodity chain” (…) a relatively greater share of wealth generally accrues to core-like nodes than to 
peripheral ones. This is because competitive pressures are less pronounced in core-like nodes than in 
peripheral ones”.  Nevertheless, the commodity chains approach, which is also influenced by 
Schumpeterian views on competition (Raikes, Friis Jensen, & Ponte, 2000), considers that in the long-run 
competition is cyclically restored. According to this view, during expansionary phases of Kondratieff 
cycles driven by radical innovations, commodity chains become more vertically integrated and 
monopolistic concentration among tiers is reduced. Symmetrically, during the contraction phase of the 
cycle fiercer competition eliminates weaker firms and concentration increases, while vertical 
disintegration takes place in order to reduce costs by replacing labor and capital costs by contractual 
relations.  
A decade later, in the 1990s, an evolution of this approach took place around the concept of ‘global 
commodity chains’ (GCC). This approach let behind the historical and cyclical concerns of the 
Commodity Chains approach and conceptualized commodity chains as forms of coordination of 
production and international trade. Indeed, these authors considered that, since the 1980s, not only was 
production being internationally fragmented, but also that it was being shaped and driven by “chain 
management” strategies by leading multinational firms using a series of market and extra-market forms of 
coordination (Gereffi, Humphrey, & Sturgeon, 2005). The goal of the GCC approach aimed at 
understanding how production and international trade is organized within GCCs. Not surprisingly, among 
the three dimensions Gereffi (1994) identified to analyze a GCC (input-output structure, territoriality or 
“geographical configuration” and governance structure)68, the governance structure became the central 
one in GCC studies. The GCC approach identified the governance of GCCs with the concept of 
                                                          
68 A year later Gereffi, Humphrey and Sturgeon (2005) added a fourth dimension: institutional context. The latter 
refers to the “rules of the game” that apply to the organization and operation of GCCs. 
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“driveness”, which refers to by which means a lead firm can assure the coordination of the internationally 
dispersed production process through both market and non-market means. Influenced by the insights of 
management literature developed by Porter (1986), they identified “higher-order” factors of 
competitiveness that make a firm the leader or coordinator of a GCC, such as “proprietary technology, 
product differentiation, brand reputation, customer relations and constant industrial upgrading” (Gereffi, 
Korzeniewicz, & Korzeniewicz, 1994, p. 6). The factors that allow a firm to drive a GCC also allow it to 
appropriate more value than firms located in other tiers. Indeed, difficult to imitate resources (research 
and development, marketing, selling capacity, knowhow of a productive process, privileged access to a 
primary commodity, etc.) allow a firm to appropriate larger shares of the value created along the value 
chain (Gereffi & Korzeniewicz, 1990, 1994; Lee, 2010). Then, low degrees of competition and high 
degrees of innovation (the latter being ultimately linked to difficulty of replicability of a resource, and 
therefore to weak competition) in certain tiers allow the firms that can occupy them the possibility of 
governing the GCC and appropriating more value than others. Consequently, the famous distinction 
between “producer-driven” and “buyer-driven” GCCs was made. In the former, common in industries 
such as automobile and aircraft, there are barriers to entry in high-technology and large-scale production 
facilities that are characterized by scale economies and large sunk costs. Therefore, the key agent of the 
GCC is located upstream. Symmetrically, in buyer-driven GCC, common in industries such as garments, 
toys or footwear, barriers to entry are low at the manufacturing stages but high downstream. Key agents 
control design and marketing, using their brands and commercial networks to obtain a high share of the 
value created within the GCC, while production is subcontracted (Raikes et al., 2000). In sum, as Gereffi 
and Lee (2012, p. 25) point out, “governance is the centerpiece of GVC analysis. It shows how corporate 
power can actively shape the distribution of profits and risk in an industry”. 
In the 2000s, the authors that had been at the forefront of the concept of GCC (Gereffi, Sturgeon, 
Korzeniewicz, Lee, etc.) advanced a new version of it they labelled “global value chains” (GVCs). The 
object of study and its definition remained the same, namely “the nature and extent of the inter-firm 
relationships that bind sets of firms into larger economic groups” typically centered on the “sequence of 
events leading to the delivery, consumption and maintenance of goods and services” (Sturgeon, 2001, p. 
10). As this definition shows, both the GCC and GVC approaches focused on inter-firm relationships, 
neglecting the labor process, which had been at the center of the Commodity Chains approach. Although 
the switch from “commodity” to “value” was meant to clarify that the term “global value chains” not only 
refers to primary products or low-value-added goods (which are usually referred to as “commodities”) 
and to include similar undergoing theoretical constructs (Bair, 2009), some important evolutions 
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regarding the foundations of competitive dynamics and profit rate differentials in GVCs occurred when 
the term “global value chains” was adopted. 
 
The turning point was the passage from the binary distinction between buyer-driven and producer-driven 
governance modes to the five governance modes that characterize the GVC approach.  In this framework, 
power asymmetry within a GVC (and, therefore, the ability of a firm to capture more value than other 
firms of its GVC) depends on the degree of explicit (i.e. non-market) coordination. The latter, in turn, is 
the function of the combination of three variables: the complexity of transactions, the ability to codify 
transactions and the capabilities in the supply base. The combinations of these three variables create three 
GVC governance forms69: modular, relational and captive. The three of them have complex transactions 
that require some degree of non-market coordination. Following transaction costs theory, the GVC 
framework argues that the more complex exchanges and the higher the risk of hold-up derived from 
specific investment are, the more costly it is for firms to exchange in the market, and therefore the more 
likely a departure from a pure market governance will be. Nevertheless, there are ways to mitigate these 
transaction costs that explain why these hybrids between ‘pure market’ and full vertical integration named 
global value chains exist in three variants of “governance forms”.  
On the less explicit coordination side of the spectrum of GVC governance forms, the modular form is 
characterized by high complexity of transactions, a high ability to codify transactions and a high 
capability of the supplier base. The ability to codify transactions, typically by using technological 
standards, “reduces asset specificity and therefore a buyer's need for direct monitoring and control” 
(Gereffi et al., 2005). Moreover, the high capability of suppliers allows for outsourcing without much 
explicit inter-firm coordination, although this coordination certainly exceeds the mere exchange of 
information on prices that characterizes pure market transactions. In relational value chains, transactions 
are also complex and the capabilities of the supply base are also high, but transactions cannot be easily 
codified. The competences of the supply base provide incentives to outsource to gain access to 
complementary competencies, but the low codifiability of transactions forces firms to engage in a more 
explicit coordination. Finally, in captive value chains, the complexity of transactions is high, but because 
transactions are highly codifiable, the lead firm can give precise instructions on how to produce instead of 
having to internalize production completely. In captive value chains, the capability of the supply base is 
low, which encourages lead firms to intervene and control. This creates transactional dependence on the 
lead firm by suppliers.  
                                                          
69 The other two, market and hierarchy (i.e. full vertical integration) are not GVCs, which is why we do not develop 
on them here. 
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The degree of power of lead firms relies on the degree of explicit coordination they assume towards other 
firms of the value chain. The latter, in turn, is the result of both characteristics of the transactions 
(complexity and ability to codify transactions) and the capabilities of the firms involved in the production 
process. When the difficulty of codifying transactions leads to explicit coordination, it is the risk of the 
hold-up that could arise from asset specificity that motivates the explicit coordination that gives the lead 
firm power, as in the relational governance type. In this case, power is founded on a transaction costs 
theory of the firm. On the contrary, when, as in the captive governance type, the low capabilities of 
suppliers are what motivate explicit coordination, there is a cognitive theory of the firm at the foundation 
of power. In this sense, the GVC approach can be considered an eclectic approach in terms of the 
theory of the firm that underlies it.  
Finally, a fourth generation of the GVC approach in terms of competitive dynamics and profit rate 
differentials within value chains has recently emerged with the work of Milberg and Winkler. Closer to 
the initial Commodity Chains approach, Milberg and Winkler claim that an asymmetrical concentration of 
market power along the value chain is the reason why there is an uneven distribution of value between the 
tiers of the value chain. Contrary to the Global Commodity Chains approach, this power does not result 
from the characteristics of the industries in terms of the capabilities that are more relevant and 
intrinsically shielded from competition in certain value chains that explained buyer-driven and producer-
driven commodity chains, but rather from strategies deployed by lead firms. Departing from a Kaleckian 
pricing theory, they argue that, because raising final prices has become more difficult as a mean of 
exerting monopoly power, firms recur increasingly to exerting downward pressure on input prices instead 
in order to enlarge their mark-ups. Their ability to do so relies on “an asymmetry of market structures 
through the global value chains, with oligopoly, lead firms, at the top, and competitive markets among the 
lower-tier suppliers” (Milberg, 2006). The power of lead firms to exert downward pressure on input 
prices is applied through four mechanisms Milberg and Winkler (2013, pp. 123–128) identify: 1) 
inducing competition among suppliers; 2) offloading risks to suppliers; 3) erecting entry barriers through 
branding and 4) minimizing technology sharing.  Moreover, they consider that a factor helping in 
“sustaining the asymmetry is the persistence and growth of global excess capacity in many industries” 
(Milberg & Winkler, 2013). This causes a downward pressure on prices that helps lead firms erecting and 
maintaining barriers to entry while benefiting from inputs that become constantly cheaper in their value 
chains (Milberg & Winkler, 2013, p. 129). It is worth mentioning that, unlike the Commodity Chains 
approach, Milberg and Winkler do not consider global value chains to be something that has existed for as 
long as capitalism has and, more importantly in the context of this section, do not think that successive B-
phases of Schumpeterian economic cycles restore competition in GVCs. On the contrary, they believe the 
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barriers to entry set by lead firms are difficult to erode. It is for that reason that we consider Milberg and 
Winkler’s a fourth generation of the GVC concept in terms of competitive dynamics and profit rate 
differentials within the value chain. 
 
Two main conclusions can be drawn from the rapid review of competitive dynamics and explanations of 
intra-value-chain profit rate differentials in the different phases of evolution of the global value chain 
concept. First, the poor and/or eclectic theoretical foundations of many of these approaches, 
especially regarding the theory of the firm, has made of “global value chain” and its neighbor 
concepts a fuzzy term both in terms of its definition and its frontiers. As Raikes, Friis and Ponte 
(2000, p. 10) point out, is a GVC “just any channel, or set of channels, by which produce crosses the 
world, or should the notion itself include the specific power and governance structures seen by Gereffi to 
define GCCs?”70. Moreover, where is the frontier of a GVC to be drawn? How far in the production 
process should one go to determine where one GVC starts and where the other ends? The existing 
definitions, a handful of which we have quoted in this section, provide no answer to this question71.  
Second, as we have shown along this section, none of the variants of the GVC approach can make 
compatible long-run profit rate differentials between tiers and competitive pricing. In the best case, 
competitive pricing exists only in certain tiers (Milberg, 2006; Milberg & Winkler, 2013) or in certain 
periods of the economic cycle (Wallerstein, 2000). This is due to the fact that, just like most of the 
competition theories examined in Chapter II, the different versions of the GVC approach recur to a 
concept of market power as an obstacle to competition (concentration, product differentiation or rent-
earning resources) to account for profit rate differentials between firms. 
Therefore, the GVC framework, in all its versions, is not adequate to fulfill the goal of this chapter, 
namely to develop the basis of a theory of competition that takes global value chains as its object 
and can account for both long-run profit rate differentials between firms of different tiers 
(industries) and strong competition on prices. Consequently, we will begin to do so in the next section 
by analyzing global value chains from the perspective of an evolutionist theory of the firm. This will be 
the foundation on which we will rely to develop our contributions in Sections 3 and 4. 
                                                          
70 The quote refers to GCCs, but the criticism applies as well to GVCs and commodity chains. 
 
71 For a detailed review of the existing definitions of a GVC and how they fail to clearly delimitate the boundaries of 
a value chain see Carballa Smichowski, Durand, & Knauss (2016). 
 186 
2 De facto power as the backbone of the network-firm: an 
evolutionist approach to global value chains 
 
We have seen in the previous section that, just like the competition theories examined in Chapter II, the 
GVC literature and its neighboring variations are incapable of making long-run profit rate differentials 
between firms and strong price competition compatible. Therefore, as mentioned in the introduction, we 
will have to develop our contributions to a theory of competition and market power within and between 
global value chains to meet that goal. Moreover, we have seen that because of the poor theoretical 
foundations or the eclectic theory of the firm that underlies the GVC literature and its neighboring 
variations, they lack a clear and consensual definition of what a GVC is and where its boundaries are to 
be drawn. Since such a definition is essential to building a theory of competition and market power 
between and within global value chains that can make long-run profit rate differentials and strong 
price competition compatible, we will devote this section to developing an evolutionist 
conceptualization of global value chains. 
In this section we will conceptualize global value chains as globally-disperse network-firms. This 
conceptualization, which draws from an evolutionary theory of the (network) firm, places de facto power 
at the core of the network-firm. The central role that de facto power plays in organizing the 
production process in the network-firm will be basis on which we will develop contributions to a 
theory of competition and market power within and between global value chains in the next section. 
In doing so, we will offer the explanation this chapter aims at providing: how can long-term profit 
rate differentials be compatible with strong price competition. 
As explained in Chapter II, evolutionary economics considers firms to be an organization that, as such, is 
characterized by its (unique) repertoire of routines (Nelson & Winter, 2004) understood as organizational 
automatized responses to wide-ranged problems on which firms’ competences are built. The latter are 
“idiosyncratic, difficult to imitate, often only incrementally changing over time” (Dosi, 2012). Moreover, 
the routines and the organizational or technological knowhow that characterize a firm are largely tacit, 
which makes them difficult to transfer (Coriat & Weinstein, 2015, p. 130). Then, not only are firms are 
heterogeneous, but their heterogeneity also remains through time.  
Moreover, heterogeneity in time and the evolution of firms follows a rationale given by the very nature of 
the firm. The firm learns as a result of “experience and experimentation” (Dopfer & Potts, 2014). 
Routines, usually said to play the role genes play in biological evolution, are different to the latter in one 
fundamental aspect: they can be consciously (yet slowly) modified by the firm as an answer to its 
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interaction with the economic environment. In order to do this, firms use their “meta-routines”, which are 
the routines in charge of the modification and adaptation of lower level routines (Nelson & Winter, 2004). 
Nevertheless, routines cannot change in any way and, more importantly, their change depends on the 
history of the firm. Path dependence (the recognition that “history matters”) plays a central role in 
evolutionary economics. At the firm level (and regarding competition theory), path dependence implies 
that “a firm’s previous investments and its repertoire of routines (its ‘history’) constrains its future 
behavior” (Teece, Rumelt, Dosi, & Winter, 1994, p. 17).  
In other words, firms are unique problem-solving devices equipped with competences, and that 
uniqueness is to remain through time and evolve based on firms’ past repertoire of routines. Uniqueness 
should not be mistaken with exclusiveness: each firm can be unique and, at the same time, two or more 
firms can offer similar responses or equally efficient responses to the same problem. This will be 
important in building our contributions in this chapter in that, although many competing firms can offer 
similar products or services to other firms or final customers, in the short and medium-run the set of firms 
that can offer that product or service remains unchanged. In a context of vertical disintegration and 
modular production, this means that firms that participate in a network-firm need each other’s 
complementary competences72 to be able to deliver a final product with a quality and/or at a price 
that is competitive. Mutual dependence between firms of different tiers of a same value chain is 
therefore the norm.  
The question that follows is how firms coordinate to pool their complementary competences together. In 
other words, how do a set of firms become a network-firm? Chassagnon offers an answer in his definition 
of the network-firm: 
“The network-firm refers to a productive entity that unifies a set of legally independent firms, vertically 
integrated and coordinated by a main firm called the hub-firm, in order to produce a specific good or 
service. The distribution of power between actors is the main coordinating mechanism in a vertical 
network of production.” (Chassagnon, 2009, p. 24) 
Power, in turn, has three sources that act within the boundaries of a firm (Chassagnon, 2010, 2011): 
formal authority (the power employers have over employees resulting from the employment contract), de 
                                                          
72 We can define complementarity as “the extent to which two mutually adapted factors can yield superior value in 
combination” (Jacobides, Knudsen, & Augier, 2006, p. 1201). 
 
 188 
jure power (the power that comes from private and exclusive property rights held on assets73 and gives an 
agent the power to exclude another agent from using them) and de facto power, which comes from 
resource dependence. The latter differs from de jure power in that it “does not strictly result from 
contractual and legal mechanisms but from an informal mechanism: access to critical resources” 
(Chassagnon, 2009, p. 17, emphasis added). This does not mean that access to critical resources cannot 
and is not put into contract clauses. Nevertheless, one could take the logic further and question why a 
contract clause between a firm and a subcontractor would benefit more the former than the latter. Power is 
reflected in contracts but it is not explained by them when dealing with two legally independent firms. 
Moreover, it goes without saying that formal authority is not the source of power between two legally 
independent firms. The source of power that glues the network-firm together is then de facto power. 
According to Chassagnon (2012, pp. 25–26), “the  complementarity  of  critical  resources  generates  
synergy  that  creates  a  systemic  interdependence  peculiar  to  the  network-firm.  Each legal entity of 
the network is in situation of economic dependence with each other, which requires compliance between 
actors (…) The exploitation of de facto powers is hence at the origin of the emergence of the network-
firm.  In the latter, informal aspects form the ‘glue’ that unifies some legally independent firms into a 
single production process”. 
In other words, in an industrial organization landscape in which, as shown in Chapter I, 
complementary competences are vertically scattered across different legal entities, and in absence 
of formal power, de facto power is the mechanism through which legally independent firms 
coordinate in order to pool together their complementary competences to produce a final good or 
service; through the means of de facto power, problem-solving devices are federated to constitute a 
mega-problem solving device that the network-firm is. De facto power can be (imperfectly) translated 
into inter-firm contracts (franchising, subcontracting, licenses, joint ventures, alliances, etc.) and act 
through contract law, which makes it manifest as de jure power. However, the source of power within the 
network-firm remains de facto power. It should be noted that the fact that de facto power is the underlying 
coordination mechanism of the network-firm does not mean that conflict is the only mean through which 
legally independent firms coordinate within the network-firm. De facto power is what glues firms 
together and implicitly distributes hierarchies within the network-firm, as we will see in more detail in 
Section 3. Relative power positions within the network-firm affect the conditions of cooperation and 
informally enforce them. Nevertheless, the actual cooperation that takes place in this power-based 
background occurs through a mix of market mechanisms (price signals, bargaining) and a form of 
                                                          
73 Chassagnon (2012) writes “property rights of physical assets” while we would like to also include intangible 
assets. 
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hierarchical control that transcends the legal boundaries of the firms that constitute the network-firm or 
“supply chain”. In Dosi et al’s (2007, p. 31) words: 
“Division of labour and decentralization associated with the expansion of the network require at the same 
time stronger integration and coordination within the nodes of the network. As some activities are 
outsourced, their coordination implies the development of highly structured functions dedicated to their 
management and to the achievement of coherence and integration. In other words, division of labour does 
not simply reduce the need for managerial control, but shifts it at different levels. Thus, the management 
of supply chains does not eliminate the need for hierarchical control. If anything, it changes its nature and 
its practices. But one could legitimately argue that the management of supply chains is a more 
organizationally complex activity than straightforward vertical integration. In this perspective, the Visible 
Hand is not disappearing. Perhaps the grip of its fist is relaxing. But its strength is not weakened: its grip 
is perhaps smoother but firmer.” 
 
In this sense, the network-firm constitutes a unique form of organization of production distinct from the 
‘pure’ market-based coordination mechanisms and the exclusively hierarchical ones on which the division 
of labor within the boundaries of the firm is based. It is “a dynamic network of capabilities” (Chassagnon, 
2011) glued together by power relationships that manifest through coordination mechanisms that include 
repeated and sustained (Lamoreaux, Raff, & Temin, 2003; Sabel & Zeitlin, 2004) managerial and market-
based interactions between legally independent firms. 
Our main interest in the underlying power relations that glue together the network-firm is nevertheless 
linked to the fact that when a firm has considerable power over others, it can influence the 
mechanisms of coordination of production (either by defining them, controlling them or both), the 
production process (technology, labor standards, etc.) and the distribution of value and risks within 
the network-firm (Bair & Palpacuer, 2015).  
Identifying de facto power as the coordination mechanism of the network-firm is also of relevance to 
delineate its boundaries.  Although the literature on the network-firm, global value chains and its neighbor 
concepts is large, definitions of a network-firm or a global value chain generally do not address the 
question of its boundaries (Carballa Smichowski, Durand, & Knauss, 2016). We argue along with 
Chassagnon that “the  economic  perimeter  of  the  network-firm transcends  the  legal  boundaries 
of the firm stricto sensu and can be circumscribed by the perimeter of power exploitation” 
(Chassagnon, 2009, p. 23). More precisely, we argue that the boundaries of the network-firm are 
reached when a vertical relation between two firms is not subject to any firm’s (either one of the 
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two or a third firm belonging to the same network-firm) influence in terms of the coordination and 
the nature of the production process and, therefore, price mechanisms become the only 
coordination mechanism (Powell, 2003; Carballa Smichowski, Durand, & Knauss, 2016). This follows 
Benkler’s definition of being “in” a (generic) network. According to Benkler, an agent is in a network if 
its behavior, outcomes and configurations are affected by it (Benkler, 2011). A good example to assess 
the boundaries of the network-firm is the purchase of primary products to be used as inputs. When a firm 
buys a barrel of oil to use it as energy in a plant, its relation with the oil-selling firm relies exclusively on 
price mechanisms. The two firms might negotiate the price and the conditions of delivery and bargain 
power can be uneven, but neither the coordination nor the nature of their production processes will be 
influenced by that transaction. Then, oil-selling firms are not part of the network-firm(s) of which the 
buying companies participate. On the contrary, when a firm gives a subcontractor a blueprint to 
manufacture a part of a car following a specified production process and coordinates the work of other 
subcontractors to assure the final assembly and the delivery to clients, these firms, even if they are legally 
independent, can be considered to be part of the same network-firm.  
Following this logic, we can conceptualize global value chains as globally-dispersed network-firms. 
In other words, global value chains can be defined as networks of firms producing different stages of a 
product coordinated by the de facto power the lead firm(s) has (have) as a consequence of the mutual and 
uneven interdependencies that exist between the participants of the network. Interdependence, in turn, is 
the result of different firms of the network possessing complementary critical resources. 
A question that remains to be answered is what makes a resource critical or, moving on to a non-
binary analysis, what defines how critical a resource is and, therefore, how much de facto power a 
firm holds within the network-firm. In the next section we will investigate in-depth the concept of de 
facto power that arises from critical resources and we will show it can be made the pillar of a theory of 
fully vertical market power that, in the context of the network-firm, can make high competitive pressure 
on prices and long-run profit rate differentials between firms of different industries compatible. 
3 Short-run competition and market power within and between 
network-firms 
 
In this section, we will develop a theory of competition and market power within and between network-
firms that is rooted in the findings of the previous section. In subsection 3.1, the concept of de facto 
power within a network-firm will be developed into a more precise one that we will denominate “net 
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independence”. The latter will help us operationalizing the concept of de facto power and showing how it 
can explain profit rate differentials within a network-firm. In subsection 3.2, we will show how this form 
of market power is compatible with two competition forces that operate in the short-run in the context of 
the network-firm: traditional horizontal competition and network-firm vs network-firm competition. 
Therefore, by the end of Section 3 our objective for this chapter consisting in providing 
contributions to a theory of competition and market power between and within GVC that can make 
long-run profit rate differentials between firms and strong price competition compatible will have 
been met. 
 
3.1 Net independence as the source of intra-network-firm market power 
 
In this subsection, we will develop the concept of de facto power within a network-firm to show how it 
can be operationalized to account for profit rate differentials within a network-firm. Subsection 3.1.1 will 
be devoted to a theoretical approach that will depart from the concept of de facto power to develop it into 
the more precise concept of “net independence” that we will introduce. In subsection 3.1.2 we will use a 
graphical representation that, based on some basic concepts of network theory, will help us 
operationalizing the concept of net independence so that profit rate differentials within a network-firm can 
be explained by it. Then, subsection 3.2 will show how profit rate differentials within a network-firm can 
be compatible with strong price competition, reaching so the goal of this chapter.  
3.1.1 A theoretical approach 
 
As said in Section 2, the network-firm is glued by interdependence relationships between firms that 
interact both through the means of cooperation and power exertion (Baudry & Chassagnon, 2012). We 
define power independently of its source as “an effect one entity can have on another within a system that 
will influence that other entity’s actions or outcomes” (Benkler, 2011, p. 4). Power is then “never the 
property of an individual; it belongs to a group and remains in existence only so long as the group keeps 
together” (Arendt, 1970, p. 44). In this case, the entities are the firms and the group is the global value 
chain or network-firm. Following the findings of organizational theory, Chassagnon tells us that “in an 
organization, the distribution of power is based on the pattern of interdependencies amongst actors’ 
resources and activities” (Chassagnon, 2009, emphasis added). It is important to point out that 
interdependences are not limited to direct commercial transactions between two firms. A change in 
production standards, prices or quality in one tier, for example, affects the whole network and, therefore, 
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might even have an impact on competitive dynamics between two network-firms. In Chassagnon’s (2012, 
p. 25) words: “owing to the dependence between the members of a network, power is more widely 
dispersed and accrues to key actors having made specific investments around a critical resource of the 
network-firm. The complementarity of critical resources generates synergy that creates a systemic 
interdependence peculiar to the network-firm. Each legal entity of the network is in situation of economic 
dependence with each other, which requires compliance between actors”. Harvey and Randles (2002, p. 
19) push this logic further by saying that “power asymmetry and mutual dependency extends beyond the 
immediate exchange process between any two classes of economic agent to relative power positions of all 
classes of economic agent involved in a nexus of interdependent exchange process on either side of any 
given exchange process”. Moreover, not all firms are equally important to the production process. While 
some perform a simple task that requires little interaction with other firms of the network-firm, others 
play more relevant roles such as being the hub firm that has the complex task of integrating other firms’ 
previous work (Baudry & Chassagnon, 2012). 
The question that follows is what determines the level of interdependencies in the power fields that 
network-firms are. We know that, in a network-firm, firms cooperate by producing together with their 
complementary resources or, more broadly, competences. But what makes a resource “critical” in a 
network-firm? What is the ultimate source of de facto power within the network-firm? So far, the 
answers from theories that have studied the network-firm or global value chains have been constrained to 
concentration, barriers to entry or to a case-by-case appreciation of the degree of specificity of an 
investment a firm makes to produce with another. The latter is a transaction cost economics explanation 
that ultimately relies on lock-in effects, which are barriers to exit. In all cases, the explanations are based 
on market power mechanisms in which market power is considered as an obstacle to competition (cf. 
Chapter II). 
Our answer is that a firm’s “net independence” (i.e. how much other firms of the network-firm 
depend on it vs how much it depends on other firms of the network-firm) is determined by how 
essential that firm is for the network-firm to be able to resist competition from other competing 
network-firms relative to other members of its network-firm. In other words, a firm’s net 
independence is determined by how much the network-firm’s competitive position in face of other 
competing network-firms would be affected if that firm stopped participating in it, relative to how much 
the network-firm’s competitive position would be damaged if other members of its network-firm did the 
same. The impact of one firm leaving a network-firm, in turn, depends on how many tasks of the 
production process depend on the firm’s intervention in it relative to other firms of the network-
firm, i.e. on how essential the firm is to the network-firm’s production process. 
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3.1.2 A graphical representation  
 
By recurring to some basic concepts of network theory, we can graphically translate a firm’s “net 
independence” as its centrality in the network (-firm) relative others’. In order to do so, we will first 
present the elements of the visual representation we will use along this chapter to expose our thesis 
hereafter.  
Firms are denoted by nodes (which are graphically represented as circles) and commercial transactions74 
between them (selling/buying a good or service, licensing a patent, etc.) as weighted directed vertices 
(graphically represented as arrows linking the dots). When firm A sells a good or service to firm B, the 
arrow goes from firm A to firm B. The weight of the vertices represents the unitary cost for purchaser 
node B of acquiring a good from selling node A75. It is graphically represented as the length of the vertex 
so that the costlier the input is, the longer the vertex is.  Following Zhang (2006), this cost includes both 
monetary and non-monetary costs such as quality and coordination costs. Nevertheless, contrary to 
Zhang’s model, and following the administered prices/normal cost doctrines, monetary costs are not 
marginal costs but full costs. Firms’ vertical positions in the figure represent the tier in which they 
participate. The lower part of the spectrum corresponds to more upstream activities (for example, the 
extraction of primary goods) and the upper side of the spectrum corresponds to more downstream 
activities such as marketing and retail.  
Institutional and technical conditionings are represented as a two-dimensioned space (i.e. as lines on a 
plan) on which firms (nodes) are contained. Figure 16 illustrates this.  
 
                                                          
74 For the sake of simplicity and comparability, we assume that all managerial coordination relations are translated 
in commercial transactions, which is a realistic assumption. For example, if a firm advices another one on the 
development of a product, it translates into a contract in which a firm sells consulting to the other. 
 
75 A second dimension defining the weight graphically represented as the thickness of the vertex could be added to 
account for the firm’s market share. In that way, concentration and economies of scale (a negative relation between 
a vertex thickness and its length) can be added to our framework. Miberg’s (2006) theory of pricing and profits in a 
global value chains context  can be then thought of as a particular case of an extended version of our thesis that 
includes market shares. This also goes in line with two of the three variables of economic dependence Baudry and 
Chassagnon (2012) identify within the network-firm: “the concentration of exchanges between member firms” and 
“the respective sizes of subcontractors”. The third one, “the importance of the specific assets engaged in the 
economic relationship” is implicit in our formulation because the more specific an investment firm A did to work for 
firm B, the more central firm B will be in respect to firm A. For the sake of simplicity, and in order to highlight what 
we consider to our main original contribution in this chapter, we have decided not to include market shares and 
sizes, although they are perfectly compatible with our thesis.  
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Figure 15: A network-firm with one upstream supplier 
 
 
In Figure 16, nodes represent firms and the lines that surround them represent the technical and 
institutional conditionings affecting the network-firm. In this example, the combination of technical and 
institutional conditionings leaves room for only one firm to exist downstream in the supply chains that 
can be formed. An example of this can be railway transportation in many European countries, where high 
fixed costs of having deployed already-existing networks (technical conditioning) and the decision of 
antitrust agencies to have competition on infrastructure (institutional conditioning) created a monopoly 
upstream (Cayla, 2014). Technological progress that reduces the high fixed cost of deploying a network 
or a change in antitrust policy to create competition through infrastructure can be represented by a 
loosening in the lines that surround the upstream node (firm), opening the possibility to the existence of 
more firms upstream. Then, changes in any of these two conditionings affect the number of firms in each 
tier, the scope of their possible vertical integration and the possibility of relating to each other76. In terms 
of Jacobides, Knudsen and Augier (2006),  the latter are the “technical” and “legal and regulatory 
authority” determinants of industry architectures77. An industry architecture, in turn, is defined as “a 
structure of co-specialized agents and assets” that constitutes “a sector-wide construct that defines the 
terms of the division of labor” (Jacobides et al., 2006, p. 1202). Industrial architectures include full 
vertical integration, ‘pure’ market relationships between firms and network-firms. 
                                                          
76 Let us note that barriers to entry and rent-earning resources can be represented by shaping the contouring lines 
that would benefit one node over other horizontally competing nodes in, for example, placing it vertically ‘closer’ to 
suppliers and/or more far away from clients than other competing nodes (i.e. by making it able to charge more and 
purchase for less than competing firms).  
77 The authors also consider path-dependency as a third factors that shapes industry architectures. 
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If a central firm was to leave the network-firm, the value loss for the latter would be greater than if a non-
central easy-to-replace firm left (Crook & Combs, 2007). Because “a node [firm] with high betweenness 
centrality has a great capacity to facilitate or constrain interactions between other nodes [firms] (Freeman, 
1979) (Kim, Choi, Yan, & Dooley, 2011, p. 3)”, its removal affects the network more than the removal of 
a node (firm) with a low betweenness centrality. This means that central firms are those on which the 
whole network (-firm) depends more to function because they perform tasks that are more 
necessary to assure the overall coordination of the network-firm. This is the ultimate reason of its 
de facto power. This form of market power is vertical in that it is exerted from suppliers to buyers or 
vicecersa, and it is ‘fully’ vertical in that it affects the whole network-firm and not only the upstream or 
downstream tiers directly linked to the firm exerting it. Therefore, we will speak hereafter of “fully 
vertical market power”. 
As network theory shows, a node’s (firm’s) centrality, in turn, is a property of the topology of the network 
(-firm). If we wanted to establish which node is the most central in a network, there would be many ways 
to do so. Network theory offers different centrality measures that translate different concepts of centrality. 
The one that is pertinent to us, as we anticipated a few line ago, is betweenness centrality, which is a 
measure of the share of total shortest paths in a network that pass through a node (a firm) in a network (-
firm). A shortest path is defined as the minimum number of vertices that have to be transited to go from 
point A to point B. Because in our representation of network-firms all the vertices have to be transited 
(i.e. all the intra-network-firm transactions have to be done for the final product to be sold), all paths are 
shortest paths. Then, if we notate a node as Nx where x identifies a particular node in the network, its 
betwenness centrality can be calculated using Equation 1. 
Equation 6: Formula of betwenness centrality of node X 
BC (Nx) =
Number of paths passing through Nx
Number of paths in the network
 
Where BC stands for “betweenness centrality” and Nx for “node X” 
In terms of network-firms, since vertices represent a firm buying something to another to continue 
with the production process of the network-firm, the bigger the share of shortest paths that pass 
through firm X relative to other firms in the network, the more essential that firm’s contribution to 
the production of the final product is to the network-firm relative to others. This is the case because 
each shortest path represents a production process that has been carried on by other firm(s) and 
requires firm X’s intervention for the final product to be produced. In other words, a firm’s 
betweenness centrality relative to other firms’ (“relative centrality” hereafter) translates its net 
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independence within the network-firm. A firm’s fully vertical market power within a network-firm 
is then based on its net independence, which gives it power to distribute the value created by the 
network-firm in its favor. 
Let us illustrate this with an example represented in Figure 17. 
Figure 16: Two non-competing network-firms with two tiers and different numbers of upstream suppliers 
 
 
 
Figure 17 shows two non-competing network-firms with two tiers each, one upstream and one 
downstream. In both, there is a single firm at the downstream level. The line between the two can be 
interpreted as an institutional and/or technical barrier to entry that makes non-viable for any firm to 
switch to the other network-firm. For example, the two network-firms could produce the same final good 
but be located in different continents, with transportation costs and tariffs making it non-profitable to 
compete with or to switch to the other network-firm. For the sake of simplicity, we will assume that they 
both sell at the same price per unit, which is 1 even though horizontal price competition is not acting 
because of the existence of barriers to entry. Graphically, because the lengths of arrows represent absolute 
per unit prices, this translates into the arrow going towards final consumers having the same length in 
both network-firms. In Network-Firm 1, there are two upstream firms while in Network-firm 2 there are 
four. In the first network-firm, there are two shortest paths from upstream suppliers to final consumers, 
while in the second one there are four.  
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Using Equations 1 to 4, we can calculate the prices and value retained for each node in a way that is 
compatible with our thesis according to which the value retained by each node depends positively 
on its fully vertical market power, which translates numerically into its relative centrality in the 
network. 
Equation 7: Formula of squared betweenness centrality of node X 
SBC (Nx) = [ BC(Nx)]
2 
Where SBC stands for “squared betweenness centrality”. 
Equation 8: Value retained by node X 
VR(Nx) =  
SBC (Nx)
∑ SBC (Ni)
n
i=1
 
Where VR stands for “value retained” and n is the number of nodes in the network. 
There are t tiers in the network. The tier to which a certain node belongs is noted as a superscript of that 
node, while the subscript of the node, as it was already the case in equations 1, 2 and 3, identifies a 
specific node. Then, the node x located in tier k would be noted Nx
k. Each tier is noted with a natural 
number starting from 1, which corresponds to the most upstream tier. The immediately downstream tier is 
noted 2 and so on until the tth most downstream tier of the network.  
Then, given a network with n nodes and t tiers, and assuming that the final selling price is 1, we can 
calculate the selling price of a node Nx located in tier r in absence of horizontal competition with the 
following formula: 
Equation 9: Selling price of node x located in tier r in absence of horizontal competition 
P(Nx
r) = [1 − ∑ ∑ VR (Ni
r)
t
r+1
n
i
]  
SBC (Nx
r)
∑ ∑ SBC (Ni
l)rr
n
i
 
 
In other words, Equation 4 tells us that in order to calculate the selling price of a node x located in tier r in 
absence of horizontal competition we have to perform the following calculation: one (i.e. the final selling 
price we set) minus the sum of the value retained by all the nodes located in more downstream tiers (r+1 
to t) and divide the result by node x’s share of square betweenness centrality of the sum of the square 
betweenness centralities of all the nodes located in its same tier (r). 
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Table 3: Betweenness centrality, price and value retained for firms in two competing supplying chains for 
Figure 17 
FIR
M 
NETWORK
-FIRM 
TIER 
BETWEENNES
S 
CENTRALITY 
SQUARE 
BETWEENNES
S 
CENTRALITY 
PRICE 
VALUE 
RETAINE
D 
A 1 Upstream 0.5 0.25 0.17 0.17 
B 1 Upstream 0.5 0.25 0.17 0.17 
C 1 
Downstrea
m 
1 1 
1 0.67 
D 2 Upstream 0.25 0.06 0.05 0.05 
E 2 Upstream 0.25 0.06 0.05 0.05 
F 2 Upstream 0.25 0.06 0.05 0.05 
G 2 Upstream 0.25 0.06 0.05 0.05 
H 2 
Downstrea
m 
1 1 1 
0.80 
 
Let us show how the application of equations 1 to 4 results in the values shown in Table 2. Since in both 
network-firms the downstream firms (C and H) are necessary in all the steps of the production process 
(each of them is the only retailer of its supply chain, for example), their betweenness centrality is 1. On 
the contrary, suppliers are less central in the second network-firm, where each is needed in one out of four 
processes (making the betweenness centrality of each of them equal to 0.25), while in the first network-
firm each is needed in half of the processes, which is why suppliers A and B have a centrality of 0.5 each. 
If we used each node’s betwenness centrality as a direct measure of their fully vertical market power, we 
should conclude that since both downstream firms (C and H) have the same betweenness centrality, they 
should both retain the same share of the value created in their respective network-firms. Since the price of 
the final product is the same in both network-firms, this would imply firms C and H retaining the same 
amount of value. Nevertheless, as we said above, a firm’s fully vertical market power within its network-
firm depends on its net independence (which is translated by its betweenness centrality in the network-
firm) relative to others firms’. In our example, this means that a firm like firm C that has a betweenness 
centrality of 1 (i.e. an unavoidable firm in the production process of its network-firm) but deals with two 
firms that have a centrality of 0.5 each (half of firm C’s centrality) has less fully vertical market power 
than a firm like H that has also a centrality of 1 but deals with four firms that have a betweenness 
centrality of 0.25 each (a quarter of firm H’s centrality). In other words, given that firm H is more central 
relative to the other firms in its network-firm than firm C, firm H has more fully vertical market power 
than firm C. A way of representing this relationship arithmetically is to pose a positive exponential 
relation between a firm’s betweenness centrality and its fully vertical market power, and then calculating 
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a firm’s retained value as its share of all firms of the network’s fully vertical market powers added. This is 
what we did in Table 2 by calculating the square betweenness centrality of each node. The value retained 
by a firm, then, equals its share of the sum of the squared betweenness centralities of all the nodes in the 
network. For example, firm A has a square betweenness centrality of 0.25 (0.5 to the square). The sum of 
all firms’ square centralities in network-firm number 1 is 1.5 (0.25 + 0.25 + 1), which makes firm A’s 
value retained equal to 0.17 (0.25/1.5). Using this formula, we find that although firm H has the same 
betweenness centrality as firm C, since it has a higher relative centrality, its share of value retained (0.8) 
is higher than C’s (0.67). 
Then, by putting into practice the concept of net independence developed in subsection 3.1.1., the 
numerical example developed in this subsection shows how the share of the value created by a 
network-firm that is retained by a particular firm can be calculated as that firm’s (node’s), relative 
centrality, a concept that, as shown above, translates the firm’s fully vertical market power derived 
from its net independence. Having shown this, subsection 3.2 will proceed to demonstrating that the 
resulting uneven distribution of value (profits) can be compatible with strong price competition.  
3.2 The compatibility between long-term profit rate differentials and horizontal 
price competition 
 
We have seen that the fully vertical market power a firm holds within a network-firm is the result of its 
net independence, which can be arithmetically represented as its betweenness centrality relative to that of 
the other firms of the network. Fully vertical market power, in turn, is what gives firms the capacity to 
retain a higher share of the total value produced by the network-firm and, therefore, it can explain long-
term profit rate differentials between firms of a same network-firm. In this subsection, we will show 
how this fully-vertical-market-power-based explanation of long-term profit rate differentials can be 
compatible with horizontal price competition. 
There are three competition forces acting simultaneously in a network-firm context (Rezapour, 2012), as 
described by Farahani et al (Farahani, Rezapour, Drezner, & Fallah, 2014) in their review of the supply 
chain management literature: competition among the firms of one tier (“traditional horizontal 
competition”, hereafter), competition between two network-firms and competition between the firms of 
different tiers of the same network-firm. These forces are represented in Figure 18. 
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Figure 17: The three competition forces in a network-firm context 
 
 
Source: Farahani et al. (2014) 
 
At this stage of our argumentation, we will only consider horizontal price competition, i.e. competition 
between firms that sell the same or substitutable good of a similar quality to the lowest possible price (i.E. 
in a context of strong price competition). Since competences are scattered across firms that are able to 
produce only certain parts of a final good, horizontal competition takes two forms: traditional horizontal 
competition (i.e. horizontal competition between firms of the same tier of their respective network-firms) 
and network-firm vs network-firm (NF vs NF) competition. Consequently, for horizontal price 
competition between sellers of the final good to take place, only network-firms that minimize the total 
final price of a good can survive. This important aspect of horizontal competition has been put forward by 
many scholars coming mainly from the management literature who, attentive to the relevance that global 
value chains were taking by the mid-1990s, started highlighting the increasing importance of “supply 
chain vs supply chain” (“network-firm vs network-firm” in our terminology) competition (Andreassen, 
2005; Antai, 2011; Christopher, 1999; Langdon & Sikora, 2006; Rice & Hoppe, 2001; Spekman, 
Kamauff Jr, & Myhr, 1998; Zhang, 2006), although economists have paid little attention to it. 
We will define short-run competition by the nature of competition and the factors that firms take as 
given in the process. The nature of competition is price competition. We assume that firms offer goods 
of similar quality, leaving competition on quality and innovation for a second stage of long-run 
competition that we will address in Section 4. The factors taken as given by firms in the short-run are the 
following: 
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 Technical and institutional dimensions of competition (as defined above) 
 Number of firms in each tier  
 Competences of the firms (i.e. what they can produce and with what technology) 
 Maximum output of the firms 
 Efficiency of the firms (i.e. the minimum possible selling price they can set without making losses) 
 Total demand for the final good 
Firms can choose three things: 
 Production level 
 What amount of output/input to sell/buy to/from each downstream/upstream firm 
 The selling price 
 
We consider a cost-plus pricing mechanism. More precisely, we consider that firms price in the way 
described by the administered prices doctrine when they are subject to shareholders’ pressure to deliver a 
certain return on investment. When this is not the case, they price in the way described by the normal cost 
doctrine (cf. Chapter 2). This means that, in both cases, firms apply a margin rate to normal unitary costs 
(i.e. calculated for a long-run average rate of capacity utilization), which includes both direct and 
overhead costs. If the firm has a profit target, the level of the margin (and, therefore, the price) will also 
depend on it as long as competing firms cannot offer a significantly lower price, as we will show further 
on. Following this pricing strategy, given a certain demand, firms sell as much as they can. This is 
certainly an accurate description of how firms pricing takes place that is soundly corroborated by 
empirical evidence (Lavoie, 2014), and we should therefore adopt it when dealing with price competition 
mechanisms. Nevertheless, it does not say anything about the determinants of the level of the margin 
besides that it depends positively on the target profit rate (if there is one) and on the actual and normal 
rate of utilization (since the higher the latter is, the lower unitary costs are). Competition forces that set an 
upper limit to the level of the margin (and, therefore, the price level) must be assumed to affect the level 
of the margin directly when there is no profit target (mark-up and normal costs doctrines) or to influence 
the targeted profit rate in the case of the administered prices doctrine. In the case of the mark-up doctrine, 
Kalecki made this explicit with the concept of “degree of monopoly”, which is defined as the share of 
margin: the less competition there is, the higher the margin can be (Kalecki, 1971; Kalecki, 2013). It is 
also what postkeynesian theory represents with the expansion of the frontier of the firm (Dallery, 2009). 
When a firm faces less competition, the frontier is expanded, which means it can obtain a higher profit 
rate at the same level of growth. We will argue that, in a context of vertical disintegration characterized 
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by the important role played by network-firms in the global production process, the margin also depends 
on a form of fully vertical market power that does not consider market power as an obstacle to 
competition as postkeynesian theory does.  
We said above that two horizontal competition forces play in the short run: traditional horizontal price 
competition and NF vs NF competition. The first thing to notice is that the latter has supremacy over the 
former. The reason is simple: if a network-firm cannot compete with another one by offering a similar 
final product of comparable quality at a competitive price, it will eventually disappear. This would imply 
all the firms constituting the losing network-firm to lose sales linked to that network-firm. Moreover, for 
traditional horizontal price competition to exist, firms need to integrate a network-firm. Here we can 
appreciate the role that competition plays as a cooperation-generating mechanism (Turchin, 2015). A 
network of firms needs to cooperate by coordinating tasks and ‘agreeing’ on value distribution in such a 
way that they can survive competition from other ‘coalitions of firms’ (i.e. other network-firms). In order 
to do so, they have to offer a final product of similar quality at a similar price. This suggests that NF vs 
NF competition is the competition force that will ultimately determine which network-firms will 
survive.  
Given the institutional and technical conditions and the other factors taken as given mentioned above, 
firms must choose to which other firms to sell and from which firms to buy, how much to buy/sell from 
them and buying and selling price. In other words, firms must cooperate to form competitive network-
firms. Since NF vs NF competition has primacy, whatever network-firm emerges from these choices will 
have to offer a final good at a price that other existing network-firms might match but not beat in the 
short-run. In parallel, traditional horizontal price competition assures that prices between firms that can 
produce the same good are similar. Finally, for the sake of simplicity, we assume that all the units 
produced by the network-firms are bought by final consumers. 
As the transportation problem solution to supply-chain formation in the management literature shows 
(Nagurney, 2006; Nagurney, Liu, & Woolley, 2007; Zhang, 2006; Zhang, Dong, & Nagurney, 2003), the 
network-firms that will be formed are those that can survive NF vs NF competition, i.e. those for which 
the length of the last vertex or the sum of the lengths of the vertices at the most downstream level (the 
final total cost per unit of the final good) is the lowest possible. Moreover, as said before, at every tier of 
network-firms, traditional horizontal price competition makes firms sell similar goods at the same or 
similar prices. Finally, we have seen that fully vertical market power, which translates in a firm’s 
betweenness centrality relative to others’, is what determines its capacity to capture a share of the value 
produced within the network-firm through pricing. Using some examples, we will show in the following 
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lines how these three forces that affect pricing in a network-firm context (NF vs NF competition, 
traditional horizontal price competition and fully vertical market power) are compatible. Our first 
example is represented in Figure 19. 
Figure 18: Two competing network-firms with two tiers and identical topologies 
 
 
 
Figure 19 shows two network-firms that have the same topology as network-firm 1 in the previous 
example: one downstream retailer and two upstream suppliers. For the sake of simplicity, we will assume 
that firms’ only cost is buying inputs from other firms in the network-firm and that firms at the most 
upstream level (A, B, D and E) produce without buying inputs. Then, a firm’s value retained is by 
definition equal to the difference between the sum of the prices to which it sells to more downstream 
firms/final consumers minus the sum of the price to which they buy from more upstream firms. Because 
NF vs NF competition is acting, the price to the final consumer has to be the same in both network-firms. 
In our example, this price is 1. Moreover, since traditional horizontal price competition is acting, prices at 
each tier also have to be the same.  
When we calculate betweenness centralities, square betweenness centralities, prices and value retained for 
each node using Equations 1 to 4, according to which prices and value retained are determined by firms’ 
relative centralities, we obtain the values presented in Table 3.  
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Table 4: Betweenness centrality, price and value retained for firms in the two competing network-firms 
represented in Figure 19 
FIRM 
NETWORK-
FIRM 
TIER 
BETWEENNESS 
CENTRALITY 
SQUARE 
BETWEENNESS 
CENTRALITY 
PRICE 
VALUE 
RETAINED 
A 1 Upstream 0.5 0.25 0.17 0.17 
B 1 Upstream 0.5 0.25 0.17 0.17 
C 1 Downstream 1 1 1 0.67 
D 2 Upstream 0.5 0.25 0.17 0.17 
E 2 Upstream 0.5 0.25 0.17 0.17 
F 2 Upstream 1 1.00 1 0.67 
 
As it can be noticed, the prices that we calculated for each tier using Equation 4 and the price of the final 
output of these two network-firms are the same, which is why the arrows for each tier have the same 
length. This shows that price competition is acting. At the same time, the distribution of value within the 
two network-firms, which we calculated using Equation 3, is uneven and responds to firms’ fully vertical 
market power. Moreover, the value retained by each firm, which we calculated using Equation 3, respects 
the logical constraint of being equal to the difference between the sum of the prices to which the firm sells 
to more downstream firms/final consumers minus the sum of the price to which it buys from more 
upstream firms. 
In other words, both traditional horizontal price competition and NF vs NF competition are acting 
without any obstacle to competition (concentration, product differentiation or rent-earning 
resources) being in place. Moreover, these ‘free competition’ prices are compatible with the 
unequal value capture (which in our example equals the profit rate78) that results from each firm’s 
net independence within its network-firm relative to others’. The firms that are less benefited by 
this distribution of value (suppliers A, B, D and E) can freely choose to switch to the other network-
firm. However, the fact that they only have supplier capabilities compels them to join network-
firms as suppliers, which subjects them to the forces of fully vertical market power in the network-
firm they choose to join.  
Let us now present another example in the same line but in which competing network-firms’ topologies 
differ. This example is slightly more complex than the previous one, but it will allow us to see the cascade 
effects of NF vs NF competition between tiers. The same assumptions made in the previous example hold 
for this one. 
                                                          
78 If fixed costs were introduced, we could calculate the profit rate. 
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Figure 19: Two competing network-firms with three tiers and different topologies 
 
 
 
Figure 20 deceits two competing network-firms with three tiers each. The difference between the two is 
that while in the first one there is a single supplier in the first tier (firm A), in the second one, each firm 
from tier number 2 buys from two suppliers from tier number 1, so that there are four suppliers in tier 1 
overall. If we calculate betweenness centralities, square betweenness centralities, the value retained and 
the selling price for each firm in these two network-firms in the same manner we did it in the previous 
examples (i.e. using Equations 1, 2, 3 and 4, respectively) we obtain the values for t=0 presented in Table 
4. 
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Table 5: Betweenness centrality, prices in t0 and t1 and value retained for firms in two competing supplying 
chains represented in Figure 20 
 
The first thing we can notice is that, while firms from tiers 2 and 3 have the same level of betweenness 
centrality in both network-firms, firm A in network-firm 1, which monopolizes upstream production, has 
logically a higher betweenness centrality than each individual firm in tier 1 of network-firm 2. 
Nevertheless, this does not translate in firms from tiers 2 and 3 of both network-firms having the same 
fully vertical market power respectively. Keeping in mind that fully vertical market power depends on a 
firm’s betweenness centrality relative to others’, we have that firms from tiers 2 and 3 in network-firm 2 
can retain more value than their counterparts in network-firm 1 in t0. The reason is that in network-firm 1 
there is a firm with a high betweenness centrality (A, with a betweenness centrality of 1) in a tier where in 
network-firm 2 there are four firms with small betweenness centralities (0.25 each). As a result, other 
firms’ betweenness centralities in network-firm 2 are larger relative to those of the firms of its network-
firm compared to network-firm 1. Then, not only do firms that bypass the monopolist supplier by 
recurring to two suppliers each (firms I and J) have a  larger fully vertical market power than their 
counterparts of network-firm 1 (firms B and C), but the firm that buys from them, firm K, also has more 
fully vertical market power than its counterpart firm in the competing network-firm (firm D), because this 
‘bypass’ makes it more central relative to other firms within its network-firm.  
However, fully vertical market power is altered by horizontal competition forces. If we calculate the 
prices that each firm in network-firm 1 would have to charge to obtain a final price of 1 (i.e. for NF vs NF 
competition to hold) and for value distribution to depend on each firm’s squared betweenness centrality 
(if we use Equation 3 to calculate prices given that the final price is 1), we would find, as we can 
appreciate by looking at the column corresponding to prices in t0, that prices of the same product in the 
FIRM
NETWORK 
FIRM
TIER
BETWEENNESS 
CENTRALITY
SQUARE 
BETWEENNESS 
CENTRALITY
PRICE 
(t=0)
VALUE 
RETAINED 
(t=0)
PRICE 
(t=1)
VALUE 
RETAINED 
(t=1)
A 1 1 1 1 0.20 0.40 0.07 0.14
B 1 2 0.5 0.25 0.30 0.10 0.21 0.14
C 1 2 0.5 0.25 0.30 0.10 0.21 0.14
D 1 3 1 1 1.00 0.40 1.00 0.57
E 2 1 0.25 0.06 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04
F 2 1 0.25 0.06 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04
G 2 1 0.25 0.06 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04
H 2 1 0.25 0.06 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04
I 2 2 0.5 0.25 0.21 0.14 0.21 0.14
J 2 2 0.5 0.25 0.21 0.14 0.21 0.14
K 2 3 1 1 1.00 0.57 1.00 0.57
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two competing network-firms would differ. In other words, traditional horizontal price competition would 
not be acting. Let us see what happens if we consider both NF vs NF and traditional horizontal price 
competition to be acting, which translates into each tier having the same overall price. Then, when 
horizontal competition is introduced, prices and value retained are calculated in using Procedure 1. 
Procedure 1: How to calculate the selling price and the value retained corresponding to a node in presence of horizontal 
competition 
Step 1: Calculate betwenness centralities, square betweenness centralities, value retained and prices of all 
nodes for all competing network-firms using Equations 1 to 4. 
Step 2: For each node, check if the selling price calculated using Equation 4 is higher than any of the 
selling prices of the competing node(s) of the same tier in competing network-firms.  
If it is not the case, retain Equation 4 to calculate the selling price of the node in question.  
If it is the case, adopt the price of lowest competing node(s) of the same tier of competing     
network-firms. Then, the selling price becomes an exogenous variable for the node in question and the 
value retained will be endogenously determined using Equation 5. 
 
Equation 10: Value retained by a node x located in tier r when it has to match lower prices from competing 
nodes of its same tier 
VR(Nx
r) =  ∑ P(Nx
r) − ∑ C(Nx
r) 
Where C stands for the cost paid by node Nx
r, which is equal to all the purchases made from nodes located 
in inmmediatly more upstream tiers of the network-firm. 
The prices and values retained for each firm using Procedure 1 are shown in the columns corresponding 
to t1 in Table 4. Because horizontal price competition is acting, supplier A in network-firm 1 has to match 
the price of the competing network-firm 2 suppliers that provide the same input (i.e. the sum of two of the 
first tier suppliers’ prices). The same happens in the second tier. In Network-Firm 1, firms B and C are 
forced to match firms I and J’s prices, which are lower because the latter are more relatively central in 
their network than firms B and C. Nevertheless, because horizontal price competition in the most 
upstream tier makes firms B and C buy inputs from firm A at lower prices, their value capture increases 
from 0.1 to 0.14.  
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The takeaway from this example is that firms have to adapt to the prices set by the network-firms 
with topologies where the distribution of centralities (and, therefore, the distribution of the value 
created by the network-firm) is more uneven. Eventually, as a result of both traditional horizontal 
price competition and NF vs NF competition forces, we should expect competing network-firms to 
converge to the topology of the one that sets the lowest prices. This seems to be the case, as the 
literature on global value chains and the network-firm show. In these two strands of literature we find 
several broad categorizations of network-firms’ topologies that are identified with certain industries. 
These two literatures converge in identifying three broad topologies that correspond to three “governance 
structures”79: modular/contract manufacturing, relational/collaborative manufacturing and captive/arm’s 
length (Herrigel & Wittke, 2004; Kaplinsky, 2013; Sturgeon, 2008; Weinstein, 2011). Moreover, the 
global value chains literature that has developed more detailed case studies also finds similar or “generic” 
network-firms’ topologies in the same industries. For example, Herrigel and Wittke (2004) show along 
other scholars that “the quintessential realm for contract manufacture in the contemporary manufacturing 
environment is product level electronics” (Lüthje, 2002; Lüthje, Schumm, & Sproll, 2002; Sturgeon, 
2002). On the other hand, the literature on the network-firm has also identified other country-specific 
network-firm topologies such as the “Japanese model”, the “Italian model” or the “German model”  
(Sturgeon, 2002). Both the network-firm and the global value chains literatures discuss the conditions 
required for the network-firm in general and each topology of the network-firm in particular to emerge. In 
fine, we conclude with Powell that “network forms have multiple causes and varied historical trajectories” 
(Powell, 2003). Regardless of the multiplicity of factors that influence the emergence or a particular 
network-firm topology, the important takeaway is that both the GVC and the network-firm literatures 
agree on the fact that these topologies are shared by competing network-firms. Therefore, we can see a 
convergence of competing network-firms towards similar topologies, as our previous example suggested 
it should happen. This convergence is both the result of similar institutional and technical 
conditionings applying to competing network-firms (similar regulations, state of the art technology 
requiring a certain pattern of combination of competences held by different firms, etc.) and the 
effect of NF vs NF and traditional horizontal price competition forces that create a pressure for 
network-firms to adopt the topology of the network-firm where the final value of the product is the 
lowest (NF vs NF competition) and value distribution is more unequal, as shown in the last 
example. This reinforces our main point. Given that competing network-firms have similar 
topologies, and even in an environment in which traditional horizontal price competition and NF vs 
NF competition forces are strong, value distribution (and, ultimately, profit rates) within the 
                                                          
79 We exclude the “market” and “hierarchy” governance structures since they are not network-firm or global value 
chains topologies. 
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network-firm depends on firms’ net independence, which translates into firms’ betweenness 
centrality relative to others’. This allows for horizontal competition to act ‘freely’ and, at the same 
time, profit rates being unequal in the long-run across industries (tiers of a network-firm). 
Indeed, in the second example all firms are assumed to be equally efficient. Their only cost is the inputs 
they purchase to upstream firms and their only revenue is the price they charge to downstream firms. 
Since horizontal price competition is acting, prices for the same good in competing network-firms 
equalize, which makes firms from competing tiers (i.e. industries) have the same profit margin80. Given 
that we assumed that there are no fixed costs, the profit margin equals the profit rate. Nevertheless, even 
if firms can freely enter or exit markets without any sort of barriers to entry or to exit applying, 
profit rates between tiers (between industries) do not equalize because of the fully vertical market 
power that arises from an uneven distribution of interdependences within network-firms. The 
restated market power paradox we proposed in Chapter II makes full sense now: competitive 
behavior results in the obtaining and the exertion of market power by some firms, which renders 
the competitive landscape… competitive. The fully vertical market power mechanism that acts in the 
financialized form of competition, in which the network-firm is the norm, is therefore not the opposite of 
competition. Competition and fully vertical market power are not two opposed concepts but two 
manifestations of the same competitive process. Fully vertical market power glues the network-firm 
together, making NF vs NF competition possible. Moreover, as we will show in the next section, 
competition in the long-run takes the form of competition for fully vertical market power. This does 
not mean that barriers to entry or obstacles to competition in general do not exist in network-firms, 
but rather that profit rate differentials between tiers of a network-firm (industries) can be 
explained as the result of fully vertical market power without that meaning that price competition 
is necessarily lessened. 
Diagram 6 represents a summary of our concept of short-run competition and fully vertical market power 
between and within network-firms we have developed theoretically in subsection 3.1.1 and illustrated 
with numerical examples in subsections 3.12 and 3.2. 
 
 
                                                          
80 We could complexify the example by adding fixed costs and different efficiencies between competing firms of the 
same tier in order to obtain differential profit rates between them (i.e. within an industry). We would still find that 
profit rates between firms of different tiers would not equalize. 
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Diagram 6: Summary of our concept of short-run competition and market power within and between 
network-firms 
 
 
It can be summed up in three logical steps. 
1) As described in the last section of Chapter I, the current form of competition is characterized by 
vertical disintegration and firms’ withdrawal to their core competences. This implies that, in order for a 
final product to be produced at the lowest possible price, firms need to form coalitions of network-firms 
in which each firm will bring its core competences in order for the network-firm to produce the final 
product at the lowest possible final price. In other words, because firms are not able to produce a final 
product by themselves at a competitive price, network-firm vs network-firm competition forces them to 
integrate a network-firm that will be more competitive than a vertically integrated firm would be. 
 
2) The topology of the network-firm depends on several factors.  
 
First, we have institutional and technological conditionings. For example, in railway transportation in 
many European countries, high fixed costs of having deployed already-existing networks (technical 
conditioning) and the decision of antitrust agencies to have competition on infrastructure (institutional 
conditioning) created a monopoly upstream (Cayla, 2014), which means that in the network representing 
the railway network-firm there will be only one node (firm) at the most upstream tier . 
 211 
 
Second, given the institutional and technological conditionings, we have competitive forces. On the one 
hand, we have network-firm vs network-firm competition, which forces network-firms to sell the final 
product at a similar price regardless of how the repartition of value within the network-firm is done. On 
the other hand, we have traditional horizontal competition, which forces firms of the same tier belonging 
to competing network-firms to sell at a similar price to the firm located downstream of its network-firm. 
As we have shown along this chapter, because firms with higher relative centralities in their network (i.e. 
firms that are more essential to the production process of their network-firms) can retain more value by 
buying from their suppliers in the network-firm at a lower cost, they can be more competitive in terms of 
price. Then, traditional horizontal competition obliges less relatively central firms of the same tier located 
in competing network-firms to match their prices and, consequently, to suffer a reduction in the share of 
value they retain. This process eventually leads to less competitive (less relatively central) firms being 
replaced by more competitive (more relatively central) firms, and, therefore, the topologies of competing 
network-firms tend to converge to that of the network-firm where relative centralities are more unequal. 
 
3) Then, once a standard topology is attained by the competing network-firms, we have that the 
lowest price has been adopted at all tiers of the network-firm (i.e. traditional horizontal price 
competition and network-firm vs network-firm price competition are both acting) and that, at the 
same time, those prices are compatible with an uneven distribution of value (of profit rates since 
there are no fixed costs in our example) within the network-firm. Moreover, the value retained by 
each firm is directly linked to its fully vertical market power (i.e. to its net independence or to how 
essential the firm is in the overall production process of its network-firm), which translates into the firm’s 
relative centrality in the network.  
We can therefore say that the goal of this chapter has been met: both price competition and long-
run profit rate differentials are compatible in our concepts of competition and market power 
between and within network-firms.  
Let us close this section by pointing out that the concepts we have developed in this chapter show that in 
the current Finance-led form of competition, similarly to what had happened during the collusive 
form of competition in the United States (1870s to 1910s) analyzed in Chapter I, a symbiotic 
relation between market power and competition takes place. Indeed, we have shown that, in the 
short-run, market power coordinates competition, as it is what glues together a set of firms within a 
network-firm and allows the lead firm(s) to coordinate the production process of the network-firm 
for the whole network-firm to be able to compete on prices with other network-firms Then, market 
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power, in the form of fully vertical market power within a network-firm, allows for the fulfillment 
of competition. Moreover, it is precisely the existence of strong price competition what forces firms 
to form network firms of which fully vertical market power is constitutive to survive it. Then, 
competitive forces produce a form of market power (fully vertical market power) that do not 
hinder them.  We can therefore speak of two-way symbiotic relation between competition and 
market power.  
Moreover, the symbiosis between competition and market power proper to the Finance-led form of 
competition (1980s to present) identified in Chapter I and that we have developed in this chapter not only 
differs from that of the collusive form of competition in its mechanisms and in that the latter proved to be 
weak, as collusion and, later on, horizontal integration, were unable to compensate for the survival-
threatening damage predatory competition was doing to firms’ profitabilties. The symbiosis between 
competition and market power proper to the Finance-led form of competition is also particular in 
that it is the translation in the realm of industrial organization of the financialization process 
evoked in Section 5 of Chapter I, which resulted in historically unusual levels of return on investment 
(usually not below 15%) going to the financial sector (Auvray, Dallery, & Rigot, 2016). One of the 
mechanisms that allowed for such historically high returns on investment has been the 
reconfiguration of the link between competition and market power in the context of global value 
chains, which allowed some firms to obtain high profits to the detriment of other firms of their 
global value chains (internationally-dispersed network firms) in order to satisfy the financial 
sector’s draconian demands of return on investment the internationalization and liberalization of 
finance (and the consequent liquefaction of capital) that started in the 1980s enabled. In terms of 
the governance of the firm, as said in Chapter I, this translated into the supremacy of the 
“shareholder governance” model (Caby & Hirigoyen, 2001). 
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4 Long-run competition for fully vertical market power 
 
“Los abogados y los innovadores eran predadores que competían entre sí por la transformación del 
territorio, y el ciclo biológico de la tecnología pedía otro tipo de ecosistema”81. 
 Pola Oloixarac, Las constelaciones oscuras, p. 162 
 
We have so far dealt with a situation in which everything was constant except for prices and production 
levels. We have seen that, given a certain network-firm topology, firms have fully vertical market power 
that derives from the position they occupy within the network-firm, which is the translation of their net 
independence. This power allows them to influence buying/selling prices in their favor. It is expectable 
then that, given that firms’ competences and institutional and technological contexts evolve over time, 
firms try to evolve along in order to occupy the positions in network-firms that will give them a higher 
fully vertical market power; or to redefine the topology of the network so they will become more central 
in it and, therefore, increase their fully vertical market power. Then, in the long-run, we can expect 
competition for fully vertical market power. This is what we actually observe. In this section we will 
briefly show how firms’ choices regarding innovation, make-or-buy decisions and influencing 
institutions that define markets and competition (property rights, technological standards, 
regulation in the broad sense) can be read as a strategy by firms to obtain a higher relative 
centrality (fully vertical market power) within their network-firms. 
Firms can modify their net independence or relative centrality within a network-firm either by changing 
positions within the same network-firm or by modifying its topology. Regardless of the method chosen, 
there are two ways in which this can be accomplished. The first one implies a modification in their 
competences and/or changes in technology in order to obtain a more central position in their network-firm 
relative to other firms’ (Subsection 4.1). The second one implies a change in the institutions that has the 
same purpose (Subsection 4.2). We are therefore both in a long-run and a topological perspective, since 
firms intend to modify the topology of the network-firm and to occupy the more central positions it offers 
by affecting long-run variables: technology, competences and institutions.  
 
                                                          
81 The quote translates as “lawyers and innovators were predators competing with each other over the transformation 
of the territory, and the biological cycle of technology asked for another type of ecosystem”. 
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4.1 "Make-or-buy" and innovation decisions as long-run competition for fully 
vertical market power 
 
The first mechanism through which firms can obtain a more central position in the network-firms 
they participate of is make-or-buy decisions. Weinstein refers to it in respect to the problem of strategic 
assets when he writes that “in any case, a firm’s organizational choices and overall in-house/outsourcing 
choices are strongly oriented by power and ‘value chain’ control issues, to the same extent if not more 
than by static or dynamic efficiency criteria. The major problem is then to identify the strategic assets 
(material and immaterial) that allow that result and the conditions of their control through property or by 
other means” (Weinstein, 2010)82. In the context of our framework, this means that firms can decide to 
outsource or keep in-house a task in order to become more central in their network-firms. In a network-
firm, the hub-firm, “which is the firm that, in fact, sets up the network and takes a proactive attitude in the 
care of it” (Jarillo, 1988, p. 32) is the one that can capture a higher value share in the network. This 
“central power” in the network “is legitimated by its key strategic role in the coordination of the whole 
network. The degree of coordination of the network is high because of the large number of relational 
contracts. This coordinator role confers the hub-firm a durable specific resource and so a reproducible 
source of power” (Chassagnon, 2009, p. 25). In other words, the hub-firm’s market power comes from its 
ability to “manage diverse and complementary capabilities” (Chassagnon, 2011, p. 10). Moreover, “such 
an assignment must belong to the hub-firm that controls critical resources as brand name and reputation 
around which revolve complementary activities that need to be qualitatively and quantitatively 
coordinated” (Chassagnon, 2011, p. 10). The extreme case is the hollow corporation (Coriat & Weinstein, 
2015), which is “a  business  entity  that  does  not  have  any  core  technical competences  and  uses  
contractual  mechanisms  to  link  particular  market requirements with productive capacities” (Teece et 
al., 1994, p. 20). 
Being the coordinator of the network implies, in our framework, a high net independence, which 
translates into a high relative centrality. Visually, this would translate into many arrows indicating 
productive processes that require the contribution of the hub-firm. Our theoretical contribution allows to 
understand in a more precise and general way why some resources are critical and make it possible for 
hub-firms to dominate their supply networks and, consequently, to extract more value from it than other 
participating firms. Critical resources (either material or immaterial) are those whose private and 
exclusive ownership by the hub-firm allows it to make other firms in the network-firm that have 
complementary competences more dependent on the hub-firm than the hub-firm is on them. This 
                                                          
82 The translation is ours 
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happens because the critical resource is complementary to the competences of other firms in the 
network-firm and necessary in order to produce in a way efficient enough to resist NF vs NF 
competition.  
These considerations have important implications for the understanding of the evolution of firms’ 
competences and their boundaries. We will argue that the maximizing-net-independence logic behind 
make-or-buy decisions applies not only to firms’ decision on what already existent competences to keep 
in-house and which ones to outsource; it extends to what new competences to explore. In other words, it 
applies to organizational and technological innovation paths.  
Nevertheless, firms cannot acquire any competence at any given time to maximize their net independence. 
Evolutionary theory shows that a firm’s change in terms of competences follows a coherent and path-
dependent evolution that exploits asset complementarities and is influenced also by other “environmental” 
factors such as technological opportunities, the convergence of technological paths and selection 
mechanisms (i.e. competition mechanisms) (Teece et al., 1994). We argue along with evolutionary theory 
that firms evolve in their competences in a coherent way, which means that “firms  over time  add  
activities  that  relate  to  some  aspect  of  existing  activities.  They build literally on what they have got.  
New  product  lines  bear  certain  technological and  market  similarities  with  the  old” (Teece et al., 
1994, p. 3). This is the case because, as the evolutionary theory of the firm argues, firms are characterized 
by a unique repertoire of routines, which are problem-solving devices (Dosi, 2012) the firm possess and 
allow it to coordinate and treat knowledge. Firms evolve in their competences by recurring to learning 
processes through which they discover what the best routines are to solve the problems they want to solve 
(Teece et al., 1994).  Moreover, learning is “a process of trial, feedback and evaluation” that makes new 
competences to be “close in” to previous activities. In other words, “a  firm’s  previous  investments  and  
its  repertoire  of routines  (its  ‘history’)  constrains  its  future  behavior” (Teece et al., 1994, p. 17). 
Finally, firms tend to evolve technologically by trying to exploit complementary assets83. In that manner, 
they intend to increase their utilization rate to deal with sunk costs. The choice of complementary assets 
responds to the fact that “the  cognitive  path  associated  with  doing  this is  likely  to  be  clearer  than  
other  alternatives” (Teece et al., 1994, p. 21). 
We argue that in the context of global value chains, firms not only evolve in their competences in a 
coherent and path-dependent way that exploits assets’ complementarities; they do it also seeking to 
maximize their net independence or relative centrality in the topology of the network-firms they 
                                                          
83 The exemption being fusions and acquisitions that can be motivated by a firm’s (or two firms’) desire to acquire 
competences it/they do/does not have that are situated far from its/their traditional domain of knowhow. 
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participate of. Firms seek to develop the competences that will allow them to make other firms in 
the network-firm more dependent on them than they are on other firms. In other words, because 
the current selection environment or form of competition rewards central firms, firms will seek to, 
as far as possible, evolve in their capabilities in such a way that maximizes their relative 
centralities. This implies that firms choose their current and future boundaries betting on the 
competences that will allow them to maximize their relative centrality or net independence. Firms’ 
evolution is therefore not only coherent and path-dependent, but also strategic. Let us develop on 
this and provide some examples in the following lines. 
This rationale of innovation proper to the Finance-led form of competition form echoes a similar 
movement that, as shown in Chapter I, had occurred within the Taylorist firm at the beginning of the XXth 
century. Taylorism had taken away from workers the monopoly of the knowhow of the production 
process. This had allowed firm owners to set the conditions of the production process and, as a 
consequence, to extract more surplus value from workers (Coriat, 1979). More than 50 years later, a 
similar movement occurred between firms. Firms that acquired the indispensable core competences 
needed to produce a final product can set production conditions to other firms of the network-firm 
and, therefore, extract more surplus value from them. Identifying this mechanism opens the door to 
a reinterpretation of the vertical disintegration process that started with the crisis of Fordism in the 
1970s as a reconfiguration of the form of competition that allowed for the recovering of the profit 
rate… of some firms.  
Let us now develop on the concrete ways in which firms can increase their net independence/relative 
centrality in the network-firm by innovating (i.e. obtaining new organizational and/or technological 
competences). It can occur in two potentially overlapping ways. The first one is obtaining new 
competences that allow a firm to replace another one in the network-firm but with the latter’s 
topology remaining unchanged. This is what the literature on global value chains usually refers to as 
“functional upgrading” (Gereffi & Lee, 2016; Kaplinsky & Morris, 2001; Schmitz & Humphrey, 2000). 
When firms upgrade to positions of the value chain that imply different competences and a higher value 
capture, they upgrade from a less central position in the network-firm to a more central one, which 
explains why they can capture more of the value created within it, as we explained above. The multiple 
case studies conducted within the global value chain framework show that firms follow a path in their 
innovation processes that aims at acquiring other (more relatively central, we add) firm’s capabilities in 
the value chain. 
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The second way for firms to obtain a more central position in the network-firm by recurring to new 
competences is to modify the topology of the network-firm. Firms can acquire new technical and/or 
organizational competences that make a reconfiguration of the network-firm around it more efficient for 
the network-firm as a whole. Therefore, NF vs NF competition forces will make that new configuration 
survive over the previous one. Other firms will then have to accept a new network-firm topology in which 
the firm that has successfully innovated becomes more central and, therefore, gets a higher share of the 
value produced by the network-firm. The result of this type of strategic innovation is therefore a new 
network topology that enlarges the share of value capture by the innovator (Santos & Eisenhardt, 2004), 
as Morris and Ferguson (1993) have shown for technological architectures and Gawer and Cusumano 
(2002) for platforms. Jacobides, Knudsen and Augier arrive to the same conclusion when they write that 
“an industry architecture84 will emerge on the basis of the interfaces defined by firms that initially happen 
to hold superior capabilities, in terms of technical efficiency (Jacobides & Winter, 2005)” (Jacobides et 
al., 2006, p. 1203). An example of this dynamics is Monsanto, which developed genetically modified 
seeds that allowed farmers to benefit from productivity increases. Since the latter need to resist horizontal 
price competition and the whole network-firm needs to resist NF vs NF competition, these seeds were 
adopted, reconfiguring network-firms’ topologies in such a way that Monsanto became the upstream 
supplier. Given that Monsanto is the sole owner of the seed, it can charge high prices and impose harsh 
conditions on the means of contract law (Kloppenburg, 2014). Because NF vs NF and traditional price 
competition forces are acting, farmers are forced to adopt the use of the seeds and to pass contracts with 
Monsanto that do not favor them.  
In the case of technological innovation, technological discovery does not have necessarily to come from 
the firm that becomes more central. Firms can exploit a newly available technology to create new value 
chains or modify existing ones in a way that makes them more central in it. Let us note than whereas 
technological change comes from the firm that obtains a higher relative centrality or not, it implies a 
change in the technical conditionings of network-firms, which graphically translates in a change in the 
shape of the contouring lines that surround nodes (firms). Logically, the new contouring lines foster an 
increase in the innovating firms’ relative centrality. 
4.2 Institutional change as long-run competition for fully vertical market power  
 
Lead firms governing a network-firm can influence institutional change so that the topology of the 
network-firm is modified in a way that makes them more central. In other words, they can “orient the 
                                                          
84 As mentioned above, the network-firm is a subset of industry architectures. 
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functioning of the market (and stabilize rules) in a way that favors the formation of unequal surplus 
sharing or rents attached to exchanged products” (Coriat & Weinstein, 2005, p. 3)85. It can relate to 
changes in regulation in the broadest sense, property rights reconfiguration, technical standards setting, 
etc. Markets are institutions that, among other things, define and condition the rivalrous interactions 
between firms in the competitive process. It follows from this observation that “the rivalry can be 
exercised as an attempt not only to directly surpass the other sellers or buyers but also to control and 
modify the institutional environment for the seller’s or buyer’s own benefit” (Fernández‐Huerga, 2013, p. 
116). This phenomenon has been studied in the literature and covers a wide range of heterogeneous 
industries such as healthcare (Scott, 2000) smart cards (M’Chirgui, 2006), nanotechnology (Grodal, 2006) 
mobile telephony (Leiponen, 2006), construction (Cacciatori & Jacobides, 2005) or even two-sided 
markets in general (Eisenmann, Parker, & Van Alstyne, 2006). 
The clearest manifestation of this form that long-run fully vertical competition mechanisms can 
take is lobbying. Firms invest financial resources to influence institutions in their favor. In some cases, 
this is done to maintain or expand their relative centrality in network-firms. For example, they can lobby 
to set technological standards that require the use of their intellectual property, assuring so that other 
firms in the network-firm will have to use its technology, which increases its relative centrality. A recent 
example of this is the “regulatory competition” between teams of firms and States in the setting of digital 
broadcasting standards. The United States, Japan and Europe competed through lobbying in order to 
impose the standards of their national champions “in order to attract or retain businesses and investment 
within their jurisdiction” (García Leiva, 2011, p. 104). From a network-firm perspective, this can be seen 
as a competition between downstream firms (broadcasters) trying to modify regulation (an institutional 
conditioning) so that more firms will depend on them to deliver the final product (so that their net 
centrality will increase). 
The most important institutional change that has been altering network-firms’ topologies in a way 
that makes them more asymmetrical in terms of the relative centralities of firms is certainly the 
extension and increasing enforcement of property rights. As we have seen in Chapter I, since the late 
1970s, the domain of what might fall into private and exclusive property has been extending considerably, 
notably in the realm of immaterial assets through intellectual property rights (Orsi & Coriat, 2006). In 
parallel, its enforcement has been increasing as well, especially after the signature of the TRIPs 
agreement (Grosheide, 2010). This process of extension of intellectual property rights and their 
enforcement has allowed firms to have exclusive control of some immaterial assets (patents, trademarks, 
databases, etc.) that used not to be subject to ownership such as living entities (Tordjman, 2008) or 
                                                          
85 The translation is ours. 
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software (Mangolte, 2013). In the case of copyright, its extension in terms of duration and its increasing 
enforcement has played the same role in creative industries (Bell, 2000). Since these immaterial assets are 
required by all the firms in their value chains to produce, firms that control them have been benefiting 
from a high net independence in their network-firms, which has allowed them to extract more value and 
to set conditions to other participants of the network-firm. A good example of this is the Ipod. Apple’s 
ownership of some key intellectual property assets (both patents and the brand) gives it a central position 
in the Ipod supply chain and, as a consequence, Apple captures roughly 28% of total retail price, which is 
considerably more than what other firms of the supply chain capture (Linden, Kraemer, & Dedrick, 
2009). 
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Conclusions 
 
The goal of this chapter was to set the basis of a theory of competition and market power that would be 
able to make two major empirical facts of the current Finance-led form of competition described in 
Chapter I compatible: high competitive pressure on prices and long-run profit rate differentials between 
firms of different industries (tiers). In Chapter I we had seen that the most relevant form of organization 
of production in the current Finance-led form of competition is the global value chain and that the process 
of financialization allowed the financial sector to demand historically high rates of return. In Chapter II 
we have shown that no competition theory is capable of making strong price competition and long-run 
profit rate differentials between firms of different industries compatible, and we have suggested that a 
competition theory that expected to meet those expectations would have to have a fully vertical scope. In 
other words, a competition theory of the global value chain was needed.  
In Section 1 of this chapter, we showed that the global value chains literature has gone through four 
phases in the way it has evolved regarding competitive dynamics and explanations of profit rate 
differentials between tiers, but none can offer the theoretical conciliation we were looking for. Just like 
most of the competition theories examined in Chapter II from which this eclectic literature takes elements 
from, the global value chains literature recurs to mechanisms identified in that chapter in which market 
power is conceived as an obstacle to competition (rent-earning resources, product differentiation and 
concentration) to account for profit rate differentials between firms. This makes the conciliation of long-
run profit rate differentials between firms and strong price competition impossible. The examination of 
the global chains literature done in Section 1 therefore confirmed the idea that we would need to develop 
a theory of competition and market power in global value chains in order to bring about that conciliation. 
Consequently, the rest of this chapter was devoted to developing a contribution to a theory of competition 
and market power within and between global value chains that would make strong price competition and 
long-run profit rate differential between firms compatible. In order to do so, in Section 2 we started by 
developing a theory of the network-firm, global value chains being internationally-dispersed network-
firms. Our analysis placed power relationships originated in interdependence between firms at the center 
of the definition and the boundaries of the network-firm. In our conception, in the network-firm, a 
particular relation between competition and market power that in Chapter I we had also identified in the 
collusive competition era (1870s to 1910s), although acting through different mechanisms, takes place: 
market power does not hinder competition but coordinates it.  
 221 
The contributions to competition and market power theory presented in Section 3 considers two 
horizontal competition forces, namely traditional horizontal price competition and NF vs NF price 
competition. These two forces assure high competitive pressure on prices at each tier. We have shown 
that, in the absence of any kind of market power as an obstacle to competition (rent-earning 
resources, product differentiation and concentration), intra-network-firm prices depend on how 
important a firm is to the network-firm relative to others to resist NF vs NF competition, which 
translates into its relative centrality within the network that constitutes the network-firm. 
Consequently, some firms can set higher prices and buy at lower prices, obtaining higher profit 
rates than other firms from different industries. In other words, in the current form of competition 
described in Chapter I and characterized by a vertical disintegration landscape where the network-
firm is the norm, strong competition is compatible with (fully vertical) market power mechanisms 
that explain long-run profit rate differentials between tiers (industries). Moreover, the theoretical 
contributions of Sections 2 and 3 of this chapter have provided an explanation (although certainly 
not the only one) of the origin of the high returns on investment that the finance sector has been 
getting since the beginning of the financialization process evoked in Chapter I. Indeed, the 
reconfiguration of the link between competition and market power in the context of global value 
chains has allowed some firms to capture higher profits than others to satisfy the financial sector’s 
demands without hindering the strong world-scale price competition the world has seen since the 
1980s, when trade liberalized and production became considerably more international in a context 
in which global value chains became the dominant form of industrial organization at the 
international level. 
This result, as we had shown in Chapter II, was impossible to obtain by recurring to other existing 
competition theories. We believe there are two distinct traits of our theoretical contributions that can 
account for this. First, contrary to what most competition theories describe (namely those that see 
market power as an obstacle to competition), we do not consider market power necessarily being a 
denial of competition. As shown in Sections 2 and 3, in the short-run, market power coordinates 
competition, as it is what glues together a set of firms within a network-firm and allows the lead firm(s) to 
coordinate the production process of the network-firm for the whole network-firm to be able to compete 
on prices with other network-firms. As shown in Section 4, in the long-run, competition is on obtaining 
and reinforcing market power through innovation (both technological and organizational) and through 
institutional change (mostly by extending the realm of property rights). Firms compete on price both at 
the final market and at the supply chain level, yet market power is still possible. Market power arises 
here from the uneven interdependence between firms in the production process they carry on 
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within a network-firm and not from foreclosing competition.  Second, as a corollary of the previous 
point, contrary to both competition theories that see market power only as an obstacle to 
competition and those that have a positional concept of market power86, we do not identify the 
existence of market power with a departure from the lowest possible price in which competition 
would result. We have shown that, by exerting fully vertical market power, some firms can set 
buying and selling prices in their favor and still price competition prevails between tiers of the 
different network-firms and between network-firms. 
We believe that our theoretical contributions have also offered a solution to the two limitations of the 
existing competition theories identified at the end of Chapter II. First, our theoretical developments 
consider market power in its fully vertical dimension in a coherent and holistic way. We have seen that 
the patterns of interdependences that are at the core of firms’ market powers extend vertically all along 
the network-firm and how this interacts with traditional horizontal price competition and NF vs NF 
competition. In this sense, our concept of vertical market power is fully vertical (i.e. it does not limit 
vertical market power to direct downstream/upstream links between firms), holistic (it considers not only 
fully vertical market power, but also other horizontal competition forces) and coherent in the sense that it 
is compatible with the two above-mentioned horizontal competition forces. Second, contrary to most of 
the existing competition theories, market power is not identified with pricing over the competitive level. 
In our theoretical development, fully vertical market power can translate into purchasing inputs from 
other firms at a low price.  
  
                                                          
86 In Chapter II we have defined positional market power as market power that comes from the strategic obtainment 
and usufruct of a particular link with other agents as a result of multilateral strategic choices by all of the agents in a 
competitive context. 
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Chapter IV: Competition and market power in platform capitalism: 
the case of trust-based algorithmic coordination firms 
 
Introduction 
 
In Chapter I we have characterized a Finance-led form of competition that started in the 1980s and 
continues to dominate today. We saw that one of its conditions of possibility was the information and 
communication technologies (ICT) revolution that started in the 1970s (Perez, 2010) and that one of its 
salient features was the rearrangement of the legal boundaries of the firm around its intellectual-property-
defined core competences in a context of vertical disintegration. Moreover, we explained how these two 
factors (combined with other institutional transformations) gave rise to a particular form of competition in 
which a new form of industrial organization, the network-firm, came to replace the vertically integrated 
firm. 
In Chapter II we reviewed the existing competition theories and we concluded that none of them is able 
to account for the conjunction of two stylized facts proper to the Finance-led form of competition 
identified in Chapter I: long-run profit rate differentials and strong price competition.  
In Chapter III we revisited the theory of the internationally-dispersed network-firm (a.k.a. global value 
chain) and, based on our conceptualization of it, we developed a theory of competition and market power 
that takes it as its object. That theory was intended as a contribution to understanding the new form of 
competition that the network-firm brought about by offering a competition-theory-based account of the 
coexistence of the two above-mentioned stylized facts. 
The goal of this chapter is to contribute to the understanding of another new form of competition 
that, just like the one centered on the network-firm, was made possible by the ICT revolution and 
also implied a shrinking of the legal boundaries of the firm around some intellectual-property-
defined core competences: competition in the so called "platform economy". Since the scope of the 
platform economy is extremely wide in terms of organizational forms, forms of competition and 
business models, we will center our analysis around a specific type of firm that appeared within 
platform capitalism in the 2000s: (for-profit) trust-based-algorithmic coordination (TBAC) 
platforms. Although we will provide a detailed characterization of the latter in Section 2, let us by the 
 225 
moment refer to them as online platforms such as Uber, Airbnb or TaskRabbit that intermediate offline 
exchanges of goods and services between other agents. 
We will divide the chapter in four sections. Section 1 will overview the technological revolutions that 
made possible the platform economy and distinguish two trends within it: the sharing economy and 
platform capitalism. We will show how different types of business models around platforms appeared 
within the latter in terms of the role played by data, notably by briefly comparing the cases of Google and 
Amazon. Then we will focus on the history of a particular type of platform-firm: the trust-based 
algorithmic coordination firm. We will recall the factors that originated its expansion and show its 
evolution from sharing economy initiatives to for-profit firms as well as the appearance in recent years of 
a nascent movement trying to reconquer the sharing economy roots, “platform cooperativism”. This will 
lead us to interrogate ourselves in Section 3 about the competitive dynamics that might explain the shift 
towards for-profit TBAC platforms that dominate today. 
Section 2 will be devoted to characterizing trust-based-algorithmic coordination platforms. We will offer 
a precise definition that is rooted in a competence-based theory of the firm. We will argue that the novelty 
of this type of firm lies in the fact that a key element of its core competence is algorithmic coordination of 
trust-based networked interactions between other agents.   
Building on this characterization of the TBAC firm, Section 3 will study competition and market power 
dynamics between TBAC firms. Two problems will be distinguished. The first one is competition 
between TBAC new entrants and traditional incumbents. We will show that current regulation favoring 
TBAC firms over traditional ones and the static and dynamic efficiency that algorithmic coordination 
allows for are the two key factors that explain TBAC firms’ competitive advantage over traditional firms. 
Moreover, we will see how the shift from traditional firms to TBAC firms resonates with the vertical 
disintegration movement analyzed in Chapter I in that it allows for an amalgam of strong horizontal 
competition between TBAC firms and traditional firms, on the one side, and vertical market power 
exertion from TBAC firm owners to some agents that participate in it, on the other side. The second 
problem is competition between TBAC platforms. We will show how the nature of TBAC platforms 
elucidated in Section 2 can explain why TBAC platforms’ markets are winner-takes-all markets in which 
a dominant firm is expected to eventually hold market power. We will support this claim by studying the 
case of Uber in the main ride-hailing markets of the United States.   
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1 The rise of the trust-based-algorithmic coordination firm in the 
context of the platform economy: from technological to 
organizational revolutions 
 
“The story of the revolution in information technology must be told in two ways: first as a story of 
technology; second as a story of innovations in business organization and practice. Only the intertwined 
stories explain how the technology moves out of the laboratory, into the economy, and into daily life.” 
 
Stephen S.Cohen, J. Bradford DeLong and John, Zysman, “Tools for Thought: what is new and important 
about the e-economy” 
 
1.1 The emergence of the platform economy 
 
In the 1970s a new technological revolution centered on information and communication technologies 
started (Perez, 2010) and by the 2000s it made possible the emergence of the platform economy. 
Nevertheless, the latter is as much an organizational revolution as it is a technological one. The goal of 
this subsection is to overview the technological breakthroughs that made possible the emergence of 
the platform economy and show how they allowed for the appearance of a family of business 
models in which the interaction between algorithms and the appropriation of data play central yet 
differentiated roles. In doing so, we will distinguish the sharing economy from platform capitalism.  
The technological revolution that started in the 1970s can be divided into three complementary clusters of 
innovations that allowed for the rise of the platform economy: the semiconductor revolution, the internet 
and cloud computing.  
In 1965, Gordon Moore, co-founder of Intel, announced in a paper what would be later known as Moore’s 
law: the density of transistors of a silicon chip (i.e. its power) would double every eighteen months at the 
same cost. For decades, Moore’s projection has been verified, although, as shown in Figure 21, the 
tendency has been stagnating since 2012. Nonetheless, the increase in the capacity of microprocessors 
over the past decades has been staggering. This implies that automated treatment of data passed from 
being an expensive an inefficient (in the eyes of a contemporary reader) privilege to an economically 
accessible powerful tool. With the continuous exponential growth in the power of microprocessors, the 
two first IT revolutions, large computers and then personal computers, came to be.  
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Figure 20: Moore's Law 
 
Source: The Economist, 2016 
 
The second facet of the ICT revolution was the internet. Far from being a novelty, the first version of 
what became the internet started with the United States’ Defense Department’s project ARPANET in 
1969. Nevertheless, for decades networking was either restricted to private corporate networks or was 
limited to public networks with restricted services, such as the French Minitel. The internet as we know it 
was the result of the invention of the http protocol and the image-displaying browser that compose the 
World Wide Web. It was not until the 1990s that these two inventions made the scaling-up of networking 
possible. However, the internet could only scale to the level we know under two conditions. First, by the 
1990s the microprocessors revolution had already reached a level that allowed private individuals to 
possess personal computers that could be connected to the World Wide Web. Second, there were already 
deployed voice telecommunication networks on which the first World Wide Web could run before other 
infrastructures came to replace it (Cohen, Zysman, & DeLong, 2000). Once other bandwidth technologies 
such as optic fiber were developed and deployed during the 2000s, the cost of internet connections 
dropped dramatically, making the internet widespread. 
The third cluster of innovation that made the platform economy possible is cloud computing, a 
technology that “delivers computing services— data storage, computation and networking—to users at 
the time, to the location, and in the quantity they wish to consume, with costs based only on the resources 
used” (Kushida, Murray, & Zysman, 2015). This technology born in the 2000s could only come to be 
once the internet had become widespread and microprocessors’ capacity had reached a certain level of 
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cost-efficiency. Cloud computing represented not only a technological advance, but mostly a revolution in 
terms of the business models of many firms. Indeed, the cost of data storage alone is so high that only a 
few firms can afford it. Cloud computing made technically and economically feasible for firms such as 
Amazon (Amazon Web Services) or Rackspace to rent out storage space, computation capacity and 
networking to other firms that cannot afford the sunken capital cost that this implies. Then, with cloud 
computing, computing expenses passed from being capital expenses to be operating expenses. This 
opened up the possibility of creating an array of IT firms and business models around it. Before cloud 
computing, any IT-based service would require onerous capital expenditures. With cloud computing, 
startups with little capital can focus on developing an application in a garage, renting out all the 
background computing power, data storage and networking that its functioning requires from net giants 
such as Amazon or Google that have invested in the necessary fixed capital. 
Finally, also during the 2000s, the conjunction of the improvement in microprocessors’ capacity and 
internet technologies (2G, 3G and 4G) gave birth to smartphones, which quickly became a widespread. 
Then, by the 2000s, as a result of these three technological revolutions (the microprocessors revolution, 
the internet and cloud computing), personal computers and smartphones that could connect through the 
internet and access apps of all sorts in one click became affordable and widespread in many countries: the 
technological conditions for the platform economy to emerge had been met. 
With these technologies deployed, an array of new forms of organization became possible. In this context 
was born what we will call hereafter a platform economy, which we will define as the set of 
organizations in which data-fed algorithms (platforms) are at the core of their business model. A 
business model in turn, can be defined as “the distinctive and fundamental principles and 
mechanisms by which an organization deploys a strategy to create, sell, and use values (of use and 
change),  in order to fulfill its primary goals” (Harracá, 2017, p. 9)87. Then, the platform economy is 
a set of value-creating organizations in which data-fed algorithms, in as much as they are a new 
form of routine88, are one of the key competences on which the value creation process relies.  
These organizations can be profit-oriented or not, and there is a family of business models that can be 
built around them. Many distinctions and typologies should be made in order to understand the 
competitive dynamics that exist within it. It is for this reason that we will focus on one specific type of 
                                                          
87 Harracá’s definition of a business model is an adaptation of that provided by Benjamin Coriat at the conference 
“Platform Capitalism & Cooperativism” held in October 7, 2016 at Université Paris Diderot, according to which a 
business model “describes the principles and mechanisms by which an organization creates, sells and use values (of 
use and change). These principles must sustain the long-term survival of the project”. 
 
88 We will develop this point in Section 2. 
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platform within the platform economy that we will define in the next section: trust-based algorithmic 
coordination platforms (TBAC). More precisely, we will focus on for-profit TBAC, meaning those 
that belong to platform capitalism (for-profit firms) and not to the sharing economy, if we define the 
latter as constituted by non-for-profit organizations. 
Indeed, the platform economy can be divided into two families. On the one hand, we have platform 
capitalism, which comprises all the platform-firms that follow the traditional capitalistic logic. On the 
other hand, we have the sharing economy, in which platforms are not used primarily for profit goals. 
Apart from the "for profit/not for profit" criteria, a way to  differentiate the two series of platform is to 
look carefully at the nature of the governance of the platform (Carballa Smichowski & Coriat, 2017). In 
platforms belonging to platform capitalism the platform is vertically coordinated, which means that the 
manager of the platform intervenes in the nature of the transaction by setting admission rules and/or the 
rules of the transaction itself (quality, price, labor conditions, etc.), and it does so pursuing the objective 
of maximizing the profit of the platform. On the contrary, in platforms belonging to the sharing economy, 
the actors involved in exchanges can define themselves the nature of the transactions. We can therefore 
speak of horizontal coordination between peers89. Keeping this distinction in mind will be important to 
understand the different phases of the history of TBAC platforms that we will review in the next section. 
Before moving on to that review, let us point out that the competitive dynamics of for-profit TBAC 
platforms cannot be generalized to the entire platform economy, in part because of the different 
roles data plays in platforms’ business models. While in some platforms the appropriation of data is of 
paramount importance to the business model because the data is the product that is commoditized to 
create revenue, in others, such as in TBAC platforms, data is a collateral element of the business model.  
Let us take the case of Google as an example of the first case. Most of the services the company provides 
(Google search, Gmail, Google drive, etc.) are free of charge. The superior performance of Google’s 
search algorithm and other products is what attracts a large user base. Nevertheless, value capture comes 
from commoditizing data. Through the consent of users in the terms of agreement that have to be 
accepted to use its products, and shielded by trade secret, Google ‘appropriates’90 the data that is 
generated by users’ searches, emails, etc. This data is then used to sell targeted advertising and, because 
of all the detailed information that it offers about a precise individual, it is very valuable to advertisers. 
                                                          
89 One may notice that this definition and characterization of the « sharing economy » is more restrictive than the 
definition usually proposed in the literature. On this point, see Carballa Smichowki & Coriat (2017). 
 
90 It is not appropriation in the legal sense of the term, since there is not such a thing as property rights over data. 
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The result of such a business model is that data is the main source of Google’s revenue, accounting for 
more than 90% of it (Harracá, 2017). 
In other platforms, although data plays an important role, it should be considered a collateral element of 
the business model and not as constituting its core, as in the case of Google. Let us take the case of 
Amazon as an example. Amazon has an impressive variety of businesses. Nevertheless, it has two core 
businesses. Amazon Web Services is the most profitable one. Its operating income’s share of revenue was 
25.4% in 2016, and it has been growing exponentially since 2014. In terms of revenue, its retail products 
represent the core business (67% of its revenues in 2016), although they have been losing ground to 
Amazon Web Services and other services (third-party sellers and subscriptions) since 2010 (Harracá, 
2017). Regarding retail products, Amazon’s platform nature allows it to gain competitive advantage over 
traditional retailers by (Harracá, 2017):  
 Lowering search times and costs 
 Lowering transaction costs 
 Offering an ‘unlimited’ selection of products  
 Benefiting of the network effects of users’ reviews of products (the more reviews there are, the more 
attractive Amazon becomes as an online retailer) 
 Profiting from a virtual environment that uses clients’ observed behavior to customize the shopping 
experience (e.g. proposing items to buy based on past purchases and searches) 
 Being able to track retailers’ offerings on the platform and instantly adapt prices based on competition 
and demand  
All of these competitive advantages are based on Amazon’s platform structure. In all cases, it is the 
capacity of harvesting data that is automatically turned into decision-making through algorithms what 
gives Amazon the hedge over traditional retailers. Nevertheless, value capture in its e-commerce business 
still depends on traditional retailing logics: enlarging its customer base through price cuts in order to 
make revenue over a large base with small margins, and then use that solid client base to negotiate lower 
prices from suppliers to enlarge margins. On the same line, brick-and-mortar logistics are the key of 
Amazon’s fast delivery, which represents one of its competitive advantages in retail sales. Capturing and 
treating data through algorithms, contrary to the case of Google, plays a corollary role in the business 
model of Amazon’s e-commerce because it is a source of competitive advantage in the frame of a 
traditional retailer business model. On the contrary, Google’s business model is built around the 
harvesting of data. 
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Having reviewed the technological breakthroughs that made the emergence of the platform economy 
possible in its two versions (sharing economy and for-profit platform economy), and having pointed out 
the different roles that data and algorithms can play in the business models the platform economy gave 
birth to, we shall now focus on one particular type of platform-firm on which our study of competitive 
dynamics will focus for the rest of the chapter: TBAC platforms.  
1.2 The emergence and evolution of trust-based algorithmic coordination 
platforms 
 
We have briefly recalled how a set of technological revolutions in ICT has opened up the possibility of a 
variety of business models and organizational practices we have characterized as the platform economy. 
We have also pointed out the large variety in terms of governance (sharing economy vs. platform 
capitalism) and business models that exists within it and decided to focus on one particular type of 
platform: trust-based algorithmic coordination platforms. The goal of this subsection is to do a quick 
review of the reasons of the emergence of these types of platforms within the platform economy 
keeping in mind the two variants that exist in terms of governance: for-profit TBAC platforms and 
TBAC platforms belonging to the sharing economy. 
Practices of networked interaction between individuals sharing a resource are not new. For example, early 
carpooling clubs date back to World War II in the United States. Nevertheless, a transformation and a 
large expansion in these types of practices occurred when online platforms started supporting them. The 
origins of this shift can be timed around the mid-2000s, when internet and smartphone penetration was 
large enough in some countries for TBAC platforms to reach a critical mass of users. Moreover, the first 
use of the term is attributed to Lawrence Lessig in 2007 (Kummer, 2007). 
One of the main factors that explain the emergence of the TBAC economy is the above-mentioned 
ubiquity of high-speed internet access and smartphones, which act as an infrastructure that allows almost 
free communication between individuals at any moment and place (The Economist, 2013; OECD, 
2015a) . This technological advance has allowed, first, to enlarge the potential pool of members of a 
TBAC network considerably. Before the internet became widespread, individuals who wanted to engage 
in networked interactions usually relied on focal points such as bulletin boards located in key points 
where a community meets (the city hall, the church) or more limited means of communication in terms of 
reach and speed such as newspapers to connect with each other and build a community. Other options 
included referral by other individuals or institutions that acted as connectors. This rendered the scope of 
the community geographically local and small. Most importantly, digital technologies have made it easier 
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to verify identities (upload an ID, verify users’ identities with their Facebook accounts, etc.) and to create 
reputation systems that allow users to easily verify the communities’ opinion of other users’ behaviors. 
This is of paramount important because, when no common institution or social link connects two 
individuals that are strangers to each other, they do not have any reason to trust each other. Information 
and communication technologies have been able to provide this trust that is a precondition for individuals 
to engage in networked interactions. Organizations such as CourchSurfing, where people from all over the 
world offer other members of the community accommodation in their homes for free, would have been 
extremely difficult to build if people could not find each other online and get some sort of signal of how 
trustworthy other members are. We will come back to this point in the next section.  
Moreover, this technological progress has enabled the appearance of TBAC platforms also because of the 
capacity of real time automated coordination it created. Firms such as Deliveroo base their functioning on 
it: people order through their mobile phones, providing in one click their address and credit card 
information needed for the delivery and the payment to be done; deliverers, on the other hand, get the 
orders in their phones as well as key information such as from which restaurant they should pick it up and 
how to get there; the restaurant manager also knows who is assigned to pick up the order being cooked; 
all of them can call or text each other in case there is any problem. Although not all TBAC firms rely on 
real time automated coordination through mobile phones (some might as well function with traditional 
webpages resembling discussion forums), part of the sharp increase in the number of TBAC platforms 
would not have been possible without it. In addition, even TBAC platforms that do not rely on it benefit 
from real-time coordination through mobile phones. For example, in Airbnb, although the transaction can 
be coordinated before travelling using desktop computers, the mobile application allows visitors to text 
hosts in case they are late, or hosts to offer a quick answer to people asking questions about the house or 
accept accommodation demands before they get access to a computer. It is important to stress that, above 
all, it is the automaticity of coordination what has helped boosting the development of TBAC platforms. 
While in the past individuals had to explain each member the standard coordination procedures in a 
network of interactions and carry them out analogically, internet websites and mobile apps embed these 
procedures and automatize most of them (we will develop this point in the following section). This 
lowered coordination costs to a level that encouraged people to join these platforms. In sum, the 
widespread of internet connectivity and smartphones has allowed to widen the scope of potential TBAC 
communities both in size and in geographical terms and lowered transaction, coordination and 
communication costs between individuals, boosting so the development of these platforms (P2P 
Foundation, 2015). 
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Although the adoption of certain technologies was a necessary condition for the TBAC economy to take 
off, other factors have to be accounted for to understand the timing of its development. Some authors 
signal cultural changes towards preferring accessing goods over owning them, which favors people’s 
participation in TBAC organizations. In some cases, participation is driven by a rise in ecological 
concerns, which have gained importance as the effects of and the knowledge on climate change increased 
(Novel & Riot, 2012). For example, using carpooling platforms can be for some persons a way of 
minimizing C02 emissions.  
Another factor to take into account to understand the surge of TBAC platforms is the weakening 
economic situation of individuals that participate in them. From a long-run perspective, the weakening of 
the labor status and job security experienced in many developed countries since the 1980s (Kotz, 2015) 
has pushed some individuals to find alternative sources of revenue, especially after the financial crisis of 
2008. Many TBAC platforms that were blooming during the crisis offer individuals a way of monetizing 
their underused assets (rent a spare room on Airbnb, rent their cars through MyWheels, etc.), saving 
money by renting or accessing for free goods on a platform instead of buying them or having a second 
part-time job (or even a full-time job) in a TBAC platform (e.g. delivering food in Foodora, driving in 
Uber, offering services in TaskRabbit, etc.).  
It is interesting to point out that throughout history of the development of TBAC platforms two strains, 
each corresponding to a time period, can be identified. In the early years, a first sharing economy in the 
sense we gave to the term in the previous subsection started to emerge on the basis of the technological 
tools mentioned above. Indeed, the first TBAC websites such as CouchSurfing (founded in 2003) or 
Coivoiturage.fr (founded in 2004, became BlaBlaCar in 2013) correspond to this logic. Couchsurfing, 
which was for years the largest lodging TBAC platform, was financed by donations and based on self-
organized communities of volunteers that worked as ambassadors to spread it and improve its software 
code. Covoiturage.fr was free and allowed users to communicate with each other through any mean they 
wished (through the website, by phone, by email, etc.) and set up the pricing mechanisms they would find 
suitable to share the cost of the ride. 
But in the late 2000s and early 2010s, for-profit TBAC platforms started to take over the original sharing 
economy ones. The cases of CouchSurfing and Covoiturage.fr are illustrative of this trend. In the case of 
CouchSurfing, its conversion from a not-for-profit corporation to a for-profit corporation in 2011 entailed 
a shift in its governance structure that washed out its autonomy and decision-making principles: 
volunteers who had donated time to build the community were not compensated when the company sold 
equity and the city groups (information hubs for Couchsurfing communities) they had created were 
 234 
eliminated, software development stopped being collectively carried on through CouchSurfing collectives 
and the terms of use of the platform were changed so that users had to give away all the rights over their 
personal data to be able to use it (Gigaom, 2015). Covoiturage.fr underwent a similar transformation as it 
started to raise venture capital. In 2011, it stopped being free, and in 2014 it raised the fixed rate it 
charges per ride between 11% and 50% (each corresponding to a total price under or above 8 euros, 
respectively) and its percentage commission by 25%. In 2014, users were blocked from sharing their 
phone numbers through the platforms. In 2014, the company set up a commission scheme where users 
pay more as the booking gets closer to the departure date. Other modifications such as the obligation to 
pay online (and drivers getting the money between 48 hours and 72 hours after the ride) were made 
(Evenstrood, 2014). These transformations show how the self-organization of users of the platform was 
restrained in order to introduce profit-maximizing logics proper to traditional corporations.  
Although we have quoted two exemplary cases of sharing economy platforms that, after having become 
the go-to platform in their respective fields, have shifted to a for-profit corporate model, the rise of this 
second generation of corporate TBAC platforms has not only been driven by transformations in the nature 
of initially sharing economy platforms. In other cases, platforms that started as for-profit TBAC platforms 
in the late 2000s quickly became dominant in their respective fields. This is the case of Uber, one of the 
most popular ride-hailing platforms, which was founded in March 2009, Airbnb, the most popular lodging 
platform (founded in August 2008) or the popular freelance labor platform TaskRabbit, founded in 2008. 
The common denominator of these platforms is that they belong to what we have defined in the previous 
subsection as platform capitalism. Governance is hierarchically exerted by platform owners that set the 
rules of transactions and, therefore, the individuals that participate in it cannot be considered peers. 
Consequently, value distribution is decided by platform owners, which choose the transaction fee they 
charge users. It is also worth mentioning that in their growing strategies many platforms have bought 
competitors to grow, as in the case of BlaBlaCar, which bought many foreign competitors to secure its 
leading position and become the European leader in the carpooling market (Ahmed, 2015). 
Finally, a third trend in the evolution of TBAC firms can be identified since the mid-2010s91: the 
“platform cooperativism” movement. In recent years, displeased by the working conditions and the 
uneven value distribution practiced in some dominant platforms, independent users, cities and unions 
                                                          
91 Based on a media survey, the European Commission identifies the 2012-2015 period as that for which “the 
‘honeymoon’ with the ‘sharing economy’ has ended (Codagnone, Biagi, Abadie, & Institute for Prospective 
Technological Studies, 2016).  “Optimistic  and  utopian  narratives  have been  substituted  by  accounts  of  legal  
disputes  and  the  ‘dark  side  of  the  sharing economy’(Malhotra & Van Alstyne, 2014)” (Codagnone & Martens, 
2016). 
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have started creating their own co-owned TBAC platforms. Platform cooperatives resemble for-profit 
TBAC platforms in their user experience and technological core, but differ in their ownership and 
governance model. Following the tradition of the social and solidarity economy, these platforms are 
owned by the stakeholders involved, be it workers (e.g. the ride-hailing platforms Green Taxi Coop or 
Union Taxi Cooperative) or multiple stakeholders (e.g. the gig work platform Loconomics). In platform 
cooperatives, governance structures can be characterized as "horizontal" since all the stakeholders have a 
vote on the decisions to be made by the firm. The platform cooperativism movement can be seen as a 
return to the original ethos of the sharing economy, but with a strong accent on the importance of 
ownership and horizontal governance by the community of participants of the platform, something that 
lacked in many ‘naïve’ pioneer sharing economy communities and contributed to their decline or even 
their conversion into for-profit TBAC platforms. Nevertheless, despite this awareness, the platform 
cooperativism movement is still in its infancy and one can doubt how far it will be able to go if it has to 
compete with dominant for-profit TBAC platforms, especially considering the winner-takes-all dynamics 
that can be generated in markets in which they participate, as we will show in Section 3.  
Noticing this transformation towards a dominance of for-profit TBAC platforms raises the question of 
what the competitive dynamics behind this shift are. Are there any characteristics, either proper to TBAC 
platforms or also present in other markets or types of firms that favor a corporate model that would be 
more competitive than peer-to-peer alternatives? Moreover, we observe today a tendency toward the 
consolidation of TBAC giants that hold large market shares and expand aggressively: BlaBlaCar 
dominates the long-distance carpooling sector92, Airbnb has currently over 3 million lodging listings in 
65,000 cities and 191 countries (Airbnb, 2017), Uber, (even if it has not made profits for 9 years), 
outpaces competing American ride-hailing platforms by far in terms of market share and at an increasing 
speed (FutureAdvisor, 2014). This indicates that there are competitive dynamics that need to be 
understood to account for the decline of the sharing economy in favor of for-profit TBAC platforms.  
In the next sections, we will investigate these competitive dynamics in detail. But in order to do so, we 
will first need to define precisely what we mean by “trust-based algorithmic coordination platforms”, a 
task to which we will devote Section 2. As we will show, this is not a minor issue, since current 
definitions lack consensus and present some clear limitations. Our characterization will build on the 
competence-based theory of the firm we have worked with in the previous chapter. Building on it, we will 
show in Section 3 how the nature of the TBAC firm and its current regulatory environment render TBAC 
firms more competitive than traditional incumbent firms. We will see how in this case, as we have shown 
                                                          
92 BlaBlaCar’s CEO claims that the company had in 2014 between 70% and 90% of the market share in the 
countries where it was active (Bouleau, 2015). 
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for the case of the network-firm, vertical market power coexists with strong horizontal competition. Then 
we will proceed to study the competitive dynamics between TBAC platforms in order to show how they 
lead to winner-takes-all markets and support this claim with a case study of Uber in the main United 
States ride-hailing markets. 
2 A competence-based definition of the trust-based algorithmic 
coordination firm 
 
We have so far exposed the technological and organizational transformations that have given birth to the 
platform economy and, within it, to TBAC platforms in its two variants in terms of governance: sharing 
economy-oriented ones and for-profit ones. Nonetheless, we have not yet provided a precise definition of 
TBAC platforms. The goal of this section is to provide a precise definition of TBAC platforms that 
builds on the evolutionist theory of the firm. This definition will be the basis on which we will study 
the competitive dynamics proper to for-profit TBAC platforms in the next section. 
Many terms have been used in recent years to define the same phenomena: ‘gig economy’, ‘on-demand 
economy’, ‘peer-to-peer economy’, ‘collaborative economy’, ‘access economy’, ‘the mesh’… Among 
these terms, ‘sharing economy’ stands out as the one with the most widespread use. Nevertheless, its 
definition is neither consensual nor rigorous and, as we have pointed it out in the previous pages, our use 
of the term ‘sharing economy’ differs from what it is generally understood by it. Therefore, in order to 
study competition-related issues in TBAC platforms it is necessary to begin by defining precisely what 
we mean by that term. In other words, we need to rigorously characterize these new types of firms. There 
are currently two widespread families of definitions to understand these platforms. On the one side, there 
are definitions based on the idea of access over ownership and/or network interactions between 
individuals channeled through a digital platform. On the other side, these platforms are defined as a 
multisided market. Although these two families of definitions capture some key features of the TBAC 
firm, we will show that they are not sufficient to characterize it thoroughly. 
Let us begin with the first family of definitions. Novel and Riot define what they call “sharing economy” 
as an economy “based on network pooling of resources owned by each person”93 (Novel & Riot, 2012, p. 
35). Gansky uses the term ‘mesh’ to designate organizations where “in sum, it is about going from a 
world where we own everything that we use to a world where access is imposed over property” (Silicon 
                                                          
93 The translation is ours. 
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Maniacs, 2011). According to Jeremy Rifkin, ‘collaborative commons’ are “a digitalized space where 
providers and users share goods and services” (Rifkin, 2014). Benjamin Tincq, co-founder of Ouishare, 
defines what he labels as well “sharing economy” as “the set of social practices and business models 
based on horizontal structures and members contributions of a community” (Tincq, 2014)94. Rachel 
Botsman, in turn, speaks of “an economic model based on sharing underutilized assets from spaces to 
skills to stuff for monetary or non-monetary benefits. It is currently largely talked about in relation to P2P 
marketplaces but equal opportunity lies in the B2C models” (Botsman, 2013). On the same line, the 
European Commission defined the collaborative economy in a guideline as “business models where 
activities are facilitated by collaborative platforms that create an open market for the temporary use of 
goods and services, often provided by private individuals” (European Commission, 2016). OuiShare takes 
another of Botsman’s definitions to define the ‘collaborative economy’ as “initiatives based on horizontal 
networks and participation of a community. It is built on ‘distributed power and trust within communities 
as opposed to centralized institutions’ (R. Botsman), blurring the lines between producer and consumer. 
These communities meet and interact on online networks and peer-to-peer platforms, as well as in shared 
spaces such as fablabs and coworking spaces” (OuiShare, 2016). Benita Matofska, founder of The People 
Who Share, defines the “sharing economy” as “a socio-economic ecosystem built around the sharing of 
human, physical and intellectual resources. It includes the shared creation, production, distribution, trade 
and consumption of goods and services by different people and organisations” (Matofska, 2016). Laure 
Wagner, spokesperson of BlaBlaCar, defines the “sharing economy” as “the optimization of under-
exploited resources thanks to a digital system that allows approaching supply to demand, to create a 
community of suppliers and demanders” (Wagner, 2014)95. It is important to stress that Wagner highlights 
along with Valérie Peugeot that “if there is not a technical online device it is not sharing economy” 
(Peugeot, 2014)96. Arun Sundararajan, an economist that specializes in the platform economy, defines 
what he also labels “sharing economy” as an “economic system” that has five characteristics: largely 
market-based (i.e. the creation of markets and enabling of exchanging of goods and emergence of new 
services); high-impact capital (it allows “everything, from assets and skills to time and money, to be used 
at levels closer to their full capacity”); “crowd-based ‘networks’ rather than centralized institutions or 
‘hierarchies’” and “blurring lines fully employed and casual labor, between independent and dependent 
employment, between work and leisure” (Sundararajan, 2016). 
Three main characteristics that emerge from these definitions: 
                                                          
94 Ibid. 
95 Ibid. 
96 Ibid. 
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 The existence of a network of interconnected agents at the core of the activity 
 The existence of a digital infrastructure that allows networked interactions 
 Access over ownership: underused goods owned by some agents are accessed by others than do not 
need to buy them to use them 
The second family of definitions of identifies these platforms as multi-sided markets that use a digital 
platform. These “are roughly defined as markets in which one or several platforms enable interactions 
between end-users, and try to get the two (or multiple) sides ‘on board’ by appropriately charging each 
side. That is, platforms court each side while attempting to make, or at least not lose, money overall” 
(Rochet & Tirole, 2006). A condition for multisided markets to exist is the presence of distinct and 
complementary types of users that the platform puts in touch (those who need a ride and those who offer 
it, those who want to rent or share a spare room and those who are looking for one, etc.) and the existence 
of positive network effects between the groups (Rysman, 2009). For example, the more people there are 
offering a spare room in Airbnb (first side of the market), the more useful it becomes for those who are 
looking to occupy a spare room (second side of the market) to use the platform, and the more useful it 
becomes to advertisers who want to reach the biggest possible audience (third side of the market).  
It is important to point out that when the literature on multisided markets uses the term ‘platform’ it does 
not necessarily refer to digital platforms. For example, a speed-dating center can be a platform that, 
without using any digital tool, puts in touch two complementarian groups of people that create positive 
network effects between them. Some authors (Demary, 2015; Evans & Schmalensee, 2013; Hagiu & 
Wright, 2015a, 2015b; Lougher & Kalmanowicz, 2015) have taken this definition of multisided markets 
to define TBAC platforms as multi-sided markets where the platform is digital. 
 
Although these families of definitions capture some of the main characteristics of the TBAC firm, they 
have shortcomings. Regarding the first family, while the first two characteristics it identifies are general 
to all TBAC organizations, the last one (access over ownership) refers only to the most popular type of 
TBAC platforms, collaborative consumption platforms (e.g. car-sharing platforms, home-sharing 
platforms, etc.), where individuals own physical assets they rent or let other individuals use for free under 
certain conditions. Therefore, the ‘access over ownership’ characteristic does not contemplate gig-work 
platforms that are generally considered to be part of the TBAC such as TaskRabbit, for example. The 
multisided market definition has two shortcomings. First, it does not see any specificity in TBAC 
platforms in respect to multisided digital platforms in general. It simply puts them as examples of digital 
multisided platforms of which are also part, for example, online market places, social networks or dating 
apps. As we will see in subsection 3.1.2, this theoretical framework an effect on how competition 
 239 
dynamics between TBAC platforms are identified by some authors. Second, it omits the particular social 
form that the organization of labor and exchange take in TBAC organizations: in TBAC organizations, 
labor and exchange, contrary to what happens in traditional firms, is not driven by employment 
relationships. A shortcoming shared by both of these families of definitions is that they omit the role 
TBAC firms play in coordinating production and exchange through algorithms embedded in the platform.  
Taking into account the contributions and the shortcomings of the existing definitions, we propose a 
definition we will adopt hereafter. We define the TBAC as a way of producing and/or distributing 
goods or services (either in exchange for money or not) based on network interactions between 
agents channeled through digital platforms and where users’ participation is not driven by 
employment relationships. TBAC platforms have the following characteristics:  
a) They set the conditions of network exchange and/or production (including labor conditions and 
value distribution) through algorithmic coordination. 
 
b) They create a digital support that not only serves as a virtual matchmaking space that allows 
network interactions to take place in physical space stricto sensu, but also incorporates 
mechanisms such as reputation systems and third-party identity verification that make these 
interactions viable.  
Point a) shows the specificity and the novelty of this type of firm regarding its nature from a competence-
based theory of the firm. According to this theory of the firm, firms are a device for coordination and 
knowledge treatment through routines that form their core capabilities (Nelson & Winter, 2004). The 
latter can be defined as “a particular way of associating and combining fragmentary competences 
embedded in individuals in order to perform a task”97 (Coriat & Weinstein, 2010). Following this theory, 
we argue that the TBAC firm is characterized by the fact that one of its core capabilities is algorithmic 
coordination (Lee, Kusbit, Metsky, & Dabbish, 2015; Rosenblat & Stark, 2016; Schildt, 2017)98 of 
network interactions of other agents (typically individuals) located outside of the legal boundaries of the 
TBAC firm. Indeed, regardless of the wide range of markets in which these firms participate 
(transportation, accommodation, gig-work, etc.), the routines that form their core capabilities always 
                                                          
97 The translation is ours. 
 
98 Our concept of ‘algorithmic coordination’ resembles that of ‘algorithmic management’ found in the papers we 
have just quoted. Nonetheless, the two differ in that, while ‘algorithmic management’ refers to the coordination and 
control of labor from the platform to workers, ‘algorithmic coordination’ takes into account a broader spectrum of 
agents because it also includes coordination between the platform and consumers, between consumers and workers 
and between all types of users of the platform and third parties. 
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consist in coordinating production and/or exchange between private individuals through algorithms 
embedded in the platform that are ‘fed’ by different types of data generated by users. Data on inventories, 
billing, payment, geo-localization, within-platform interaction between individuals and so on are collected 
by the platform. The platform offers an automated response to the situation described by these different 
pieces of data in order to coordinate production and/or exchange between individuals both in a ‘soft’ 
manner (by giving them incentives) and in a ‘hard’ manner (by giving them instructions). In other words, 
the algorithmic coordination routines of the TBAC firm “combine fragmentary competences embedded in 
individuals” that do not have a contractual relationship with it beyond the terms and conditions of use of 
the platform “to perform a task”. These routines constitute one of the core capabilities of the TBAC firm, 
although not its only core capability. It is important to stress that algorithmic coordination goes beyond 
matchmaking. In TBAC platforms, algorithms not only put in touch two sides of the market: they embed 
the conditions of exchange and/or production between individuals so that a series of tasks can be 
performed in a particular manner. While matchmaking platforms such as e-commerce websites limit 
themselves to offering a digital environment that facilitates matchmaking between two sides of a market, 
TBAC platforms also coordinate the performance of the tasks that take place after the matchmaking 
and/or direct the matchmaking: Uber sets the route and makes sure drivers stick to it; Deliveroo 
coordinates the logistics between deliverers and restaurants in real time; Airbnb gives more visibility to 
listings that comply with certain criteria (instant booking setting, good reputation, activity rate, 
cancellation rate, etc.) and gives automatic regular ‘advice’ to hosts on their behavior towards guests and 
their listings so they will get more bookings, inducing so users to interact in a certain manner, which 
exceeds mere matchmaking. In sum, TBAC firms’ algorithms are hierarchical exoskeletons that pierce the 
legal boundaries of the firm, reaching the market sphere where agents interact with each other through 
and coordinated by algorithms. 
As crucial as algorithmic coordination is to characterize the TBAC firm, it is not sufficient. If we were to 
limit ourselves to this part of the definition, we should include all platforms in which network production 
or exchange is somehow automatically coordinated in the TBAC firm category. In that case, the online 
peer-to-peer encyclopedia Wikipedia should be included, since it contains all the features described 
above: based on data on contributors’ experience and the content of a particular article, the platform gives 
them differentiated rights to contribute to the article (editing, erasing, adding, etc.), coordinating so 
network-based production of knowledge in an automatized manner. The same could be said of online 
games that allow for algorithmically coordinated network interactions between players. 
This leads us to the second part of our definition expressed in point b). TBAC platforms are not simply a 
digital space that allows individuals to interact in a certain manner coordinated by the platform. They also 
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offer mechanisms that make interactions between individuals in an online platform viable. The two main 
ones are reputation systems and third-party identity verification. For certain interactions to take place, 
individuals require a minimum amount of trust without which they would never engage in the 
transaction99. In traditional firms, trust is assured by the firm itself, as it is solely responsible for the 
services its workers (independently of their contractual status as employees of the firm or individual 
contractors) provide in their name. Nevertheless, in TBAC platforms, services are provided between 
individuals that are not part of the firm and for whose performance the firm is not responsible. Then, in 
order to supply trust, firms recur to reputation systems and third-party identity verification of individuals. 
While in some network-interactions-based platforms such as dating apps or some online games engaging 
in network interactions do not require trust, it is crucial in other ones. In effect, TBAC firms do not 
algorithmically coordinate any kind of network interaction; they coordinate those that require trust to take 
place. For example, people would hardly rent their houses to total strangers using Airbnb instead of a 
certified agency if it was not for the reputation system set up by Airbnb and its identity verification 
screening process. These mechanisms work as a signal to hosts that tells them if the users wanting to rent 
their houses are trustworthy. Reputation systems are therefore a condition for TBAC business models to 
work (Sundararajan, 2016), and they are very effective in proving users with the trust required for them to 
engage in certain network interactions with each other100. Nevertheless, it should be noted that these trust-
creating mechanisms are not perennial and that they depend on the reputation of the firm that provides 
them. For example, recent scandals of different sorts with the ride-hailing company Uber (accusations of 
sexual harassment within the company, implantation of the Hell spy software in its clients cellphones101, 
false advertising to drivers, deceiving law enforcement in some cities, among others) have affected the 
trust that users put on the platform itself, regardless of the individual behavior of its workers and users 
(The Guardian, 2017). Then, trust-creating mechanisms are necessary but not sufficient conditions for 
individuals to trust a TBAC platform. Identifying this feature of TBAC firms is primordial because it 
allows us to clearly differentiate TBAC platforms from other network interactions-based platforms where 
algorithmic coordination takes place.  
                                                          
99 In the PwC Report “The Sharing Economy”, 89% of the respondents agree on the fact that the “sharing economy” 
is based on trust between providers and users.  
 
100 A study by the leading ridesharing platform BlaBlaCar shows that the level of trust its users have in each other is 
close to the one they have in friends. See https://www.blablacar.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/entering-the-trust-
age.pdf 
 
101 This spy software allowed Uber to track drivers that were also working for its main American competitor Lyft in 
order to target economic incentives to them so that they would work less for Lyft. The use of Hell was brought to 
court in the Michael Gonzales v Uber Technologies, Inc, Case 3:17-cv-02264-JSC, U.S. District Court for the 
Northern District of California.   
 242 
Finally, let us stress that our definition describes the TBAC firm as a particular form of social and 
technical organization of labor. As mentioned above regarding the platform economy in general, this 
particular way of organizing labor can be done following a variety of governance (traditional capitalist 
firms, cooperatives, mutual societies, commons, etc.) and business models (charging a fee per transaction, 
revenues through advertisement, revenues through the use of personal data, financing through members’ 
contributions, crowdfunding, etc.) Moreover, property rights over physical and intellectual assets in the 
community can take many forms. In this manner, both sharing economy TBAC firms and for-profit 
TBAC firms fall into this category despite the deep differences we have pointed out between them in the 
previous section. Nonetheless, one should bear in mind that the analyses that we will provide in the 
following section refer exclusively to for-profit TBAC firms. Indeed, since TBAC firms belonging to 
the sharing economy do not have the same market-conquering and profit-oriented goals that for-profit 
platforms have, the competition and market power dynamics we will analyze in the following pages do 
not apply to them.  
3 Competition and market power dynamics in for-profit trust-
based algorithmic coordination firms 
 
In the previous section we have defined the TBAC firm following a competence-based theory of the firm. 
This was a necessary first step since, without a precise definition, the fuzziness of the different terms 
usually employed to characterize these types of platforms might create ambiguities about the object of our 
study. Moreover, as we will show in this section, the characterization of the TBAC firm done in Section 2 
will be of paramount importance to understand the competitive dynamics proper to these platforms. Two 
sets of competitive dynamics need to be analytically distinguished. The first one (subsection 3.1.1) is 
competition between TBAC firms and traditional (i.e. non-TBAC) incumbent firms in their respective 
markets (lodging, gig work, ride-hailing, etc.). The second one is competition between TBAC firms 
(subsection 3.1.2). Given the sharp differences between the two types of firms, differentiated dynamics 
are expected. While the first competition logic will help us understanding the rapid penetration of for-
profit TBAC firms in many markets, the second one will give us insights on how these markets might 
evolve in the future.  
Before starting analyzing these competitive dynamics, let us point out that, although TBAC generally 
operate in many countries, the markets in which the competitive dynamics that we will analyze in this 
section take place (as the study of the case of Uber in subsection 3.1.2.3 will show) are local markets 
geographically circumscribed to a territory (e.g. a city). This is the case because platforms compete to 
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attract users that carry on offline transactions through the platform and those transactions are themselves 
defined in the scope of a territory. For example, a platform might dominate the lodging market in Paris 
but be a small player in that market in London. 
  
3.1.1 Competition between trust-based algorithmic coordination platforms entrants and 
traditional incumbents 
 
The literature on competition issues related to TBAC platforms covers many different problems that range 
from new and challenging topics like algorithmic collusion102 (Ezrachi & Stucke, 2015) to more 
traditional discussions such as barriers to entry. Nevertheless, when it comes to competition issues related 
to TBAC platforms, a lot of the attention of scholars, antitrust agencies and the media has been devoted to 
competition issues that arise between new entrant TBAC platforms and traditional firms in certain 
markets (e.g. Airbnb vs hotels, Uber vs taxis, etc.). This is not surprising. If we take these two examples, 
which represent the two markets where TBAC platforms have expanded the most, we can see how TBAC 
platforms are paving their way into markets that had been so far dominated by traditional firms.  In the 
case of lodging, an empirical study based on 59 United States cities (Lane, Woodworth, & others, 2016) 
shows that Airbnb, which dwarfs competing platforms, has a share of all hotels accommodated demand 
that, although small (which is understandable when calculating one firm’s demand as a share of 
hundreds’), “has grown significantly [between October 2014 and September 2015] and that this share 
becomes more or less relevant to hotels depending upon the time of the year”. The analysis concludes that 
“Airbnb has and will continue to encroach on the business of the traditional lodging”. The case of ride-
hailing is probably the one that has create more tensions between incumbents (mainly taxis) and ride-
hailing platforms around the world, with taxi drivers protests having spread across countries. The scare 
available evidence on Uber’s market share compared to taxis’ confirms that ride-hailing platforms are a 
serious threat to the taxi industry, since it shows that Uber is replacing the latter in Los Angeles (Nelson, 
2016), in all the boroughs of New York (Brooklyn, Queens, Manhattan, Bronx and Staten Island) 
(Fischer-Baum & Bialik, 2015; Schneider, 2016a, 2016b) and, in the case of business travelers, in all 
main cities of the U.S (Certify, 2015).  
Incumbents argue that TBAC platforms practice unfair competition by recurring to business models that 
allow them to bypass the constraining regulations and economic costs they have to bear. In some cases 
they have also accused TBAC platforms of practicing dumping. TBAC platforms, on the other side, 
                                                          
102 Algorithmic collusion refers to collusion that takes place (tacitly or explicitly) through algorithms without human 
interference. 
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respond that regulation is outdated and that it should be adapted to fit their innovating business models 
which introduce competition by offering a better service at a lower price. It is important to highlight that 
the validity of these assertions depends heavily on the regulatory landscape, as regulations of different 
aspects affecting TBAC platforms and traditional incumbent’s competitive advantages (sectorial 
regulations, taxation, labor…) vary considerably from country to country and, in some cases, even from 
city to city within the same country. However, in their analysis of this conflict, competition authorities 
from all over the world have unanimously sided with TBAC platforms. When referring to the D.C. taxi 
commission’s argument on unfair competition being practiced by ride-sharing platforms, the U.S. Federal 
Trade Commission stated: 
"The staff comments recommend that DCTC avoid unwarranted regulatory restrictions on competition, 
and that any regulations should be no broader than necessary to address legitimate public safety and 
consumer protection concerns… The comments recommend that DCTC allow for flexibility and 
experimentation and avoid unnecessarily limiting how consumers can obtain taxis.” (Federal Trade 
Commission, 2013) 
In the context of a constellation of local regulatory landscapes that differ much from those found in the 
United States, the other most important antitrust agency, the European Commission, defends the very 
same position as the FTC. Commission Vice-President Jyrki Katainen, responsible for Jobs, Growth, 
Investment and Competitiveness, said: “A competitive European economy requires innovation, be it in 
the area of products or services. Europe's next unicorn could stem from the collaborative economy. Our 
role is to encourage a regulatory environment that allows new business models to develop while 
protecting consumers and ensuring fair taxation and employment conditions” (European Commission, 
2016). 
On the same line, the German Antimonopoly Commission called to fix existing regulation in the transport 
and the accommodation industries to eliminate “regulatory restrictions for market entry” to new entrants 
that include TBAC platforms (Monopolkommission, 2015) 
The Spanish antitrust agency, CNMC, argues in its preliminary findings of its upcoming report on TBAC 
platforms that “a  number  of  unnecessary  and/or  disproportionate  restrictions  on  competition  were  
found in sectorial and horizontal regulations, in particular, in the markets for transport and tourist  
accommodation. These restrictions impede the users to fully benefit from the potential benefits that would 
be derived from the new entries in the market” (CNMC, 2016). 
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Discussions on competition issues related to TBAC platforms by antitrust authorities have therefore not 
only focused on competition between new entrants and incumbents, but, within this topic, they have paid 
special attention to its regulatory dimension. This is not a minor issue regarding the competitive 
advantages TBAC platforms might have over traditional incumbents. Anderson and Huffman (2017) 
consider that TBAC firms “include the possibility of ‘regulatory disruption’ as a means to avoid 
regulatory limits and costs that burden established firms. This happens when “whether  intentionally  or  
otherwise,  sharing  economy  enterprises  take advantage  of  regulatory  disruption  to  achieve  
competitive  scale” (…) “Achieving firmlike  stature  while  retaining  the  convenience  of  enterprises  
comprised  of independent  contractors  constitutes  regulatory  arbitrage  and  possibly regulatory 
disruption” (Anderson & Huffman, 2017). Discussions and conflicts regarding the regulation of TBAC 
platforms cover many areas that range from food safety to antitrust concerns. Nevertheless, not all of 
these are used with the purpose of “regulatory arbitrage”, which is to avoid regulatory costs (Kaplan, 
2014). When investigating the reasons behind TBAC platforms’ competitive advantages over traditional 
incumbents, three regulation-related reasons stand out: the classification of platforms as ‘digital 
marketplaces’ instead of as service providers, the classification of workers as independent contractors 
instead of as employees and fiscal elution.  
The fact that platforms are not considered service providers (i.e. the company that provides the final 
service to consumers, such as transportation in the case of ride-hailing platforms) gives them in many 
cases the opportunity to enter markets without restriction, while in some markets entry is regulated by 
local governments. For example, while hotels need to obtain licenses to operate, lodging platforms can 
monetize the accommodation market without being themselves legally considered as services providers, 
and therefore without needing to apply for licenses. Similarly, in the ride-hailing market, while the 
number of taxis is limited by the number of medallions cities establish, ride-hailing platforms have 
entered the market as suppliers of the same service bypassing the need of purchasing medallions. 
Moreover, not being considered service providers entails several regulatory advantages in terms of 
taxation, health and safety regulations, insurance liability, lessor liability or price-regulation, among 
others. In all of these cases, the ‘digital marketplace’ status exonerates platforms from the obligation to 
meet the regulations that traditional incumbent competitors have to follow. This not only gives platforms 
more flexibility but also lowers their operation costs. It should be noted that the recent opinion of the 
European Court of Justice on the 'Uber Spain' case103 classifies Uber as a service provider, rejecting the 
ride-hailing platform's claim of being an "information society service". This opinion might create a 
                                                          
103 C-434/15 Asociación Profesional Elite Taxi (‘Uber Spain Opinion’) EU:C:2017:364 
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precedent that could limit TBAC firms' competitive advantage over traditional firms arising from the 
former's legal classification. 
TBAC platforms that are labor-intensive (e.g. ride-hailing, gig-work, delivery, etc.) benefit from another 
regulatory advantage: the classification of workers as independent contractors. In most of these platforms, 
workers are independent contractors, although in most occasions they have to follow orders from the 
platform just as in a traditional boss-employee relationship. The competitive advantage of this 
(miss)classification is evident: while traditional incumbent firms have to pay welfare costs and offer 
benefits to their employees (paid vacations, sick days, etc.), TBAC platforms can save on these costs. 
Fortune magazine has estimated that if Uber had to pay the corresponding costs of having all of its drivers 
registered as employees it would cost 4.1 billion U.S. dollars, which represents a non-negligible 8% of the 
company’s valuation at the time (51 billion U.S. dollars)104.  Moreover, this status allows TBAC firms to 
avoid having to negotiate with unions, although protests by gig-workers of these platforms are becoming 
more and more common, as the strikes from workers of Foodora, Deliveroo and UberEats have shown 
(Tassinari and Maccarrone, 2017). 
Finally, it is easier for TBAC platforms to practice tax avoidance. Tax avoidance refers to all the legal 
means by which firms reduce the total amount of taxes to pay. Although this is not a practice exclusive to 
TBAC firms, the fact that they are digital firms makes it easier for them to practice it. This is so mainly 
because they can easily use transfer prices between subsidiary companies to charge for the use of their 
immaterial assets (software, databases and brands), and, in doing so, shifting all the profits to companies 
located in fiscal havens. Given that immaterial assets are more difficult to price, this method of tax 
avoidance is easier for TBAC platforms than for traditional incumbents, which gives the former a 
competitive advantage over the latter (Collin and Collin, 2013). Indeed, firms like Uber (O'Keefe and 
Jones, 2015) or Airbnb, which has more than 40 subsidiaries (Kocieniewski, 2016) elude taxes to 
surprising levels.   
It is therefore clear that the regulatory environment currently benefits TBAC firms over traditional ones. 
Depending on the analysis made, this could be seen as unfair competition (the consequence being that 
current regulation affecting incumbents should be applied to new entrants), as incumbents claim, or the 
result of outdated regulation that should be fixed to accommodate TBAC firms in their respective 
markets, as antitrust agencies advice. We would not like to go beyond this point on this topic. A thorough 
analysis would require analyzing each sector separately on a country-by-country basis and even at the 
                                                          
104 The 4.1 billion number is nonetheless an overestimation, since not all of Uber drivers work on a regular basis or 
even part-time. 
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municipality level, which would certainly divert us from the goal of this chapter. It is sufficient for the 
purposes of this chapter to conclude that regulation of different aspects affecting both TBAC firms and 
their traditional competitors is a factor to take into account in order to explain why TBAC firms have 
been able to outcompete traditional incumbents. However, it is not the only factor. 
We would like to turn now to what we believe is the second main factor that explains the competitive 
advantage of TBAC firms over their traditional rivals: efficient routines. As we have seen in the previous 
subsection, the routines that form one of the core capabilities of TBAC firms are algorithmic coordination 
routines.  
Routines are conceived by the main authors of the competence-based theory of the firm as analogous to 
software (Cyert & March, 1992; Feldman, 2003; Gioia & Poole, 1984; March, Simon, & Guetzkow, 
1993). Nelson and Winter (2004, p. 73) put it this way: “we  use ‘routine’ in a  highly flexible way, much 
as ‘program’ (or, indeed, ‘routine’) is used in discussion of computer programming. It may refer to a 
repetitive pattern of activity in an entire organization, to an individual skill or, as an adjective, to the 
smooth uneventful effectiveness of such an organizational or individual performance.” The key point of 
this analogy is the fact that routines are automatic. This is what explains the economic efficiency of 
routines over deliberation and contracts, which entail heavier coordination costs (Coriat & Weinstein, 
2010).  By assuring an almost entirely software-based coordination process, TBAC firms give individuals 
the possibility of following routines that can be more efficient to perform a task (renting a room, getting a 
pipe fixed, getting a ride) than recurring to a traditional firm. In sum, algorithmic coordination, because of 
the extreme automation of responses that it allows for, can create a routine more efficient than non-
algorithmically coordinated routines. Let us take the example of lodging to exemplify this. A traditional 
agency would contact both the host and the guest and offer them possible candidates on both sides 
according to the preferences they have declared (for example, the guest could want a house with a yard 
and the host might only accept reservations from non-smokers, three people maximum). Then these two 
clients would sign contracts with the agency and arrange the arrival details with it. In a TBAC firm such 
as Airbnb, the coordination process is almost entirely automated. Guests can find in a few clicks the most 
suitable options by themselves with the help of algorithms that, based on their profiles and past 
experiences using the platform, pre-filter the lodging that are more likely to fulfill their needs, and then 
book the house in one click. Hosts can get automatic bookings for the days where they have declared to 
the platform the house to be free, and automatically pre-filter what kind of users they want and the house 
rules they should comply with (for example, high reputation, non-smokers, no pets) as well as the prices 
and amounts of days they would like to set for different periods (for example, charge more during 
weekends, ask for a minimum stay of three days) or cancellation policies. The payment is done 
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automatically from the platform without any need to sign anything. Deliberation is minimized and 
contracts reduced to one click when both users accept the terms and conditions of the platform, which 
takes care of the rest almost entirely by recurring to algorithms that offer automated responses. In sum, 
algorithms enhance the cognitive efficiency and reduction of complexity that is proper to organizational 
routines (M. D. Cohen et al., 1996; March, Simon, & Guetzkow, 1993; Simon, 2008). Then, algorithmic 
coordination creates efficient routines that translate into different types of efficiencies for TBAC 
platforms such as lower transaction costs (e.g. a few clicks on a smartphone vs manual/face-to-face 
coordination), increased capacity utilization of assets or information efficiencies (e.g. ride-hailing using 
drivers’ smartphone GPS to dispatch the nearest one vs radio dispatchers consulting drivers through the 
radio and deciding on the dispatch based on their answers) (Edelman & Geradin, 2015). 
We have just described why algorithmic coordination represents an organizational routine proper to 
TBAC firms that can explain its superior static efficiency over traditional firms. However, routines are 
also a source of dynamic efficiency. In their cognitive dimension, routines are, as mentioned above, 
problem solving devices. These devices evolve through time to improve the way the problem is solved 
either because the environment of the firm changes or because a more efficient way of solving the device 
within the same environment is found. The set of routines structures learning dynamics (Coriat & 
Weinstein, 2010). At this point we have to be careful with the analogy between routines and genes that 
the evolutionist literature makes. Changes in routines (the genes of an organization) are assimilated to 
genetic mutation, but there is a major difference between the two. While genetic mutation is random, 
changes in routines are not. In order to change their routines, firms employ “meta-routines”, which are the 
routines that deal with the modification and adaptation of lower-level routines (Nelson & Winter, 2004). 
Meta-routines are the result of the evaluation of the performance of past routines in their selection 
environment, i.e. the market in which firms compete. In order to do so, firms store and analyze 
information on how their past routines have been carried on and how they have performed in the market 
(the selection outcome of the routine), and then proceed to make changes in accordance following a meta-
routine.  
TBAC firms have an advantage over traditional firms regarding this source of dynamic efficiency because 
they possess a much larger pool of information about the execution of their routines and their market 
outcomes. Indeed, while traditional firms usually have, in addition to individuals’ non-codifiable 
knowledge, databases where they store some aspects of the development of their routines, TBAC firms 
store every single step of the organizational routines they facilitate because each step takes place within 
the platform. From every single piece of information a user has unwillingly and effortlessly generated 
while looking for food on Foodora (what kind of food he/she likes, at what hour, from where, for how 
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much people, how much he/she spends, the restaurants he/she has checked out but declined, the time 
he/she spent in each possible option, etc.) to deliverers’ generated information (response time, distance 
traveled, path taken, etc.) to restaurants’ generated information (the dishes people order the most, when 
they order them, how much they spend, how it compares to other restaurants in the neighborhood offering 
similar food, etc.), TBAC platforms store it. This allows TBAC firms to speed the process of mutation of 
routines for two reasons. First, TBAC firms count with more information about their past routines and 
their outcomes than non-TBAC firms, which improves the possibilities of mutating routines into more 
efficient ones. Second, the fact that this information is largely codified in databases allows for the 
automation of meta-routines through the use of algorithms, which speeds up the mutation process. 
Moreover, machine learning makes possible an automated process of modification of meta-routines.  For 
example, Foodora could realize through data analysis that people in a certain neighborhood tend to order 
sushi for four on Friday nights, but that whenever they have to spend too much time scrolling through a 
vast menu they get tired and end-up ordering something easier like pizza. Then, it can adapt its routines 
by displaying more sushi restaurants and highlighting the most popular combos for four people they offer 
when users log in that certain neighborhood on Friday nights. A traditional firm would have to go through 
an expensive and more time consuming market research based on questionnaires or interviews with a 
sample of users (instead of all its users) to obtain this knowledge and adapt its routines in consequence. 
It is important to point out that this does not mean that the fact that TBAC firms possess almost every 
piece of information related to the execution of their routines and their outcomes in a codified format 
allows them to automatically find the optimal solution to every problem using algorithms. In Dosi and 
Marengo’s words, “information about sates of the world, solution concepts, and admitted rules –no matter 
how ‘perfect’- are by themselves insufficient to automatically derive in general terms any solution 
algorithm and hence, a fortiori, the optimal one. In order to do so, one requires also some form of 
preexisting knowledge and some imperfectly definable procedures, which are usually the product of 
inferential induction, analogy, and problem framing but also of socially constructed norms and bodies of 
knowledge” (Dosi & Marengo, 1994, p. 56). 
Now that we have elucidated the static and dynamic sources of efficiency that contribute to explaining the 
competitive advantage of TBAC firms that compete horizontally with non-TBAC firms, we can 
understand how this efficiency relates to the vertical market power TBAC firms possess. 
As explained above, algorithmic coordination enhances static and dynamic efficiency which, in addition 
to a regulatory environment that currently favors TBAC firms over traditional ones, allows the former to 
offer the same products as the latter at a lower price and with an improved user experience (i.e. it gives 
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them a competitive advantage). This widens the market share of TBAC firms and, therefore, makes them 
more attractive to professional workers in the case of business to consumers (B2C) TBAC firms as, for 
example, Uber (drivers), or TaskRabbit (individual contractors that perform different tasks) that otherwise 
would have worked as employees of traditional firms.  We can see here a pattern similar to the one 
studied in Chapter III when analyzing fully vertical competition in global value chains. The evolution 
from traditional service providers to B2C TBAC firms (for example, from a taxi company to a TBAC 
ride-hailing app) represents the fallback of the firm to a core competence (in this case, running a ride-
hailing service, a core competence that relies to a great extent –although not exclusively- on algorithmic 
coordination of trust-based network interactions) that renders the production process more efficient and 
cheaper for final consumers (which shows that horizontal competition exists) but that, at the same time, 
renders subcontractors more dependent on the firm than the firm is dependent on them, which gives it 
vertical market power and, therefore, the possibility to offload risk to them and capture more value. In 
B2C TBAC platforms, regardless of the market analyzed, as said before, the core competence of the firm 
builds to a large extent on algorithmic coordination of trust-based network interactions. B2C TBAC firms 
create an efficient coordination process that renders the production process of the service offered to 
clients more competitive than that of traditional firms. This, in turn, requires that members of the supply 
chain (in this case, individual contractors using the platform) accept working with the B2C TBAC firm in 
order to access the final client base that is seduced by the cheaper and better service rendered possible by 
this more efficient core competence. But as the core competence reduces the scope of the production 
process carried on by the firm and the other members of this production process (individual contractors) 
are dependent on the firm, they have to bear much of the cost of capital and accept an unfavorable 
distribution of value set by the B2B TBAC firm. This logic can be exemplified with the case of Uber. 
Drivers are forced to work for it because they can find there more clients than in brick-and-mortar 
transportation companies, since Uber's clients benefit from a better user experience and lower prices. But 
drivers, just as subcontractors of lead firms in global value chains, have to bear most of the capital costs 
(using their own vehicle, paying for the gasoline and the insurance, etc.), which lowers the cost of capital 
for Uber, boosting so its profit rate. Moreover, the dependence they have in face of Uber gives the latter 
the possibility to take a large portion of the value created. Uber’s commission ranges between 25% and 
30%, which is considerably high given that marginal costs are virtually entirely supported by drivers. It is 
important to clarify that this is only the case in for-profit TBAC platforms, those belonging to the sharing 
economy are based on free cooperation of equals and decision making is not unilaterally held by one 
stakeholder.  
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We can see how the same logic of vertical disintegration as a process that combines strong horizontal 
competition through efficiency gains and vertical market power that affected most industries that have 
adopted global value chains as their form of industrial organization takes place with the appearance of 
B2C TBAC firms. In the latter, algorithms play the role lead firms’ governance plays in global value 
chains, bridging markets and hierarchies.  
We have so far studied competition and market power dynamics proper to competition between entrant 
TBAC firms and incumbent traditional firms. Nevertheless, the ‘incumbents vs new entrants’ conflict, 
although relevant, is not the only interesting competitive dynamic the surge of TBAC firms has generated. 
Other competition issues are arising around TBAC platforms that governments should start paying 
attention to. In Balaram’s words, “in allowing sharing platforms free rein, governments turn a blind eye to 
both the monopoly power of incumbents and of emerging competitors in mainstream markets” (Balaram, 
2016).  In other words, some TBAC platforms are no longer new entrants introducing competition but 
established actors that are gaining market power and tend to dominate markets, making it more difficult 
for other platforms to compete and grow. Although antitrust agencies have so far overlooked or 
downplayed this issue, some scholars have been discussing it in recent years. These discussions will be 
the focus of the next subsection. 
 
3.1.2 Competition between trust-based algorithmic coordination platforms 
 
Richard: Right, but we can offset a lot of that once we get a few customers and start a subscription 
revenue model 
 
Russ: What? Revenue? No, no, no, no, no. No revenue. I'll call you back. What? Why would you go after 
revenue?  
 
Richard: Because… to make money.  
 
Russ: No. If you show revenue, people will ask "How much?" And it will never be enough. The company 
that was the 1x becomes the 2x dog. But if you have no revenue, you can say you're pre-revenue. You're a 
potential pure play. It's not about how much you earn, it's about what you're worth. And who's worth the 
most? Companies that lose money. Pinterest, Snapchat. No revenue. Amazon has lost money every f**ng 
quarter for the last 20 f**ng years and that Bezos motherf**er is the king.  
        
Richard: The king.  
 
Russ: There's no revenue. No one wants to see revenue.  
 
Richard: Oh, uh I just thought that mainly the goal of companies is to make money.  
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Russ: Yeah, no, no, no. That's not how it works. I don't want to make a little bit of money every day. I 
want to make a f**k ton of money all at once.  
 
                      Silicon Valley, Season 2, Episode 3, “Big Money” 
 
We shall now study competition and market power dynamics between TBAC platforms.  Using the 
multisided markets theory (subsection 3.1.2.1) and our own characterization of TBAC firms as 
algorithmic coordinators of trust-based network interactions (subsection 3.1.2.2), we will show how, 
under current regulation, these features render competition between TBAC platform a winner-takes-all 
competition. Then we will proceed to illustrate this point with some empirical evidence about Uber’s road 
to dominance of the main ride-hailing markets in the United States (subsection 3.1.2.3).   
3.1.2.1 The multisided markets roots of trust-based algorithmic coordination platforms’ winner-takes-
all markets 
 
As mentioned above, TBAC platforms are also, although not simply, multisided platforms105. Therefore, 
it is worth to begin by analyzing competitive dynamics proper to multisided platforms that have already 
been discussed in the literature. The literature has identified four factors that lead to a winner-takes-all 
dynamics in multisided markets: strong direct network effects, strong indirect network effects, difficulty 
(or irrelevance) of differentiation between platforms and difficulty of multi-homing in at least one side of 
the market (Chen & Tse, 2008; Kouris & Kleer, 2012). We shall therefore begin by assessing each of 
them in the case of the TBAC firm. 
Let us begin with network effects. In TBAC platforms direct network effects are not of much importance. 
Indeed, there is even rivalry between users of the same side of the market, sometimes in both sides of the 
market. An example of the former is the gig-work platform YoupiJoB, where workers compete to find 
clients, while clients do not compete between each other to find workers. An example of the latter is the 
carpooling platform BlaBlaCar, where the more riders there are for a certain route, the lower the chances 
a rider has to find a free spot are and, therefore, the higher the price he/she will pay will be. 
Symmetrically, the more drivers there are for a certain route, the lower the price the driver will be able to 
set. Independently of the existence of rivalry within a side of the market, the number of users in one side 
                                                          
105 We will employ hereafter the term “multisided platform” to refer to businesses that are multisided, as the term 
“multisided market” is ambiguous: sometimes it is used to refer to these businesses and sometimes to refer to the 
markets in which they operate. 
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of the market rarely increases the utility of the platform for users of that side in TBAC platforms. On the 
contrary, given that one of the main features of TBAC platforms is to put in touch individuals from two 
sides of a market for them to engage in network transactions and/or production, indirect network effects 
play a major role. In TBAC platforms, the utility of the platform for a user of one side of the market 
always depends positively on the size of the other side of the market. If this effect is strong enough, it can 
create a tendency for users to converge to a single platform once it has reached a critical mass of users in 
at least one side of the market 
Nevertheless, when differentiation between platforms participating in multisided markets is possible, the 
winner-takes all dynamic can be offset. In this sense, following Schepp and Wamback (2015), Sokol and 
Comerford (2016) argue that “online platforms are highly differentiated, even in the provision of the same 
type of service” and that “each entrant carves out a niche”. The problem with this assertion is that the 
term ‘online platform’ is too broad and not fit to analyze TBAC platforms as defined in the previous 
section. Indeed, when it comes to TBAC platforms, differentiation plays a smaller role in attracting users 
than in other types of online platforms. When discussing differentiation, the literature on multisided 
markets usually recurs to examples of multisided markets in which the originality/quality of the content 
provided by the firm or the identity of the platform are crucial for firms to gain a competitive advantage. 
This is the case of newspapers (a certain type of subjects covered, an editorial line, a writing style), social 
networks (a certain way of interacting online with other people) or night clubs (a certain aesthetic, a 
certain musical style). In the case of TBAC platforms, there is no original content and the identity of the 
platform is anecdotal. The key role of the platform is the provision of a service in which differentiation 
plays a small role because it is reduced in scope. For example, in the case of ride-hailing platforms, 
differentiation is reduced to mainly three variables: luxuriousness of the vehicle, available passenger seats 
on the vehicle and sharing or not sharing the ride with other passengers traveling along the same route. 
Consequently, it is hard to carve out a niche in ride-hailing platforms through differentiation because the 
possibilities of differentiation are limited. 
Moreover, precisely because differentiation possibilities are limited, platforms practice within-platform 
differentiation to make sure they can reach each type of user and adapt to users with swinging needs by 
offering them differentiated versions of the same service. For example, the two main American ride-
hailing apps, Uber and Lyft, offer a very similar bundle of services that differ between each other in terms 
of these three variables. Both Uber and Lyft have a baseline option that seats up to four passengers 
(Uberpop and Lyft), a minivan or SUV that seats up to six passengers (Uber XL and Lyft Plus), a cheaper 
option that pairs users with other passengers traveling along the same route (uberPool and Lyft Line), a 
luxury black service (Uber Black and Lyft Lux) and a luxury SUV or minivan service (Uber SUV and 
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Lyft Lux SUV). Similarly, Airbnb offers hosts different pricing and reservation criteria options. Hosts can 
set a fixed price per night or use an automatic pricing algorithm that takes into account supply and 
demand for similar accommodation in the area. Hosts and travelers can also choose to either having to 
send/receive a request to book/rent a house or to book/rent a house instantaneously without previous 
authorization of the host. Another example of within-platform differentiation is the gig-work platform 
TaskRabbit, where workers can opt to set a fixed hourly rate and apply to perform tasks in a future day or 
let the platform choose a variable hourly rate and have the possibility of doing tasks to be completed in 
the same day. Then, limited mimetic within-platform differentiation across competing platforms 
makes of differentiation less of a competitive advantage to carve out a niche than in other 
multisided platforms: users can find more or less the same variants of the baseline product 
regardless of the ride-hailing platform chosen. 
Let us now analyze the possibility of multi-homing (participating in two or more competing platforms) in 
TBAC platforms. The main reason why multi-homing can be hindered in TBAC platforms is the 
existence of strong switching costs. The latter exist when users refrain from switching to a competing 
platform because of the (usually non-monetary) costs it implies. In TBAC platforms, switching costs can 
be divided in three categories: learning costs (learning how a platform works), bureaucracy-related costs 
(in the case of platforms that require doing paperwork such as background checks or proof of insurance to 
join them) and ‘reputational costs’ (the cost of losing the reputation that has been accumulated in another 
platform).  
 
Learning and bureaucracy-related costs are negligible. Consumers using TBAC platforms are used to a 
dynamic market of applications and platforms and can adapt without much inconvenience to new 
platforms. In the ride-hailing market, which is probably one of the markets with higher bureaucracy-
related costs for drivers (background checks, vehicle inspection, insurance, etc.), it is common for them to 
drive for both Uber and Lyft, as studies indicate (Choudary, Parker & Van Alystne, 2015). However, 
when it comes to reputation, switching costs can be higher. As shown above, reputation plays an 
important role for users in TBAC platforms. A solid digital reputation opens the door to network 
interactions with other users that may be harder or impossible to achieve with a low reputation score. In 
Uber, drivers whose rating goes below 4.6/5 are expelled from the platform. In Airbnb, hosts with bad 
reviews get less visibility of their listings, which makes it more difficult for them to rent their houses. 
Symmetrically, drivers with higher ratings are more likely to get more rides and hosts with higher ratings 
are more likely to get more reservations and/or set a higher price as a result of the higher quality of their 
hosting other users have signaled. It is important to point out that reputational costs increase over time 
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because, the longer users have been using a platform, the more solid their reputation score is: a five stars 
score based on a hundred reviews signals better the quality of the service offered by a user than a five 
stars score based on just one review. Therefore, the more experience users collect in a platform, the higher 
the cost of losing their reputation becomes. Switching costs, and the subsequent difficulty of multi-
homing, are the consequence of users not enjoying data portability (Van Gorp & Honnefelder, 2015). 
Then, it follows that “switching costs would be reduced further if consumers were assured data portability 
between platforms” (Perzanowski & Schultz, 2010). It follows the lack of data portability, in turn, limits 
competition (Autoritat Catalana de la Competència, 2016). 
3.1.2.2 User feedback loop in the a multisided market with positive indirect network effects: a trust-
based algorithmic coordination platforms-specific barriers to entry 
 
Given that the core capability of a TBAC firm depends to a large extent on algorithmic coordination that 
relies on user activity data, it follows (as explained above when dealing with dynamic efficiency in TBAC 
firms) that large sets of user activity data are the main source of efficiency gains and quality improvement 
of the service the firm provides. In this context, the “user feedback loop” (Graef, 2015) or “data snowball 
effect”, as the French and German antitrust agencies call it (Autorité de la Concurrence & 
Bundeskartellamt, 2016) constitutes a major mechanism that pushes markets in which TBAC firms 
participate towards being winner-takes-all markets. 
This effect consists in the fact that the more users a platform has, the more attractive it becomes for users, 
although not because of network effects per se but because of a “user feedback loop” where “as a 
platform gains more users, it can collect more user data, leading to better insights into consumers and 
their needs, which can be used to improve quality, attracting even more users” (Sokol & Comerford, 
2016). The reason for this link between user activity data and the quality of the service has to do with 
technical properties of the use of big data. Algorithms not only need large amounts of data to function, 
they also need it to improve. Once an algorithm (or, more generally, a model) is correctly designed to fit 
its data (once the right questions are asked in the proper way)106, the more data that an algorithm can work 
on, the more likely it will be that it will improve over time. Once the team of developers is performant 
enough, the ‘algorithm race’ becomes a matter of who has more data. As the famous quote by Google’s 
                                                          
106 For a more detailed explanation of under which conditions does more data improve a model, see Amatriain, X. 
(2015), “Machine Learning, What is Better: More Data or better Algorithms.” Available at 
http://www.kdnuggets.com/2015/06/machine-learning-more-data-better-algorithms.html 
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Chief Scientist Peter Norvig goes, “we don’t have better algorithms than anyone else; we just have more 
data”. Therefore, “the acquisition of large volumes of data by ‘first mover’ providers may, however, raise 
barriers to entry and thus deprive users from the benefits of competition” (Geradin & Kuschewsky, 2013). 
On the same line, a report on taxation of the digital economy commanded by the French government 
points out that “all digital economy firms use data to improve their supply, obtain productivity gains, 
diversify their activities or reinforce their position on the different faces of the business model”107 (Collin 
and Collin, 2013). Moreover, the literature stresses the importance of offering a high quality service rather 
than being the first mover for a firm to enjoy the benefits of network effects in multisided  markets 
(Iansiti & Zhu, 2007; Liebowitz, 2002; Rangan & Adner, 2001).  
Taking into account the operation of the user feedback loop effect in multisided markets characterized by 
the existence of positive indirect network effects, we can expect the existence of a tipping point where a 
TBAC platform would have so much more data on user activity than its competitors for the latter to be 
unable to compete in quality with the former. In Kestenbaum words, “if the information necessary to 
compete on equal footing is not readily available from alternative sources, the potential competitive harm 
from data-driven entry barriers raises a cognizable theory of competitive harm under the antitrust laws” 
(Kimmel & Kestenbaum, 2014). In that sense, as the OECD has observed (OECD, 2015b) echoing Tim 
O’Reilly’s words (Bruner, 2013.), “where companies acquiring massive proprietary data sets there is thus 
a higher risk that we're kind of heading toward data as a source of monopoly power”. As Geradin and 
Kuschewsky (2013) have suggested, this opens the way to the use of the essential facility doctrine to 
examine this market power building mechanism, although its applicability under article 102 of the TFEU 
might not be easy. In the case of TBAC firms, the essential facility would not be data itself but a large 
enough amount of user activity data in respect to competitors’. 
Following this logic, we should expect the winner of these winner-takes-all markets to uphold a dominant 
position. Indeed, once the above-mentioned tipping point would be reached, it would be hard for potential 
competitors to challenge the winner’s position by offering a service of similar or higher quality because of 
the large asymmetry in the ownership of the necessary data that would play in favor of the winner. In 
addition, these mechanisms reinforce over time: the more users a platform has and the longer they have 
been using the platform, the stronger the user feedback loop becomes and the larger the amount of user 
activity data needed to contest the market becomes. Moreover, as said before, reputation costs could also 
become a barrier to entry which size would increase over time: the more time a platform remains the 
winner, the more experience its users collect, and, therefore, the higher the cost of losing their reputation 
                                                          
107 The translation is ours 
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becomes. Nevertheless, this does not mean that the winner would be uncontestable, although 
incumbent platforms would find it difficult to do so for the reasons we have given above. It rather 
means that we should expect that the result of competitive dynamics between TBAC firms would be 
market structures in which a dominant player will have most of the market. 
Nevertheless, not all scholars agree with the idea that the user feedback loop, coupled with positive 
indirect network effects, can create winner-takes-all dynamics in markets in which TBAC firms 
compete108. In the following lines, we will present these arguments and some counter-arguments. As we 
will show, because the former have been formulated to apply to any digital platform participating in 
multisided markets, they are rarely pertinent when assessed in the context of TBAC platforms. 
First, it has been argued that in multisided platforms it is not the number of users on each side that counts 
the most, but rather the quality of the match between users of each side because “most customers on most 
platforms are not very good matches for each other” (Evans & Schmalensee, 2017). Nevertheless, this is 
hardly the case in TBAC platforms. In ride-hailing platforms, a good match is essentially a nearby 
rider/driver, as “waiting time is an essential feature of the quality of ride hailing platforms” (Herrera 
Anchustegui & Nowag, 2017). Then, the more riders/drivers there are on the platform in a given territory, 
the more likely it will be for a nearby driver/rider to demand/offer a ride. In lodging platforms, although 
users’ requirements are more specific (e.g. visitors might want to stay in a certain neighborhood and not 
pass a certain budget, while hosts might prefer hosting couples of non-smokers), the more hosts there are, 
the more likely it will be for visitors to find a good match, and vice versa. For this reason, users use 
TBAC platforms that have the most users. Moreover, the probability of a good match happening depends 
also on the performance of the matching algorithm. In ride-hailing platforms, the algorithm predicts 
which areas will see a rise in demand and, accordingly, ‘directs’ drivers there by increasing the price of 
rides in the area and/or by providing benefits (e.g. bonuses or granting more rides) to drivers that go there, 
as the above-mentioned case about Uber’s use of the software Hell shows. In order to do a proper 
prediction, ride-hailing apps recur to past data on how drivers and riders have interacted in the platform 
(McLean, 2016). In Airbnb, algorithms predict supply and demand for different types of accommodations 
depending on the time of the year. Using that information, which builds on past data about users’ 
interaction within the platform, they customize the options they display to visitors and suggest prices to 
hosts in order to maximize the number of “good matches” (and the revenue of the platform). Therefore, 
                                                          
108 We will follow Sokol & Comerford’s (2016) and Evans & Schmalensee’s (2017) papers since they cover vastly 
the criticisms that have been made in the literature against winner-takes-all dynamics in multisided markets.  
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the accumulation of large amounts of data by one firm can lead it to secure a competitive advantage that 
can only increase over time as the data snowball effect keeps operating. 
Second, following Tucker and Wellford (2014) and Lerner (2014), Sokol and Comerford argue that 
“online providers can gain scale in users in ways that do not involve user data, and that access to data 
alone is not enough to improve quality and gain scale in users. Additionally, firms can gather data from 
other sources than users (e.g. data brokers), and can gain scale in data in alternative ways, such as 
entering into strategic distribution arrangements” (Sokol & Comerford, 2016). The problem with the first 
argument is that in TBAC platforms’ quality depends much more on access to large datasets on user 
activity than in other online platforms. As said before, contrary to what happens in other digital platforms, 
differentiation plays a smaller role and takes place within platforms to a large extent, while the service 
they offer does not have any original content aspect. Then, the quality of the product depends highly on 
the performance of algorithms, which in turn relies on the availability of large datasets on user activity 
that allows their improvement. The second argument is currently difficult to hold in the case of TBAC 
platforms. To our knowledge, there are no data brokers that could sell relevant data to new TBAC 
entrants. Moreover, we have to be careful on what data we are talking about. The most relevant data for a 
new TBAC entrant is observed data on how users interact within competing incumbent platforms. 
Contrary to non-TBAC data-driven businesses such as search engines, the data collected by TBAC 
platforms about their users’ activity cannot be obtained without the platforms’ consent. For data brokers 
to have access to it (which, to our knowledge, is not the case for TBAC platforms), they would need to 
buy it from TBAC platforms. It is difficult to imagine why an incumbent TBAC platform would sell that 
valuable data to a data broker that could in turn make a profit by selling it to competing TBAC platforms. 
Nevertheless, some ways to obtain (partial) data user activity exist. For example, it has been recently 
revealed that the company Unroll.me, which offers a simple unsubscribing service from mailing lists to 
users, has used the access users give it to their emails to collect data on the Lyft bills they get through 
email and sell it to Uber, its main competitor (The Hustle, 2017). Although these indirect and alternative 
ways of obtaining user experience data may exist, it has to be kept in mind that they are rare and partial. 
A third similar argument offered by Sokol and Comerford (2016) is that “data is ubiquitous, inexpensive, 
and easy to collect” (C. Tucker, 2012) because “customers leave multiple digital footprints on the internet 
(Lambrecht & Tucker, 2015)”. While this is true for data in general, as we said before, it is seldom the 
case for the specific data a new firm would need to challenge TBAC incumbents. The digital footprints 
that are useful to new entrants are mostly located in proprietary databases owned by incumbents. If, for 
example, a platform cooperative like Juno wanted to capture a significant market share from Uber and 
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Lyft in the United States, it would need large amounts of data of users’ trips in those platforms, not any 
data.  
The fourth argument is that data is non-exclusive and non-rivalrous. In other words, “collection of a piece 
of data by one firm does not occur at the expense of another firm” (Sokol & Comerford, 2016). This 
claim confuses the technical properties of data with the legal rights applied to it, while in fact economic 
properties of data are the combined result of the two. Data being non-exclusive and non-rivalrous depends 
on what data we are talking about. It is true in the case of personal information, for example. A person 
can provide information about his/her birthplace to two competing platforms. But it is not true for most of 
the relevant data new entrants would need to compete in the sharing economy. Following our previous 
example, if Uber has information about a certain amount of trips users did using its application, Juno will 
never be able to collect that same data to improve its algorithms because Uber’s exclusive intellectual 
property rights over the database that contains that data and/or its right to use trade secret to keep the data 
away from competitors gives it a legal right to exclude Juno from its use. In other words, intellectual 
property and trade secrecy can create rivalrousness where technical conditions do not. 
The fifth argument is that “data has a limited lifespan – old data is not nearly as valuable as new data – 
and the value of data lessens considerably over time” (Sokol & Comerford, 2016). This assertion is taken 
from Chiou and Tucker’s paper (2014), which investigate search engines. There is no reason to consider it 
is also the case of TBAC platforms. On the contrary, as said before, it is precisely past data that allows 
algorithms to perform an effective matchmaking in TBAC platforms. 
The sixth argument is that “the possession of data alone therefore, even in large volume, does not secure 
competitive success – that can only be achieved through engineering talent, quality of service, speed of 
innovation, and attention to consumer needs” (Sokol & Comerford, 2016). Similarly, Evans and 
Schmalensee (2017) argue that multisided platforms “have to figure out how to get all sides on board in 
order to create any value at all”. This is certainly true, but it does not imply that the lack of large amounts 
of data can be a barrier to entry for newcomers in markets in which TBAC platforms participate. New 
entrants can effectively overcome this barrier by offering a very good service, but that does not mean the 
barrier does not exist. Moreover, it should be pointed out that this argument, backed in Evans and 
Schmalensee’s (2017) article by the example of the case of Youtube, has a lesser weight in the case of 
TBAC platforms than in content-based platforms or social media platforms. While some platforms 
effectively rely a lot on the distinctive features of the platforms to engage users to participate, the decision 
to choose a particular TBAC platform depends mainly on variables that leave little room for 
differentiation (e.g. short waiting times, small prices, having many offerings to choose from, etc.). These 
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variables, in turn, depend largely, for users from each side of the market, on the number of users on the 
other size of the market, and the resulting matchmaking-improving data having many users on both sides 
of the platforms generates. 
Finally, Evans & Schmalensee (2017) argue that indirect network effects are a double-edged sword 
because they can work in reverse. The argument is that, since switching costs are low, once a better 
platform comes into the market, users start multi-homing and eventually drop the first (dominant) 
platform to join the new one, which leads to an exponential decline (inverse network effects) in the 
number of users of the first platform. The authors recall the examples of social networks (AOL, 
Friendster, MySpace, Orkut and Yahoo), mobile providers (Blackberry and Microsoft), search engines 
(AltaVista, Infoseek and Lycros) and browsers (Microsoft) that suffered from reverse network effects to 
back their argument. Although, as said above, we agree on the fact that switching costs are rather small in 
TBAC platforms and multi-homing is easy, we believe this argument does not hold properly in the case of 
TBAC platforms. As said above, contrary to social networks, mobile providers, search engines and 
browsers, product differentiation plays a small role in TBAC platforms and it even takes place within 
platforms that have the largest users base. Consequently, the attractiveness of a new TBAC platform 
relies vastly on its capacity to offer to both sides of the market a service which quality depends on 
variables that leave little room for differentiation (e.g. short waiting times, small prices, having many 
offerings to choose from, etc.) and that, in turn, rely heavily on having a large user’s base.  
In a nutshell, the problem with the arguments exposed above is that they refer to the platform economy in 
general. While they may apply to some types of online platforms, they are rarely pertinent when it comes 
to TBAC platforms because the latter present particularities that we have pointed out in Section 2. This 
shows why it is important to analyze the competitive dynamics of each type of platform of the platform 
economy separately as we decided to do by focusing on TBAC platforms. 
We conclude that there are mechanisms through which competition dynamics between TBAC firms tend 
to create winner-takes-all markets in which the winner would hold a dominant position. This is due to the 
combination of several features proper to the TBAC firm and its regulatory environment: the small role 
played by differentiation, the prevalence of (mimetic) within-platform differentiation and the existence of 
particularly strong and positive indirect network effects that, coupled with a ‘user feedback loop’, can 
make large enough amounts of data on user activity become an essential facility. 
3.1.2.3 Some evidence of winner-takes-all dynamics in trust-based algorithmic-coordination 
platforms’ markets: the case of Uber in the main U.S. ride-hailing markets 
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We have argued in the previous section that TBAC platforms’ markets are winner-takes-all markets. In 
this section we will provide some (rough) evidence that supports this claim using the example of Uber, a 
platform that seems to be conquering the main ride-hailing markets of the United States. The choice of 
this case responds to three criteria. First there is the availability of data. The data required to rigorously 
analyze the existence of a winner-takes-all dynamic in any market where TBAC platforms compete is 
currently scarce and incomplete. Nevertheless, in the case of Uber and its competitors, some scattered 
sources of data that will help us in this endeavor are available. Although imperfect, the available evidence 
will offer some interesting insights. The second criteria is that transportation is one of the sectors in which 
TBAC platforms have expanded the most and, therefore, a sector in which the winner-takes-all dynamics 
described above are more likely to be manifesting already. Finally, the United States is a country in which 
competition between two TBAC platforms, Uber and Lyft, is particularly strong, so the choice of this 
country represents a hard test of our theoretical findings.  
In order to build our argument, we will begin by defining the relevant market of ride-hailing platforms. 
Then we will compare the existent data on market shares in American ride-hailing markets to show that, 
as expected in winner-takes-all markets, the market shares of a single firm (Uber) have been increasing to 
the detriment of that of its competitors’. Finally, we will show that Uber’s strategy to conquer these 
markets seems to be based on a predatory pricing strategy that can only be rational if ride-hailing markets 
are winner-takes-all markets. 
Market definition and market shares 
 
We will begin by analyzing the evolution of market shares. If, as we claim, ride-hailing markets are 
becoming winner-takes-all markets that Uber is conquering, we should observe an increasing gap over 
time between Uber’s market share and its competitors’ in favor of the former. In order to so, we need to 
define first the relevant market in which Uber participates.  
 
The definition of the relevant market is particularly difficult when it comes to multisided platforms. 
Traditional approaches based on defining the products that are part of the relevant market and those that 
are not “are particularly likely to obscure market realities” in the case of multisided platforms (Evans and 
Noel, 2005), since competition does not take place in a single-sided market over a product or a range of 
products. Because the aim of defining a relevant market is to understand the factors that constraint 
business behavior and to assess the contours of competition of a firm, a more fruitful approach for ride-
hailing platforms (and for multisided platforms in general) consist in identifying sources of competition 
constraints (Evans and Noel, 2005). Based on the analysis of Uber’s business model made in the recent 
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“Uber Spain Opinion”109, Dunne (2018) argues that Uber’s market is the underlying services market (the 
ride-hailing service market) rather than a niche intermediation market. This is a geographically defined 
market that can be circumscribed to a territory. In this geographically defined market, and consistently 
with the finding of the literature on market definition in multisided platforms, firms compete to attract 
users on both sides of the market (Evans and Noels, 2005; Dune, 2018). On the riders’ side, two types of 
Uber competitors can be identified: other ride-hailing platforms (the main and only national one in the 
United States being Lyft) and other non-platform-based ride-hailing services, out of which the most 
relevant ones are taxis. On the drivers’ side of the market, given that the number of taxi licenses is limited 
by regulators and their price is too onerous for the vast majority of Uber and Lyft drivers110, taxis are not 
to be considered as relevant competitors. In other words, ride-hailing platforms do not compete with taxis 
for drivers because ride-hailing apps’ drivers can very rarely become taxi drivers, and taxi 
drivers can only lose income by becoming ride-hailing drivers.  
 
Having defined Uber’s relevant market, we should begin by studying the evolution of its market shares in 
these markets. Two observations need to be made in this respect before starting studying Ubers’ market 
shares. First, because, as said above, Uber competes over users on both sides of the platforms (drivers and 
riders), ideally, the measurement of market shares should be done on both sides: the share of rides and the 
share of full-time equivalent drivers of each competitor. Unfortunately, there is no such available data on 
drivers. Therefore, we will have to limit our analysis to measurements of market shares that only consider 
the riders’ side of the market. Nevertheless, ceteris paribus, unless mean waiting time increases 
considerably, because of the existence of indirect network effects, an increase in a firm’s riders’ market 
share will translate into an increase in its drivers’ market share. Otherwise, average waiting time would 
increase because of an excess of demand for rides, which would in turn reduce riders’ market shares as 
passengers shift to competitors with lower mean waiting times. Then, although we will not be able to 
measure drivers’ market shares, we can make conclusions about their dynamics (and not their 
magnitudes) by looking at how the riders’ market shares evolve. This is not very problematic as what we 
need to corroborate is if there is a widening gap between Uber’s and its competitors’ market shares over 
time. Second, although calculations of Uber’s market shares on the riders’ side of the market exist, they 
generally define the market narrowly, as most of them consider either Lyft or taxis as the other market 
                                                          
109 Opinion in C-434/15 Asociación Profesional Elite Taxi (‘Uber Spain Opinion’) EU:C:2017:364 
 
110 A recent study by the MIT (Zoepf et al, 2018) shows that, in the United States, 74% of Uber and Lyft drivers earn 
less than the minimum wage in their state.  
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participant and not the two, while some measurements include both of them. Given that data sources are 
scarce, we will recur to all of these sources and, conscious of their shortcomings, compare them to 
corroborate our theoretical findings of this section. 
 
When we look at the existing evidence on Uber’s market share properly calculated (i.e. when both taxis 
and Lyft are taken as market participants), they all show that Uber is on its way to dominating the market. 
By combining different data sources on 1.1 billion trips in New York, and taking Uber, Lyft, Green Taxi 
and Yellow Taxi as market participants, Schneider (2016a) finds that between May 2015 and September 
2016111 Uber has steadily increased its market share measured in number of trips much more rapidly than 
Lyft and to the detriment of Yellow Taxi’s. It follows from this tendency shown in Figure 22 that Uber is 
on its way to dominating the New York City market, including every borough (Brooklyn, Queens, 
Manhattan, Bronx and Staten Island) and airport trips. 
 
Figure 21: New York monthly pickups –May 2015 and September 2016 
 
 
Source: Schneider (2016b) 
 
The same tendency is verified when the analysis is narrowed down to each borough (Schneider, 2016b) 
and airports: Uber’s market shares grow exponentially, Lyft’s grow at a decelerating pace and taxis’ fall.  
                                                          
111 This timeframe, like all the other timeframes used to calculate the other market shares that will be presented in 
this subsection, are not the most pertinent to draw conclusions by any means. Lacking additional sources of data to 
calculate market shares, we have no option but to take these numbers knowing they present limitations. 
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This tendency is corroborated by analyses that, by recurring to a narrower market definition that includes 
Uber and taxis but not Lyft as market participants, also conclude that Uber is gaining market shares to the 
detriment of taxis. Using data provided by the New York City Taxi and Limousine Commission, Fischer-
Baum & Bialik (2015) estimate that between 2014 and 2015 Uber’s share of pickups has increased by 12 
percentage points for the April-June period in New York City counting all the boroughs. The same 
tendency is observed by Certify (2015) for business travelers in all main cities of the United States during 
the first quarter of 2015. Nelson (2016), in turn, finds that since Uber and Lyft started operating in Los 
Angeles, trips taken in taxis have declined by 30% over three years (2012 to 2015). Similarly, “in San 
Francisco, the corporate home of both Uber and Lyft, the number of trips taken per taxi dropped by more 
than two-thirds over a two-year period” (Nelson, 2016). 
 
Finally, calculations that define the market by only taking into consideration Uber and Lyft as market 
participants show that Uber is taking an increasing share of the trips taxis are losing to ride-hailing apps. 
A report from 7Park that compares the market shares of these two platforms by revenue shows that 
Uber’s market share was considerably larger in the twenty main U.S. cities in the second quarter of 2016. 
During that period, its market share varied from 62% to 83% depending on the city (7Park, 2016). This is 
in line with the (optimistic) claim Uber made to its investors in August 2016 according to which its 
market share (which includes only other ride-hailing apps as market participants) in the U.S. was between 
84% and 87% (Bloomberg Technology, 2016). If we turn now to the evolution of the gap between Uber 
and Lyft’s market shares, we corroborate what is expected in a winner-takes-all market: it widens over 
time in favor of the winner (Uber). Using anonymized credit and debit card spending data of a sample of 
3.8 millions of users, a report by FutureAdvisor shows that, between June 2013 and September 2014 
Uber’s revenue has increased 10 to 11 times faster than Lyft’s in absolute terms. For the same period, 
Uber has increased its number of rides 6 to 7 times faster than Lyft in absolute terms (FutureAdvisor, 
2014). Moreover, during that period 82,000 people used Uber, while only 14,200 people (5.8 times less) 
used Lyft.  
We can conclude that the available figures on ride-hailing market shares in the main United States 
markets, although certainly imperfect and incomplete, point out in the same direction: Uber is increasing 
its market share to the detriment of both taxis’ and Lyft’s. These market shares, although not large enough 
to raise suspicions of dominance neither by European (above 40% of the market) or US antitrust (65% 
market share being “doubtful”) standards (Dunne, 2018) when both taxis and Lyft are taken as market 
participants, are evolving in favor of Uber and to the detriment of its competitors, as expected in winner-
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takes-all markets. Nevertheless, it should be noted that even if these market shares were large, there 
would not necessarily be indicative of market power. Market shares provide an indication that may be 
disproved by other factors. In this sense, it is pertinent to analyze other indications that back our 
theoretical findings according to which there is a risk of Uber gaining market power in the future when it 
becomes the winner of a winner-takes-all market. In this sense, in the next subsection we will study 
Uber’s behavior in these markets to argue that the increase in its market shares is the result of a predatory 
pricing strategy that can only be rational if ride-hailing markets are winner-takes-all markets in which, 
once Uber becomes the winner, it will gain market power, which will allow it to recover the losses 
induced by predation. 
Signs of Uber’s predatory pricing strategy aimed at securing a winner-takes-all ride-hailing market 
 
We have seen so far that Uber’s market shares are increasing exponentially to the detriment of Lyft’s and 
taxis’. What strategy is it employing to get there? On the riders’ side of the market, Uber has expanded by 
systematically cutting fares in more and more cities every January for three years in a row since 2014. In 
that year, it did so in 16 of its 24 US cities. In 2015 it cut fares in 48 cities and in 2016 in 100 cities. 
While this boosts demand, it decreases the size of the drivers’ side of the market, since drivers earn 
money by getting a cut of the fare charged to riders. Moreover, Uber has been increasing the commission 
it takes from drivers, lowering so drivers’ revenue per trip. Until 2014, Uber’s commission was 20%. It 
then rose to 25% and it is as high as 30% in some cities. In addition, Uber started charging flat fees to 
drivers in 2014, the amount of which began at 1 dollar and is now as high as 2.5 dollars in some cities 
(Bloomberg Technology, 2016). To avoid losing drivers, Uber has started offering them bonuses, 
incentive programs an earning guarantees. It is worth noting that the conditions that drivers need to meet 
to be eligible for earning guarantees make it almost impossible for drivers to work for other platforms at 
the same time (i.e. to practice multi-homing). In other words, Uber has been systematically subsidizing 
both sides of the market. 
As a result of this strategy, Uber has been reporting losses since its foundation in 2009. In 2015 it lost 2 
billion dollars and in the first half of 2016 it lost 1.27 billion dollars. Uber’s head of finance, Gautman 
Gupta, claimed that subsidies to drivers explain the majority of the company’s losses (Bloomberg 
Technology, 2016). Nevertheless, Uber has increasingly been able to raise large amounts of funds. 
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Figure 22: Uber’s vs Lyft’s cumulated funding (in million US dollars)
 
Source: own elaboration based on www.crunchbase.com 
 
As Figure 23 shows112, Uber raised 3,700 million dollars in 2015 (equivalent to 185% of the losses of that 
year) and 4,850 million dollars in 2016 (equivalent to 328% of its mid-year losses). In its last round of 
funding in August 2016, Uber’s valuation was set at 69 billion dollars, a number that seems astronomical 
(roughly 35 times the value of Uber’s yearly losses of the past 2 years!) considering the company has 
been making losses for 9 years in a row since its foundation. 
These trends indicate that Uber, which has no other source of revenue but the commission it takes on each 
trip, is engaging in predatory pricing to conquer a winner-takes-all market. Indeed, in the case of 
multisided platforms, predatory pricing takes place when a firm makes losses over the whole platform 
(Evans & Schmalensee, 2005), and not over the most elastic side of the market, since multisided 
platforms’ pricing schemes are characterized by one side subsidizing the other one. This is the case with 
Uber, which systematically cuts fares (riders’ side of the market) and gives bonuses, incentive programs 
an earning guarantees to drivers (drivers’ side of the market) and, as a result, has been making losses over 
                                                          
112 The numbers shown in Figure 23 do not include the funding rounds with undisclosed figures of money raised that 
took place in the following periods. For Uber: December 2011, February 2015, April 2017 and January 2018. For 
Lyft: April 2014, October 2016 and December 2017. 
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the whole platform for 9 years. This strategy echoes traditional predatory pricing models based on 
financial constraints in which, as long as a firm can secure more financial resources than its rivals to 
sustain a price war long enough, it will be rational for it to practice predation (Roberts, 1985). As Figure 
23 shows, Uber benefits from considerable financial asymmetries in respect to Lyft: being a year younger, 
Uber has been able to secure about four times more funds than its local American rival Lyft. Moreover, 
Uber’s last valuation has been estimated at 70 billion dollars, while Lyft’s has been estimated at 11 billion 
dollars113. Far from being a United States phenomenon, predatory pricing strategies take place in other 
countries’ ride-hailing markets. In Asian markets, Uber left the market after losing a price war with Grab 
(South East Asia), on the one side, and Didi (China), on the other side. In both cases, as stated recently by 
Raphaël Morel, Uber’s Head of City Development in France114, Uber left these markets because it did not 
have as many financial resources as its competitors to survive the price war. 
The only possible explanation for this strategy is that, consistently with our analysis in this section, 
investors are providing enough funds for Uber to be the winner of a winner-takes-all market in which it 
will eventually be able to make up for the losses of the previous years by exerting market power. Given 
that entry costs are low in the ride-hailing market (they come down to basically the developing an app and 
marketing campaigns), Uber’s predation strategy can only be rational if the market, as we argued in this 
section, is a winner-takes-all one. In this case, Uber would be able to recover from the cost of predation in 
two combinable ways. First, once it dominates a market, it can raise prices, just like the Chinese ride-
hailing app Didi did once it won a price war to Uber in China (Beijing Review, 2016). Second, it can use 
its dominance over ride-hailing markets to conquer other markets. This could happen by using the data in 
markets where competition takes place through innovation, as it is currently doing by using ride-hailing 
data to develop artificial intelligence that will allow it to enter the autonomous vehicle market. It could 
also happen by following a business group structure similar to that of the Chinese net giants Tencent, 
Alibaba and Baidu, in which “the different platforms can both feed one another and be leveraged to 
expand into other business areas” (Jia & Kenney, 2016) by cross-feeding traffic to another platform (e.g. 
the food delivery platform Uber Eats) and using cross-platform personal data to customize offers to users. 
In any case, if a new entrant tries to contest the market once Uber wins it, the latter, relying on its market 
dominance to attract even more investors than today, and knowing that differentiation is not a strategy 
that pays-off in ride-hailing markets, could trigger a price war and leverage on the financial and data 
                                                          
113 Last valuations available on May 13th 2018. 
 
114 Statement made during the conference « Plateformes et territoires » organized by the Cities and Digital 
Technology Chair of Sciences Po on May 3rd 2018 in Paris. 
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asymmetries (the latter improving its matchmaking algorithm, as shown above) that would play in its 
favor to remain dominant. 
These findings lead us to encourage industrial economists to further study the particularities of TBAC 
platforms so that regulators and competition authorities can avoid the abuse of market power by dominant 
platforms in the future. As shown at the beginning of Section 3, competition authorities are focusing on 
competition issues related to TBAC firms that are related to asymmetries in regulation in respect to 
traditional firms, while they are downplaying or avoiding treating the issue of the constitution of winner-
takes-all markets. Moreover, as we have shown in the case of Uber, these markets are in some cases being 
conquered by TBAC platforms that recur to predatory pricing, which should be as much as a concern as 
regulatory asymmetries when it comes to guaranteeing competition on equal footing in markets in which 
TBAC firms participate. 
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Conclusions 
 
In this chapter, we have focused on the competitive and market power dynamics of a particular new type 
of firm that, just like the network-firm we studied in Chapter III, was born out of the ICT revolution: the 
TBAC firm. We started our analysis by situating TBAC platforms in the broader context of the platform 
economy. We explained how the latter was enabled by the ICT technological revolution that started in the 
1970s and reached a critical maturity in the 2000s. By that decade, the conjunction of widespread internet, 
the maturity of the microprocessors revolution that made PCs and smartphones pervasive and cloud 
computing allowed for the creation of an array of business models based on platforms that collect data 
and treat it with algorithms to provide services. By recalling the cases of Amazon and Google, we 
illustrated the different roles data can play in platform firms’ business models. Moreover, we signaled the 
difference between the sharing economy, in which horizontal coordination between peers takes place 
within the platform, and platform capitalism, which is characterized by for-profit platforms. 
Having set the context of the emergence of the platform economy, we moved on to analyzing a particular 
type of platform-firm: the TBAC firm. We first reviewed its history and showed how TBAC platforms 
started as novel sharing economy organizations before platform capitalism took over them and eventually 
led to the birth of a new minority sharing economy trend within TBAC platforms: platform 
cooperativism. Then, based on a competence-based theory of the firm, we proposed a novel 
characterization of TBAC firms as algorithmic coordinators of trust-based network interactions, a 
characterization that, in our view, overcomes the problems of current definitions of the type of firms the 
TBAC economy includes. Building on this characterization, we showed that algorithmic coordination is a 
source of both static and dynamic efficiency that, along with a current regulation that, although 
heterogenic across countries and even cities, tends to benefit TBAC firms over traditional firms, accounts 
for a large part of the competitive advantage of TBAC firms over traditional firms that act as incumbents 
in their respective markets. Moreover, we showed how the movement from non-TBAC firms to TBAC 
firms resonates with that from vertically integrated firms to an industrial organizational landscape 
dominated by network-firms (cf. Chapters I and III) in that, by recurring to a fallback to (overall more 
efficient) firms’ core competences, strong horizontal competition is amalgamated with vertical market 
power.  Then we proceeded to analyze competition between TBAC platforms and we have argued that, 
given the algorithmic coordination nature of the TBAC firm and current regulation on data ownership, 
there is a tendency towards winner-takes-all markets in the TBAC economy, a claim we have empirically 
supported by studying the case of Uber in the main United States ride-hailing markets. 
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Conclusions of Part II 
 
Part II has been dedicated to offering contributions to make strong price competition and long-run profit 
rate differentials theoretically compatible. We focused on two organizational objects that are of special 
relevance today and in which the coexistence of these two stylized facts can be identified: global value 
chains and trust-based algorithmic coordination platforms, a subset of platform capitalism. 
Chapter III picked up the torch of the previous two chapters by offering a contribution to a competition 
theory of the internationally-dispersed network-firm or ‘global value chain’ in which strong price 
competition between network-firms is compatible with some firms exerting fully vertical market power 
within the network-firm and, as a result, obtaining bigger profits in the long-run. We have shown how 
uneven interdependence, which arises from firms’ capabilities being dispersed along the vertically-
disintegrated global value chains that started becoming the norm in the 1990s, is the foundation of this 
form of market power that is not limited to the immediate tiers of the supply chain. It is precisely because 
strong network-firm vs network-firm competition forces firms to cooperate to produce at the lowest 
possible price a final product that some firms that are more essential to the overall production process of 
the network-firm are able to capture more value than others through the exertion of positional market 
power, obtaining higher profit rates as a consequence. Moreover, we have shown that the fact that firms 
have been increasingly focusing on their core competences since the 1980s is in part a long-run strategy 
aimed at maximizing this positional market power by increasing their centrality in the network-firms they 
belong to. Such a strategy, in turn, would not have been possible without all the (international) 
institutional transformations identified in Chapter I that occurred in parallel. 
In Chapter IV we further illustrated how, by the mid-2000s, this competitive dynamic characterized by 
some firms exerting vertical market power in a strong price competition scenario has started to appear in a 
new type of firm within the emergent platform capitalism, the trust-based algorithmic coordination 
(TBAC) firm. Relying on an evolutionary theory of the firm, we have shown that the distinctive trait of 
firms such as the ride-hailing platform Uber or the lodging platform Airbnb lies on the fact that the 
routines that form a large part of their core competences consist in coordinating through algorithms 
exchanges between legally independent firms or individuals and providing trust-creating mechanisms 
without which these exchanges could not take place. Using the case of Uber as an illustration, we showed 
that, just as in the network-firm, the TBAC firm conjugates vertical market power (TBAC firms being 
able to obtain increasingly higher shares of the value created with other members of the network, e.g. 
drivers) with strong price competition (e.g. Uber constantly cutting prices to leave its competitors out of 
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the market) in a competitive dynamic in which there is a tendency towards winner-takes-all markets. Here 
again, vertical positional market power coexists with strong price competition and, moreover, market 
power serves to articulate a production process in which each coalition of agents, be it a network-firm or 
the producers of different TBAC firms’ platforms and the companies owning them, compete strongly on 
price. 
The results of Part II show that market power and competition can establish a synergic relationship today. 
Moreover, the fact that we could account for this relationship in two very distinct organizational objects 
that have emerged during the current form of competition identified in Chapter I (Finance-led 
competition) suggests that there have been recent historical developments both in institutions and in 
technology that have transformed the nature of the link between competition and market power in some 
organizational fields. We will develop this reflection in the general conclusions. 
  
 273 
General conclusions 
 
This thesis has been devoted to understanding possible articulations between competition and market 
power that differ from the traditional opposition between these two concepts on which all competition 
theories are built. Noticing the seemingly incompatible coexistence of long-run profit rate differentials 
between firms, a strong sign of market power, and fierce international price competition is what has 
triggered this investigation. Proposing a theoretical conciliation of the two in which competition and 
market power may establish a symbiotic relation has been the main goal of this thesis. 
In doing so, we have examined competition theories (Chapter II) and American economic history 
(Chapter I), as well as two distinct organizational objects emblematic of contemporary competitive 
dynamics: global value chains (Chapter III) and trust-based algorithmic coordination firms (Chapter IV). 
As we have already developed in length the conclusions of all of these separate examinations in each 
chapter respectively, we will devote the general conclusions to exposing the main original contributions 
we have offered in this thesis that constitute answers to our general problem. After doing so, we will 
present the limitations of our work and the future lines of research that we believe follow from the 
findings and the limitations of this thesis. 
Main original findings 
 
Changes in institutions, technology and the nature of the firm not only affect the 
degree of market power; they also transform the nature of its link with competition 
 
 
When we reviewed the exiting competition theories in Chapter II, we were able to appreciate how they 
evolved through time to account for historical transformations in the relevance of competition and market 
power and their mechanisms. For example, Imperfect Competition Theory is to a large extent a product of 
the rise of market power in the United States and England during the period we have described in Chapter 
I as ‘Constricted competition’ (circa 1920s to 1945) for the American case. Nevertheless, as history goes 
on, competition theory evolves by building theoretical architectures that seem to account for a certain 
period and, when times change, other (often contradictory and incompatible) competition theory is born to 
explain the new scenario. Each of these competition theories implies a certain link between competition 
and market power. While in all of them the two are opposed (i.e. market power is exerted if and only if 
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competition is hindered), the conditions under which market power can be obtained and exerted, the 
nature and the definition of competition and the conditions under which competition may lead to market 
power obtainment and exertion, vary from theory to theory. Nevertheless, each theory poses the link 
between competition and market power as an immutable one: regardless of the theory taken into 
consideration, competition theory would argue that if the balance between competition and market 
power varies it is because the conditions under which this link takes place (barriers to entry, 
information asymmetries, etc.) change over time and space and across industries, making the 
degree of market power evolve. In every case, the important roles of the evolution of institutions 
and historical transformations in affecting the nature of the antithetical relation between the two is 
downplayed or absent. Interestingly, Regulation theory, which is certainly the theoretical framework 
that has stressed the influence of institutional and technological change on competitive dynamics the 
most, also fails to appreciate how this influence can alter the nature of the link between competition and 
market power. Indeed, Regulation Theory considers ‘competitive’ and ‘non-competitive’ periods in 
history that are the result of historical institutional transformations in institutions, but in all cases market 
power is the denial of competition; institutions change over time and give market power more or less 
relevance over competition. 
In this thesis we have shown that, on the contrary, history not only transforms the conditions under 
which competitive and market power mechanisms are exerted, resulting in variations in the degree 
of market power; it also transforms the very nature of the link between competition and market 
power.  When analyzing the Collusive competition era (circa 1870s to 1910s) we saw how institutional 
transformations such as the literalist interpretation of the Sherman Act and the introduction of the shop-
right doctrine, as well as the technological revolution of the age of heavy engineering, led to the use of 
horizontal integration and patents as mechanisms of horizontal market power that were aimed at 
regulating competition through collusion, not hindering it. This was due to the experience of the previous 
Predatory competition era (circa 1840s 1860s) in which excessive competition had proven to be ruinous 
for firms. In absence of effective institutions that would regulate competition to avoid the effects of 
predatory competition, firms used horizontal market power to regulate competition. Nevertheless, lacking 
barriers to entry, they failed to a large extent in their endeavor. When, during the Constricted competition 
era (circa 1920s to 1945), other institutional transformations such as the rule of reason interpretation of 
the Sherman Act or the recognition of the ownership of employees’ inventions by the firm in the labor 
contract gave firms the possibility of integrating vertically and using patents as barriers to entry 
respectively, market power quickly became a mean to constrict competition. In other words, an 
institutional and technologically-driven change that increased market power led to a qualitative 
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transformation of the nature of its link with competition: it passed from regulating it to constricting 
it.  
Similarly, we saw in Chapter I how the ICT revolution, the expansion, reinforcement and homogenization 
of the IP regime and the liberalization of trade gave birth to a new type of firm, the internationally-
dispersed network-firm or ‘global value chain´. We showed (cf. Chapter III) that market power is the 
backbone of the network-firm in that it allows for the coordination of production within it, articulating in 
that manner competition between network-firms. At the same time, market power is the foundation of an 
uneven distribution of profits within the network-firm. Once again, institutional and technological 
transformations, as well as the subsequent organizational transformation the emergence of the 
(internationally-dispersed) network-firm represents, gave birth to a new type of link between market 
power and competition in which the former articulates the latter. The same conclusion can be drawn from 
the findings of Chapter IV regarding trust-based algorithmic coordination (TBAC) firms. The ICT 
revolution also allowed for this new type of firm; its appearance, in conjunction with the regulatory 
regimes applying to the data produced by these platforms, led to a competitive dynamic in which market 
power articulates competition. Indeed, the efficiency of algorithmic-coordination in winner-takes-all 
markets give TBAC firms market power, which they use both to extract more value from platform users 
and to algorithmically coordinate the fierce competition they are entangled in with TBAC and traditional 
firms. 
 
Market power can be based on the capacity to efficiently coordinate production… 
and this gives it the possibility to coordinate competition 
 
 
We have seen in Chapter II how most competition theories conceive market power as an obstacle to 
competition. The exception is Transaction Costs Theory (TCT), which also recurs to what we have 
labelled ‘positional market power’, a term that refers to the strategic obtainment and usufruct of a 
particular link with other agents as a result of multilateral strategic choices by all of the agents in a 
competitive context. Nonetheless, positional market power as described by TCT depends on relationship 
lock-in, which is a particular situation of opportunism that cannot account for long-term and sustained 
market power. Moreover, when positional market power as described by TCT is exerted, prices depart 
from their competitive level and, therefore, competition is hindered. This shows that the existing 
competition theories can only conceive competition as antithetical to market power. 
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In Chapters I, III and IV we have shown that, on the contrary, market power can act as a 
coordinator of competition. In order to do so, we have focused on two organizational objects: global 
value chains and TBAC firms. While they differ in terms of competitive dynamics and the nature of the 
firm, there is a source of market power that is common to both: the ability to efficiently coordinate 
competition. We saw (cf. Chapter III) how in global value chains the firms that have more market power 
are those that are more central in the network(-firm). The centrality of a firm within the network-firm, in 
turn, translates how essential the former is to the overall production process carried on by the network-
firm. This gives certain lead firms the capacity to coordinate the process of the network-firm and, as a 
consequence, fully vertical market power to extract more of the value created by the network-firm than 
other participants firms. But, at the same time, being essential to the overall production process also 
means being essential to resist network-firm vs network-firm competition by assuring that the network-
firm can produce at a price similar to that of competing network-firms. As a result, competition between 
network-firms is fierce because some firms exert market power within each network-firm and, 
inversely, market power exists because competition is fierce. 
In Chapter IV, we saw that algorithmic coordination is a source of efficiency that allows TBAC firms to 
conquer winner-takes-all markets. This, in turn, is a source of market power they exert on (some) users of 
the platforms to increase their profits, but also to coordinate competition with other TBAC firms. For 
example, we saw how the efficiency brought about by Uber’s ability to algorithmically coordinate ride-
hailing is making it the leader in most American ride-hailing markets. This, in turn, gave it market power 
it used, on the one hand, to raise the commission it takes from drivers, increasing so its profits. On the 
other hand, it used it to impose work conditions (mainly monetary rewards) to drivers that make Uber 
more attractive for riders than other competing platforms such as Lyft. In that manner, just as in the 
network-firm, in TBAC firms market power coordinates competition, establishing so a synergic 
relationship with it. 
The analysis of the competitive dynamics of these two organizational objects shows that, contrary to what 
all competition theories argue, market power is not necessarily antithetical to competition; it can also be a 
mean of coordinating it and, in doing so, it establishes a synergic relation with it. Understanding this 
synergic relation between competition and market power provides a theoretical explanation for the 
coexistence of the two seemingly incompatible stylized facts that triggered this investigation: long-
run profit rate differentials and strong price competition. It is because market power can 
coordinate competition that we can have strong competition on prices (Uber’s price wars with Lyft, 
network-firms competing strongly on price) and, at the same time, an increasingly uneven 
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distribution of profits between the participants of the value creation process (Uber and drivers, lead 
firms and other firms of the network-firm).  
Conceiving market power as a coordinator of competition implies setting aside visions of the former as an 
obstacle to the latter in favor a vision of positional market power. Nonetheless, contrary to the positional 
market power mechanisms described by TCT, which are all based on relationship lock-in, the positional 
market power mechanisms we have described in the cases of network-firms and TBAC firms can 
conciliate the existence of long-run profit rate differentials and competitive pricing. This is due to the fact 
that, when the positional market power mechanisms we have described take place, they do not annul 
competition, they enable it. In both cases we have an usufruct of a particular link with other agents in a 
competitive context but, while in TCT this usufruct (the exertion of marker power) implies driving away 
from the competitive price, in ours the exertion of market power is the counterpart of market power 
enabling the selling of the final product or service at a competitive price. 
Limitations and future lines of research 
 
This thesis represented a first step towards a theoretical reconsideration of the link between competition 
and market power that departs from the traditional understanding of the two as being antithetical. We 
have just highlighted the main original findings it led to. Nonetheless, our work contains some limitations 
that are worth mentioning in order to bring out future lines of research that we hope we will have set.   
Limitations 
 
In Chapter III we have offered a contribution to a theory of competition and market power between and 
within global value chains that rests on the idea that a firm’s market power within a network-firm depends 
on its centrality relative to other firms’. We showed how this can be theoretically compatible with strong 
competition on prices and we used simple numerical examples to illustrate it. The theory is in accordance 
with existing case studies in the global value chains literature. 
Nevertheless, because of the theoretical focus of this thesis and the difficulty of finding the necessary 
firm-level data, no corroboration of the theory could be made by looking, for a given network-firm, for 
correlations at the firm-level between indicators of relative centrality, on the one side, and profit rates or 
value retained, on the other side. Consequently, the results of Chapter III, although theoretically 
consistent and in line with the findings of the literature that has carried on case studies of global value 
chains, are not empirically robust. 
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In Chapter IV, on the contrary, we had access to (imperfect) data to successfully corroborate our theory 
by doing a case study of Uber. Nevertheless, three important limitations of this corroboration have to be 
kept in mind. First, it is geographically circumscribed to the main United States’ markets. Different 
conclusions could have been made had we had data for other countries. Some characteristics of other 
countries, such as the existence of cultural differences in the way the population uses ride-hailing 
platforms, a different supply of platform and non-platform services or particular regulations regarding 
transportation could alter the conclusions. Second, our empirical study focused on the ride-hailing market. 
Nevertheless, TBAC firms comprise a variety of heterogeneous industries that we have not explored 
empirically such as lodging or personal care. The results we have found might change if we test them in 
other industries. Third, the object of study, TBAC firms, is still rapidly evolving. The tendencies we have 
identified in Chapter IV such as the winner-takes-all dynamic might change as TBAC firms and 
especially their environments evolve. Regarding the two latter limitations, it is worth noting two recent 
major regulatory changes at the European level might affect our conclusions: the European Union’s 
General Data Protection Regulation, which, among other things, will allow for data portability from May 
25th 2018 on, and the recent European Court of Justice’s classification of Uber as a transportation service, 
which might make the regulations that apply to ride-hailing platforms stricter. 
Future lines of research 
 
We can identify three main future lines of research. One follows from the limitations of our work we have 
presented and two are derived from the main original findings of this thesis. 
A wider empirical corroboration of our theories of competition and market power 
 
As said above, the theoretical approach chosen for the thesis, the limitation to a single case study in the 
case of Chapter IV and, in some cases, the lack of data, have left room for a future line of empirical 
research aimed at corroborating our findings to a larger extent. This could lead to nuancing or reinforcing 
our conclusions as well as to refining our theoretical findings. Other possible positive outcomes of this 
research would be the development of new indicators of market power compatible with our notion of 
positional market power in which competition is coordinated by market power. 
 
 
 279 
Consequences for antitrust 
 
In this thesis we have focused on competition theory. Although we have treated antitrust mainly in 
Chapter I while studying the history of forms of competition in the United State, we have not explored the 
consequences of our findings for antitrust.  
Because antitrust is necessarily based on competition theory, and, as we have shown, every competition 
theory conceives the exertion of market power as the annulment or hindering of competition, conceiving 
situations in which market power can coordinate competition (i.e. make it operational) would imply 
rethinking the role and the modes of action of antitrust in those cases. Should antitrust authorities abstain 
from intervention in cases in which vertical market power allows for the coordination of a strong price 
competition that assures consumers low prices? Would this type of market power have harmful 
consequences for innovation in the long-run? If so, would this justify the intervention of antitrust even if 
it implies higher consumer prices in the short-run? Moreover, while studying competitive dynamics 
related to TBAC platforms in Chapter III, we have arrived to two conclusions that would be worth 
developing in future research. The first one is the idea of large enough amounts of data being an essential 
facility. If this is the case, the conditions of application of the essential facility doctrine to data would 
require further investigation. Some important issues to explore in that vein are the definition of which 
actors should have access to which data and on which conditions, the compatibility of the application of 
the essential facility doctrine with other regulations that might apply to data (e.g.: right to privacy) or the 
link with data portability rights that the recent General Data Protection Regulation has granted in the 
European Union. The second one is predatory pricing by TBAC platforms. A proper investigation on the 
existence and the extent of predatory pricing practices by TBAC would require more data and it would be 
interesting to apply it to several markets in which TBAC firms participate. 
A wider study of the relation between competition and market power in the platform economy 
 
Following the two main original findings exposed above, we can see that the ICT revolution and some 
complementary institutional transformations have altered the nature of the link between competition and 
market power by turning it into one in which competition is coordinated by market power, making it 
possible for price competition to prevail in harmony with increasing market power. As the digitalization 
of production and consumption expands, we can only expect this particular nature of the link between 
market power and competition to be reinforced in the organizational objects we have studied (the 
network-firm and TBAC firms) and to expand to other domains. 
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This tendency is particularly relevant for the platform economy of which, as shown in Chapter IV, TBAC 
firms are part. It would be interesting to carry on studies similar to the one we did in that chapter to 
understand which competition and market power dynamics are to be expected in other types of platform-
firms and what regulatory or antitrust answers would be desirable. This would imply a first etiological 
work aimed at characterizing from an evolutionary perspective of the firm other types of platform-firms 
and analyzing the role data plays in terms of (anti)competitive dynamics. In which type of platform-firms 
does the user feedback loop operate? Can we expect data to be an essential facility in all of them? What 
role do multisided markets factors such as switching costs play in other types of platform-firms?  
These interrogations raise the issue of the sustainability of the synergic relation between competition and 
market power in which the latter coordinates the former. If, as we suggested in Chapter IV, markets in 
which TBAC firms participate are winner-takes-all markets, we should expect, in absence of new 
regulation or antitrust remedies, prices to raise and competition to be hindered in the future. Then, 
contrary to what happens in the case of global value chains, the synergic relation between market power 
and competition would be ephemeral. However, the results we found by focusing on TBAC firms cannot 
be extrapolated. We hope the approach we have taken in Chapter IV will set good bases to further explore 
these issues in the rest of the platform economy. 
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Titre de la thèse 
 
Concurrence et pouvoir de marché : une reconsidération critique à la lumière de changements récents 
Résumé 
Les objectifs principaux de cette thèse sont expliquer l’émergence de nouvelles dynamiques 
concurrentielles caractérisées par une symbiose entre concurrence et pouvoir de marché et élucider 
comment elles peuvent être appréhendées sous l’angle de la théorie de la concurrence. Le chapitre I 
investigue l’évolution des formes de la concurrence aux États-Unis de 1840 jusqu’à nos jours. On montre 
qu’alors que dans certains cas le pouvoir de marché s’est traduit par l’entrave à la concurrence (et vice-
versa), dans d’autres les deux établissent une relation symbiotique. Le chapitre II fait une revue des 
théories de la concurrence et conclut qu’elles ne rendent pas compte de la coexistence de deux faits 
stylisés majeurs propres à la forme de concurrence hégémonique actuelle : des différentiels de taux de 
profit de long terme et une forte concurrence par les prix.  
Le chapitre III développe une contribution à la théorie de la concurrence entre et au sein des chaînes 
globales de valeur (CGV). On montre que l’interdépendance inégale est la source du pouvoir de marché 
intra-CGV, ce qui explique les différentiels de taux de profit entre firmes appartenant à une même CGV. 
On montre par la suite comment ils peuvent être compatibles avec une forte concurrence par les prix. Le 
chapitre IV étudie le capitalisme de plateforme en se focalisant sur les « firmes de coordination 
algorithmique basées sur la confiance » (FCABC). En s’appuyant sur le cas de la firme de VTC Uber, on 
argumente que la FCABC conjugue du pouvoir de marché avec une forte concurrence par les prix dans 
une dynamique concurrentielle dans laquelle il y a une tendance à la monopolisation. 
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Competition and market power: a critical reassessment in light of recent changes 
Abstract 
The main objectives of this thesis are to explain the emergence of competitive dynamics characterized by 
a symbiosis between competition and market power and to elucidate how they can be apprehended 
through the lenses of competition theory. Chapter I investigates the evolution of forms of competition in 
the United States from 1840 to today. We show that while in some cases market power has translated into 
hindering competition (and vice versa), in others the two establish a symbiotic relation. Chapter II 
reviews competition theories and concludes that they do not account for the coexistence of two major 
stylized facts characteristic of the current hegemonic form of competition: long-run profit rate 
differentials and strong price competition. Chapter III develops a contribution to competition theory 
within and between global value chains (GVC). We show that uneven interdependence is the source of 
intra-GVC market power, which explains long-run profit rate differentials between firms belonging to the 
same GVC. Then we show how they can be compatible with strong price competition. Chapter IV 
studies platform capitalism with a focus on “trust-based algorithmic coordination” (TBAC) firms. 
Building on the case of the ride-hailing firm Uber, we argue that the TBAC firm conjugates vertical 
market power with strong price competition in a competitive dynamics in which there is a tendency 
towards monopolization. 
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